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Abstract 
This thesis identifies and analyses what it terms the doctrine of transcontinentalism, a 
geopolitical and technological vision for the projection and territorialisation of state 
power across continental space between c. 1880 and 1930. At this time many 
transcontinental railways were either fully or partly constructed across the American, 
Asian, and African continents. Transcontinentalism was a doctrine based upon the 
recursive relationship that developed between civilised and naturalised geopolitical 
imaginations of space and the spread of railway technology in the late nineteenth 
century. The thesis argues that the construction of transcontinental railways should be 
conceptualised in terms of the extension and territorialisation of state power and 
civilisation across continental space in an increasingly closed world political map, where 
European states were imagined as the pinnacle of civilisational development while 
nonetheless existing in constant, naturalised competition with one another. The 
entwining of this naturalised geopolitical imagination with a notion of railways as 
circulatory systems enabling the movement of labour and resources across space 
produced the imperative to insert railway systems into the supposedly inert, lifeless, and 
unconscious expanses of non-European continental space, reawakening and revitalising 
the continents and connecting them to wider global circulations. Concomitantly, this 
was variously equated to the ascension of whichever state could construct 
transcontinental railways to the status of global hegemon. After detailing the historical 
and conceptual roots of transcontinentalism in Part One, Parts Two and Three of the 
thesis conduct empirical analyses, based on extensive archival research in Britain, into 
the Baghdad and Cape-Cairo Railways. In doing so the thesis demonstrates the 
development of transcontinentalism in two British examples, while drawing out the 
wider contributions to the fields of critical geopolitics, British diplomatic and imperial 
history, and wider histories of the expansion of imperial powers across continental 
space.    
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Institute of British Geographers and The Geographical Journal. All published sources are 
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exception to this is Leo Weinthal’s The story of the Cape to Cairo railway & river route 
from 1887 to 1922, five volumes, which for convenience has been cited in footnotes 
under the abbreviation SCCR followed by I, II, III, IV, or V to indicate volume.  
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under consideration to the time of writing. When a place name has been quoted I have 
retained the usage that was originally utilised, while in my own prose I have used 
modern renderings. For example, in Chapter Four I render the common late nineteenth 
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Chapter One – Introduction  
1.1. ‘An uncontrollable passion to bring together the uttermost ends of a continent’ 
“A generation ago steam and the Suez canal appeared to have increased the 
mobility of sea-power relatively to land-power. Railways acted chiefly as feeders 
to ocean-going commerce. But trans-continental railways are now transmuting 
the conditions of land-power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the 
closed heart-land of Euro- Asia, in vast areas of which neither timber nor 
accessible stone was available for road-making” (Mackinder, 1904: 434).  
 At first glance, opening a thesis that analyses the relationship between 
geopolitics and transcontinental railways with this quote might seem like a bit of an 
unimaginative choice. These words, spoken in January 1904 by the man many consider 
to be the founding father of geopolitics, Halford Mackinder, are some of the most 
frequently cited from the considerable catalogue of soundbites bestowed upon us by 
the classical canon of geopolitical theorists. Yet it is my contention in this thesis that the 
emphasis on this particular soundbite has obscured the wider connections that can be 
traced between geopolitics and transcontinental railways between c. 1880 and 1930. 
Mackinder was not the only one to discuss the rapid impact of transcontinental railway 
technology on the international political system. For instance, in 1912 the geographer 
and African administrator Harry Hamilton Johnston (1912: 558) noted that  
 "[s]everal railway projects of importance have recently been placed before the public for 
 consideration in England, France, Germany, and Russia, projects which are intended to 
 attain two chief purposes: unbroken railway communication (1) between Calais and 
 India, and (2) between Capetown and the Mediterranean. The construction of these 
 great trunk lines for the last ten years has depended less on the amount of money 
 they would cost than on the assuagement of international jealousies, rivalries, and 
 fears. If these last could be allayed by some happy solvent of the ambitions of the four 
 greatest Powers in the Old World - Britain, France, Austro-Germany, and Russia - 
 not many years would elapse before we might be able to travel from London to 
 Capetown, or London to the chief cities of India, with no more sea passage involved 
 than the crossing from Dover to Calais, from Tarifa to Tangier, or Constantinople to 
 Scutari." 
 Johnston was speaking not of the Trans-Siberian Railway across Russia like 
Mackinder was, but rather two other transcontinental routes – the first between Europe 
and India, which at the time he was writing was being constructed jointly by Germany 
and the Ottoman Empire. The second he mentioned was the Cape-Cairo Railway, which 
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in 1912 was creeping slowly through the Belgian Congo in Central Africa under the 
auspices of the engineer and capitalist Robert Williams. Evidently Johnston considered 
both railways a universal good; projects that would increase the intercourse and cross-
fertilisation of human ideas, commodities, and peoples. Yet as he rightly recognised, 
both were embroiled in the deep geopolitical contestations of the Great Powers, the 
‘assuagement of international jealousies, rivalries, and fears’ that characterised the 
years leading up to the First World War. If these rivalries could be put aside, Johnston 
believed, a ‘happy solvent’ applied to them, both railways could be completed and the 
traveller could move between continents as quickly and comfortably as they could move 
between proximate cities.  
 Yet it was not only among servants of the British Empire that such fantasies 
abounded. As Mackinder (e.g. [1911] 1921: 197-203; 1912: 258-259) knew well, by the 
turn of the twentieth century railways had been completed across the North American 
continent in both the United States and Canada. Here too, the construction of 
transcontinental railways was seen as an extraordinary thing. Decades earlier, during the 
construction of the transcontinental Pacific Railroad in the US, a local magazine in 
Denver had apparently “spoke[n] for nearly all of America” when it declared that “[t]he 
one moral, the one remedy for every evil, social, political, financial, and industrial, the 
one immediate vital need of the entire Republic, is the Pacific Railroad” (quoted in 
Ambrose, 2002: 144). Here the Pacific Railroad represented the unrolling of the 
blossoming American state westwards, orientating it away from Europe and towards its 
own unique future on the west coast of the continent and beyond (Cumings, 2009: 109). 
When completed it would apparently negate all of the evils – social, political, financial, 
and industrial – faced by the American state.  
 In 1890 a Colorado governor called William Gilpin (1890: iii) took this to its most 
eccentric length when he proposed a plan for a ‘Cosmopolitan Railway’, which “should 
not only traverse the [North American] continent from sea to sea, but should continue 
its course north and west across the strait of Bering; and across Siberia, to connect with 
the railways of Europe, and of all the world.” For the progress of humankind, Gilpin 
(1890: 108) reasoned, the railway “ha[d] become almost as much a necessity as is the 
circulation of the blood to the individual.” He confidently predicted it would “obliterate 
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race distinctions”, “discourage war”, and “bring about a universal brotherhood of man” 
(Gilpin, 1890: 48). It would enable “a wider intercourse of human ideas,” open up “new 
agricultural regions, coal-fields, mines, and manufacturing sites”, and facilitate the 
emergence of a “world currency, world weights and measures, and [a] world language 
and literature” (Gilpin, 1890: 56). Its ultimate outcome would be nothing less than 
“intellectual elevation, material development, and a higher scale of civilisation” (Gilpin, 
1890: 48). And if these benefits were not enough, Gilpin (1890: 45) believed that the 
project harboured “no serious obstacles […] from an engineering point of view”. “The 
more I investigated,” he wrote, “the more practicable the plan appeared, until the 
certainty of its consummation at no far distant day became with me a settled 
conviction” (Gilpin, 1890: iii).  
 Meanwhile, across the Bering Straits, the Trans-Siberian Railway that so troubled 
Mackinder in 1904 was simultaneously being talked up as the cure for the various ills of 
Russia.  In 1881 the famed Russian essayist and philosopher Feodor Dostoevsky (quoted 
in Hauner, 2013: 1) contemplated the necessity of the “future seizure of Asia” by the 
Russian state. In a block of text that would have chilled the blood of Mackinder, he 
argued that Russia’s “coming destiny” could only be achieved in Asia:  
 “In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas to Asia we shall go as masters. In 
 Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. Our civilising mission 
 in Asia will bribe our spirit and drive us thither. It is only necessary that the 
 movement should start. Build two railroads: begin with the one to Siberia, and then 
 to Central Asia, and at once you will see the consequences.” (quoted in Hauner, 
 2013: 1).   
 The nature of these statements by Dostoevsky, Gilpin, Johnston, and Mackinder 
lead one to agree with the shrewd observation of the one-time Russian finance attaché 
in Berlin Herr Adolf Rothstein. In 1898, the British investigative journalist W.T. Stead 
(1899: 363) had travelled to St. Petersburg, and, reflecting upon a chance meeting he 
had with Rothstein, wrote that he was “hardly prepared for the philosophical 
observation which fell from his lips on the subject of the great transcontinental line 
which Russia is building across northern Asia." This shrewd observation went as follows: 
"This railway, [...] like many others of the same nature, is being built under the 
compulsion of an impulse or instinct which it is impossible to justify on financial, 
political, or military grounds. The sacrifices which their construction entails will never be 
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repaid, at least, to the men who make them. From a financial point of view I could name 
a score of other methods of investing money within the Empire that would pay 
handsomely, pay far better than this transcontinental railway can ever hope to do. But 
nations appear to be sometimes possessed by an uncontrollable passion to bring 
together the uttermost ends of a continent, quite irrespective of rational motives. It is a 
kind of demon which drives them: and I can only suppose that the impulsion is intended 
to promote the general good of mankind" (quoted in Stead, 1899: 363-364).  
 This thesis aims to explain what Rothstein called “the uncontrollable passion to 
bring together the uttermost ends of a continent, quite irrespective of rational motives.” 
To do so the thesis introduces a new and original conceptualisation of the relationship 
between transcontinental railways and geopolitics which it terms transcontinentalism. 
This is not a new word, but the term itself has, with one exception discussed below, 
never been formalised, theorised, or discussed in any detail or depth. This thesis 
proposes transcontinentalism as a way of understanding the construction of 
transcontinental railways across the world’s continental landmasses. It proposes that 
transcontinentalism can be used as a framework for making sense of transcontinental 
railway construction, what it meant, what it was believed to accomplish, and why it 
grasped the attention of so many between c. 1880 and 1930. To do this, the thesis 
focuses on two empirical examples: the German/Ottoman Baghdad Railway and the 
British Cape-Cairo Railway. It examines both railways from a British perspective, utilising 
archival research methods to do so.  
 The remainder of this introduction does four things. Firstly, it defines and 
explains what is meant by the term transcontinentalism, and discusses its emergence in 
the nineteenth century. Secondly, it shows how transcontinentalism contributes to three 
different fields of academic study. Thirdly, it discusses the archival methods used in 
Parts Two and Three of the thesis. Finally, it gives a breakdown of the thesis structure in 
its entirety. 
1.2. Transcontinentalism 
 Transcontinentalism is defined in this thesis as a geopolitical and technological 
doctrine with three interconnected components; 1) the projection and territorialisation of 
state power across continental space, 2) the spread of civilisation across continental 
space, and 3) the extension, reproduction, and transformation of the state and its spaces 
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of circulation across continental space; through the construction of transcontinental 
railways. As this definition reveals, it was a doctrine that embodied three essential 
features, all of which I will fully explain and substantiate in Chapter Two. Firstly, it 
embodied the projection and territorialisation of state power (Williams, 2005; 2010) 
across continental space through the construction of transcontinental railways, and the 
concomitant shifting of the global balance of power away from the sea-power of the 
British Empire towards the land-power of Germany, Russia, and the US. Secondly, it 
embodied the related geopolitical fantasy of the European and American civilising 
missions (Agnew, 2003: 86-93; Duara, 2001; 2004; Gong, 1984; Robertson, 2006), and 
was a doctrine that denoted the spread of civilisation across entire continental 
landmasses that were overwhelmingly imagined as desolate, empty, and uncivilised 
spaces. Thirdly, it was a doctrine conceptualising states as organisms struggling for 
survival in an increasingly closed and colonised world (Agnew, 2003: 93-101; Murphy, 
1997; Wolkersdorfer, 1999). Transcontinentalism consequently signified the extension, 
reproduction, and transformation of the biological state across continental space, 
enabled by an implicit imaginary of railways as extensions of the circulatory apparatus 
that increasingly sustained the ‘life’ of the state (Kapp, 1877). Non-European continental 
space was concurrently imagined as dormant, unconscious, and slumbering, and thus 
requiring railway technology to be brought back to corporeal, breathing, life. The 
concept of circulation is crucial to this, holding together biological and naturalised 
understandings of the state and of railway technology (Kapp, 1877; Schivelbusch, 1986). 
Transcontinentalism was therefore equated to the production of transcontinental 
spaces of circulation, enabling the movement of natural resources, manufactured goods, 
other objects, and people across continental space and connecting them for the first 
time with wider global and transnational economies and flows. This was, in turn, 
equated to the invigoration of continental landmasses out of their state of pure nature, 
lifting them for the first time into the modern, civilised world. 
 Transcontinentalism emerged from the entwining of geopolitical and 
technological discourses in the mid-nineteenth century. Geopolitically, 
transcontinentalism was connected to what Agnew (2003: 2-7) has termed the modern 
geopolitical imagination, a spatial ontology that developed at the beginning of the 
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nineteenth century in civilisational and later naturalised geopolitical modes. The modern 
geopolitical imagination was defined by Cartesian Perspectivalism, or the belief that the 
world could be examined and classified by an objective observer; the turning of time 
into space, whereby Europe was imagined as atop a ‘stream of Time’ with the rest of the 
world further downstream and striving to ‘catch up’; and by a broadly realist view of 
international relations whereby states were assumed to exist in an ungoverned 
anarchical system, exercising their power over blocks of space and increasingly falling 
into fricticious conflict at the margins of their respective empires (Agnew, 2003). 
Transcontinentalism emerged from this as a way of enabling the rest of the world to 
‘catch up’ through the diffusion of civilisation across the world, and as a way of 
maximising and securing the status of one state to the detriment of others through the 
political and economic benefits that would accrue through the domination of entire 
continental landmasses.  
 Technologically, transcontinentalism was inseparable from the advent and 
spread of railway technology from the 1820s. By the 1880s, railway technology was 
imagined as having two inherent characteristics – it was firstly a means through which 
state power was projected across space and secondly how civilisation was diffused into 
the backwards, uncivilised expanses of the world. By the beginning of the First World 
War it had accrued a third, as a natural, biological extension and augmentation of the 
state, both inside and outside territorial boundaries. I argue that this little noted but 
important understanding of railway technology entwined with the naturalised 
geopolitics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to give 
transcontinentalism its most salient feature. The era of naturalised geopolitics was 
defined by an imagination of the state as a living, breathing biological organism, 
requiring a specific amalgamation of land, people, and resources to persist in a world 
where the survival of the fittest had become the implicit norm in international relations 
(Wolkersdorfer, 1999). The biologisation of geopolitical and technological discourse thus 
folded together, producing transcontinental railways as the ‘spine’, ‘backbone’, or ‘trunk 
line’ that would fuse together transcontinental landmasses under the flag of one 
particular state, thus ensuring that a state had all the necessary resources, peoples, and 
land to survive. I conceptualise this in terms of circulation (Schivelbusch, 1986), with the 
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transcontinental empire a great body and the railway securing and directing the 
continual flow of people, resources, and other objects that ensured the continuing 
welfare and prosperity of that empire. In an era of relative ascent and decline, this was 
inevitably associated with the ascension (or maintenance) of one European power to the 
status of global hegemony, to the detriment and decline of the others. 
 Finally, my use of the word ‘doctrine’ in describing transcontinentalism is 
deliberate. I prefer this word to other candidates such as theory, ideology, idea, or 
philosophy for a reason connected to Rothstein’s bewilderment at the demon driving 
the construction of transcontinental railways. Namely, the imagined benefits a 
transcontinental railway would bring upon completion were entirely divorced from any 
material function it could conceivably perform, a point stressed most emphatically by 
Den Otter (1997) in his study of the American Pacific Railroad. This was a product of the 
well-noted nineteenth century faith in the powers of modern technology; what 
Lehmann (2016: 98; see also Müller and Tworek, 2016) refers to as the “limitless belief 
in the capacity of technology to solve all social, political, and environmental problems.” 
For example, for the geographer Alderman Isaac Bowes (1899: 193), the triumph and 
possibilities enabled by transportation technologies were found in their “overcoming 
[of] the natural barriers that separate man from man and [in] promoting the kind of 
intercourse which is so beneficial to all the best interests of mankind.” Yet the 
construction of transcontinental railways, as some of the protagonists in this thesis 
painfully learned, were often prevented by a range of strategic, financial, and political 
obstacles. The use of the word doctrine, with its connotations of theological and 
religious faith and belief, is therefore explicitly utilised to gesture towards this aspect of 
transcontinentalism. The two railways studied in this thesis were not completed as 
planned, and both were left abandoned immediately after the First World War. Efforts 
to complete them thus relied more on the faith-like belief that “in light of the past (and 
current) state of technological development and the laws of nature, there [was] only 
one possible future cause of social change” (Bimber, 1994: 83). My stating of 
transcontinentalism as a doctrine is deliberately intended to reflect this.  
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1.3. Contributions to knowledge        
 In identifying, explaining, and analysing the doctrine of transcontinentalism, this 
thesis contributes more widely to three different fields of academic study. First and 
foremost, this thesis is a contribution to the field of critical geopolitics. As Chapter Two 
will explain fully, critical geopolitics emerged in the late 1980s as a reaction to the 
appropriation of classical geopolitics by Cold War strategists and the bipolar balance of 
international power between the US and the USSR. It has since flourished as a vibrant 
and eclectic field of study, defined primarily by its theoretical, conceptual, and 
methodological plurality and loose concern for the spatialisation of politics. However, 
critical geopolitics has been neglectful of the place of technology in histories of 
geopolitical thought, and in the ways geopolitical space is divided, ordered, and 
experienced at a number of different scales. This is an argument that I develop in 
Chapter Two, and transcontinentalism – with its entwined geopolitical and technological 
foundations – is consequently a contribution to what Butler (2001) first called 
technogeopolitics, a branch of critical geopolitics that  
“calls upon geopolitical thinkers to reconsider the place of technology within geopolitics 
and to critique the agency within technology to shape and be shaped by geopolitics 
rather than seeing technologies as the outcomes of geopolitical positioning” (Williams, 
2007: 508).    
In foregrounding the place of technology in geopolitical thought and practice, the thesis 
aims to contribute to a gradually growing offshoot of critical geopolitics that emphasises 
“the roles of global geopolitics in identifying regions and resources suitable for programs 
of technological intervention” (Sneddon and Fox, 2011: 452). My analysis of the 
relationship between railways and geopolitics is a pertinent one, given that 
technogeopolitical analyses have been conducted into technologies such as aviation 
(Williams, 2005; 2007; 2010; 2011; 2013), aircraft carriers (Williams, 2017), river dams 
(Sneddon and Fox, 2011; 2012; Sneddon, 2012), radio (Pinkerton, 2008; Pinkerton and 
Dodds, 2008; Weir, 2014), geoengineering (Dalby, 2015), and spacefaring technologies 
(Duvall and Havercroft, 2008), but not railways. It is also pertinent because wider studies 
on the relationship between technology and geopolitics, most prominently those by 
Hugill (1995; 1999), do not help us bridge the gap between technology and critical 
geopolitics, as I will argue in Chapter Two.  
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 Secondly, the thesis is a contribution to, and a partial generalisation of, the work 
of historians into the continental expansion of imperial states in the mid-late nineteenth 
century, particularly Britain, Germany, Russia, the US, and Canada. The doctrine of 
transcontinentalism as I define it relates to and partially subsumes different ideas 
concerning the expansion of these states, specifically accounts of American 
‘continentalism’ (Ambrose, 2002; Bain, 2000; Cumings, 2009; den Otter, 1997; Vevier, 
1960), Russian ‘Eurasianism’ (Bassin, 1999; Hauner, 2013), Germany’s ‘Drang nach 
Osten’ (McMurray, 2001; McMeekin, 2011), and Britain’s Cape-Cairo ‘idea’ or 
‘imaginary’ (Merrington, 2001; 2002; Raphael, 1936). For example, Vevier (1960) first 
used the word ‘continentalism’ to refer to America’s westward colonisation and 
expansion under the banner of ‘Manifest Destiny’ in the nineteenth century, and more 
recently others have directly related this expansion to the construction of the Pacific 
Railroad (Bain, 2000; Cumings, 2009; 108-110). In these accounts, America’s blossoming 
civilisation is conceptualised as riding in the carriages of the Pacific Railroad, unfolding 
the American nation across space as it did so. In a 2010 PhD thesis, Eigen uses the word 
transcontinentalism to refer to a similar process, the creation of the US and Canada as 
‘transcontinental nations’. As she puts it, “the transcontinental national form was not 
only geographically determined, but was also fuelled by the nationalistic desire for 
territorial expansion and international influence that could be gained by settling lands 
on the Pacific Coast” (Eigen, 2010: 1). However, she only obliquely relates this 
conceptualisation to the Pacific Railroad (Eigen, 2010: 73-80) and does not connect it to 
geopolitics at all.  
 In a different example, Bassin (1999) has analysed how Russia’s desire for 
eastward expansion reflected a similar but nationally, culturally, and politically specific 
form, portraying Russia as a state whose grand destiny could only be achieved through 
the territorialisation of Russian power from the furthest north-west of Murmansk to the 
eastern tip of Vladivostok. However, although he occasionally weaves railways and 
specifically the Trans-Siberian Railway through his account, it is not the primary object of 
his study and is therefore not foregrounded in his analysis. The works of Bassin (1999) 
and Eigen (2010), along with McMeekin’s (2011) account of Germany’s expansion 
towards the Ottoman Empire and Raphael’s (1936) detailed analysis of British Cape-
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Cairo imperialism, share this basic limitation – they marginalise the role of the railway in 
the stories that they tell. Herwig’s (2012: 190) comment on McMeekin (2011) is in other 
words broadly relatable to other examples:  
 “[w]ith the exception of, at best, two chapters, it has little to do with the Berlin-Baghdad 
 [Railway], using the ‘railroad to nowhere’ mainly as a backdrop for ‘Hajji’ Wilhelm II’s ‘
 Great Game’ to unseat British and French power in the Middle East and beyond” 
 A prominent exception to this trend is Meinig’s grand history of America, where 
he narrates from an explicitly geographical and geopolitical perspective the 
development of America from its eastern, ‘Atlantic’ settler origins to the continental and 
then transcontinental power it became in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In the second of these volumes, Meinig (1993: 158-164) pinpoints the 1840s as the 
decade that witnessed the end of a specifically Atlantic geopolitical imagination, one 
that believed the Union of individual states must shatter if stretched between the 
Atlantic and Pacific coasts. In its place came an imagination of an America which 
“spanned the continent” (Meinig, 1993: 159). Furthermore, and most importantly, 
Meinig (1993: 163) highlights the beginning of plans to construct some kind of 
transcontinental railway in December 1844 as a pivotal moment in this transformation, 
simply because it shaped a wider, and explicitly geopolitical, vision “that neither the 
Continental Divide1 nor any other massive physical feature would interfere with the 
reality of a transcontinental state.” Put differently, Meinig (1993) acknowledges the 
centrality of railway technology in the shaping of a geopolitical vision of westward 
transcontinental expansion, a vision that he subsequently argues American statesman 
began to make a reality from 1850 onwards.  
 It is in the following, third volume that Meinig (1998) articulates how exactly the 
transcontinental railway was envisioned to do this. Firstly, it was to be a national trunk 
line, “the essential ‘chain of union’ ensuring ‘the integrity’ of the whole” (Meinig, 1998: 
6). This integrity was imagined to be twofold; the securing of the west coast of the 
United States against potential attack from the British or Spanish navies through the 
                                                     
1
 The Continental Divide describes an imaginative longitudinal line cleaving North and South America into 
two. All precipitation falling west of the line flows into the Pacific Ocean, while all precipitation falling east 
of the line flows into the Atlantic.   
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streamlining and quickening of communication, government, and administration, and 
the bonding together of all the peoples of America into a coherent society or nation. 
Secondly, Meining (1998: 6) shows how all advocates of the transcontinental railway 
stressed its power as a developmental project. Quoting a United States Congressman, he 
narrates how  
 “[w]hereas the ‘law of nature’ kept population and the commercial economy bound to  
 the riverbanks, ‘the railroad operates as the river did in olden time...The railroad is the 
 river produced by modern science [...] From this great stream rivulets will flow, so 
 that...American civilization will spring up, and the land will teem with life’” (Meinig, 
 1998: 6).  
The railway, in other words, would revolutionise the formerly arid unproductive spaces 
of ‘the plains’, encouraging the construction of workshops, the working of mines, and 
the extension of arable land (Meinig, 1998: 158-159). Thirdly and finally, Meinig stresses 
how the railway was imagined as a national symbol of American character and 
supremacy. Quoting a different Congressman, he shows how it was “’necessary to the 
highest destiny of the [American] nation,’ it would ‘elevate our national pride, stimulate 
our national energies and consolidate our national character’” (Meinig, 1998: 8). 
Although he goes into great detail over the different proposed routes the railway could 
have taken (Meinig, 1998: 8-28), Meinig’s point is that regardless of where it was to 
actually run, when completed the railway would accomplish the extension and 
consolidation of the American state into a virtuous, integrated geopolitical state entity. 
It was the railway alone, in other words, that produced what some Americans referred 
to as the “magnificent parallelogram” of the American state (Meinig, 1998: 28).   
 At the end of this book, the timeline having finally reached 1914 and the 
beginning of the First World War, Meinig (1998: 391-393) contrasts this transcontinental 
vision with that of Mackinder. The distinction he draws is that, for Mackinder, the 
construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway had global consequences; it could inaugurate 
the rise of a power that could dominate the entire world. For most Americans, Meinig 
suggests, the Pacific Railroad was imagined solely in transcontinental or hemispheric 
terms – it was to enable the domination and territorialisation of a continent, but without 
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the wider planetary consequences that so concerned Mackinder. The analysis offered 
throughout this thesis is in kind with Meinig’s, but I will argue throughout that 
transcontinentalism can act as a new lens that can deepen our understanding of the 
continental territorial expansion not only of Germany and Britain, but of America and 
other imperial powers between c. 1870 and 1930. This is because it foregrounds a new 
conceptualisation of transcontinentalism as jointly geopolitical and technological in a 
way that has not been done before, and could fruitfully be related to examples outside 
of the British involvement with the Baghdad and Cape-Cairo Railways.      
 Finally, this thesis is a contribution to British imperial, geopolitical, and 
diplomatic history. When related to the doctrine of transcontinentalism, I argue 
throughout this thesis that new light is thrown on several important aspects of British 
history, some of which have been fiercely debated by historians in the past few decades. 
To take but three examples, Part Three of this thesis can be seen as the first critical 
history of the envisaging, planning, and construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway. For a 
railway that has been much mythologised, the alliterative allure of the term ‘Cape-Cairo’ 
producing a range of cultural and colonial tropes, there has been no attempt to properly 
examine the construction of the railway and place it within its proper colonial, 
geopolitical, and imperial context. Some scattered considerations of it exist, and the one 
book that does profess to analyse the story of the railway is deeply problematic, as I will 
outline in the next section. This thesis thus contributes to the history of a 
transcontinental railway that is paradoxically well-known yet little understood. A second 
example is the history of Britain’s diplomatic reaction to the Baghdad Railway, which has 
been the subject of numerous yet now quite outdated diplomatic histories. Placed in the 
perspective of transcontinentalism, new light is thrown on this history, placing it in 
longer historical perspective and relating it to Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism in Africa. 
A final example is Cecil Rhodes, who remains a figure of great ire for historians of British 
imperialism in Africa. My perspective on Rhodes, developed in Chapters Six and Seven, 
provides an alternative way of understanding his life, his ideas, and some of the 
contradictions about him that have provoked debate among historians in recent years.  
 This thesis consequently straddles several different fields of inquiry and draws on 
literatures from a range of disciplines and currents of thought. It contributes to debates 
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in geography and history, broadly defined. The next section explains and justifies the 
methods used to research the Baghdad and Cape-Cairo Railways, and details how this 
project changed from its initial conception.  
1.4. Methods and methodological considerations 
 “[I]n the writing of historical geography there is no such thing as success, only degrees of 
 unsuccess.” (Darby, 1960: 155) 
 In writing this thesis, I have reflected much on Darby’s words concerning the 
unsuccess of historical geographical work. This is because this thesis has changed 
profoundly from its original conception – as most do, but not for the reasons most do. In 
the original proposal that I submitted to the ESRC in early 2013, I sketched out a plan for 
a bilingual study of the Baghdad Railway using both British and German sources based 
on Butler (2001) and Williams’ (2005) concept of technogeopolitics. My initial impetus 
for this was threefold. Firstly, on an analytical level I believed that a detailed bilingual 
study of the Baghdad Railway would be the most appropriate for analysing the 
geopolitical rivalry between Britain and Germany over the railway. Secondly, I harboured 
the acorn of an ambition to potentially undertake future work on German geopolitical 
thought, for which my experience in Germany and language training would be 
invaluable. Thirdly, I was taken by Sauer’s (and Leighly, 1963: 401) adage that “[a] 
monolingual Ph.D. is a contradiction of terms”, and that “[c]omplacency as to our own 
language means the exclusion of a great, probably the greater, part of what has been 
well learned and well thought about.” Consequently, I decided I would undertake 
archival research in Britain and Germany, investigating how the railway was envisioned 
as a means of projecting German power across space in both countries.  
 Archival methods are indispensable for any geographical project whose subjects 
of research are no longer alive, principally because other methods such as interviews, 
focus groups, oral histories, or questionnaires are evidently impossible to undertake. 
Archival research in geography is therefore based on the premise that organisations and 
persons leave evidence of their activities behind – usually as text but also in the form of 
photographs (Rose, 2000), objects (DeSilvey 2006), maps (Holdsworth, 2003), and so 
forth – and that these traces come to be stored in such a way that they are accessible to 
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researchers in the present. Of course, the practices of collection and storage that 
determine the contents and organisation of archival repositories are distinctly inexact 
and conditioned along national, political, cultural, and institutional axes (Craggs, 2008; 
Lester, 2006; Mills, 2013; Moore, 2010). Consequently, these practices and the resultant 
archives they continually assemble are always partial and limited; unwittingly silencing 
some voices while accentuating others. No archive contains a complete record of a 
person, government, or organisation, and “[e]ven a collection that may be a complete 
‘set’ chronologically is still essentially one version of the past” (Mills, 2013: 703). 
Archives are never apolitical storehouses of documents that the researcher enters and 
extracts objective knowledge from; they instead embody “the power of the present to 
control what is, and will be, known about the past” (Schwartz and Cook, 2002: 3). 
However, at its simplest, “in any given archive informed searches of sources are 
undertaken and, as a result, data about the past is uncovered” (Lorimer, 2009: 250). 
Such searches are typically guided by the research topic, timeframe, aims, and 
questions; the conceptual and theoretical position of the researcher; and through 
engagements with secondary literatures to determine what has already been written 
about the particular period or place at hand (Baker, 1997: 234; Harris, 2001). 
 Between September and December 2014 I undertook archival research at the 
National Archives (TNA), British Library (BL), and Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in 
London. These archives were chosen to enable a wide range of practical, formal, and 
popular geopolitical data to be collected.2 TNA and BL hold the papers of the British and 
Indian Governments respectively on the Baghdad Railway, while the BL’s status as a legal 
deposit library enabled access to a diverse ensemble of historical documents such as 
maps, newspapers, books, and magazines. At the RGS I accessed the papers of the 
railway engineer R.I. Money. Together, these sources enabled a wide range of data to be 
collected on the diverse responses by British actors to the construction of the Baghdad 
Railway. For the German side, I planned to travel to Berlin for an intensive language 
course between January and May 2015, before spending the rest of 2015 undertaking 
archival research at archives in Berlin, Munich, and Koblenz. However, in London I 
developed severe health problems, which ultimately resulted, in conversation with 
                                                     
2
 See Chapter Two, Section 2.2.1. for the definitions of practical, formal, and popular geopolitics.  
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family, supervisors, and doctors, in the postponement of the German half of my thesis. 
As a result of these problems I took a two-month interruption of studies between 
January and March 2015. Upon my return a decision was jointly taken that the German 
leg of my doctorate would be cancelled completely, which left me with inadequate 
empirical material to fulfil the requirements of a thesis. I consequently decided to 
choose a second transcontinental railway as a comparative example to the Baghdad 
Railway.  
 I chose the Cape-Cairo Railway as the most appropriate replacement for four 
reasons. Firstly, like the Baghdad Railway it was never completed as intended. Although 
a railway finally trundled into Baghdad in 1941 to minimal fanfare, the Cape-Cairo 
Railway still stands uncompleted today. Because of this, both cases were judged to be 
pertinent to compare. As Heffernan (2011: 618) writes with regards to the Trans-
Saharan Railway,  
“unrealized engineering projects are in many respects more revealing and important 
than projects conceived, executed, and successfully implemented with minimum fuss. 
Unsuccessful initiatives, especially controversial and long-running ones, tend to leave an 
archival legacy that is more complex and extensive than realised projects. Failures allow 
the historian to chart the limits of our faith in science and technology.” 
Secondly, like the Baghdad Railway, the Cape-Cairo Railway was a project largely devised 
within the epistemological networks of European geopolitics, and which transverses 
what was imagined as fundamentally non-European continental space. This meant that 
both railways were relatable to the modern geopolitical imagination espoused by Agnew 
(2003), and able to be placed within broader experiences of European geopolitics. 
Thirdly, as mentioned in the previous section I quickly realised that the Cape-Cairo 
Railway has been oft mythologised but very rarely analysed critically. The book 
described by Wolmar (2009: 336) as the sole attempt “to give coherence to the highly 
complex story of the Cape to Cairo” is an exercise in the Orientalisation and 
infantalisation of Africa at its worst, brashly stating on the first page that  
 “to those who have never visited Africa and whose knowledge is gleamed entirely 
 from the half-baked articles and programmes put out by people suffering from Post 
 Colonial Guilt, with the simplistic notion that everything Black was good and everything 
 White was wicked, then this book may be an irritation [...] [Britain] ensured that scores 
 of antagonistic races, tribes and religions lived in peace and harmony, with 
 minimum control” (Tabor, 2003: iii).  
16 
 
Moreover, on reading Tabor’s book it becomes clear that it is not really about the Cape-
Cairo Railway at all, but rather about the various peculiarities (to the Westerner, at 
least) that following its route into the ‘heart’ of Africa supposedly reveals. Because of 
this and the lack of adequate citations throughout his work, Tabor’s (2003) history of the 
Cape-Cairo Railway must be discounted as unreliable. My point is that bringing the Cape-
Cairo Railway into my thesis offered an opportunity to contribute to an element of 
British history that is paradoxically well-known yet little-understood. Fourthly and 
finally, the fact the Cape-Cairo Railway was predominantly associated with Britain made 
the task of archival research more achievable within the limits I had.  
 However, on searching for relevant archival materials I quickly became cognisant 
of Merrington’s (2002: 155) observation that “[i]t is difficult to trace any literature on 
the topic of the ‘Cape-to-Cairo’ idea that is not strictly first-hand travel narratives”, and 
in particular its salience to the Cape-Cairo Railway. The railway was never explicitly 
discussed by the Colonial Office or the British Government (Raphael, 1936). This is 
indicative of the difference between Britain and Germany’s approach to foreign 
infrastructural investment. While Germany’s Deutsche Bank guaranteed and helped to 
fund the Baghdad Railway, it was the caution and conservativeness of the British 
Government that stopped British financiers getting involved in the Euphrates Valley 
Railway in the nineteenth century and the Baghdad Railway in 1903, and which denied 
Cecil Rhodes a guarantee for his continuation of the Cape-Cairo Railway in 1899. This 
necessitated a different approach to the Cape-Cairo Railway. The numerous travel 
narratives mentioned by Merrington were deemed unsuitable for comparison with the 
data I had collected on the Baghdad Railway, given their vastly different genre. As a 
result, I opted for a different approach, what historical geographers and historians have 
referred to as a structural biography of the figure that did more than anyone to attempt 
to construct the Cape-Cairo Railway, Cecil John Rhodes. 
 At its simplest, structural biography is an approach that uses individual lives as 
“windows onto the complicated trends, events, [and] crises of their time, providing an 
entry point for a deeper understanding of a particular historical era” (Kent, 2015: 2). It 
has become popular in historical geography as a way of comprehending and 
complicating the intersection of core historical and geographical themes and processes 
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(Hodder, 2017a). Smith (2003), for example, used the life and work of the geographer 
Isaiah Bowman to examine the geographical vision at the heart of the development of 
America’s globalised economic empire in the twentieth century, and Forsyth (2016a; 
2016b) has explored the entanglement of nature, technology, and militarisation through 
a series of biographical vignettes. In such cases, geographers have enlisted the individual 
life “as a relationally dense node at which to tie together and render coherent a much 
wider set of logics, circumstances, and political dynamics” (Hannah, 2005: 240). 
Importantly, the structural biography is a way of negotiating between wider historical 
processes and dynamics and the agency of individuals to shape, even as they are shaped 
by, these processes and dynamics.  
 What I mean by this is that it is tempting, although erroneous, to see the 
geopolitical and technological features identified as crucial to transcontinentalism as 
things injected from an exterior into the minds of the individuals discussed throughout 
this thesis. This would be a form of structural determinism, and a disavowal of much 
historical geographical work that has unsettled and invalidated the uniformity of ideas 
across time and space. For example, historical geographers have emphasised how 
diverse and transnational experiences of space and place formatively and 
heterogeneously impact upon the careers, identities, ideas, and subjectivities of 
individuals (Craggs and Neate, 2017; Lambert and Lester, 2006). Put differently, ideas 
are not “conjured out of thin air” (Livingstone, 2014: 15) but shaped by social, spatial, 
and intellectual contexts (Ferretti, 2017a). Accordingly, historical geographers have also 
stressed the importance of paying attention to the relational and often mundane sites 
and spaces of geographical knowledge production that are usually underappreciated in 
more standard scholarship on geopolitics (Daniels and Nash, 2004; Livingstone, 2014; 
McGeachan, 2013; 2016; but see Smith, 2003; Kearns, 2009, for prominent exceptions). 
Finally, they have emphasised the importance of contextualisation, or what Kearns (in 
Agnew et al, 2011: 55) defines as “relat[ing] geographical ideas to the political, moral, 
economic, and other circumstances that explain the demand for certain perspectives, 
[and] why they achieve salience in particular periods.” By taking methodological lessons 
from historical geography, it is consequently possible to use structural biography as an 
approach that illuminates wider themes and processes (such as transcontinentalism), 
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whilst remaining sensitive to how such themes and processes emerge and are reworked 
and contested across time, space, and social/intellectual/cultural contexts.  
 Relatedly, structural biography offers a way to meet other methodological 
problems in geopolitical research. As Ó Tuathail (2002: 605) has pointed out, practical 
geopolitical research in particular “is a difficult challenge for it requires near total 
immersion in the everyday world of foreign policy discourse and practice.” Researchers 
need to be embedded to the greatest degree possible in the micro-world of diplomacy in 
order to comprehend the production and contestation of geopolitics. In recent years, 
scholars associated with what has been termed the ‘practice turn’ in diplomatic and 
geopolitical scholarship have attempted to achieve this (Dittmer and McConnell, 2015; 
Kuus, 2013; Neumann, 2012). They have used a mixture of qualitative methods to 
attempt to get inside the ‘black box’ (Müller, 2012) of geopolitics and its typically 
prosaic, day-to-day operations. Despite the fact that this endeavour is often stunted by 
issues of access and secrecy, such research demonstrates the importance of the non-
textual and non-documentable (conversations in corridors, non-verbal body language, 
and so on) to diplomatic relations and the (re)production of geopolitical meaning. The 
problem, as Baker (1997) put it, is that the dead do not answer questionnaires. Nor can 
one conduct an ethnography in the Foreign Office in 1905 to understand how meaning 
was ascribed to the Baghdad Railway. The records stored at TNA and BL are “tailored to 
exclude the everyday routines and materialities” of geopolitics, usually because they 
were “often so mundane as to be beneath notice” (Dittmer, 2016: 87). As a 
consequence, Ó Tuathail’s (2002: 605) characterisation of “[reconstructing] the historical 
record of policy formation and policy-making, without knowledge of crucial private 
meetings, key memos and other private archival material” as “a challenge” is 
exacerbated when extended to historical geopolitical research.      
 Thus structural biography is a way of meeting Ó Tuathail’s challenge by tracing 
how transcontinentalism emerged in Rhodes’ life across social, intellectual, and spatial 
contexts. In Part Three of the thesis I follow Rhodes’ life and legacy, utilising “the 
incomparable collection without which no biographer [of Rhodes] could proceed” 
(Rotberg and Shore, 1988: xi), which is located in the Weston Library (WL) in Oxford, UK. 
It contains a large amount of correspondence between Rhodes and his various 
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associates, as well as copies of all of the letters Rhodes sent and received to the Colonial 
Office and the British Treasury when he was trying to secure financial backing for the 
Cape-Cairo Railway in 1898. Of course, the WL’s archive is as fragmented, contingent, 
and incomplete as any other, and despite its comprehensiveness only therefore offers a 
partial entry point into Rhodes’ life – not least because a fire at his house Groote Schuur 
in 1896 destroyed many of his papers. Nonetheless, triangulated with biographies 
(written in the immediate aftermath of his death in 1902 by his associates, and then 
later by academic historians), articles he published in magazines and newspapers, a 
collection of his speeches published in 1900 (Vindex, 1900), obituaries and testimonies 
by his associates, and a miscellaneous assortment of other published and unpublished 
material, I was able to use Rhodes as a window into the complicated emergence of 
transcontinentalism in the 1880s and after.  
 Studying Rhodes, however, presents its own unique challenges. Few figures have 
been equally eulogised and disparaged. In the most recent overview, MacFarlane (2007: 
437) has argued that Rhodes’ historiography can be divided into two broad categories, 
“chauvinistic approval or utter vilification.” The utter vilification has largely emanated 
from the pens of post-World War Two historians and biographers, who have criticised 
Rhodes’ practices of capital accumulation, his contributions to the violences of 
colonialism and imperialism, his treatment of Africans and women, and finally his odd 
but problematic advocacy of white Anglo-Saxon supremacy. The chauvinistic approval, 
on the other hand, is predominantly (but not exclusively, see Tabor, 2003) associated 
with biographies written by Rhodes’ friends and contemporaries in the early decades of 
the twentieth century. They constructed an image of Rhodes as “one of the greatest 
Englishmen” (Williams, 1913: 133), who ploughed his not inconsiderable wealth and 
power into the creation of a just, free, and civilised world. Reading contributions to both 
of these historiographical categories can misdirect, pushing the researcher towards a 
monolithic interpretation of Rhodes’ life as distinctly one thing and not another. I have 
therefore tried to retain a critical distance from Rhodes, not whitewashing any points 
that might be worthy of reproach but sometimes understating them in places where 
they could be more prominent. I have tried as much as possible to heed Hannah’s (2005: 
240) advice, to be “neither celebratory nor adversarial, but rather ‘diagnostic’”, 
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analysing and interpreting his life without following more standard biographical 
practices of “draw[ing] up some kind of final balance for good or ill.”  
 Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism did not die with Rhodes in 1902. Rather, it lived 
on in the work of several of his associates, many of whom were prominent geographers, 
explorers, soldiers, academics, and imperial administrators in their own right. In Chapter 
Eight I follow these individuals to ascertain how transcontinentalism developed after 
Rhodes’ death. Among the individuals followed are Harry Johnston, Robert Williams, and 
others such as the soldier Ewart S. Grogan, the first Governor of Nyasaland Alfred 
Sharpe, the engineer Charles Metcalfe, and the journalist Leo Weinthal. Tracing Rhodes’ 
connections to these people led to three overlapping groups of sources which I make 
use of in Chapter Eight.3 The first is a range of lectures and debates which took place in 
the auditoriums of British learned societies around the turn of the twentieth century, 
especially the Royal African Society, the Central Asian Society, the Royal Geographical 
Society, and the Royal Commonwealth Society. These societies all functioned as centres 
of British knowledge formation, organisation, and dissolution in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries (Lubenow, 2015: 26). Lectures were given to these societies by 
a diverse array of individuals on the Cape-Cairo Railway and its future, and many of the 
individuals were present at each other’s talks, providing comments and criticisms in the 
discussions that followed. The learned societies were therefore a space within which 
transcontinentalism was discussed, negotiated, and reworked after Rhodes’ death.  
 The second group of sources is a miscellaneous range of articles, books, 
magazines, speeches, and supplements that discussed the Cape-Cairo Railway. Much of 
this assortment was written by the same individuals who contributed lectures and 
discussions to the learned societies. The main exception to this is the magazine entitled 
The African World and Cape-Cairo Express which was edited by Leo Weinthal, and which 
was largely aimed at mining prospectors, businessmen, and venture capitalists. Thirdly 
                                                     
3
 I searched for archival repositories on all of these men. Williams’ archives are held by the John Rylands 
Library at the University of Manchester, but on undertaking a scoping study I judged there was not enough 
relevant material to justify a detailed exegesis of his archive. Johnston’s archive is held by the Royal 
Geographical Society in London, but on examination contained no relevant papers. However, I found 
several letters between Johnston and Cecil Rhodes in TNA, along with various maps of Africa Johnston had 
published or sketched. Metcalfe burned his personal papers before his death, and I could find no 
repositories on Grogan, Sharpe, or Weinthal.  
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and finally, I made use of a mammoth five volume collection, spanning over 2500 pages, 
which was published in 1923 entitled The Story of the Cape to Cairo railway & river route 
from 1887 to 1922 and also edited by Leo Weinthal. Four of these volumes are 
comprised primarily of text and illustrations, and the fifth is a collection of twelve maps 
alongside a formidable index of the topics covered throughout. The first four volumes 
cover a dizzying array of topics; memoirs and biographical sketches of pioneers of 
African exploration; detailed descriptions of the construction of the parts of the railway 
that were built (along with speculations as to when the parts unfinished would be 
complete); arguments concerning the necessity of completing the railway in its entirety; 
discussions of the wider economic development and civilisation of the African continent; 
as well as more ephemeral topics such as the varieties of ‘Natives of Africa’ and wild 
game found along the route.  
 These volumes required extra interpretive care. They were a seven year editorial 
project that Weinthal worked on continually during the First World War, and in the early 
pages of the first volume he describes the finished collection as a “pulsing literary 
cenotaph to the great men who brought the route into being”.4 As a result, it has often 
been used as a primary source in studies on the history of the Cape-Cairo Railway. 
Raphael (1936), for instance, bases much of her classical study of the Cape-Cairo idea on 
it, and even more critical authors such as Ramutsindela (2007) cite it favourably. 
However, in my reading this collection must be understood as both eulogy and obituary 
of the Cape-Cairo Railway. It is a eulogy in that it praises ‘the great men who brought the 
route into being’ in an exaggerated, adulating, and hagiographical fashion, portraying 
them as selfless bastions of African development and the railway as a kind of master 
technological variable inherently connected to the existential fate of the African 
continent. Yet it is also an obituary in the sense that it was explicitly intended to 
reinvigorate and garner public support for a project that, during and after the First 
World War, was largely abandoned and would never be finished. Weinthal’s collection 
can therefore be read as a desperate attempt to resurrect the Cape-Cairo Railway from 
the dead by eulogising its virtues and stressing the purported necessity of its 
completion; as Merrington (2001: 353) observes,“[t]he mere bulk of this five-volume 
                                                     
4
 SCCRI, 15. 
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opus lent a kind of cogency to what was no more than a dream.” My point is that this 
makes it problematic when used uncritically as a historical source as Raphael and 
Ramutsindela do, but an invaluable source for tracing the doctrine of 
transcontinentalism through the connections it evinces between geopolitics and 
technology, and the inherent quasi-religious faith in the power of railway technology 
which saturates its pages.  
 As a whole, these sources enabled the core features of Berlin-Baghdad and Cape-
Cairo transcontinentalism, along with the spatial, social, and political specificities of 
each, to be traced in Britain. My reading of these sources was deductive; I did not 
conceptualise transcontinentalism beforehand and then go to the archive with it pre-
conceived in my mind. Rather, it emerged from what I’ve come to think of as an 
interconnected process of ‘shuttling’. This shuttling was threefold. Firstly, it was textual, 
shuttling between archival documents, secondary literatures, chapter drafts, ideas 
books, note documents, and other ephemeral scribbles. Secondly, it was spatial, 
shuttling between desks at London, Oxford, Newcastle, and between various trains and 
coffee shops – spaces each with their own emergent properties that impacted on my 
thinking in ways I cannot fully comprehend retrospectively. Finally, it was interpersonal 
– shuttling between supervisors, fellow postgraduates, friends, and other colleagues, 
discussing ideas and collectively “explor[ing] differing constructions of problems and 
methods” (Petts, Owens, and Bulkeley, 2008: 600). This process of shuttling has 
persuaded me research is intrinsically non-linear; “[r]ather than moving in a straight line, 
a nonlinear research path makes successive passes through steps, sometimes moving 
backward and sideways before moving on. It is more of a spiral, moving slowly upward 
but not directly” (Neuman, 2006: 152, original emphasis). The formulation of the 
arguments in this thesis was therefore emergent from Neuman’s spiral itself.  
1.5. Structure of thesis 
 This thesis is split into three parts. Part One explains and analyses the conceptual 
and historical foundations of transcontinentalism. It traces transcontinentalism in two 
overlapping historical discourses, the modern geopolitical imagination, and the 
development of railway technology, using examples where appropriate. This is achieved 
23 
 
through a critical engagement with a range of literatures, from critical geopolitics to 
railway history to the philosophy of technology. It also elaborates a critique of critical 
geopolitics as neglectful of the role of technology in shaping geopolitical thought and 
practice, thus establishing the broader conceptual and theoretical relevance of the 
thesis. Part One ends with a return to the ideas of Mackinder, demonstrating how he 
evinced transcontinentalism in his corpus of writings and how critical histories of 
Mackinder downplay the role of technology in his thought.  
 Parts Two and Three are each composed of three chapters, respectively tracing 
transcontinentalism in Britain’s response to the Baghdad Railway and in Rhodes’ and his 
associates attempts to construct the Cape-Cairo Railway. These chapters show how 
transcontinentalism developed in each case, along with their similarities, different 
emphases, and divergences. They also demonstrate, when appropriate, how the story of 
transcontinentalism contributes to wider discussions of continental imperial expansion 
and British imperial, geopolitical, and diplomatic history.  The thesis is bookended by a 
conclusion which summarises the core contributions and gestures towards future areas 
of research that would complement and extend the arguments presented throughout.  
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Chapter Two – Geopolitics and Technology: The Conceptual and Historical 
Foundations of Transcontinentalism  
2.1. Introduction 
 This chapter identifies, explains, and analyses the conceptual and historical 
foundations of transcontinentalism. Transcontinentalism is defined as a geopolitical and 
technological doctrine with three interconnected components; 1) the projection and 
territorialisation of state power across continental space, 2) the spread of civilisation 
across continental space, and 3) the extension, reproduction, and transformation of the 
state and its spaces of circulation across continental space; through the construction of 
transcontinental railways. This chapter argues that transcontinentalism emerged in the 
nineteenth century out of a twofold apex of what Agnew (2003) has defined as the 
modern geopolitical imagination and the development and spread of railway technology 
from the 1820s. It shows how out of this apex emerged the three interrelated 
components of transcontinentalism, explaining and analysing each one and relating 
them explicitly back to geopolitics and technology. The chapter begins by considering 
the first dimension of transcontinentalism, geopolitics, before moving to the second, 
technology. As it explains the salient features of transcontinentalism, the chapter also 
critiques critical geopolitics for its relative neglect of the role of technology in the 
production and transformation of geopolitics. This demonstrates the wider relevance of 
the thesis for ongoing debates in the field of critical geopolitics. Finally, after outlining 
transcontinentalism, the chapter embarks on a rereading of the work of Halford 
Mackinder, arguing that his geopolitical and wider corpus of writings epitomises the 
doctrine of transcontinentalism in all of its essential features.    
2.2. Geopolitics and the modern geopolitical imagination 
 The term geopolitics was coined by the Swedish writer Rudolf Kjellén in 1899 to 
describe “the geographical influence on the behaviour of states” (Tunander, 2001: 457).  
Kjellen, Halford Mackinder, the American naval theorist Alfred T. Mahan, and the 
German geographers Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer all sought to objectively 
evaluate the importance of geography and geographical position on the changing 
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conduct of statecraft and thus provide practical advice to the states and empires they 
respectively served. Following the association of Haushofer with Germany’s actions in 
the Second World War geopolitics was largely sanitised from discourse in political 
geography and wider international relations before re-emerging in the language and 
practices of the Cold War (Hepple, 1986). This spurred the development of the critical 
approach to geopolitics, which focused not only on disarming and deconstructing the 
logic and endurance of earlier classical geopolitical theorising but also in illuminating and 
critiquing the ways in which the world is actively demarcated, labelled, and 
hierarchically ordered by a diverse ensemble of actors at different scales.  
 Agnew (2014: 314) has commented that “since the 1970s the use of terms like 
‘geopolitics’ and ‘geopolitical’ [have] proliferated without any single meaning necessarily 
having more resonance in the contemporary context than any other.”  Agnew argues 
subsequently that our focus should not be so much on identifying and tracing the 
multiple trajectories of the word geopolitics across time and space, but rather on how 
utilising it as a concept denoting a wide range of spatialising practices can help us 
understand world politics and events. In his words (2014: 315), this is because 
 “thinking and acting geopolitically is a fundamental feature of modernity. What I 
 mean by this is that geographical designations and assumptions have long entered into 
 the making of world politics. To restrict definition of a redolent word to a narrow 
 disciplinary frame of reference from the early 20th century is to retreat from active 
 engagement with new ways of thinking about world politics.”  
This is a helpful statement because it foregrounds the utility of geopolitics as a way of 
making sense of the world in instances where the broadly classical understanding of the 
term, ‘geography as an aid to statecraft’ (see Kearns, 2008: 1599), is not applicable. 
Consequently, my aim in this section is to illustrate how geopolitics, and especially the 
critical approach developed in the 1990s by authors such as Agnew, Dalby, and Ó 
Tuathail, helps to explain the emergence of transcontinentalism as a way of thinking in 
the nineteenth century.  
2.2.1. Critical geopolitics 
“Critical Geopolitics is no more than a general gathering place for various 
critiques of the multiple geopolitical discourses and practices that characterize 
modernity.” 
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 As Ó Tuathail (in Jones and Sage, 2010: 316) suggests above, critical geopolitics is 
a difficult term to firmly define or delineate. Dalby (2010: 280) also agrees that “there is 
nothing close to a consensus on what the term designates or how these matters are to 
be studied.” Consequently, to define critical geopolitics is to paradoxically commit an act 
that critical geopolitics would reject. Further, “[g]iven the important influence of 
poststructural philosophies on critical geopolitics”, to try and define what critical 
geopolitics ‘is’ suggests that the signifier ‘critical geopolitics’ has some sort of abstracted 
underlying meaning that we can objectively pinpoint and recite (Power and Campbell, 
2010: 243). As a consequence, any overview of critical geopolitics must begin by defining 
what it is while simultaneously being aware of the paradox inherent to doing so.  
 In the spirit of this paradox, critical geopolitics is here defined as the study, 
analysis, and critique of the “geographical assumptions, designations and 
understandings that enter into the making of world politics” (Agnew, 2003: 2). It can be 
posited as having coalesced from a number of philosophical and intellectual currents 
within the wider humanities and social sciences. Crucial to its development was the 
seeping of poststructuralist philosophies into the humanities and social sciences in the 
1970s and 1980s. Much like Ó Tuathail, Dillon (2000: 2) argues that poststructuralism 
“refers to such a diverse body of work and thought that it cannot be captured in a 
summary definition”, but also that it is nonetheless possible to identify a number of 
positions that are common to the majority of poststructuralist thinkers. At its broadest, 
the term poststructuralism simply denotes a movement of contemporary continental 
philosophy which stretches back a century or more, often to the philosophy of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, and which came to prominence in France in the 1960s with the work of 
philosophers such as Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida, and Michel Foucault (Harrison, 
2006). Poststructuralism is radically anti-foundationalist and anti-essentialist, rejecting 
any notions of objective truth, meaning, and identity and instead rendering these things 
as the ongoing and perpetually unstable effects of social, political, economic, cultural, 
and linguistic struggle (Belsey, 2002; Gibson-Graham, 2003). Truth, meaning, and 
identity are therefore “not inside a word - or an object, a thing, a process - inherent to it, 
uniquely owned by it", but continually ascribed in a way that is only ever temporary and 
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which is given the illusion of permanence through constant social (re)production (Wylie, 
2006b: 300). 
 One early preoccupation of critical geopolitics was therefore to apply such insight 
to geography and challenge the notion that geography functions simply as the static and 
fixed backdrop to international politics, a notion encapsulated in Spykman’s (1938: 236) 
famous tautology that “[g]eography does not argue, it just is.” As such, one of the 
principles of critical geopolitics is that “geography is a social and historical discourse 
which is always intimately bound up with questions of politics and ideology” (Ó Tuathail 
and Agnew, 1992: 192). The physical geography of the earth’s surface is therefore not 
self-evident nor “an innocent body of knowledge” but instead the ongoing product of a 
process of historical and social constitution and definition that is refracted through 
assumptions about race, class, gender, nationality, and all manner of other things (Ó 
Tuathail, 1996: 7). Ó Tuathail argues that the definition of what geography ‘is’ at any 
given moment is thus “a conflict between competing images and imaginings, a contest 
of power and resistance that involves […] struggles to represent the materiality of 
physical geographic objects and boundaries” (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 14-15). This 
poststructuralist inspired critique sought to puncture the stability of assertions such as 
Spykman’s by questioning and unsettling the hidden suppositions and biases 
constituting the supposedly stable and ahistorical complexion of nature and of 
geography.  
 Concurrently, a second preoccupation of critical geopolitics was the extension of 
this critique towards commonsensical geographical designations that portrayed 
particular places as imbued with essential identities, characteristics, and peoples. Such 
work dovetailed with concomitant analyses in what came to be termed ‘dissident’ 
International Relations (Campbell, 1992; Der Derian, 1992; see also Dalby, 1991: 262-
269) and was more widely inspired by Said’s ([1978] 2003) influential critique of 
Orientalism. Said (2003: 40-41; see also Gregory, 1995) described Orientalism as a 
hegemonic Western discourse purporting “that the Orient and everything in it was, if 
not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West”, and emphasised 
how this Orient came to be discursively associated with barbarism, violence, 
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backwardness, and mystery in ways which conversely constructed a Western identity 
defined by enlightenment, progress, authority, and rationality. 
 Drawing on such work, practitioners of critical geopolitics sought to understand 
how foreign policy discussions projected spatial renderings of space onto territorially 
demarcated states through “implicitly geographical policy rationalizations” (Ó Tuathail, 
1986: 74) such as references to shatterbelts and domino theories (Dalby, 1990). They 
sought to analyse how the world is discursively filled “with certain dramas, subjects, 
histories and dilemmas” by powerful actors through “unremarkable assumptions about 
places and their particular identities” (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 194). Dodds (1994), 
for instance, examined how Argentina was historically constructed as an absurd, 
reactive, and untrustworthy state actor in British foreign policy after the Second World 
War because of its actions towards the Falkland Islands, and Sidaway (1994) conducted 
one of the first critical geopolitical analyses of the problematic essentialist 
representations of the ‘Middle East’ as inherently violent and irrational. In both cases, 
such language is not banal in that it “[opens] up a field of possible taxonomies and 
trigger[s] a series of narratives, subjects, and appropriate foreign policy responses” (Ó 
Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 194; see also Dalby, 1990). In other words, the definition of 
particular places as imbued with certain characteristics has a very real impact upon how 
foreign policy is conducted. The emphasis was therefore on highlighting and critiquing 
the discursive construction of meanings and identities and the historically contingent 
ways in which these meanings and identities came to be attached to certain peoples and 
places.    
 A final early concern of critical geopolitics was “the development of critical 
histories of geopolitical thinkers and discourses” (Jones and Sage, 2010: 316), which 
traced the diverse and complicated social, intellectual, and cultural undercurrents of 
geopolitical reasoning and the assumptions geopolitical theorists made regarding the 
essence and overarching conditioning power of geography. For the most part this was 
stimulated by the rediscovery of the classical theorists of geopolitics by Cold War 
strategists such as Spykman and Henry Kissinger who began to apply the supposedly 
transcendental insights and aura of authority of classical geopolitics to the new bipolar 
arena of international politics. Key figures from the classical geopolitical canon were 
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thus ‘put back in their place’ (Ó Tuathail, 1992) and resituated amongst the constraints 
and anxieties of their particular national and social contexts. Other scholars sought to 
excavate the specificity of various geopolitical traditions in parts of the world other than 
the US and the UK. Atkinson (1995), for instance, has traced a history of Italian 
geopolitics throughout the twentieth century, with others having done the same for a 
wide array of European and non-European traditions (see Dodds and Atkinson, 2000; 
Heffernan, 1998; Mayell, 2004; Megoran and Sharapova, 2013; Murphy, 1997). In all 
cases, much attention has been paid to how geographical and geopolitical assumptions 
are always inflected through the variegated historical and cultural contexts within which 
they are received, and therefore the ways in which geopolitical ideas are translated and 
transformed as they are capriciously communicated across space.  
 Largely for heuristic purposes, early critical geopolitical scholarship was divided 
into three overlapping foci of analysis; a division which is blurry in practice but which 
loosely still persists today. This is what Rech (2014) terms the ‘three-fold superstructure’ 
of critical geopolitics, one which examines practical, formal, and popular types of 
geopolitical reasoning. Practical geopolitics refers to the ways in which “foreign policy 
decision makers use practical and pragmatic geopolitical reasoning whenever they try to 
make spatial sense of the world” (Ó Tuathail, 1999: 113). In other words, practical 
geopolitics concerns the vocabularies, languages, and rhetorical devices used by 
politicians and other political actors to render the world (or different parts of it) 
meaningful. Formal geopolitics refers to the geopolitical knowledge produced by “elite 
institutions and actors that are not directly part of the state apparatus [such as] think 
tanks, academic institutions, and nongovernmental organizations” (Kraxberger, 2005: 
50). Popular geopolitics refers to “the various manifestations [of geopolitics] to be found 
within the visual media, news magazines, radio, novels and the Internet” (Dittmer and 
Dodds, 2008: 441). Scholars have also highlighted what could be termed the awkward 
cousin of Rech’s ‘three-fold superstructure’, structural geopolitics, which can be defined 
as the ways in which “global processes, tendencies, and contradictions affect the 
contemporary geopolitical condition and its related geopolitical practices” (Ek, 2000: 
842; see also Agnew, 2003; Ó Tuathail, 1999). In practice, these four typologies of 
geopolitical reasoning are always already intertwined. For instance, McFarlane and Hay 
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(2003: 213) highlight that the popular geopolitical reasoning in newspapers and 
magazines is often nothing more than “practical geopolitical reasoning found in 
informal, everyday discourse”, and the knowledge produced in the elite institutions 
shapes practical geopolitical reasoning and is often disseminated more widely through 
popular media.   
 Since its inception, critical geopolitics has been subject to a dizzying array of 
theoretical, conceptual, and methodological transformations. Crucial to the broadening 
of the remit of the early critical geopolitical scholarship was the injection of feminist 
(Dowler and Sharp, 2001) and postcolonial (Slater, 2004) theoretical perspectives, as 
well as the enlargement of empirical research beyond (mostly Western) state actors 
towards ‘peripheral’ states and regions, non-state actors (see Dodds, Kuus, and Sharp, 
2013: 387-420), and various non-governmental institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (Popke, 1994). Concomitantly, a seemingly endless assortment of 
conceptual terms have been prefixed to geopolitics, so that it is now possible to speak of 
alter (Koopman, 2011), anti (Routledge, 1998), banal (Sidaway, 2001), emotional (Pain, 
2009), environmental (Dalby, 2014), Marxist (Colás and Pozo, 2011), materialist (Squire, 
2015), pacific (Megoran, 2010b), polar (Powell and Dodds, 2014), religious (Sturm, 
2013), subaltern (Sharp, 2011) and many other kinds of geopolitics as distinct but all 
nonetheless tethered to critical geopolitics. Popular geopolitics has also developed as a 
partly divergent research agenda, drawing inspiration from fandom and audience 
studies amongst other literatures to more definitively conceptualise the ways in which 
people consume, transform, and actively produce geopolitical knowledge with, through, 
and often in opposition to the geopolitical narratives espoused in popular media 
(Dittmer, 2010; Dittmer and Gray, 2010).  
 While cognisant of these developments, this thesis connects transcontinentalism 
most strongly to the modern geopolitical imagination defined by Agnew (2003) in its 
nineteenth and early twentieth century civilisational and naturalised modes. This does 
not mean that, as could be argued, the thesis advocates a form of structural 
determinism, whereby free floating structures determine the course of history 
irrespective of space, time, or personal agency. Indeed, one of the strengths of the 
biographical approach taken to Rhodes is that it foregrounds how geopolitics is 
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reworked across space and time and how geopolitical ideas emerge from social, 
intellectual, and spatial contexts while simultaneously being influenced by wider 
structural flows and processes (Livingstone, 2014; Ferretti, 2017a). The approach taken 
in this thesis therefore allows a broad, geopolitically grounded conception of 
transcontinentalism to emerge whilst remaining sensitive and appreciative of how this 
conception was reworked, transformed, and unsettled across space and time.  
2.2.2. The modern geopolitical imagination 
 My argument in this thesis is that transcontinentalism emerged from a wider 
spatial and geopolitical imagination that Agnew (2003: 2-7) has termed the modern 
geopolitical imagination. Agnew argues that there are four crucial components to this 
that emerged at the beginning of the nineteenth century and that have been 
consistently articulated through geopolitical visions and practices, albeit in different 
forms, from then to the present day. In this section I engage critically with Agnew’s 
analysis of the modern geopolitical imagination, demonstrating its importance for the 
development of transcontinentalism.  
 Agnew (2003) identifies and defines the modern geopolitical imagination as a 
specific geopolitical ontology which germinated in the sixteenth century and 
consequently solidified into the overarching means by which global space was conceived 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Its first feature is the emergence of a global 
imaginary enabling the envisioning of the entire world as an integrated and connected 
whole. As Agnew (2003: 15) puts it, this is “the imaginative ability to transcend the 
spatial limits imposed by everyday life and contemplate the world conceived and 
grasped as a picture.” In his landmark book Critical Geopolitics Ó Tuathail (1996) 
provided the most powerful articulation of this feature, and its relation to classical 
geopolitics, by refashioning it as a form of Cartesian Perspectivalism, a way of thinking 
about the world that separates the knowing subject from the knowable object. Put 
differently, Cartesian Perspectivalism “posits a pregiven reality which an independent 
subject contemplates, represents, and masters from a position of cohered detachment” 
(Wylie, 2006a: 520). The internal knowing mind is therefore positioned as looking 
outwards onto a complicated but nonetheless distinguishable world of knowable 
35 
 
objects, all of which can be classified, measured, and recorded with a certainty and 
objectivity guaranteed by the ontological separation of viewer and viewed. The 
importance of this perspective for the emergence of transcontinentalism was twofold. 
Firstly, although the division of the world into natural and essential continental 
landmasses is one of the oldest and most pervasive geographical imaginations (Lewis 
and Wigen, 1997), the emergence of Cartesian Perspectivalism allowed the continents to 
be viewed in relation to one another, and each with a particular place and importance 
with respect to the universal global whole. Secondly, it allowed the supposedly inherent 
physical geographical characteristics of different continents to be surveyed, classified, 
and defined in a manner deemed to be objective and incontestable.  
 The second feature of the modern geopolitical imagination is the organising and 
ordering of space based on time and periodisation. In Agnew’s (2003: 35) words, this is 
the categorisation of space “in terms of the essential attributes of different time periods 
relative to the idealized historical experience of one of the blocks: Europe, or, more 
broadly, the West.” He takes this conceptualisation of time largely from the 
anthropologist Fabian (1983) and his notion of the ‘stream of Time’. For Fabian (1983: 
17), “all living societies [are] irrevocably placed on a temporal slope, a stream of Time – 
some upstream, others downstream.” The further societies are placed up the stream the 
more civilised, progressed, and enlightened they are, and the further down the stream 
they are placed the more uncivilised, regressive, and unenlightened they are. As will be 
explained below, this was particularly important in the era of civilisational geopolitics 
because, broadly, Europeans self-identified their own continent as at the pinnacle of 
history, projecting their own deficiencies away from Europe and creating a moral 
imperative of action to enable the rest of the world to ‘catch up’. The importance of this 
for transcontinentalism was that continents other than Europe – primarily Africa, 
America, and the erratically and imprecisely defined Asia – were considered as 
fundamentally lagging behind Europe; located to differing levels further down the 
‘stream of Time’ and therefore in need of European influence to reach a status coeval to 
that of Europe.  
 The third and fourth aspects of the modern geopolitical imagination are related. 
The third is the assumption that “the world is made up of states exercising power over 
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blocks of space” (Ó Tuathail, 2005: 66). In other words, in the modern geopolitical 
imagination states are conceived of as the locus of power, and this power is 
implemented firstly over sovereign territories within which societies are contained, and 
secondly extraterritorially through economic and political influence, social and 
diplomatic relations, and through the exercise of military power (Agnew, 2003: 51-84). 
The fourth and final aspect is that these states are conceived of as existing in an 
anarchical, ungoverned system, “with each state trying to maximize its status relative to 
that of others” (Agnew, 2003: 54). These two features are intrinsically related to the 
realist theory of international relations which traces its roots back to a canon of political 
theorists including Thucydides and Thomas Hobbes. For proponents of this theory such 
as Waltz (1959), states are always and already in a ceaseless and eternal position of 
competition with other states in a world system defined by the absence of any 
overarching governmental apparatus (or ‘referee’). States thus compete for power in 
this unregulated world, and this is assumed to be the essential condition of the 
international state system (see Weber, 2014: 15-40). In terms of my argument, in the 
following chapters I will show how transcontinentalism variously became a leitmotif of 
British imperialism in Asia and Africa, one of several doctrines concerned with the 
maximisation of state power relative to other states. Further, I will not only show how 
this was rooted in the realist conception of international relations, but how the evidently 
continental scale of transcontinentalism was eventually seen to be something that if 
achieved could enable, or contrarily spell the end of, the global hegemony of a particular 
state.  
 Summarily, the four features that I have identified as intrinsic to the modern 
geopolitical imagination are pivotal for understanding the emergence of 
transcontinentalism in the nineteenth century. However, Agnew postulates that there 
were three ‘eras’ of the modern geopolitical imagination, each undergirded by the four 
key components but each with their own core attributes and features. These are the 
eras of civilisational geopolitics (1815-1875), naturalised geopolitics (1875-1945), and 
ideological geopolitics (1945-present). For our purposes it is only the first two of these 
eras that are relevant. The following two sections will expand upon the eras of 
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civilisational and naturalised geopolitics, and explain their relevance to the development 
of transcontinentalism.  
2.2.3. Civilisational geopolitics 
 Civilisation, although an enormously complex term with a convoluted history, 
developed two dominant yet overlapping usages in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries; both “a process and an achieved condition” (Williams, 1976: 57-60; see also 
Gong, 1984; Robertson, 2006). The achieved condition was of civilisation as a territorially 
bounded complex or entity within which a set of advanced cultural, legal, economic, and 
political practices took place. Gong (1984: 14-15) defines these practices as 
encompassing at least five aspects: the provision of basic rights and freedoms such as 
life and property; an organised and bureaucratic political apparatus with the capacity to 
make war; an adherence to the rule of law, both domestic and international; a 
recognition of the importance of, and partaking in, international diplomacy; and finally a 
rejection of ‘uncivilised’ practices such as slavery and torture. All of these criteria were 
flexible in practice and open to fluctuation depending on national and cultural context. 
Typically, however, the notion of civilisation at this time was reserved for Europe alone. 
The first maritime circumnavigations of the globe, the dual accomplishments of 
Enlightenment philosophy and science, and the beginning of the Industrial Revolution 
cultivated a growing sense of pre-eminence among the peoples of Europe, “which 
gradually hardened into an inflexible conceit that held Europe to be the most civilized 
and best governed of all the world regions” (Bassin, 1991: 3). This conceit did not deny 
that other civilisations existed, or had existed in the past, but that Europe embodied an 
unequalled phase in the development of humankind that had previously failed to 
transpire. 
 Yet Europe’s self-identification as a civilisation with previously unparalleled levels 
of culture and political organisation developed in tandem with a second preoccupation: 
that because Europe was the pinnacle of history’s culmination and industrial 
development, it was both morally right and technologically feasible to export this mode 
of being into those places in the world that had, for whatever reason, fallen behind 
(Agnew, 2003; Robertson, 2006). This was the second prominent usage of civilisation as 
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a process, a “cross-fertilization” (Robertson, 2006: 425) which had unfolded across space 
and time through the mobility and exchange of people, ideas, and cultural practices. 
Duara (2004: 2) has argued that prior to the nineteenth century, “the idea of civilization 
expressed a process – ‘the civilizing process’ – extending out from the courts to wider 
reaches of society.” In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, however, the courts were 
replaced by Europe and the ‘wider reaches of society’ were replaced with the rest of the 
world, which was quickly defined as barbaric and disorderly. The process of civilisation 
became the civilising mission, through which civilisation would unfold from Europe into 
the rest of the world in a selfless and righteous diffusion of superior ideas, cultural 
practices, and political norms. Thus, as Duara (2001: 100) puts it,  
“Western imperial nations invoked the signifier [civilisation] to justify their conquest as a 
civilizing mission. Whole continents were subjugated and held in thrall because they 
were not constituted as civilized nations by means of a formulation where to be a nation 
was to be civilized and vice versa.” 
 In post-Napoleonic Europe both of these entwined meanings of civilisation 
crested in the aftermath of “the political and economic breakdown in the political order 
of early modern Europe” (Toulmin, 1990: 170). This gave rise to the modern geopolitical 
imagination and the era of civilisational geopolitics, the dominant way that the world 
was envisaged between 1815 and 1875 in Europe:  
“Its main elements were a commitment to European uniqueness as a civilization; a belief 
that the roots of European distinctiveness were found in its past; a sense that although 
other cultures might have noble pasts with high achievements, they had been eclipsed 
by Europe; and an increasing identification with a particular nation-state as representing 
the most perfected version of the European difference” (Agnew, 2003: 87). 
Civilisational geopolitics thus drew an ontological schism between Europe and the rest 
of the world, creating not only a “general self-perception of European states as those 
who authoritatively define[d] the standards” (Behr, 2007: 240), but also a pressing 
imperative that the rest of the world should, forcibly if necessary, be assisted in meeting 
these enlightened standards; whether they be to do with law, culture, political 
organisation, technological development, or ‘freedom’. This imperative served as a 
renewed moral and ethical justification for the legitimacy of European colonialism and 
imperialism from the end of the Napoleonic Wars, particularly in Africa. Thus, as 
Pomeranz (2005: 36) has commented, although the precise outcome of the civilising 
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mission “remained a vague, contested goal, most nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
empires invoked this rationale much more than their predecessors had.”    
 Of course, as Agnew recognises civilisational geopolitics was inseparable from 
the need for overseas expansion to demonstrate political power and facilitate the 
expansion of economic networks of commerce and trade for the purposes of profit. It 
was a discourse of colonial legitimacy above all else. But I argue it was important to the 
emergence of transcontinentalism because Asia, Africa, and America were increasingly 
perceived as the negation of European civilisation; uncivilised, backwards, barbaric, and 
thus in need of corrective amendment by the self-anointed vanguard of reason, 
knowledge, and progress in Europe. Transcontinentalism emerged from this as a 
doctrine of ‘civilising’ entire continental landmasses with one fell technological swoop.  
2.2.4. Naturalised geopolitics 
 Agnew (2003) argues that the era of civilisational geopolitics was supplanted in 
around 1875 by the era of naturalised geopolitics. As he (2003: 94) puts it, this era was 
defined by  
“a world divided into imperial and colonized peoples, states with ‘biological needs’ for 
territory/resources and outlets for enterprise, a ‘closed’ world in which one state’s 
political–economic success was at another one’s expense (relative ascent and decline), 
and a world of fixed geographical attributes and environmental conditions that had 
predictable effects on a state’s global status.” 
In a story that is well known to geographers, naturalised geopolitics materialised 
partly from the ideas of a combination of biological, racial, and anthropological sciences 
that were unevenly imported into social, political, and economic thought. At its 
broadest, this era ushered in a conception of the nation-state as a corporeal, breathing 
organism, a “living being” composed of an amalgamation of “state, land and people” 
(Murphy, 1997: 9). Each state was conceived of as an organism occupying adjacent 
portions of a world that was increasingly imagined as finite and closed because of the 
expansion of colonialism. As a consequence, each state was perceived as struggling 
against the others in an indefinite battle for space and resources. This was the 
reprehensible social twist given to Darwinian biology (Ó Tuathail, 1996), as ideas around 
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species being locked in a perpetual struggle for survival were applied to the 
international state system. As Wolkersdorfer (1999: 147) writes,  
“[a]s a result of a growing and healthy population, every state needs more space to 
continue the development of its civilisation. In this manner, a struggle for more space 
automatically developed between states. For the state this conflict is the driving force of 
every human development.”  
 One of the clearest articulations of naturalised geopolitics came from the 
German anthropologist and geographer Freidrich Ratzel, whose term Lebensraum (living 
space) later became infamous due to its association with Nazi geopolitics and the spatial 
policies of Hitler’s Third Reich (Antonsich et al, 2001; Murphy, 1997; Giaccaria and 
Minca, 2016). According to van der Wusten and Dijkink (2002: 27), Ratzel wrote with “a 
Darwinian vocabulary tinged with German ecology and an idealist philosophy”. He 
postulated that the nation-state should be thought of as an inherent product of the 
geographical space it occupied, as “an organism that only displays health and strength 
when it is capable of indigenous growth, in other words, territorial expansion” 
(Wolkersdorfer, 1999; 147). Put differently, for Ratzel and the line of German 
geopoliticians that followed him the ascension of one state could only be achieved 
through the territorial expansion of that state and the absorption of smaller, weaker 
states in accordance with the Darwinian laws of evolution. They applied this apparent 
law in the service of the nation-state they served, suggesting it was the only way the 
vitality and security of the German state and people could be achieved.  
 For our purposes, the era of naturalised geopolitics was also defined by two 
changes particularly vital for transcontinentalism, and which help to explain why 
transcontinentalism did not properly emerge in Britain until the late 1880s. As 
mentioned previously, and defined by Agnew (2003) as an intrinsic feature of 
naturalised geopolitics, it was accompanied by the division of the world into continental 
landmasses with fixed geographical, environmental, and material attributes that could 
objectively be described and classified. However, what has not been so noted, and 
which I will be arguing for in this thesis, is that it also brought to the fore an 
understanding of continents other than Europe as not only uncivilised, but also lifeless, 
inert, and unconscious; existing in a state of pure biological nature and slumber and 
therefore positioning the masculinised process of European colonisation, civilisation, 
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and enlightened reason as the only means through which these continents could be 
revitalised, reawakened, and brought back to life. In addition, the naturalised era was 
important because it was associated with the decline of British political and economic 
hegemony and the concomitant sense of the closing world. As Kearns (1993: 29) writes, 
“[t]he British economic lead had evaporated, and for the British the world did indeed 
seem to be shrinking, to be closing in.” Particularly before the First World War, this 
entailed the emergence of a seeming reality in which Britain (and to a lesser extent 
France) was no longer dominant, but increasingly challenged by Russia and, after 
unification in 1871, Germany. As I will show repeatedly throughout the chapters that 
follow, spaces that had previously been considered exclusively British domains were 
progressively pressured by other European states, particularly by Russia and later 
Germany in the Persian Gulf and India.  
 In this thesis, however, the supplanting of civilisational geopolitics by naturalised 
geopolitics is not as simple as Agnew’s (2003) periodisation would suggest. In fact, I will 
argue that tracing the development of transcontinentalism points to the ways in which 
biological and naturalised geopolitics should be more suitably thought of as 
superimposing, enmeshing, and combining with civilisational ideas from the 1880s 
onwards. In his defence, Agnew (2003: 85-86) admits the problems of periodisation, 
noting that “[a] periodization of geopolitical discourse [...] obviously simplifies a more 
complex flow of representations and practices”, and that “[e]ach period has within it the 
seeds both of its own demise and subsequent periods.” The extent to which the 
civilisational and the naturalised intermixed at any given moment is therefore a matter 
for empirical investigation and analysis, and not pre-determined by the eras themselves. 
As Agnew (2003: 86) summaries,  
“we require a concept of a unified period in order to deny it, and thus make apparent 
the particularity, local difference, heterogeneity, fluctuation, discontinuity, and strife 
that are now our preferred categories for understanding any moment of the past.”     
2.2.5. Summary 
 In this section I have introduced geopolitics and critical geopolitics as the broad 
field in which transcontinentalism, and therefore this thesis, is based. I have defined four 
intrinsic features of what Agnew (2003) terms the modern geopolitical imagination and 
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detailed the two intermixed ‘eras’ of geopolitics, civilisational and naturalised, that are 
relevant for the time period under discussion. In summary, I want to restate the 
threefold importance of geopolitics for the emergence of transcontinentalism. The 
modern geopolitical imagination facilitated the emergence of transcontinentalism firstly 
because it enabled the envisioning of the world and its essential continental landmasses 
as an integrated whole, with developments on each of these landmasses having 
inevitable effects on the overall picture. While Europe was the self-anointed pinnacle of 
civilisation, Asia, Africa, and America were envisioned as continents with intrinsic 
attributes, although, of course, what these intrinsic attributes were was a matter for 
social and political contestation and differed considerably in different ways. Secondly, 
the turning of space into time produced a ‘stream of Time’, with Europe positioned at 
the top and the other continents invariably further downstream. This raised questions 
about how the rest of the world could be civilised. Finally, as the era of naturalised 
geopolitics intensified, civilisation became inseparable from the logics of colonialism and 
imperialism, and served as a justification for the so-called Scramble for Africa in the 
1880s and concomitant seizures of the ‘blank’ spaces of map elsewhere in the world. As 
the balance of power in Europe became a matter of the survival of the fittest, 
transcontinentalism transformed into a doctrine for the territorialisation of state power 
across entire continents, something which – depending on one’s national affiliation – 
was to be welcomed as a saving grace or decried as a death knell. Geopolitics however 
only explains one half of transcontinentalism. The next section turns to the second – 
technology – and specifically the development of railway technology from the 1820s 
onwards.    
2.3. Technology and the rise of the railway 
 The importance of railway technology for transcontinentalism is partly evinced 
by the etymology of the prefix trans, common to transcontinentalism, transport 
technologies, and the word transverse. The Latin prefix encapsulates a sense of “across, 
through, over, to or on the other side of, beyond, outside of, from one place, person, 
thing, or state to another” (OED, 2017: online). Put differently, it refers to a movement 
or mobility of something across or over the space between two distinguishable and 
identifiable points, whether those points are defined as places, persons, identities, or 
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other objects or things entirely. Furthermore, it also contains a sense of to surpass, 
exceed, rise above, and reach a state of being beyond that which is considered average 
or normal; a sense captured in the words transcend and transform. This etymology is 
indicative because it hints at how the development of railway technology in the 1820s 
unsettled and produced unique relations between times, spaces, peoples, and objects. 
Indeed, railways have been connected most definitively to the idea of time-space 
compression, the “ways in which human beings have attempted to conquer space” 
(Warf, 2008: 5; see also Butler, 2001; Dicken, 1998). Although space-time compression 
“took different forms, exhibited different patterns, reflected different cause[s], and 
implied different consequences, depending on where and when it occurred” (Warf, 
2008: 39), it has been most usually associated with the image of a shrinking world, the 
railway’s ability to accelerate the movement of people, goods, and communications 
producing a notion of a world in contraction.  
 Most scholars of critical geopolitics, while recognising the importance of 
technology in this general sense, have however underemphasised the role of transport 
technologies in the production of geopolitics and geopolitical imaginaries. In a significant 
exception to this oversight, Williams (2010: 82) has observed that “while Halford 
Mackinder and his associates may have made reference to trains, planes and ships in 
their geopolitical writings, little consideration has been given to how these entities act 
upon, and are influenced by, geopolitics.” Lin (2013: A1) has likewise reasoned for a 
more nuanced appreciation of the ways in which “transport and travel concerns are 
intimately intertwined with geopolitical thinking and practices” and Shaw and Sidaway 
(2010: 507-508) have argued for a greater appreciation of the roles of mobility, 
transport, and technology in the history of geopolitics. This lack of engagement with 
transport technology is particularly discernible in critical geopolitical scholarship that 
engages with the history of geopolitics in the time period under consideration in this 
thesis, and is therefore something that requires further elaboration than has hitherto 
been attempted.  
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2.3.1. Critical geopolitics and technology 
 A prominent example of this lack of engagement is Ó Tuathail’s (1996) 
aforementioned Critical Geopolitics, which pays little attention to how particular 
technologies shape the ways in which global space is written. The word particular is 
important here. In Critical Geopolitics, Ó Tuathail (1996: 12) dissects with great dexterity 
how technologies of mapping, surveying, and charting – what he refers to as “the 
techniques and technologies for displaying space” - were fundamental to the 
production, delineation, and governance of imperial space from the sixteenth century 
onwards. But technologies such as the railway and ship are given a shorter shrift in Ó 
Tuathail’s (1996: 15) discussion of the late nineteenth century a couple of pages later. 
He notes “the transformative effects of changing technologies of transportation, 
communications, and warfare […] on the exercise of imperial power across space” in the 
late nineteenth century, but precisely what these transformative effects were is left 
rather vague and unspecified. On the same page he writes that the term geopolitics 
itself was in the same timeframe a “convenient fiction, an imperfect name for a set of 
practices within the civil societies of the Great Powers that sought to explain the 
meaning of the new global conditions of space, power, and technology” (Ó Tuathail, 
1996: 15). However, throughout the entirety of his book and in his analysis of 
Mackinder, of this triangle of new global conditions it is only the words space and power 
that are critically and thoroughly evaluated. The ‘changing technologies of 
transportation’ are mentioned but then quickly fall away. 
 Similarly, Agnew (2003: 28-29) recognises that “[t]he late nineteenth century 
[saw] dramatic shifts in space-time organization with the spread of railways, telephones, 
steamship lines, foreign reporting, photography and cinema” early in his work on the 
modern geopolitical imagination. Later on, in his discussion of the late nineteenth 
century, he repeats that between 1880 and 1914 these innovations “compressed 
distance, truncated time, and threatened social hierarchies.” In particular, he suggests 
that “[t]he global spread of railways and the invention of the aeroplane were perhaps 
the most important challenges to conventional thinking about time and space” (Agnew, 
2003: 99), because they engendered and ushered in a sense of a ‘closed world’ and 
therefore intensified the notion that, in the era of naturalised geopolitics, political-
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economic success of one state had to come at the expense of another. Once more, 
though, beyond this mention there is neither sustained analysis nor empirical evidence 
offered to develop this perspective. 
 It is worth focusing in more detail on Agnew here because his mention of the 
importance of technology at the end of the nineteenth century matches almost 
verbatim Ó Tuathail’s discussion of technology in his 1992 paper on Mackinder. This 
draws attention to their common reference, Kern’s ([1983] 2003) book The Culture of 
Time and Space, 1880-1918. In this book, Kern documented the ways in which various 
technologies transformed human understandings of culture, distance, direction, and 
speed. What is peculiar is that, while both Agnew and Ó Tuathail cite Kern, they do not 
explicitly engage with his chapter on direction, where he discusses in great depth how 
railway technology (dis/re)orientated European states’ sense of direction, particularly 
away from a historical north-south or up-down axis associated with transcendence and 
freedom at the north extreme and immorality and vulgarity at the south. For Kern the 
development of the aeroplane, with its promise of upward motion, symbolised this axis, 
but railway technology underscored for perhaps the first time the political and economic 
significance of the east-west axis. Of course, and as Kern (2003: 257) agrees, the ‘East’ 
had long been associated with exoticism, mysticism, and romance, but  
“[t]hroughout the period the attention of world powers was constantly drawn to the 
new dynamics that emerged along [the east-west] axis. The new east-west railroad lines, 
the rise in global travel, the division of the world into precise and temporally ordered 
time zones, the alignment of the alliance systems, and the battle plans of generals 
underscored the ancient and universal significance of the east-west axis as the direction 
of the earth’s rotation and the location of dawn and sunset so deeply embedded in the 
poetry and imagery of human consciousness”        
Kern (2003: 258) ends this chapter with a brief discussion of Mackinder, before 
summarising that the “shifting directional orientation of nations was but one aspect of 
the complex history of diplomacy that led to [the First World War].” Yet none of this 
chapter is discussed by either of the aforementioned authors, who are satisfied to 
gesture towards the compression of distance, the truncation of time, and the 
rearrangement of social hierarchies introduced in the first two chapters of Kern’s book. 
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 In other words, there is an evident discrepancy in how critical geopolitics has 
treated transport technologies such as the railway in comparison to what Ó Tuathail 
refers to as the techniques and technologies for displaying space, something which is 
further demonstrated by the focus of popular geopolitics on different kinds of visual 
media (see Dittmer, 2010). In comparison, transport technologies are marginalised, 
gestured towards as contextual factors that must be acknowledged before more 
important and timely analyses can proceed. There also seems to be an offhand recycling 
of key tropes (the compression of distance, truncation of time, and rearrangement of 
social hierarchies) garnered from a brief reading of Kern in at least one instance. This is 
assumed to be a satisfactory gesticulation which is not deemed to require any critical 
reappraisal. Furthermore, it is perhaps indicative that what I would suggest as Kern’s 
most geopolitically relevant arguments are not specifically engaged with. This line of 
critique goes further than Williams’ (2005: 63) observation that “technology has been 
little understood as an actor in geopolitical processes”. In some of the foundational 
works of critical geopolitics, technologies of this kind have been little understood 
precisely because they are assumed to require no more discussion than a cursory glance 
of appreciation.  
 An exception to this is the work of Hugill (1995; 1999), which approaches 
geopolitics and technology not from the perspective of critical geopolitics, but from that 
of World Systems Theory. In World Trade since 1431: Geography, Technology, and 
Capitalism (1995), Hugill borrows from the theorist of technology Lewis Mumford to 
argue the history of technology may be divided into three phases or cycles – the 
Eotechnic, Paleotechnic, and Neotechnic. The first of these was based largely on rural 
production and manufacturing, and was superseded at the end of the eighteenth 
century by the Paleotechnic, defined by the emergence of heavy industries, steel, iron, 
and steam power (Hugill, 1995: 15-31). This Paleotechnic era, which was also the “first 
stage of capitalist industry” (Hugill, 1995: 7), was then supplanted by Neotechnic, which 
enabled economic production to be diversified:  
 “[w]hereas the Eotechnic was marked by extremely limited inland transportation and  
 the Paleotechnic was restricted to fixed lines of transport that operated poorly for short 
 hauls, the Neotechnic radically evened out geographic access. Electrically driven 
 streetcars and interurbans, bicycles, and automobiles, buses and trucks with internal 
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 combustion engines made short-haul transport economically viable and filled in the 
 broad interstices between Paleotechnic transportation lines.”  
Armed with this framework, Hugill proceeds on a wide-ranging analysis of different 
technological innovations, showing how each one shifted the economic and social 
relations integral to the geographical expansion of capitalism. While doing so, he argues 
the geography of these innovations shaped which states became hegemonic in different 
time periods. For example, he describes Portuguese maritime supremacy between c. 
1430 and the mid-1500s as “essentially driven by innovations in hardware. It was the 
three-masted ship, reliably navigated with good maps and navigational instruments and 
armed with cannon, that made Portugal’s hegemony possible” (Hugill, 1995: 20). In turn, 
these relations between geography and technology shaped the emergence of the global 
capitalist economy and its associated contours of world commence.  
 Hugill argued for the importance of his approach for geopolitics in a subsequent 
book, Global Communications since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology (1999). Although 
this work focuses primarily on communications, and specifically how telegraphy, radar, 
and wireless technologies enabled a transition from British to American global 
hegemony, its value from the perspective of this thesis is its acknowledgement of the 
impact of technology on geopolitical processes and relations. In doing so, he draws on 
Mackinder to suggest that, in 1904, Britain was “at the mercy of a powerful land state 
coming to control the Eurasian landmass with railroads and telegraphs and thus able to 
command the resources of the heartland to build an overpowering fleet” (Hugill, 1999: 
159). However, there is a weakness with Hugill’s articulation of the relation between 
technology and geopolitics. This is its lack of focus on how the railway, and technology in 
general, was important to geopolitical imaginations and visions of space, such as those 
analysed by Agnew (2003). The root of this weakness is his privileging of the social and 
economic relations of capitalist production over all else, including the imaginings, 
divisions, and representations of global space that comprise the foci of analysis in critical 
geopolitics (Agnew, 2003; 2014). Thus, although Hugill pays more attention to 
technology than Agnew (2003) and Ó Tuathail (1996), he does so in a way that does not 
enable a re-evaluation of the links between technology and critical geopolitics in the 
way that this thesis is attempting.  
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 In foregrounding the railway as a fundamental element in the emergence of 
transcontinentalism, this thesis thus contributes to a broader critique of critical 
geopolitics as wrongfully neglectful of the importance of transport technologies in 
shaping both the modern geopolitical imagination (as defined by Agnew) and 
geopolitical imaginaries and visions of space more generally. In the conclusion I will say 
more about why this is important to critical geopolitics’ research agenda as a whole, but 
for now I want to underscore the importance of the railway in shaping, and entwining 
with, the geopolitical processes that gave rise to transcontinentalism.    
2.3.2. Power projection and land power 
 Power projection is a crucial concept for the emergence of transcontinentalism, 
which while common in strategic studies and defence literature has been given an 
original and significant conceptualisation by Williams (2005; 2010) in her work on 
aviation geopolitics. In her PhD thesis, which examined the role of aviation technology 
and airpower in the territorialisation of the Pacific as a United States space in the 
interwar years, Williams (2005: 64) developed the idea of the technogeopolitical project, 
which “seeks to understand how technology is used to incorporate a specific space”. 
More specifically, it seeks to understand how states use specific technologies to project 
and territorialise control and sovereignty over space in particular time periods. She 
shows how, after the Spanish-American War in 1898, “the United States began to view 
the Pacific as a US space, but it was not until the interwar period (1918-1941) that the 
US was able to use the technology of airpower to materialise and territorialise this 
perception” (Williams, 2005: 12). Aviation technology enabled the US to conduct surveys 
of Pacific space, to develop and operate commercial transpacific air routes through the 
establishment of Pan American Airways, and to construct aviation facilities on a number 
of Pacific islands. Williams thus captures the essence of what Butler (2001), her key 
interlocutor, terms the recursive relationship between technology and geopolitics: a 
(US) geopolitical imaginary of a space (the Pacific) as essentially empty and thus ripe for 
colonisation precipitated a technogeopolitical project (aviation technology) which 
subsequently territorialised that space with United States sovereignty. 
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 Pivotal to the technogeopolitical project is the concept of power projection, 
which Williams develops in dialogue with a number of airpower theorists and 
contemporary political geographers. Power projection has two tenets, the first of which 
is defined as “the deployment of resources beyond the territorial boundaries of the 
state” (Williams, 2010: 83). To return to railways, in political science, military history, 
and strategic studies they have been studied in this way mostly for their ability to 
transport troops - those “commanded to execute the violence demanded by the state in 
pursuit of its wider geopolitical objectives” (Woodward and Jenkings, 2012: 496-497) - 
and munitions to military fronts with greater speed and precision (see e.g. Onorato et al, 
2014; Showalter, 1975; Van Creveld, 1977; Wolmar, 2010). Usually, this is framed as a 
solution to the perennial problem of pre-modern warfare: logistics. Prior to the 
invention of the railway, soldiers were firstly forced to bodily carry their own supplies 
(food, water, armaments, and so on) to areas of combat, and secondly when these 
supplies grew scarce, soldiers had no means of replenishing them short of foraging, 
developing agriculture, and in many cases pillaging their conquered lands. Conversely, 
“[t]he adoption of the railroad allowed states to transport men, munitions, and food in 
such quantities and with such speed that mass armies representing as much as 10 
percent of a society’s total population suddenly became feasible” (Onorato et al, 2014: 
451). Virilio (2005: 60-62) equates the invention of the railway to the invention of 
modern logistics, suggesting that modern logistics came into being when armies could 
no longer rely on the land on which they were operating, and instead had to have all of 
the necessary supplies moved to them rather than the other way round. Narrating as if 
present at the invention of the railway itself, he remarks that “initially charged with the 
transport of supplies, then with the transport of troops, this ‘weapon’ will finally be 
engaged in combat, in reinforcing the units on the line” (Virilio, 2005: 71). “With the 
steam engine,” he concludes, “we are in the presence of a weapon of movement that 
extends that of the engine of war” (Virilio, 2005: 73).  
 There is a second dimension to power projection that Williams also emphasises. 
This is the more imaginative and metaphorical side of the concept whereby power 
projection “produces specific understandings of space that privilege one state’s control 
over it” (Williams, 2010: 83). It conjures images of power as “highly mobile, but 
50 
 
nevertheless tied to a centre and projected outwards” (Williams, 2010: 84). Thus the 
US’s territorialisation of the Pacific was achieved not only through methods of colonial 
survey or war planning, but also through popular geopolitical means. For instance, 
Williams (2005) shows how the representation of the commercial Pan American Airways 
transpacific flights through postage stamps, newspaper reporting, and other popular 
geopolitical mediums engendered an increasing recognition among the general 
population that the US’s western frontier was gradually extending to encompass the 
Pacific. In other words, it is not simply that power projection signifies the application of 
military force beyond the territorial boundaries of the state. Rather, power projection 
works to territorialise particular spaces and places as under the control of one given 
state to the detriment of other states. Precisely how this occurs is dependent upon the 
technology utilised and the attributes of the space under consideration; the Pacific 
Ocean, for example, was ripe for territorialisation by aviation technology because its 
vastness rendered previous modes of sea power insufficient for achieving and 
maintaining US supremacy.  
 I will argue in the chapters that follow that power projection is crucial to 
understanding transcontinentalism because a specifically transcontinental railway, 
spanning points at opposite or opposing ends of continental landmasses, came to signify 
the territorialisation of state power across the space that would be traversed by the 
railway (i.e. the entire continent). This was because these opposite or opposing points 
were constructed as the extreme longitudinal and latitudinal points of a continent, and 
the space between these points was consequently rendered as the entirety of the 
continental landmass itself. This enabled the construction of a transcontinental railway 
to be associated with the territorialisation of power across the entire continental 
landmass as opposed to the minute space that would be physically covered by the 
sleepers and rails.  
 Finally, the importance of the railway and power projection for 
transcontinentalism is intimately related to a deeper and, by the outbreak of the First 
World War, arguably entrenched binary opposition drawn between the exercise of sea 
power and the exercise of land power. This is well known to geographers due to its 
association with Mackinder (1904), who as noted in the opening line of this thesis 
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equated the construction of transcontinental railways with the transmuting of land 
power relative to sea power. As I will analyse in much greater depth in Section 2.5., 
Mackinder conceptualised Britain as a sea power, dependent upon the power projection 
enabled by the might of the British Navy to secure and (re)produce its global circulations 
of troops, resources, and commerce. Germany and Russia, on the other hand, were 
defined by Mackinder as land powers that by virtue of their geographical position astride 
the Heartland would attempt to use railway technology to ascend to a position of global 
hegemony. However, I argue that the displacement of sea power by land power shaped 
not only the emergence, but also the critical importance of the idea of 
transcontinentalism as a doctrine that would enable the territorialisation of power 
across continental space. This was because, especially in the case of the Baghdad 
Railway, the construction of a transcontinental railway was broadly equated to the 
establishment of what the British naval strategist Corbett ([1911] 1988) called an 
amphibious power (see Kraska, 2011: 75); a power that could project power across the 
entire planet through a noxious combination of effective land and sea power. Because 
the terminating points of transcontinental railways were always ports, and because 
these ports were constructed as the extreme opposites of their respective continents, 
power could be projected across both land and sea with an unrivalled flexibility, 
mobility, and severity.  
2.3.3. The civilising rails 
 Aside from power projection, there are two other important aspects of railway 
technology relevant to the emergence of transcontinentalism; the first well documented 
by scholars but the second seldom recognised explicitly. The first is the well-known 
association of railways with the spread of European civilisation, progress, and modernity 
across the world. As Ahuja (2005: 96) has summarised, “‘railways’ were, to all intents 
and purposes, used as a synonym for ‘civilization’ in the late nineteenth-century political 
discourse of colonial legitimacy.” This synonymy became so entrenched within European 
culture that it very quickly moved from the foreground to the periphery of railway 
discourse as it became established as a universally recognised truism. In 1916 the 
President of the Royal Geographical Society, Sir Francis Younghusband (in Fox et al, 
1916: 20), encapsulated this perspective:  
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 “In Europe our railways are such everyday matter-of-fact incidents in our life that we do 
 not look on them with any particular enthusiasm; but in any of the three great  
 continents, Africa, Asia, or North and South America, a railway takes on a different 
 aspect. It becomes a thing of romance. We see its branches in the form of great fingers 
 indicating in what direction the firm hand of civilization and commerce will soon follow.”  
 The most striking example of this was Jefferson’s analysis of what he first termed 
the ‘civilising rails’ in 1928. Surveying the previous hundred years of railway technology, 
Jefferson (1928: 230) argued that it had increasingly “enabled men to carry civilization, a 
civilization that was undoubtedly European, into what had been a trackless wilderness.” 
Jefferson theorised that the space ten miles either side of a railway line marked what he 
termed a corridor of civilization, and that when many railway tracks existed in close 
proximity a railweb was created. For Jefferson (1928: 217), those living inside a railweb 
or within ten miles of a railway were automatically within ample reach of “the agency 
that for the century past has done more than any other single one of man’s inventions 
to transform human life, especially in the way of pushing backward people forward and 
lifting submerged classes”.  Jefferson used this theorisation to examine, classify, and 
analyse all the regions of the world, producing a series of maps displaying the corridors 
and railwebs of civilisation (see Figure 2.1). The dark black of the railless portions of the 
world was contrasted with the bright white of everywhere within ten miles of a railway. 
As Graham et al (2015: 337) explain,  
“[t]he white colour of the maps of Western Europe and Britain showed that connectivity 
had advanced so far that it made up a railwayweb with the ‘the civilizing rails’ having all 
but eliminated the backwoods areas with their peasant ways.” 
 The relevance of this to transcontinentalism is that, as with power projection, the 
construction of transcontinental railways was associated with the accomplishment of 
the fervent dream of Younghusband, Jefferson, and so many at the time; the civilisation 
of entire continental landmasses and the hoisting of continents such as Africa out of a 
state of pure nature to a level coeval to that of Europe. As before, this was because the 
space between the two opposite extremes of continents was fashioned as the entirety of 
the continent itself. Transcontinentalism was thus defined by the desire to use railway 
technology to span or transverse continents and thereby enable the civilising of entire 
continental landmasses.    
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Figure 2.1: Mark Jefferson's (1928: 218, 226) maps of the civilising rails in Europe and Africa. 
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2.3.4. The tentacular rails 
 Finally, a little noted feature of railway technology in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was its biologisation and naturalisation concomitantly to the 
naturalisation of geopolitics discussed by Agnew (2003). Railway lines were frequently 
discussed in terms of several different kinds of biological organism; most prominently 
the pathways of the human cardiovascular system’s veins and arteries; the structure of 
the musculoskeletal system such as the spine, ribs, and fingers; the sinews of the 
nervous system such as nerves; and finally different parts of plants and trees such as 
roots, trunk lines, offshoots, and branches. The biologisation of railway discourse was 
apparent before the invention and spread of the railway itself, emerging after James 
Watt drew an analogy between steam power and horsepower in 1784. This inaugurated 
the notion that technological and mechanised power could and should be represented 
and discussed in terms of natural, biological energy, culminating in the symbolic 
description of the railway as an iron horse (on this, see Revill, 2012: 25-29). In the 1840s 
references to railways as ‘trunk lines’ between British cities increased (e.g. Macneill, 
1843; Gandell and Brunton, 1845). The discourse intensified and pluralised enormously 
from around 1880 onwards, growing to encompass the aforementioned systems of 
biological energy crucial to the maintenance of complex life. As Revill (2012: 10-11) puts 
it, “[r]ailway systems were frequently described using organic metaphors, such as the 
cardiovascular system of a huge body or the tentacles of an enormous octopus.”  
 It is of course tempting to dismiss the biologisation of railway discourse as an 
intriguing but ultimately unimportant feature of nineteenth century language use. 
However, as Schivelbusch (1986: 195) has argued it must be seen in the wider context of 
what he calls “the biologization of social and economic processes and, conversely, the 
influence of underlying social conditions on biophysiological notions.” This, additionally, 
must be extended into the co-constitutive realm of the social, the geopolitical, and the 
technological. The most incisive and diagnostic articulation of this co-constitution was 
provided by the German geographer and philosopher Ernst Kapp (1808-1896), a writer 
who is as unrecognised in geography as he is revered in other fields as the first modern 
philosopher of technology. Influenced by the philosopher G.W.F. Hegel and the eminent 
German geographer Karl Ritter, Kapp became fascinated by the new scientific approach 
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to geography and consequently published a number of books on geography and history 
(for more details on Kapp’s life and wider work, see Hartmann, 2014: 24-25; Mitcham, 
1994: 20-25). Kapp’s work argued for and developed Ritter’s embryonic organic 
conception of the state. As Hartmann (2014: 24-25) recalls, it “was especially Ritter who 
influenced Kapp to think of geography in a physiological way in which elements of the 
earth were considered to be like inter-related organs.” In 1877 Kapp published what is 
now considered his magnum opus, Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik (‘Principles 
of a Philosophy of Technology’). It is this book that more than any other elucidates the 
geopolitical importance of the biologisation of railway (and wider technological) 
discourse.  
In this book, Kapp defined technology as Organprojektion, or a direct projection 
and prolongation of human organs. In other words, he believed that our organs are 
projected into artificial means of tools or instruments, and that technology is therefore 
quite literally a reproduction or extension of the human body (Kapp, 1877: 44-45, 
quoted in Lawson, 2010: 208). Importantly, Kapp suggested that particular technologies 
are the projections of specific organs only and not in a more general sense. His starting 
point was the human hand, which Kapp considered the most dextrous and thus most 
fundamental part of the human body. Many of the earliest human technologies were 
projections of the hand(s): the cupped hands are projected in entities that hold water 
such as the hollow coconut or, later, the cup itself; whilst the fists are projected in all 
manner of entities such as the hammer and many other kinds of weapons (Martins, 
1993). He would also suggest projections for the arm (sword, spear, shovel, spade), the 
bent finger (most notably the fishing hook), and the teeth (knife) (Kapp, 1877: 44-45, 
quoted in Lawson, 2010: 208; see also Mitcham, 1994: 23-24). The notion of 
Organprojektion, then, refers to the externalisation of an interior, whereby the human 
body is protracted and given force unto the world in and through its projection by 
technology.  
 But Kapp did not stop at simple hand tools such as these. He lived in a time 
where the proliferation of telegraph and railway technologies was reaching its height, 
and this is also reflected in his empirical meditations on technology. Kapp analogised the 
telegraph network as a projection of the human nervous system: “The nerves are the 
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‘cables’ of the animal body, and the telegraph networks are the projected nerves of 
humanity” (Steinert, 2016: 63). Hartmann (2014: 29-31) explains how Kapp compared 
illustrations of the cross section of the undersea telegraph cable to that of the nerve 
fibre to make this point (see Figure 2.2). Further, Kapp discussed railway networks as an 
extension and externalisation of the human circulatory system (Lawson, 2010). “Like the 
organism,” he suggested, “the steam engine circulates energy and needs ‘food’ in the 
form of coal in order to maintain its activity” (quoted in Steinert, 2016: 63). 
 
Figure 2.2: Kapp's comparison of the cross section of a telegraph cable (above) and the human nerve (below). Kapp 
used these images to illustrate how telegraph cables were the nerves of humanity. Reproduced from Hartmann 
(2014: 30). 
 What is significant, however, is that Kapp insisted technology is not a simple one-
way extension of human reason, intention or judgement, a notion that can sometimes 
be found in contemporary reformulations of his philosophy (e.g. Lawson, 2010). 
“Humans not only ‘project’ their organs into their artificial means but these artificial 
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means also enhance and support the bodily organs” (Kapp, 1877: 42, quoted in Steinert, 
2016: 63). Thus, instead of being a passive tool waiting patiently to be thrust into the 
world by its human masters, Kapp emphasised the active, agential role that technology 
plays in the reproduction, transformation, and distortion of the original ‘human-species-
being’ (Heersmink, 2012). Technology is not reduced to its utility value, but instead 
“becomes a fundamental functional element in the biological and cultural evolution of 
homo sapiens” (Väliaho, 2008: 7). As Väliaho (2008: 7) continues, “what is projected as 
an outside, the technological object, gets confused with the very inside, the origin of 
projection, which is the body.” Kapp thus characterised the human-technology relation 
as recursive and interdependent; “human and technology are defined as one functional 
system in which the distinction between human and technology becomes arbitrary” 
(Heersmink, 2012: 122). In other words, technology is as constitutive of the human as 
the human is constitutive of technology, to the point where upholding an ontological 
distinction between the two is entirely untenable. The evolution of humanity for Kapp is 
in fact a coevolution of humanity and technology; a constant process of production and 
reproduction.     
 Kapp’s argument has much in common with contemporary philosophical 
accounts of technology as extension (see Steinert, 2016, for an overview), but his 
argument was also of its time and should not be hastily divorced from the context of his 
geographical roots and the era of naturalised geopolitics. In his philosophy, technology is 
not deprived of the agency to impact upon bodily functions and organs, and nor does it 
simply extend them. Instead, “it is through various kinds of technological projections of 
its gestures and organs that the human kind constantly models, replicates and recreates 
itself in the course of its evolution” (Väliaho, 2008: 7). In short, in this thesis I argue that 
Kapp’s ontology of technology was ‘upscaled’ from human to state in the era of 
naturalised geopolitics. Technologies such as the railway or telegraph were not simply 
extensions or replications of the state, but were constitutive of the reproduction of the 
state itself. Thus, just as there “is no ontological distinction between the human and 
technology” in Kapp’s philosophy (Van Den Eede, 2014: 156), I would argue there was 
little distinction between the state and technology in the era of naturalised geopolitics; 
both were biologised and thus folded into one another. Organprojektion can moreover 
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be related to power projection; but although power projection suggests the movement 
of a pre-defined and latent power located at a central node through transport 
technologies, Kapp’s philosophy stressed that the technology itself was intrinsic to the 
very (re)production, replication, and recreation of state power.  
 An example of this from a similar time Kapp was writing was the French fiction 
writer Émile Zola’s novel La Bête humaine, which was published in 1890 and is centred 
upon the railway between Paris and Le Havre. In this novel Zola embarked on a detailed 
biological and anthropomorphised depiction of the expanding French railway network. 
“[The railway] was like a huge body”, Zola ([1890] 1948: 51) wrote, “a gigantic being 
lying across the earth, his head in Paris, his vertebrae all along the line, his limbs 
stretching out into branch lines, with feet and hands in Le Havre and other terminals.” 
Zola’s description conflates the focal points of the railway network and the political and 
economic urban centres of the French state, producing an image of the feet and hands 
not as the organs (as Kapp would have it) of the state but analogously as the state’s 
supportive and upholstering structures. Meanwhile, the head of the railway network is 
depicted as Paris, the calculating administrative, juridical, political, and economic focal 
point of the French state. As Kapp would have insisted, Zola’s description of the railway 
network draws no distinction between the organs (or bones) of the French state and the 
skeletal form of the railway network; they are ontologically connected and 
fundamentally inexorable.  
 This interplay between the naturalised geopolitics of the state and the 
biologisation of railway discourse produced the last and possibly most definitive aspect 
of transcontinentalism. In parallel to how non-European space was imagined as 
uncivilised with the railway the means by which civilisation would occur, it was also 
imagined as lifeless and inert, and the railway the means through which it would be 
given life, structure, and strength. Railways were the means by which biological state 
power would be reproduced, enhanced, and entrenched across space on a 
transcontinental scale. As discussed previously, this was important because continents, 
especially Africa, were similarly imagined as dark, unconscious, slumbering spaces that 
could only be enlightened, revitalised, and awakened through the construction and 
penetration of railways. Railways were the arteries through which the lifeblood of 
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continents would be both produced and given motion, they comprised the skeleton that 
gave continents their upholstering and structure, and in their association with trunks 
and branches they were the means by which continents would sprout and blossom 
upwards, the direction of ascension aloft the ‘stream of Time’, and away from their 
previous unconscious incarceration within nature. Transcontinental railways were 
accordingly the trunk, spine, or backbone of the continents they were constructed to 
traverse; quite literally providing continents with the infrastructure of civilisation and 
producing, extending, replicating, and transforming the state constructing it 
simultaneously. This was not always as explicit as Kapp and Zola made it, but I will argue 
it underpinned transcontinentalism, especially in the years immediately before, during, 
and after the First World War.  
 As Schivelbusch (1986) has argued, the biologisation of geopolitical and 
technological discourses was intimately related. Schivelbusch (1986: 194) suggests that 
the concept of circulation best captures the enmeshing of the social, biological, and 
technological together in the nineteenth century: “[t]he nineteenth century’s 
preoccupation with the conquest and mastery of space and time [found] its most 
general expression in the concept of circulation, which was central to the scientistic 
social notions of the epoch.” Circulation is a term that has become enormously 
influential in the humanities and social sciences, especially in the aftermath of the 
translation and publication of Michel Foucault’s (2007) Security, Territory, Population: 
Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978 in English. Scholars have utilised his 
definition to explore a myriad of historical and contemporary connections between 
security, population, territory, and mobility (e.g; Glück, 2015; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 
2016; Salter, 2013). However, as Behrent (2013: 55) notes, Foucault “never had much to 
say [...] about technology in its broadest and most conventional sense.” On the other 
hand, Schivelbusch (1986: 194-195) recognised that the development of circulation 
reflected both biological (cardiovascular) and technological (the movement of traffic on 
railways) developments, and that the vitality of social, political, and economic 
institutions became connected to the existence of a functioning circulatory system of 
one kind or another:  
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 “In this complex sense, the circulation concept serves as a key to unlock the open 
 triumphs as well as the hidden anxieties of the nineteenth century. The formula is as 
 simple as can be: whatever was part of circulation was regarded as healthy, progressive, 
 constructive; all that was detached from circulation, on the other hand,  appeared 
 diseased, medieval, subversive, threatening.” 
 Building on this, in this thesis I argue that transcontinentalism became a doctrine 
of inserting a functioning circulatory system – a railway system, assembled around the 
transcontinental railway as its ‘spine’ or ‘backbone’ – into previously inert, uncivilised, 
and unconscious continental spaces, providing an unrestricted and previously impossible 
mobility of troops, labour, resources, and other objects across continental space for the 
political and economic benefit of the constructing state. This system would 
simultaneously civilise the entire continental landmass in question, territorialise state 
power across continental space, and enable the full and typically dormant economic and 
developmental potential of the continent under question to be realised and connected 
to wider global and transnational flows. This, in turn, was equated with the realisation of 
the Social Darwinian ideal, the creation of an amalgamation of people, land, and 
resources so overwhelmingly superior to any other it could even guarantee the global 
hegemony of that state relative to others. In the last analysis, therefore, 
transcontinentalism was a geopolitical and technological doctrine of the creation (or 
maintenance) of global dominance.  
2.3.5. Summary 
 This section has identified and explained the three important technological 
discourses that conditioned the rise of the doctrine of transcontinentalism, which can be 
summarised as railways as a tool of power projection, railways as a vanguard of 
civilisation, and railways as a bodily augmentation and extension of the biological state 
organism. The section has also critiqued critical geopolitics for its lack of attention to the 
role of technology in shaping geopolitical processes in the time period under 
consideration. Finally, it has demonstrated how the biologisation of geopolitical and 
technological discourses is best captured by Schivelbusch’s (1986) concept of circulation, 
and thus how transcontinentalism was defined by a fantasy of inserting a functioning 
circulatory system into a previous inert, docile, and unconscious expanse of 
transcontinental space.  
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 In the final section of this chapter I return to Mackinder’s ideas; not just those 
three works considered the overtly ‘geopolitical’ segments of his writing, but his wider 
corpus as a whole. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, re-examining Mackinder’s 
corpus in the light of transcontinentalism provides a way of clarifying and grounding the 
sometimes abstract themes and ideas that I have been discussing so far in this chapter. 
The second reason is that foregrounding transcontinentalism in an analysis of 
Mackinder’s ideas produces a new and fruitful way of reading and understanding his 
oeuvre. In this reading, Mackinder is not the grand geopolitician who deduced an 
emergent reality of the relationship between geography, technology, and state power 
before anyone else. Rather, reading him in the context of transcontinentalism locates 
him in the doctrine encompassing Gilpin in the American case and Dostoevsky in the 
Russian. Mackinder, in other words, evinced the attributes of transcontinentalism I have 
defined in this chapter par excellence.   
2.4. Transcontinentalism and Mackinder 
 Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947) is unquestionably one the most important 
authors in the history of geopolitics, something that is evinced by the sheer volume and 
variance of subsequent interpretations of his work. In some branches of political science 
and neoclassical geopolitics, Mackinder’s ideas on the relationship between geography, 
technology, and state power have inspired an enormous amount of writing that seeks to 
incorporate post-World War Two technological developments into geopolitical 
theorising. To cite only two examples, Gray (1977: 6, 12) has consistently argued for the 
relevance of Mackinder’s ideas for the field of international relations, postulating that 
“[t]he meaning of physical geography is, of course, altered by technology” and that the 
reinterpretation of the likes of Mackinder therefore requires “great caution, in view of 
the changed meaning that technology gives to geography.” Similarly, like Mackinder, Ball 
(1985) considered both geography and natural resources as stable and rigid factors in 
the production of national power, fixed in place as they are in the earth. “The most 
dynamic factor”, he continued, “is technology”; the “primary determinant of much of 
human activity” (1985: 171). Thus, as he summarised,  
 “there is an extremely complex, interdependent and dynamic relationship between 
 technology, geography, and national power, the particular manifestations of which differ 
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 as between specific technologies, different geographical and strategic circumstances, 
 and over different time periods” (Ball, 1985: 171).   
Perhaps most notably, Mackinder’s ideas on geography and technology have been 
reformulated by neoclassical geopolitical theorists, those who “explicitly locate 
themselves within the Mackinder-Haushofer-Spykman tradition, but [who] creatively 
rework it with reference to changed social, economic, political, and cultural factors” 
(Megoran, 2010a: 187). Two such authors, Deudney (2000) and Dolman (2002: 31, 
original emphasis), have explicitly argued that “[t]he influence of emerging technologies 
on geography [...] is the foundation of the geopolitical strategists’ thought.” 
 Much more could be said about the appropriation of Mackinder by such authors, 
but the prominence of technology in Mackinder’s oeuvre has, in parallel to its wider 
neglect of technology, been underappreciated in critical geopolitics. Throughout the 
past three decades or so, Mackinder has been the subject of much discussion in critical 
geopolitics and beyond. Precisely because of his popularity with Cold War authors and 
theorists such as Spykman, various scholars sought to contextualise Mackinder’s writings 
within the broader social, cultural, geoeconomic, and diplomatic currents of his time in 
order to demystify the seemingly eternal insight of his ideas, while others grounded his 
geopolitical thought in his parallel and longstanding concerns with “education, imperial 
trade, banking, man-power and the so-called English tradition” (Dodds and Sidaway, 
2004: 293, see also Blouet, 1987; Kearns, 2009; Mayhew, 2000; O’Hara and Heffernan, 
2006; Venier, 2004).  Yet technology is conspicuous by its absence in many of these 
discussions, and only mentioned in passing by those who do acknowledge it. For 
example, in his account of the origins of European geopolitics (and Mackinder’s role 
therein) between 1890 and 1920, Heffernan (2000: 34) gestures towards the “awesome 
[…] and deeply disturbing” possibility of a railway system traversing Asia, but this is not 
developed into any sustained analysis.  In his landmark article on Mackinder, Ó Tuathail 
(1992: 106) discusses four material transformations that occurred between 1875 and 
1914 and their relationship to the development of Mackinder’s geopolitical ideas; the 
third of which he defines as “the time-space compression ushered in by the diffusion of 
new technologies and new global standards to regulate daily life.”  Ó Tuathail (1992: 
106) notes that the dynamism of the Trans-Siberian Railway “combined with the 
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giganticism of this land empire promoted an excessive yet self-assured futurology […] on 
Mackinder’s part”.  However, Ó Tuathail does not cultivate these comments into a 
sustained engagement with Mackinder’s ideas about technology.  
 Despite excluding technology from his later classification of the “six elements 
that are at the heart of Mackinder’s geopolitical works” (Kearns, 2013: 918), Kearns 
provides perhaps the most developed critical discussion of technology in an earlier 
consideration of Mackinder’s ideas. Kearns (2010: 190-191) notes that, for Mackinder, 
“the relations between technology and strategy were about to change producing a new 
post-Columbian age”, and that previously the “iron horse had transformed the space 
relations of the world organism.” In a similar example, Ó Tuathail and Luke (2000: 370) 
have discussed Mackinder in the context of a critical overview of the work of French 
theorist Paul Virilio. Here, they go as far as stating that “[t]he pivot in Halford 
Mackinder’s famous 1904 ‘geographical pivot of history’ paper is the relationship 
between physical geography and transportation technology or what he called ‘mobilities 
of power’”. Both of these examples have much in common with my analysis of 
Mackinder below, but I argue that they do not go far enough. Mackinder’s geopolitics 
can be thought, contrarily, as one of the most articulate and prominent examples of 
transcontinentalism. He equated the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway with the 
civilisation of the Russian state (or whatever state was to occupy the Eurasian 
Heartland), its establishment as a land-power far superior to the sea-power available to 
Britain, and the insertion of a system of circulation that would enrich and invigorate 
Russian space. For Mackinder, the servant of the British Empire, this came with one 
inevitable outcome, the final evisceration of Britain’s already declining and precarious 
position in the world. The reason, as is well known, that this was possible was because 
of the material and physical geographic features of the Heartland itself, containing all of 
the resources necessary for the creation of an impregnable global power.   
 To the extent that Mackinder’s ([1919] 1942: 176) thought can be encapsulated 
within a brief sentence, he believed that “[m]an and not nature initiates, but nature in 
large measure controls.” The oft cited ‘Geographical Pivot of History’ paper, which 
Mackinder delivered as a lecture to the Royal Geographical Society on  January 25th 
1904, is the usual starting point for such discussions, but I want to consider two of his 
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earliest papers first. Blouet (2013: 43) has noted in passing that in his 1887 ‘On the 
Scope and Methods of Geography’, Mackinder observed that “the significance of space 
and route ways might be altered by transportation technology.”  In this paper, 
Mackinder (1887: 157) argued that 
 “[m]an alters his environment, and the action of that environment on his posterity is 
 changed in consequence. The relative importance of physical features varies from age to 
 age according to the state of knowledge and of material civilisation.”         
In what followed, Mackinder (1887: 157) made clear what he meant by ‘material 
civilisation’: the development of technology; “[t]he invention of the steam engine and 
the electric telegraph”, amongst others.  Thus, while “the distribution of animal, 
vegetable, and mineral productions has done much to determine the local 
characteristics of civilisation”, Mackinder (1887: 157) was unambiguous that  
 “[o]ne thing, however, must always be borne in mind. The course of history at a given 
 moment, whether in politics, society, or any other sphere of human activity, is the 
 product not only of environment but also of the momentum acquired in the past."  
 Mackinder (1887: 143) had preceded this discussion of technology and resource 
distribution with a thoroughly naturalised geopolitical introduction: different races were 
“units in the struggle for existence, more or less favoured by their several 
environments.” These sentences, despite comprising just a few lines on one page of his 
entire paper, indicate that the abstract features of Mackinder’s thought were at least 
embryonic some fifteen years before the delivery of his Pivot lecture. For Mackinder, the 
‘relative importance of physical features’ fluctuated depending on the means of 
technology used to traverse them. Mackinder’s mention of ‘the distribution of animal, 
vegetable, and mineral resources’ also foreshadows his later concern with Central Asia 
and “the likely impact of the area’s potentially limitless resources on the global balance 
of power” (O’Hara and Heffernan, 2006: 55).  Importantly, this reflects the more general 
ability to identify, classify, and pass judgement on the physical geographic attributes on 
continental landmasses that Mackinder later did in 1904. However, although “the 
geographer look[ed] at the past [so] that he may interpret the present” (Mackinder, 
1887: 146), it was only through also understanding the currents of technological 
development that it became possible to comprehend the relative importance of this 
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geography, and also, therefore, to predict the future through speculating on future 
technological developments.  
 Mackinder (1890) developed these sentiments more concretely in an address he 
delivered to the Scottish Geographical Society in Edinburgh on December 18th 1889. 
Entitled ‘The physical basis of political geography’, Mackinder (1890: 78) declared his 
intention “to state a few of the ways in which geographical features govern or, at least, 
guide history”. He discussed how geographical features such as mountain ranges formed 
barriers to the movement or “travelling” of man, and detailed how before the 
development of technology these barriers to this movement were “constant” and “rock-
like” (1890: 79). However, he also argued that “the resistance offered by a given feature 
to man’s movement [...] are for ever varying with the state of civilisation” (1890: 79).  
Mackinder’s use of the term ‘state of civilisation’ corresponds closely to that mentioned 
two years previously in 1887. For Mackinder, whilst the physical geography of the 
earth’s surface was fixed and unchanging, the state of civilisation shaped the extent to 
which these geographical features prevented or restricted the movement of humanity, 
because a higher state of civilisation essentially equalled a more developed phase of 
technological development. He argued that, before the advent of the seafaring ship, “all 
movement was on land and the sea [was] an absolute barrier” (1890: 79). However, 
“[w]ith the compass the resistance of the ocean fell [...] to give water so trifling a 
resistance as compared with rock that men took it inland in canals” (1890: 79). Finally, 
Mackinder reached the point in history, only sixty or so years before he was  speaking, 
when “suddenly George Stephenson reversed in this respect the whole current of 
history”, so that the resistance to man’s movement offered by land “fell so out of all 
proportion that it is now lower than that of water” (1890: 79). He summarised it thusly: 
“while the mountains change their form almost imperceptibly in long ages, a daring 
leader, a mechanical discovery, a great engineering monument, may revolutionise man’s 
relations to geography in the third of a generation” (1890: 79).        
 Consequently, more than a decade before the Pivot paper, Mackinder’s core 
theorisation of the relationship between geography and technology was in place. While 
disclosing that due to various earth surface processes the physical geography of the 
earth was not actually fixed, he understandably considered their changes negligible and, 
66 
 
moreover, far subordinate to the changes that could be engendered by revolutions in 
technology. Mackinder (1890: 79) did not use the word ‘technology’, referring to what 
we would now understand as ship and rail technologies as “arts.”  Nonetheless, his 
meaning in these two lectures is clear. To Mackinder history was shaped by the relation 
between the unchanging geography of the earth’s surface (which can be objectively 
known and analysed in relation to its parts) and the current mode of technological 
development available at any given point in history. Thus, Mackinder’s use of the words 
‘govern or, at least, guide’ as opposed to simply govern (which would by synonymous 
with determine) indicates that he believed the importance of geographical features was 
irreducible to their form. While their form remained permanent, their importance to 
man’s movement fluctuated according to the erratic logic of technological development.  
 Reread in this light, I would argue that there are two major developments of 
Mackinder’s thinking in the Pivot paper. Firstly was the way he connected this already 
established relation between geography and technology to state power (as Kearns 
[2010: 189] puts it, this is when Mackinder “wished to develop the implications [of his 
argument] not for the subject of geography, but for the foreign policy of the United 
Kingdom”). The second development was how he identified the ‘pivot area’ as a 
continental landmass with all of the necessary attributes to secure the hegemony of the 
state occupying it. In the lecture, Mackinder introduced a new term which he used 
frequently throughout: the ‘mobility of power’; a term which is very analogous to 
Williams’ conceptualisation of power projection and one which I think is integral to how 
he discusses the relationship between geography, technology, and the shifting balances 
of global power. He began by analysing the rise and fall of the horsemen of the Mongol 
Empire, proposing that  
 “[f]or a thousand years a series of horse-riding peoples emerged from Asia through the 
 broad interval between the Ural mountains and the Caspian sea, rode through the open 
 spaces of southern Russia, and struck home into Hungary in the very heart of the 
 European peninsula, shaping by necessity of opposing them the history of each of 
 the great peoples around” (Mackinder, 1904: 427).   
This portion of history, therefore, was for Mackinder (1904: 427) shaped by the horse-
riding Mongols, yet, as he continues, “the mobility of their power was conditioned by 
the steppes, and necessarily ceased in the surrounding forests and mountains”.  Thus 
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the horse was the first in Mackinder’s litany of transport technologies. Mackinder (1904: 
430) defined the horse as a technology which conditioned the mobility of Mongol power 
across the “naked, unscarped lower ranges” of the steppes and into Europe; however 
this power was itself hindered by the forest and mountain, which presented 
geographical barriers to the movement of the horse and thus the mobility of power it 
enabled.  It is thus immediately apparent that the mobility of power is, like the 
movement or travelling of man, conditioned by the combination of geography with the 
mode of technology that is used to traverse it. As he previously put it, power “surges 
and rests, ebbs and flows”, around physical geographic barriers (Mackinder, 1890: 79). 
 Furthermore, Mackinder then documented how different technologies, the 
horse, the ship, the railway, and – later – the aircraft, were modes of transport with 
specific attributes which interacted with the physical geography of the earth in different 
ways to produce different effects. Next in his litany of transport technologies was the 
“the rival mobility of power […] of the Vikings in their boats”, whose “power was 
effective only in the neighbourhood of the water” (Mackinder, 1904: 427-428). At this 
point in history the people of Europe were thus held between two pincers, the dual 
pressures of the horseman from the East and the Viking from the sea, the mobility of 
power of each conditioned by the unchanging geography of the earth’s surface and the 
kind of technology used to transverse it. Mackinder (1904: 432) then proceeded to the 
advanced seafaring ship, “which endowed Christendom with the widest possible 
mobility of power, short of a winged mobility.” With this development came the shift 
from horse faring land-power to maritime sea-power that Mackinder discussed in depth. 
This was because, as he later wrote ([1911] 1921: 133), the ship  
 “carries her own supplies, and the fleet which commands the ocean can establish 
 local bases of supply in islands and peninsulas, such as Malta and Gibraltar. These 
 local bases may be compared to anchored store-ships for the replenishment of the 
 fleet”.  
Subsequent to this was the shift back from sea-power to land-power precipitated by the 
coming of the railway. Mackinder argued that “trans-continental railways are now 
transmuting the conditions of land-power”, and that as these railways were laced across 
the “closed heart-land of Euro-Asia”, Britain’s sea-power would wain and potentially be 
usurped by whichever Great Power was to occupy this area (Mackinder, 1904: 434; see 
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Figure 2.3).  After his lecture, Mackinder was criticised by Leo S. Amery, who we will 
hear more from later, for not acknowledging the germinating technology of aircraft in 
his geopolitical system, but he did touch on air power in his later writings. In 1919 
([1942]: 80) he defined the aircraft as being “of a boomerang nature, a weapon of land-
power as against sea-power”, and in 1924 he discussed the importance of the aircraft in 
overcoming obstacles to direct communication between Europe and the Pacific over the 
Arctic (Mackinder: 1924: 281).   
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Geographical Pivot of History. Reproduced from Mackinder (1904: 435). 
 In other words, what I am arguing is that the term ‘mobility of power’ replaced 
the ‘movement of man’ in the Pivot lecture, and thus connected Mackinder’s earlier 
theorisation of geography and technology to state power in a way that was then taken, 
in essence, as his geopolitical theory in the decades that followed. His analysis, as he put 
it in 1890, provided “our only key to the future” (Mackinder, 1890: 84). But his thought 
expressed all of the aspects of transcontinentalism discussed in this chapter. As is clear, 
the modern geopolitical imagination underwrote his thought. He took as a given the 
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realist view of international relations, positing that states existed in a system of 
ungoverned anarchy and that they exercised their power in competition with one 
another across space. He also articulated the changing balance of the mobility of power 
between land and sea, proposing that with the invention of the railway the balance of 
power begun to sway away from British sea-power and towards the continental powers 
of Germany and Russia. Finally, he was able, to a greater extent than any example I have 
analysed in this thesis, to detachedly and objectively assess the intrinsic attributes of 
continental landmasses and evaluate the significance of these attributes relative to the 
rest of the world, and the world as a whole.  
 Less prominent in the papers discussed thus far are Mackinder’s ideas as they 
relate to civilisational and naturalised geopolitics. However, these are evinced in his 
wider corpus of work in those instances he wrote about other railways. Mackinder 
([1911] 1921: 203), like Younghusband and Jefferson, equated the construction of 
railways with the civilisation of all of the non-European spaces of the world:     
 “Until a few years ago, most railways were constructed to connect cities which were 
 already important. Now the steel road is driven out into the vacant wastes of North and 
 South America, of Africa, and of Central Asia, and of Australia. […] As a consequence, 
 geographical discovery was hardly complete in Africa and Asia before settlement and 
 occupation in what had hitherto been closed continents. Western civilization, which 
 until thirty years ago was confined to Europe and a part of America, is now spreading 
 with marvellous rapidity into every part of the globe and to every race."  
Furthermore, he postulated that the coming of the railway to the ‘vacant wastes’ of the 
rest of the world was synonymous with the spread of those features most associated 
with the territorialisation of the modern state across space, and the incorporation of 
these vacant wastes into a unified political and economic whole. For example, in 1912 
he wrote about the Canadian transcontinental railways which had been constructed in 
the 1880s. “Undoubtedly”, Mackinder (1912: 45) argued, “the railways have been the 
chief cause of our modern unity.” In considering Canada, he suggested that the modern 
state of Canada  
 “would have been only in name had it not been possible to bridge the vast spaces of the 
 Dominion. […] North of the Canadian Pacific Railway two new trans-continental lines are 
 now being constructed, the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern Railways, 
 which will 'unroll the map of Canada a hundred miles further to the north'” 
 (Mackinder, 1912: 258).  
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 Finally, Mackinder emphasised the circulation of troops and natural resources 
that the Trans-Siberian Railway in particular would enable. In a commonly quoted 
example, he wrote that “[t]he Russian army in Manchuria is as significant of mobile land-
power as the British army in South Africa was of sea-power” (Mackinder, 1904: 434). The 
ability to circulate troops, munitions, and supplies quickly across Russian space was 
therefore an expression of the circulatory nature of the mobility of power that railways 
afforded, as well as the significance of railways to what he perceived as the usurpation 
of sea-power by land-power and the awakening and reinvigorating of the Russian state. 
Moreover, in his 1911 book The Nations of the Modern World, Mackinder ([1911] 1921: 
228-230) clarified just how its abundant natural resources, as well as its fortress-like 
inaccessibility from the sea, were significant to the Heartland’s superior geographical 
status. He noted the similarity between the Steppes and North America in terms of their 
wheat production, and how the American Pacific Railroad was the key to the 
transportation of this wheat across North America. He thus extrapolated outwards to 
argue the Trans-Siberian Railway would do the same for Russia. He also described how 
the Central Asian Railway had allowed raw cotton to be transported to Moscow and the 
surrounding region for use in industry. Finally, he mentioned at different junctures 
deposits of coal south of Moscow, precious metals in the Ural Mountains, and 
petroleum at Baku on the Caspian Sea. “Thus Russia contains within her own area all the 
resources and raw materials for industrial progress” (Mackinder, [1911] 1921: 230),  and 
it was the Trans-Siberian Railway and its feeders that would enable their access and use, 
“bringing wheat, coal and oil together into a gigantic common market” (Kearns, 2010: 
191).  The gigantic common market was, in other words, the circulatory system that 
would be inserted into Russian space when the Trans-Siberian Railway and its feeders 
were constructed.  
 Put differently, this was what Mackinder ([1919] 1942: 111) called “the unity of 
the Great Continent under modern railway conditions.”  Thus, the 1919 formalisation of 
the Euro-Asia-as-Heartland theory can be read as a combination between the system of 
circulation backboned by the transcontinental railway, the mobility of power the railway 
would afford, and the unchanging geography of Eastern Europe with its resources and its 
inaccessibility to sea-power. The Trans-Siberian Railway, for Mackinder, equalled an 
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unrivalled transcontinental mobility of (state) power, the unity and civilisation of Russia, 
and the insertion of a circulatory system into the previous dormant expanse of Russian 
territory. Ultimately the power that ruled Eastern Europe would command the 
Heartland. And as the most significant of his geopolitical soundbites followed, “who 
rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands 
the world” (Mackinder, [1919] 1942: xviii). 
2.5. Conclusions 
 This chapter has explained the conceptual and historical foundations of 
transcontinentalism. I have defined transcontinentalism as a geopolitical and 
technological doctrine with three interconnected components; 1) the projection and 
territorialisation of state power across continental space, 2) the spread of civilisation 
across continental space, and 3) the extension, reproduction, and transformation of the 
state and its spaces of circulation across continental space; through the construction of 
transcontinental railways. I have argued that it emerged from two gradual changes in 
the mid-nineteenth century; the modern geopolitical imagination in its intermixed 
civilisational and naturalised modes and the development of railway technology in the 
1820s. Geopolitically, transcontinentalism coalesced from the turning of time into space, 
Cartesian Perspectivalism, and realist understandings of international relations that 
Agnew (2003) defines, and evinced both civilisational and naturalised geopolitical 
imaginations in its articulations. Technologically, transcontinentalism emerged from two 
understandings of railway technology in the mid-nineteenth century, railways as a tool 
of state power projection and as a vanguard of European civilisation. In the era of 
naturalised geopolitics its biologisation produced an understanding of the tentacular 
rails; railways as a natural, biological extension of the European state organism that 
simultaneously strengthened, augmented, and reproduced the strength and vitality of 
the state itself. Schivelbusch’s (1986) concept of circulation is the key to this crucial, 
defining aspect of transcontinentalism – it was a doctrine that emphasised how 
transcontinental railways would become the backbone of continent-spanning systems of 
circulation, waking continents from their previous unconscious entombment within 
nature and simultaneously securing an unprecedented amalgamation of people, land, 
and resources.   
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 Although germs of transcontinentalism were present as early as the Napoleonic 
Wars, it only really took hold in Britain in the 1890s in tandem with the intensification of 
Great Power rivalry in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. From here, transcontinentalism 
developed interdependently in both Africa and the Middle East, although they retained 
different qualities and characteristics at different times. In Africa, Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism was at its height in the 1890s, popularly spurred by Cecil Rhodes 
and developed through his extensive transnational connections in Britain, Germany, and 
South Africa. After his death Rhodes’ vision was taken up and transformed in different 
ways by those who followed in his footsteps, although their ideas differed only in the 
parts of transcontinentalism they revealed most strongly rather than its fundamental 
features. In the Ottoman Empire, transcontinentalism was evinced by Britain’s reaction 
to the granting of a railway concession to Germany for a transcontinental railway to the 
Persian Gulf in 1903, but developed unevenly from then to the First World War. Few in 
Britain equated the Baghdad Railway with the annexation and absorption of the 
Ottoman Empire by Germany before the First World War, and the response of the 
British and Indian governments was often contradictory, located at the shifting apex 
between their desire to strengthen the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian 
aggression on the one hand, and their desire to keep any foreign power from gaining too 
much influence on the shores of the Persian Gulf on the other. After July 1914, however, 
transcontinentalism was expressed as the territorialisation of German power throughout 
the entire Ottoman Empire (and, by extension, the world) and the complete destruction 
of the British Empire should Britain lose the war. As we shall see, this was expressed not 
only in British War Office and Cabinet reports, but in books, maps, and other popular 
geopolitical media at the time.  
 The remainder of this thesis therefore demonstrates the utility and validity of 
transcontinentalism for understanding Britain’s engagement and policy towards 
transcontinental railway construction, primarily between 1880 and 1930. It elucidates 
how both the Baghdad and Cape-Cairo Railways were planned, envisioned, and 
constructed, and how considering them alongside the doctrine of transcontinentalism 
explained in this chapter reveals new and original insights into each. The thesis turns 
firstly to the Baghdad Railway and its roots in the early nineteenth century. 
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Part Two – Berlin-Baghdad 
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Figure 3.1: The route of the Baghdad Railway, showing the completed and uncompleted sections of the line by 
1918. The official starting point of the Baghdad Railway, formally begun after the signing of the Baghdad Railway 
Convention in 1903, is shown on the map as Konia. Reproduced from McMurry (1918: 6) 
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Chapter Three - The Genesis of Transcontinentalism in Britain, 1795-1898 
3.1. Introduction 
 This part of the thesis continues my analysis of transcontinentalism by 
considering Britain’s reaction to the construction of the Baghdad Railway by Germany 
and the Ottoman Empire. The Baghdad Railway Convention was signed on March 5th 
1903 by the Anatolian Railway Company (ARC) and the Ottoman government, and gave 
German financiers and engineers (backed by Deutsche Bank) permission to build a 
railway between the town of Konya, located approximately 600km south-east of 
Constantinople in the Ottoman Empire, and some undetermined point on the Persian 
Gulf. Although numerous diplomatic histories have documented the British and Indian 
government’s response to the railway, these studies typically trace the day-to-day 
progress of Britain’s negotiations with Germany over the railway without recourse to 
any wider context of transcontinentalism, or otherwise (see Chapman, 1948; Wolf 
[1936] 1973). 
 This chapter argues that the foundations of transcontinentalism are evinced 
consistently throughout the nineteenth century, before the construction of the Baghdad 
Railway began in 1903. It begins by suggesting that Napoleon’s short-lived 1798 plan to 
invade India from the west demonstrates a starting point for transcontinentalism 
because it raised the prospect for the first time that British India might be militarily 
vulnerable to overland invasion. From here, the chapter traces the growing British 
preoccupation with the safety and security of the Persian Gulf and India, demonstrating 
how a series of discussions around a British transcontinental railway in the 1850s 
reflected these fears. After this, the chapter switches focus to consider how Germany 
and the Ottoman Empire became infrastructural bedfellows before the Baghdad Railway 
Convention of 1903, tracing their growing political and economic entwinement after the 
unification of Germany in 1871. The chapter also analyses the revival of the Euphrates 
Valley Railway project in the early 1870s, focusing on some of the arguments proposed 
in favour before demonstrating how, with Britain’s partial acquisition of Suez in 1875, 
interest cooled in the idea and was never again considered seriously by the British 
government.  
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 In its final section, the chapter skips forward to 1898 and analyses a fleeting yet 
illustrative proposal for a transcontinental railway from the Mediterranean to the 
Persian Gulf by a Russian noble, Count Vladimir Ironovich Kapnist. Although Kapnist’s 
proposal was short-lived, briefly examining Britain’s response to it demonstrates how 
the bottled anxieties detailed in the chapter were released when it became clear a 
foreign power, whether Russia or Germany, would attempt to build a transcontinental 
railway across the Ottoman Empire. This forms the context for Britain’s reaction to the 
Baghdad Railway in the first decade of the twentieth century, examined in Chapter Four. 
Throughout the chapter I draw out the early instances of transcontinentalism, 
suggesting they are evinced particularly strongly in the ideas of three Euphrates Valley 
Railway advocates: Francis Rawdon Chesney, W.P. Andrew, and Thomas Chenery.  
3.2. India, the Persian Gulf, and the Euphrates Valley Railway, 1798-1870 
 The genesis of transcontinentalism in Britain, and in particular its inherent 
connection to the shifting balances between land and sea power, can be traced to the 
height of the Napoleonic Wars. The wars are significant because they represented the 
first time that the safety and security of Britain’s Indian possessions were imperilled by a 
land power planning, however outlandishly, to use modern technological prowess to 
enable an invasion. Upon advancing into Egypt in 1798, Napoleon had set in motion a 
plan to build a road from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and thereafter to the 
Indian provinces. He commissioned the French Bureau Topographique to begin 
surveying the route and ordered the Engineering Corps to prepare for the construction 
of the road. 5 As Cole (2008: 233) puts it, “[t]he invasion force would have probably gone 
to Syria and along the Tigris to Baghdad, turned east and gone up to Kermanshah in Iran, 
transited the Iranian plateau, entered Afghanistan, and then crossed through the Khyber 
pass down into North India.” Although this plan came to nothing, sunk along with 
Napoleon’s fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, it was paralleled by an early Russian 
proposal by Tsar Paul to invade India from the north in 1801, thirty years before the 
‘Great Game’ between Britain and Russia was to begin in earnest (Strong, 1965).  
                                                     
5
 See the March 15
th
 entry in R.I. Money’s 1910 ‘Journal from Mesopotamia Journey’, RGS RIM 
(SSC/127/1) MS/AR 63.  
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Figure 3.2: Map showing the Persian Gulf and the wider Arabian Coast. Reproduced from TNA MPK 1/178.  
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 The importance of Napoleon’s fleeting aspiration to invade India from the west is 
that it foregrounded, for the first time, India’s potential vulnerability via overland routes. 
Alder (1972: 14) has noted that the problem of defending India from the north-west was 
historically not a new one, “[b]ut until the end of the eighteenth century it was not a 
problem for the British.” After all, it was a space traversed both by Alexander the Great 
two thousand years previously, and much more recently by Nader Shah of Persia in his 
invasion of the Mughal Empire in the 1730s. But the safety and security of India was 
ensured by the relative mobility of power of the British fleet in comparison to overland 
means of transportation such as horses, camels, or simple marching – whether on a road 
or not. Such means could not match British sea power, as was recognised by Napoleon’s 
general Antoine Lavalette, who maintained that after 1805 “[i]t was no longer possible 
to think, even in the future, of taking the army to India, since the superiority of the 
British on all the seas had become incontestable” (quoted in Cole, 2008: 233).  India was 
in other words secured by the superiority and mobility of British sea power; any invading 
force from France or Russia would not be able to reach any points of significance in a 
time shorter than it would take a British force to be mobilised, transported, and 
disembarked to resist it.  
 Britain’s rule and superiority in India was paralleled by the development and 
deepening of British hegemony in the Persian Gulf, a process that shaped and was 
shaped by the growing external threats to Britain’s Indian possessions (see Figure 3.2). 
As Sidaway (1998: 227) has commented, “[i]n early imperial scripts, notably those of 
Britain, the Gulf emerge[d] as of vital interest and deep concern.” However, as Peterson 
(2009: 277) has observed, “despite its predominant position during the nineteenth and 
first half of the twentieth centuries, Britain began its adventure in the Gulf in a minor, 
tentative way.” Throughout the majority of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
the Gulf was of only tangential importance to the growing political and economic 
activities of the British Empire. Prior to 1747, the East India Company represented 
Britain’s only substantial involvement in the region, and it was mostly interested in 
developing, expanding, and protecting trade and commerce while consciously 
sidestepping any political obligations to the region or its rulers (Amin, 1967; Erikson, 
2014). It developed increasingly dense circuits of trade with Indian and Chinese coastal 
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settlements, importing valuable products such as pepper, cinnamon, textiles, tea and 
coffee, and other goods, but “military conquest and colonization were not an integral 
part of the English Company’s business strategy” for the majority of the eighteenth 
century (Erikson, 2014: x). However, between 1774 and 1778 two major developments 
brought the Persian Gulf into sharper imperial focus; the growing colonisation of India 
by British subjects, and the collapse of some of the local governing structures around the 
Gulf (Amin, 1967). In particular, the growth of piracy around the Strait of Hormuz, the 
maritime bottleneck that comprises the entrance to the Gulf, necessitated an increased 
British political and military presence to protect trading pathways.  
 Despite this increasing involvement, Onley (2005: 40) suggests that the 
propelling of the Persian Gulf into British geostrategic calculations dovetailed with the 
growth of the threat to India in the Napoleonic Wars. Shortly after the cessation of the 
wars, a naval expedition was launched against the troublesome Qawasim tribe’s pirate 
strongholds in the Strait of Hormuz in 1819, and one year later a decade long coastal 
survey of the Gulf by India’s sailors began which, when finished, dramatically increased 
Britain’s navigational and geological knowledge of the shorelines (Kelly, 1968). Onley 
(2005; 2007) has argued that these events marked the transition of the Persian Gulf into 
a part of Britain’s informal empire, defined here as Britain’s commercial empire where 
Britain exercised differing concentrations of authority and control, but which lay outside 
the formal territorial boundaries of the British Empire.6 The informal empire was 
acquired not in a ‘fit of absence of mind’ (Seeley, [1883] 1914), nor accidentally, but 
rather incrementally and out of necessity to facilitate, secure, and reproduce the 
circulations of trade that maintained the formal British Empire. Barton and Bennett 
(2010) have postulated that informal empire depended on a trisection of factors; 
extraterritorial legal control, economic domination, and policy influence. In the Gulf 
                                                     
6
 The term informal empire is contested among historians, particularly with regards to the Persian Gulf. 
While the definition is agreed upon in a broad sense, there is debate over whether the term informal 
empire is preferable to the term ‘sphere of influence’, which was the phrasing typically used by British 
statesmen at the time. The two are often used interchangeably. Radford (2013b: 245-305) further 
suggests that Britain’s involvement in the Persian Gulf is better characterised by the term ‘indirect rule’, 
which he argues is more appropriate to the deepening levels of control exercised over the Gulf by the 
Indian Government under Lord Curzon’s Viceroyalty. Nonetheless, in this thesis I retain the term informal 
empire, following Onley (2007), to refer to the Persian Gulf as a place integrated into the economic and 
political networks of the British Empire without being a formal colony.  
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States, this was primarily achieved by a combination of naval coercion, the 1763 
establishment of the Persian Gulf Residency (continually occupied until 1971 by British 
officials whom Lord Curzon (1892: 451) referred to as “the Uncrowned King[s] of the 
Persian Gulf”), and bilateral treaties, such as the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement, in 
which Kuwaiti defence and foreign affairs were handed over to Britain in exchange for a 
subsidy (Ahmad, 1992). 
 Significantly, by the time of the formalisation of the British rule in 1858, British 
activities in the Gulf were conditioned “largely by their relevance to India – whether 
those activities were concerned with commerce, diplomacy, imperial defense, or 
strategic position” (Peterson, 2009: 277). This reflected the emergence and solidification 
of two crucial geopolitical imaginaries of the Persian Gulf in the mid-nineteenth century 
which are vital for understanding Britain’s reaction to the construction of a non-British 
transcontinental railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The first was 
Persian Gulf as “communications corridor” (Onley, 2005: 40) between Britain and India. 
Originally, mail between the two places was transported via the two yearlong Cape of 
Good Hope route, and the only intermittent concern connected to the Gulf was that of 
piracy. A route then developed via Egypt, before the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, 
whereby mail was landed at Alexandria or Port Said and then transported overland to 
the Red Sea (Hoskins, 1928: 340-341). However, “difficulties in dealing with the Ottoman 
authorities made this route intermittently problematic and Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt 
exacerbated the situation” (Peterson, 2009: 279). This brought attention to another 
possible route through Anatolia and Mesopotamia to the northern tip of the Persian 
Gulf, and then on by ship to India, a route which had been used only sporadically during 
the eighteenth century due to its difficulty to traverse by wagon. But after the 
Napoleonic Wars, growing developments in rail technology and problems with the 
French dominated Suez Canal swivelled attention firmly to this Mesopotamian route. 
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century the Gulf was persistently imagined as a 
crucial node or corridor through which communications between Britain and India had 
to pass, whether these communications were by sea or overland across the Middle East.  
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 The second imaginary was Persian Gulf as frontier. Threats to British supremacy 
in the Persian Gulf became intrinsically connected to the very existence of British India. 
As Peterson (2009: 279) notes,  
“[p]erceived threats to the British position in India were seen as emanating from various 
quarters, with one of the principal ones being the direction of the Gulf. If the Gulf was 
one of India’s outer frontiers, it followed that the Gulf must be kept under British 
influence and control. European challenges to the British position in the Gulf constituted 
potential threats to India, either because they threatened British predominance in the 
Gulf or because they were seen as possible encroachments on India itself.” 
As mentioned previously, this imaginary fused in the Napoleonic Wars in response to 
Napoleon’s desired invasion of India, but was then largely subordinated by fears of 
Russian territorial aggrandisement to the north and north-west of India as opposed to 
from the direction of the Gulf.  The Russian acquisitions of the cities Samarkand and 
Khiva (now in Uzbekistan) in 1868 and 1873 respectively signified the radiation of 
Russian influence throughout Northern Persia, something that was “viewed warily in 
India” (Peterson, 2009: 288) and was a part of the wider ‘Great Game’ between Britain 
and Russia in Central Asia. As Morgan (1981) has argued at length, a major British fear 
was that Russia would continue to expand throughout Persia and towards Afghanistan 
and Tibet, two more of the ‘various quarters’ deemed to be frontiers of Britain’s Indian 
Empire. As a result the geopolitical imaginary of the Persian Gulf as a frontier was largely 
ancillary to the geostrategic politics of the Great Game in Central Asia, but was 
increasingly decisive in the 1890s when it became clear a railway from the 
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf was only a matter of time. 
 These shifting and transforming aspects of Britain’s preoccupation with the 
Persian Gulf and India were intimately shaped by the rise of the railway technology in 
the 1820s. The development of the railway entwined with Anglo-Russian antagonism to 
signal the beginning of “European, primarily British, geo-political interests, policy and 
involvement in the Near East, in particular the search for a better route to India” (Goren, 
2011: xviii). This was therefore important to how Britain was drawn to the political and 
economic significance of the east-west geopolitical axis (Kern, 2003), and precipitated a 
range of early proposals for what came to be known as a British Euphrates Valley 
Railway from the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf (see Figure 3.3). A railway 
company was formed for this purpose during the Crimean War with the support of the 
84 
 
Foreign Secretary at the time Lord Clarendon (Marshall-Cornwall, 1965), and based upon 
a survey carried out in the 1840s by General Francis Rawdon Chesney (see Goren, 2011). 
Chesney’s survey and later report emphasised how the railway would accomplish the 
dual imperative of assisting the defence of India and compressing the time it would take 
to transport troops and goods across Middle Eastern space for the benefit of Britain. “By 
means of the proposed Railway,” he suggested, “troops and warlike stores, mails, &c., 
could be conveyed from England to India (Kurrachee) in the space of 15 or 16 days, and 
to Southern Persia in a much shorter time” (Chesney, 1857: 1-2). One of Chesney’s 
associates and the Chair of the Euphrates Valley Railway Company, W.P. Andrew (1856: 
36), underlined how “the imperial considerations, which favoured the old circuitous 
communication by way of the Cape of Good Hope, have given way before the irresistible 
desire for rapid locomotion and intercourse with all parts of the world” (see also Munro, 
2003: 49). This irresistible desire, which Andrew (1856) explicitly equated with the rise of 
railway technology, meant that the power of the Royal Navy was no longer sufficient to 
ensure the defence of India. Thus, he (1856: 61) argued that  
 “[i]n case our enemies should prove sufficiently powerful to press us hard either in 
 Europe or Asia, it would be a matter of inestimable importance to have it in our  
 power to transport our military forces from Europe to Asia, and from Asia to Europe, 
 with the greatest possible celerity, as the exigences of war may demand”. 
 Both Chesney and Andrew consequently considered the construction of a British 
railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf as of paramount importance 
for the continuing mobility of British power in light of increasing Russian aggression and 
French plans to construct theSuez Canal, and for the maximisation of extracting and 
actualising the value of Mesopotamia’s natural resources such as “cotton, wool, wheat, 
indigo, sugar, copper, tobacco, valonia, red and yellow berries, &c” (Chesney, 1857: 4). 
Furthermore, they both argued that the railway was the only way that Mesopotamia’s 
full political and economic potential could be realised for the benefit of Britain, a 
potential they connected to a quasi-biblical imagination of the area as a historic yet 
forgotten space of global importance (Goren, 2011). Chesney (1857: 2) noted that 
Mesopotamia had a “sacred history” of commerce that would be revitalised and 
energised by the railway, and Andrew (1856: 36) pointed out that the railway, when 
finished, would “make that mighty river [the Euphrates] once more, as in ancient times, 
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a highway to the commerce of the East.” They accordingly positioned Mesopotamia as a 
historically dormant gateway space between the Eastern and Western possessions of 
the British Empire which would be activated and civilised by the construction of the 
railway.   
 Chesney and Andrew provide an early example of transcontinentalism in Britain, 
and of how lacing a transcontinental railway across the Middle East was perceived to 
enable a future where Britain would reap multiple political, economic, and military 
benefits. It was underpinned by an anxiety over the perceived increasing mobility of land 
power in a general sense, and the intensification of the mobility of Russian land power in 
particular, and the belief that railway technology was gradually closing and compacting 
the world. Concomitantly, it was undergirded by the crucial features of Agnew’s 
definition of the modern geopolitical imagination. The space to be traversed by the 
railway was narrated by both Chesney and Andrew as further down Fabian’s ‘stream of 
Time’ than the places geographically imagined as its Western and Eastern edges, Britain 
and India, its ‘sacred history’ demonstrating its potential but the railway acting as the 
only means through which this history could be ‘once more’ brought into the present. 
Finally, anxieties over Russian intentions reflected the normalised belief that the 
European ‘Great Powers’ were discreet entities exercising their power across space, and 
naturally coming into conflict with one another due to the friction this caused in imperial 
contact zones such as the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. Transcontinentalism in Britain, 
as evinced by Chesney and Andrew in its embryonic form, emerged from this milieu in 
the early-mid nineteenth century.  
 However, although Chesney’s application for a concession from the Ottoman 
Empire to build such a railway was accepted (The Times, 1857: 7), his company never 
raised the necessary capital to construct it. A parliamentary debate in August 1857 on 
whether or not the British government would guarantee the capital of private investors 
was dismissed by the Prime Minister, Viscount Palmerston, with support from the future 
Liberal leader William Gladstone (Marshall-Cornwall, 1965). In a long contribution to the 
debate, Gladstone advanced two key objections to supporting the railway.7 He firstly  
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Figure 3.3: An anonymous and undated [c.1850] map of possible railway routes to India. Reproduced from 
IOR/X/2963. 
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suggested that should the British government back the railway and it was subsequently 
mismanaged or misgoverned by Ottoman officials, it would become necessary for Britain 
to politically interfere in the Ottoman Empire to rectify the situation. This, he continued, 
would set “an example of interference with their government and domestic affairs” 
which would be strongly resisted in Europe or which, even worse, would open the gates 
for every European power to brazenly do the same.8 For the sake of the “European 
concert and concord which [is] of paramount importance in regard to our Eastern 
policy”, therefore, Gladstone argued Britain could not get involved.9 Secondly and 
relatedly, Gladstone surmised that any transcontinental railway across the Ottoman 
Empire would provoke the anger of France, “our great ally”, which was at this point 
preparing to build the Suez Canal.10 Gladstone would have known that a French Suez 
Canal would be open to British commerce and sea power as long as France and Britain 
remained on good terms, ensuring an enhanced mobility of power than had previously 
been possible via the Cape sea route. For both of these reasons backing the Euphrates 
Valley Railway was politically unacceptable. Palmerston concurred, summarising that 
“Her Majesty’s Government ought to be deliberate spectators” to the unfolding of the 
project. “[H]owever glad we should be to see that project completed,” he continued, 
“we cannot hold out the slightest encouragement that we should be disposed, either 
directly or indirectly, to advance any money for the attainment of that end.”11 
 This demonstrates that, although germinating, transcontinentalism was not at 
this point widespread, restricted to a few individuals such as Chesney and Andrew and 
devoid of wider purchase in the machinations of the British imperial governing 
structures. The construction of a transcontinental railway along the lines Chesney and 
Andrew suggested was not deemed relevant by the government because of deeply held 
beliefs in the predominance of British sea power and the necessity of maintaining the 
balance of power in Europe, regardless of any arguments as to the political, economic, 
or military benefits it might allow. Simply put, “[a]lthough railways provided for the first 
time a quick and efficient means of land transport [...] ships remained the most 
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satisfactory means of transporting large forces over any great distance” (Speller, 2001: 
3). Nevertheless this first mooting of the Euphrates Valley Railway project in 1857 was 
an indication of the beginning of a shift in the directional awareness of the British 
government towards the overland route to India (Kern, 1983; Goren, 2011). In its 
coverage of the August 1857 debate The Daily Telegraph (1857: 3) summarised it well 
when it noted that “[a]t last, the attention of the public has been directed to the 
necessity of improved communications with India.” It continued by praising Palmerston 
for recognising the importance of “stud[ying] the condition of the several territories that 
lie between England and her Eastern posessions” (The Daily Telegraph, 1857: 3). 
However, it was not until the early 1870s that the matter of the Euphrates Valley 
Railway was raised again, backgrounded by the rise of Germany and its increasing 
entanglement with the Ottoman Empire. It is to this that the following section turns.   
3.3. Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the 1872 Select Committee, 1871-1898 
 This section proceeds in two parts, the first analysing the political and economic 
entanglement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire after Germany’s unification 
in 1871. It demonstrates how the foundations of transcontinentalism are visible in the 
relationship that developed between Germany and the Ottomans, and provides 
additional context for the arguments that unfold in the following two chapters. The 
second sub-section analyses the revival of the Euphrates Valley Railway project in the 
early 1870s. It looks at a House of Commons Select Committee established in 1872 to 
consider whether the British government should back the railway, and analyses how 
some of the arguments put forward in its favour shows the development of 
transcontinentalism from the previous section.  
3.3.1. Germany and the Ottoman Empire 
  Chapman (1948: 17) has observed that even though the Euphrates Valley 
Railway was never constructed, the introduction of railway technology to the Ottoman 
Empire was still a largely British affair; “British capital, material or management were 
involved to some extent in every line inaugurated in Asia Minor” from around 1840 
onwards. However, parallel to this was a growing entanglement between Prussia and 
the Ottoman Empire which was to intensify after the unification of Germany in the wake 
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of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. As Trumpener (1984) has shown, the entangling of 
Prussia and the Ottoman Empire goes back to at least the 1830s; in this decade many 
Prussian military officers were advisors or trainers in the Ottoman army, and the 
Prussian consulate in Jerusalem (opened in 1842) was an important site of political and 
cultural exchange. However, until the unification of Germany, Prussian-Ottoman 
engagement and exchange was defined by a disparate and uneven flow of individuals 
and groups, some of whom sought business opportunities and some of whom sought 
Oriental pleasures and promises (Weitz, 2013).  
 However, post-unification, Weitz (2013: 152) argues that German engagement 
with the Ottoman Empire both deepened and broadened:  
“The borderlands of Eastern Europe into the eastern Mediterranean, from the Baltic to 
the Black Sea, constituted the prime area of German imperial ambitions. The 
interlocking German elite of bureaucrats and businessmen, officers and diplomats, 
intellectuals and pastors, kaisers and chancellors, had their gaze fixed tightly on Eastern 
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Through all the political upheavals of modern German 
history, the German elite thought of Eastern Europe as the place for German territorial 
expansion and population settlement and the Ottoman Empire as the prime site of 
German imperial influence abroad. The widely strewn territory of the Empire, including 
its European, Anatolian, and Middle Eastern lands, would provide investment 
opportunities and markets for the German economy and, no less important, a place for 
Germany to assert its Great power stature and contest British, French, and Russian 
power.” 
This is a helpful statement because it foregrounds how the Ottoman Empire became a 
place where Germany’s geopolitical and economic ambitions could be realised, and how 
these ambitions were refracted through a broadly Orientalist gaze which represented 
the Ottomans and their Empire as a land of opportunity and intrigue. It also underlines 
that Germany’s ambitions in the Ottoman Empire were not associated, in the main, with 
colonisation or territorial acquisition. In Jenkins’ (2004: 97) words, the Ottoman Empire 
became a “site upon which and through which German national and imperial visions 
were articulated and acted upon.” Although Said ([1978] 2003: 19) famously omitted 
Germany from his critique of Orientalism, a number of scholars have recently underlined 
the importance of Orientalist imaginaries in Germany’s political and economic 
involvement in the Ottoman Empire, particularly after 1871 (Hagen, 2004; Hess, 2000; 
Wokoeck 2009). These imaginaries underpinned the growing economic and geopolitical 
entanglement between the two Empires.  
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 Economically, “German involvement in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire grew 
steadily, highlighted by rising investments in, and trade with, the sultan’s realm” 
(Trumpener, 1984: 112). Germany’s growing iron, steel, chemical, electrical, and 
financial industries required a natural outlet beyond the territorial confines of the 
German state and, lacking the overseas empire that ensured the economic status of 
Britain and France, the German chancellor Otto van Bismarck  
 “was forced to develop a policy towards North Africa and West Asia that was quite 
 different to those of the other European powers [...] Trade, commerce, and a peaceful 
 penetration especially in open-door areas [became] cornerstones of Berlin’s Middle-
 Eastern policy. [From] Morocco to Iran, from Greater Syria to Arabia, German capital 
 invested heavily in railroads, raw material processing, financing, engineering, aviation, 
 and automobiles” (Schwantz, 2004: 1-3).  
In this way Germany gradually took its place alongside Britain, France, and to a lesser 
extent Russia in providing “improvements in transportation, commerce, and urban 
facilities” in the Ottoman Empire, to the point where “[v]irtually all such facilities that 
existed in the late Ottoman Empire derived from [European] capital ventures” (Quataert, 
2005: 72).    
 Geopolitically, however, some in Germany began to view the Ottoman Empire as 
a place where Germany’s fledging imperial ambitions could be achieved. As Jenkins 
(2004: 99) notes, “the German state and agents of its economy sought to incorporate 
pieces of the Ottoman Empire into a German-led sphere of influence”, especially in the 
first decade of the twentieth century when the Baghdad Railway began to be built. 
McMeekin (2011: 2) has documented the unusual affinity Kaiser Wilhelm II had for 
Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire more generally, observing that “[h]ere the 
German Emperor’s Weltpolitik first took concrete form, seeking to unite East and West, 
Asia and Europe, and put imperial Germany firmly on the path to world power.” Nor was 
the Kaiser alone in representing the Ottoman Empire as a “pliable junior partner or 
outright satellite of the Reich” (Trumpener, 1984: 122). “All of the leading Germans with 
experience in the Ottoman Empire”, Weitz (2013: 163) suggests, “had promoted a 
strong central state with a powerful role for the military. Those institutions would, it was 
hoped, secure the stability that German imperial interests required.” Among such 
leading Germans was Colman von der Goltz, who argued that a strong and centralised 
Ottoman state could unite Turk and Arab against the British Empire in the Persian Gulf 
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and India (Yasamee, 1998), and Max von Oppenheim, an extraordinary character who 
sought to loosen and ultimately undo the bonds of collaboration between British 
colonial administrators and indigenous elites across Egypt and the wider Ottoman lands 
(McKale, 1997; McMeekin, 2011).12  
 Summarily, as Aksakal (2008: 66) writes, “as the international rivalry of the New 
Imperialism intensified, Berlin widened its economic and political presence in the 
Ottoman Empire, a presence that was buttressed within German society by a culture 
that revered the Near East as hallowed ground.” Yet it is erroneous, as some historians 
have suggested, to position the Ottoman Empire as a passive actor in the international 
relations of the European powers, occupying no role other than “a blank canvas upon 
which Europe’s political unconscious played out its taboos and hidden anxieties” 
(Goldsworthy, 1998: 13). The encounter between the Ottomans and Germany (and 
Europe more widely) was shaped profoundly by Ottoman concerns. In particular, the 
Ottoman concern with infrastructural investment in the late-nineteenth century was 
shaped by three connected factors; the problematic Ottoman economy, disciplining the 
unruly and rebellious frontiers of the Empire, and the complicated debates concerning 
the Empire’s modernisation. 
 It has become somewhat clichéd to suggest that in the nineteenth century the 
Ottoman Empire, the original so-called ‘sick man of Europe’, was economically unstable 
(Quataert, 2003), and to say that at the end of the nineteenth century “few things 
appeared as certain as the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire” (McMurray, 2001: 
13). However, Quataert (2005) has argued that this was recognised as fact by many 
Ottoman elites, and as a consequence the Empire began to look towards Europe for 
direct financial assistance. Arguably this process began in 1838, where an Anglo-Turkish 
Convention removed the previously strictly enforced high tariffs that made trade and 
investment in the Ottoman Empire difficult for European capitalists (Khoury and 
Kennedy, 2007), and deepened after the Ottomans loaned a substantial sum of money 
from France to help finance the Crimean War (Quataert, 2005). Thus, by 1880, “key 
sectors of the modern economy of the empire was controlled by Western creditors” 
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(Khoury and Kennedy, 2007: 238). It was in this context that the Ottomans increasingly 
welcomed European investment in infrastructure; especially railway construction. 
Railways “conquered vast interior spaces, sharply reduced transport costs and thus 
linked inland regions as never before to the coast, its harbors and the global economy” 
(Faroqhi et al, 1997: 798). To the Ottoman ruling elite, in other words, railway 
construction was seen as having immediate economic benefits, not only because of its 
ability to link up agrarian areas with coastal ports (Faroqhi et al, 1997: 805; Schoenberg, 
1977), but also through providing employment on construction sites (Faroqhi et al, 1997: 
810).  
 A second Ottoman motivation for railway construction was military. Ottoman 
historians have noted that from the second half of the sixteenth century to the turn of 
the twentieth, the peripheries of the Ottoman Empire acquired an almost quasi-feudal 
autonomy from Ottoman rule, partly due to the crumbling of the legitimacy of the Millet 
system through which dignitaries ruled local provinces (Deringil, 1998; Hartmann, 2013; 
Quataert, 2005). European telegraph and rail technology was welcomed as a solution to 
the problem of controlling the Empire’s peripheries. Specifically, railways enabled the 
prospect of an enhanced mobility of Ottoman power. Thus while the advantages of 
railway construction were in one sense economic, “[t]he major motivation was strictly 
military in nature. With the help of railroads, the Ottoman Empire would be able to 
mobilise its resources in the event of war and put down any local uprisings” 
(Schoenberg, 1977: 363; see also Khairallah, 1991).  
 A final consideration here is the debate that took place among Ottoman elites 
over the modernisation of the Empire in the nineteenth century. This is important 
because historians have suggested that conceptualising and understanding how the 
Ottomans debated modernisation is crucial to comprehending the fortunes of the 
Empire in the decades before its evisceration in the First World War (see Mikhail and 
Philliou, 2012; Ze’evi, 2004). Many scholars have studied the relationship between 
Ottoman modernity, Europe’s growing influence in the Empire, and science and 
technology. As Burçak (2008: 80; 69) comments, “if the Ottoman Empire was ailing, then 
its recovery was to come through the adoption of science and technology [...] modern 
science was to serve as the vehicle that would carry the empire towards a much-desired, 
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better future.” However, this was additionally based upon what Makdisi (2002b: 768; 
see also Deringil, 2003: 319; Makdisi, 2002a) has provocatively called Ottoman 
Orientalism, the idea that in“[the] age of Western dominated modernity, every nation 
creates its own Orient. The nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was no exception.” 
Makdisi (2002b: 769) argues subsequently that the multifaceted drive to modernisation 
was provoked by a complex process whereby the Ottomans “explicitly acknowledged 
the West to be the home of progress and the East, writ large, to be a present theater of 
backwardness”, before projecting this backwardness onto its own provincial territories. 
European technology would, to put it differently, civilise these spaces, assimilating them 
"into a cohesive and uniform Ottoman modernity [...] a state and civilization 
technologically equal and temporally coeval with the West but culturally distinct from 
and politically independent of it” (Makdisi, 2002b: 770).    
 The growing entanglement between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was thus 
co-constitutive, multifaceted, and developed through specific interlocking concerns 
between German and Ottoman elites. It also reflected the emergence of naturalised 
geopolitics in Germany; an imagination of an entwining German land, people, and state 
with biological needs for political and economic outlets, and the idea that Germany’s 
ascension to a coeval status to that of other Great Powers could only be achieved 
through a relative decline of one or more of those Powers. Additionally, it reflected the 
mounting feeling of global closure – much of the world map was already ‘coloured in’ by 
Britain, France, and other European colonial states, necessitating economic and cultural 
exchange in places such as the Ottoman Empire as the possibilities for acquiring 
overseas colonies receded. On the Ottoman side, as Makdisi suggests, the Ottoman 
Empire gradually turned the civilised geopolitical imagination of Europe onto its own 
lands, augmenting and reworking the same imagination evinced by German soldiers and 
diplomats when they described a strong, modernised Ottoman Empire as necessary for 
the achievement of German imperial ambitions. Simultaneously, it is possible to read the 
Ottomans’ concern with the movement of troops, goods, and labourers in terms of 
circulation; the vitality of the Empire could only be enhanced by the circulatory promise 
railway infrastructure could provide.  
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3.3.2. The House of Commons Select Committee on the Euphrates Valley Railway, 1872 
 Some aspects of transcontinentalism are therefore discernible in the relationship 
which developed between the Ottoman Empire and Germany after German unification 
in 1871. However, the 1870s were also significant as the period in which Britain turned 
away from participation in the construction of any transcontinental railway across the 
Ottoman territories. Although Chesney and Andrew had been unsuccessful in 
persuading the British government of the necessity of the Euphrates Valley Railway in 
the late 1850s, they continued to press for it through the 1860s. In the first half of the 
1870s it was finally brought before parliament once more in response to further Russian 
intrusions into Central Asia. But it was also motivated by the opening of the Suez Canal. 
As Andrew (1870: 16) put it in 1867, when the Canal was nearing completion, “[p]olitical 
disturbance in Europe might deprive us at any moment of our communication with India 
via Egypt. Hence, the necessity of an alternative route, even were it not a better one.” A 
Conservative MP, George Jenkinson, subsequently proposed a motion on June 23rd 1871 
for the establishment of “a Select Committee to examine and report on the whole 
subject of Railway communication between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.”13 
Jenkinson noted that Viscount Palmerston had already considered and rejected such a 
railway in 1857, but then suggested that it was now “of the greatest importance to the 
North-west frontier of India, the line of the Indus, and the North-west Provinces, which 
in the case of an attack from without would stand in most need of a quick 
communication from this country.”14 The Liberal government (now led by Gladstone) 
abstained from the motion and it was therefore comfortably passed. Yet the 
government’s abstention spoke to the relative indifference that Gladstone and his circle 
still attached to the prospect of a transcontinental railway, an indifference which was to 
surface again after the Committee delivered its report. Meanwhile, the creation of the 
Committee reignited a wider debate on the railway in the press, especially on its 
potential trace across the Ottoman Empire. In The Times (1871a: 4), for example, the 
explorer Isabel Burton penned a lengthy letter on the benefits of the having one of the 
termini in southern Syria. Not to be outdone, W.P. Andrew also wrote a barbed riposte 
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to a letter written by the railway engineer Macdonald Stephenson shortly after 
Jenkinson’s Commons debate. Given that the railway was now being assessed by a 
Select Committee, Andrew had not thought it  
 “desirable or necessary at the present juncture to obtrude any views of my own on the 
 subject; but as [Stephenson], in a letter which appeared in your coloums yesterday, has 
 made certain statements which are calculated to mislead, I beg you will allow me the the 
 favour of making a few remarks.” 
Andrew went on to give a brief examination of the possible locations of the 
Mediterranean harbour, most of which were ignored by Stephenson, before reiterating 
the “national value” of the railway to the British Empire (The Times, 1871b: 10).  
 The Committee itself was appointed in July 1871 with the Secretary of State for 
India, Stafford Northcote, as chair. It heard from several witness, including Chesney, and 
gathered reports from a multitude of British administrators stationed in Mesopotamia, 
the Persian Gulf, and the Indian provinces. When completed and published in July 1872 
it concluded broadly that “the political and commercial advantages of establishing a 
second route [to India] would at any time be considerable, and might, under possible 
circumstances, be exceedingly great.”15 It was left to Jenkinson to bring the matter 
before parliament the following session in April 1873. Munro (2003: 160) has remarked 
that this was unsuccessful, and that parliament “stood its ground and comfortably saw 
off the railway’s promoters and their supporters in the Commons.” However, the reality 
was more complex than this. Jenkinson’s resolution moved that 
 “the evidence laid before the Select Committee on the Euphrates Valley Railway last 
 Session demonstrates the great advantages, both politically and commercially, that 
 would accrue to England by the acquisition of an alternative route to and from India, 
 especially in case of any emergency arising, and that this object would be best secured 
 by a Railway which would connect the Mediterranean with the head of the Persian 
 Gulf; and, therefore, the Recommendation of the Select Committee on this subject to 
 Her Majesty's Government is well deserving of their serious attention, with a view to
 carrying it into effect.”16 
Crucially, the resolution omitted the word ‘guarantee’ or any similar terminology that 
might bind the government to financially supporting the railway. This was a conscious 
                                                     
15
 PP 1872 (322) IX, 171, Report from the Select Committee on Euphrates Valley Railway, p.viii.  
16
 Hansard 3rd, 215 (4 April 1873), 606.  
96 
 
move by Jenkinson to secure additional support, but it meant that the resolution itself 
was a dead rubber; a non-committal nod of encouragement which entailed no promises 
or guarantees whatsoever by Gladstone or his Treasury. The fact that it was passed was 
ultimately a hollow victory. After two years of inaction and the ejection of the Liberals 
from government in 1874, Jenkinson asked his new Conservative Prime Minister 
Benjamin Disraeli in July 1875 whether he had “comtemplate[d] taking any steps 
towards carrying out the recommendations of [the] Select Committee.” Disraeli’s 
answer was negative; because “the line could never pay”, he replied that “I hesitate – 
and probably shall continue to hesitate – to guarantee a great expenditure for that 
purpose.”17 Jenkinson responded that he would move a second resolution to parliament 
on the subject, but it seems he never did.18 The Times (1875: 9) summarised the end of 
the railway’s prospects the following month, writing that “[t]he Government would view 
with great satisfaction the construction of a railway between the Mediterranean and the 
Persian Gulf; but as to giving support either as a guarantee or in the shape of a 
contribution to the funds, the Government could entertain no such proposal.”          
 The year of Jenkinson’s final question was important, because with Disraeli’s 
partial acquisition of Suez later in 1875 and the occupation of Egypt seven years later, 
the British government transitioned from making supportive but non-committal noises 
towards the railway to consistently opposing any transcontinental link across the 
Ottoman Empire in its entirety (Bektas, 2004).19 As the journalist Edwin A. Pratt (1916: 
358) put it during the First World War, “the arguments originally advanced in favour of 
the Euphrates railway lost most of their force on the opening of the Suez Canal.” A 
secure sea route through Suez ensured faster communications than the circuitous, now 
outdated path around the Cape of Good Hope, and the continuing supremacy of British 
sea power was deemed by the majority of officials in both Britain and India to render 
any Euphrates Valley Railway unnecessary.20 This combined with a decline in the 
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interests of private capital in railway construction in the Ottoman Empire.21 French and 
especially German financiers were willing to lock down their capital in protracted 
ventures while British capitalists preferred to keep it liquid, and the lack of paying traffic 
turned investors elsewhere. Thus, from 1875, the interlocking interests of government 
and capitalist began to turn away from Ottoman railway construction.   
 Nonetheless, examining some of the arguments advanced in favour of the 
Euphrates Valley Railway at the beginning of the 1870s shows how transcontinentalism 
continued to evolve. Andrew, for his part, continued to equate the railway with an 
unrestricted mobility of British power. The railway, he argued,  
 “would render the invasion of India all but impossible [...] It would render the resources 
 of England so promptly available in Asia, that Chatham and Portsmouth might be 
 made the bases of operations as easily as Kurachee or Bombay. It would give England 
 the first strategical position in the world" (Andrew, 1870: 8).   
Furthermore, he insisted that the Euphrates Valley Railway was preferable to the Suez 
Canal, albeit before Britain had acquired control of it. For Andrew (1870: 20), “the 
Euphrates route presents a striking contrast to that via Egypt, which, during a portion of 
the year, could not be used for the transport of troops without a serious sacrifice of life, 
in consequence of the excessive heat of the Red Sea.” This was in other words a matter 
of climate inhibiting the mobility of power that could be afforded by sea power through 
the Suez Canal, leading Andrew to conclude the railway was necessary. His arguments 
were echoed and extended by Chesney’s evidence to the House of Commons Select 
Committee. Chesney emphasised the importance of a railway from the Mediterranean 
to the Persian Gulf because “both termini [would be] on the sea, where they would be 
under the entire control of Great Britain.”22  
 Here Chesney was hinting at what Corbett referred to as the entrenchment of 
Britain as an amphibious power. In a 1911 publication, Corbett ([1911] 1988: 16) wrote 
that “great issues between nations at war have always been decided [...] either by what 
your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by fear of what 
the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.” However, for strategists like Corbett 
amphibious power referred to the ability to strike coastal ports, harbours, and 
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fortifications from the sea, rather than the ability to disembark troops and then 
transport them thousands of miles overland. Chesney, contrarily, proposed that the 
construction of fortified ports on the Mediterranean coast and on the Persian Gulf, 
dominated by British sea power and connected by a railway, would enable the 
movement of troops from the British fleet in the Mediterranean to India (via the 
communications corridor that was the Gulf) more quickly than going through Suez.  
  Aside from Andrew and Chesney’s repeated arguments concerning the utility of 
the railway for the mobility of British power, others discussed the railway in overtly 
civilisational terms. The most notable example of this aspect of transcontinentalism was 
evinced by Thomas Chenery, editor of The Times from 1877 and secretary of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, in a short book entitled Suggestions for a Railway Route to India (1869). 
Although cognisant of the military advantages offered by a transcontinental railway 
(Chenery, 1869: 23-24), he was one of the first to detail the overt civilisational 
geopolitics of the Euphrates Valley Railway. Chenery (1869: 12) spoke of the great 
“Europeo-Asiatic” continent and narrated the intrinsic attributes of the “extreme” ends 
of the continent in a very specific way. For Chenery three quarters of the ‘Europeo-
Asiatic’ peoples were concentrated at the opposing, and civilised, ends of the continent. 
Western and Central Europe bookended its western tip, whereas the peoples of India 
and the slowly “awakening” (Chenery, 1869: 11) Chinese civilisation comprised its 
eastern extreme. Between these extremes lay  
 “countries fertile and beautiful, gifted in the highest degree with all that can conduce to 
 the prosperity of their inhabitants, but for various reasons, historical, political, and 
 geographical, peopled but thinly, and by races some of which have but a defective and 
 decaying civilisation, while others seem utterly wild and irreclaimable” (Chenery, 
 1869: 12).     
As a consequence, Chenery continued,  
 “we have to face the difficulty, and I have no desire to conceal it, that the two wealthy 
 and populous regions of the world which I have mentioned are divided by a great 
 tract where railways are not likely to be constructed by the spontaneous and 
 independent efforts of the people” (Chenery, 1869: 12).   
 Chenery (1869: 19) was thus one of the first to express an intrinsic feature of 
transcontinentalism, namely the construction of the space between the supposedly 
naturally determined (although longitudinally inaccurate) extreme ends of a continent as 
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fundamentally uncivilised - “inferior to the West in civilisation and enlightenment” - in a 
direct contrast to the civilised attributes of those eastern and western extreme ends. 
Plainly, Europe was the pinnacle of civilisation, yet what Chenery (1869: 12) called the 
“Indo-Chinese” eastern extreme was historically also home to a great civilisation, 
something it was beginning to rediscover through the ongoing British colonisation of 
India. These are the wealthy and populous regions of the world Chenery (1869: 14) 
spoke of, divided by a ‘great tract’ of uncivilised space characterised by “stagnation and 
barbarism”. However, Chenery also narrated these regions as holding great potential for 
the future, both femininely fertile and beautiful, needing only the masculinised 
impregnation of railway technology to reverse the defective decay of their civilisation.  
In sum, he created the conditions for a transcontinental railway stretching between 
Europe and ‘Indo-China’ as a project that would civilise the entirety of Asiatic Turkey, 
precisely because it would traverse a space constructed as the entirety of the “Europeo-
Asiatic” continent (notwithstanding its extreme, civilised ends). Thus, Chenery (1869: 24) 
concluded,  
 “[t]o quicken, if possible, the inert regions of south-western Asia, to bring them within 
 the European system, to interest in their independence not only our own 
 government, but the most powerful and civilized of our neighbours, and thus to give 
 the world security against Muscovite conquest, is a work not unworthy of a 
 statesman.” 
 A final two points here are that, firstly, Chenery’s use of the word ‘inert’ 
foreshadowed the naturalised geopolitical trope that portrayed continental spaces as 
lifeless and dormant in a biological sense, thus requiring the railway’s bodily 
upholstering and the insertion of a system of circulation to provide a return to life. 
Chenery’s account of the railway shows an example of the beginnings of this feature of 
transcontinentalism, and dovetails closely with the case of the Cape-Cairo Railway. 
Secondly, Chenery (1869: 2) demonstrated a banal yet important feature of 
transcontinentalism; that civilisation, although represented as a universal good for 
“human society and intercourse”, was a discourse intrinsically concerned with the 
imperial logics of European power. Like all who argued for the Euphrates Valley Railway 
he emphasised the importance of an overland mobility of troops and mails, and 
foregrounded the railway as a check on the supposed “Muscovite conquest” (Chenery, 
1869: 24) of the world. This basic truth was recognised by some. In his evidence to the 
100 
 
Select Committee in 1872, a member of the Public Works Department at Aleppo 
shrewdly observed that “no one has ventured to assert that [the railway] will be 
beneficial to the Turks beyond giving utterance to common-place observations as to 
civilization, &c.”23 He preferred an international, collaborative transcontinental railway 
that would benefit all involved in constructing it, including the Ottomans. Thus, 
civilisation for Chenery was a convenient yet powerful discourse justifying the political 
and economic advantages of the railway’s construction for Britain by couching it in the 
moral imperative of the civilising mission.  
 To summarise, this section has traced the foundations of transcontinentalism in 
the relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire that developed after the 
unification of Germany in 1871, and the second and final attempt by individuals such as 
Andrew and Chesney to persuade the British government of the necessity of a Euphrates 
Valley Railway. The interlocking concerns of Germany and the Ottomans led to a political 
and economic entanglement between the two empires, as German financiers – backed 
by the German Deutsche Bank – invested in the infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire. 
For the Ottomans, this was a means of combatting a tripartite of anxieties; their 
stagnating economy, their rebellious peripheries, and the perennial question of 
modernisation. What I want to underline here is that this, combined with the growing 
reluctance of British officials and financiers to support railway construction in the 
Ottoman Empire after 1875, created the conditions in which Germany would be the 
state that was finally able to begin constructing the long-debated transcontinental 
railway in 1903. British sea power was deemed necessary to secure the Empire against 
any threat; the opening of Suez, as Mackinder wrote later, appeared to have increased 
the mobility of sea power relative to land. The arguments of Andrew, Chesney, and 
Chenery therefore went largely unheeded, although in Chenery’s short book we see the 
most developed account of transcontinentalism in Britain before the 1890s.  
 In the final section I move to the 1890s to examine the reaction of the British 
government to a fleeting proposal by a Russian nobleman, Count Vladimir Ironovich 
Kapnist, to build a transcontinental railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian 
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Gulf. Although Kapnist’s plot was little more than an implausible scheme that quickly 
blew over, the reaction to it by the British and Indian governments demonstrates the 
growing intensification of transcontinentalism, and particularly the railway’s role as a 
means of projecting state power towards the communications corridor between Britain 
and India, India’s frontier, the Persian Gulf. This project placed Russia’s supposedly 
malicious intentions towards Britain’s Indian Empire firmly under the spotlight, but did 
so from a direction not typically associated with Russian expansionism. While in the mid-
nineteenth century Russia’s threat was primarily from Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, in 
1898 it was believed the Russian imperial telescope was retrained firmly onto the 
Persian Gulf. 
3.4. Count Kapnist’s proposal for a transcontinental railway, 1898 
 The reduction of British investment in the infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire 
after the occupation of Egypt left the door open for Germany. The same year the House 
of Commons Select Committee was sitting, a German railway engineer named Wilhelm 
von Pressel had constructed a new and important railway along the Ottoman Empire’s 
eastern Anatolian shoreline, and in 1878 had attempted unsuccessfully to raise the 
capital to construct the first section of what would later become the Baghdad Railway. A 
decade later however he was successful, persuading the director of the Deutsche Bank 
Georg von Siemens to provide financial backing and underwriting for a programme of 
railway construction in the Sultan’s lands. With the backing of the Deutsche Bank Pressel 
had a renewed application to build the first section of the Baghdad Railway in October 
1888 accepted, a railway line that would run between Constantinople and Ankara. The 
Deutsche Bank created an offshoot company, the Anatolian Railway Company, in March 
1889 to manage the construction. By December 1892 the Constantinople-Ankara line 
was opened, and the railway was extended to Konya – the official starting point of the 
Baghdad Railway, in 1896 (see Figure 3.1). Here it remained until 1903 and the signing of 
the Baghdad Railway Convention (see McMurray, 2001, for more details). It is worth 
highlighting that the British and Indian governments were not concerned about the 
slow, creeping progress of the railway eastwards at this time, believing anything that 
strengthened the Ottomans against the perennial threat of Russia was a good thing. 
However, with Kapnist’s proposal the prospect was raised of a Russian controlled 
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railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, something which demanded a 
response.   
 It was in June 1898 that Kapnist applied to the Ottoman government for a 
concession to build a railway from an unnamed port on the Mediterranean Sea, through 
Aleppo, Homs, Baghdad, and Basra, to eventually terminate at Kuwait on the Persian 
Gulf (see Alghanim, 1998: 63-67; Kumar, 1965: 141-144).  A translation of his proposal 
landed on the desk of the British Prime Minster, the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury Robert 
Gascoyne-Cecil, on August 1st and caused immediate alarm.24 Aside from its 
transcontinental trace it also included proposals for the irrigation of the Tigris and 
Euphrates deltas and the construction of a port terminus at Kuwait. “On the face of it”, 
as Alghanim (1998: 63) has commented, “this was an ambitious plan to create a Russian 
presence in the region of Iraq and the northern Gulf, with enormous political benefit to 
Russia but at little economic cost”. However, in early 1899 it transpired that Kapnist had 
neither the support of the Russian Government nor the private capital needed to 
construct such a railway, and the project faded into insignificance. 
 Nonetheless, “the very idea of a Russian railway to the Gulf was enough to raise 
British hackles” (Busch, 1967: 105). This was largely because of the two geopolitical 
imaginaries discussed previously; the Persian Gulf as a communications corridor and the 
Persian Gulf as a frontier of British India. Yet there was a contradiction evinced by these 
imaginaries. In Britain, the Persian Gulf was an intrinsically British space. “Our position in 
the Persian Gulf,” said Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Foreign Office Lord 
Cranborne in January 1902 (quoted in Busch, 1967: 248), “is one of a very special 
character, and His Majesty’s Government has always considered that the ascendency of 
Great Britain in the Persian Gulf was the foundation of British policy. This is not merely a 
question of theory; it is a statement of fact.” This fact was epitomised by the term 
‘British Lake’, one which was disliked by the British Foreign Secretary between 1900 and 
1905, Lord Lansdowne, but which is nonetheless apt.25 It signified a de-facto and deeply 
commonsensical belief in British society that the Persian Gulf was a fundamentally 
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British space. Yet the intensification of the rivalries of the naturalised geopolitical era 
and the growing friction in the contact zones of empire had created a problem: “the 
‘Lake’ was no lake at all, but an international waterway of steadily increasing importance 
in an age of imperial rivalries, diplomatic flux, and sizable dangers to international peace 
of mind” (Busch, 1967: 1-2). This problem created anxiety in Britain, and the prospect of 
a Russian transcontinental railway making berth at the Persian Gulf was reacted to 
strongly as a result.  
 Two dispatches received at the Foreign Office in November 1898 illustrate this 
most prominently. The first was a memorandum authored on November 29th by the 
Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office, Major-General Sir John Ardagh. 
Ardagh argued that the exploitation of the Tigris and the Euphrates Valleys would allow 
the “[s]tate financiers of [Russia] to acquire predominant influence in the basins of the 
Euphrates and Tigris, with a view to their eventual inheritance.”26 According to Ardagh, 
underlying Kapnist’s scheme were “aspirations for extending Russian power over Turkey, 
Persia, Afghanistan, for ports on the Persian Gulf and, for the invasion of India; to none 
of which we can afford to be indifferent.”27 For Ardagh the status of the railway as a tool 
of Russian power projection was self-evident; it was equated with the acquisition of the 
river basins in Mesopotamia and the overland projection of Russian power towards India 
via ports on the Persian Gulf. The second was a memorandum from Lord Curzon 
(reproduced in Lauterpacht et al, 1991: 8) on November 19th, prepared two months 
before he became Viceroy of India. Curzon was an influential British statesman who 
travelled extensively in Persia in the late 1880s and early 1890s, subsequently writing 
and speaking extensively on questions pertaining to the safety and security of British 
India. After working as the Under-Secretary of State for both India and then Foreign 
Affairs in the 1890s he was appointed to the Viceroyalty in January 1899, two months 
after his memorandum on the proposed transcontinental railway was written.  
 Curzon used the Kapnist scheme to reflect on the wider issue of British and 
Indian policy in the Gulf. “Kowait is the best,” he declared, “indeed the only port 
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deserving of the name in the Persian Gulf, and should a line be protracted to the actual 
shores of the Gulf instead of stopping at Bussorah, Kowait is about the only place to 
which it could go.”28 But for Curzon any concession granted by the Turkish Government 
for a transcontinental railway terminating at Kuwait could not be valid because the legal 
question of who in fact was sovereign over Kuwaiti territory was not resolved. Curzon 
thought the recognition “of Turkish, or indeed, of any alien authority at Kowait, might be 
fraught with danger to British interests in the Gulf.” The reason why the railway would 
be fraught with danger he gave shortly afterwards:  
“A Russian railway ending at Kowait would be in the highest degree injurious to British 
interests. A German railway to Kowait would be scarcely less so – even a Turkish railway to 
Kowait would be unwelcome. Any one of these would challenge our hitherto uncontested 
supremacy in the Gulf, and would turn those waters into a sort of mid-Asian Gulf of Pechili” 
(in Lauterpacht et al, 1991: 8). 
As we will see, this was just the beginning of Curzon’s concerns with the Gulf. For Curzon 
any non-British railway to the Persian Gulf would be disastrous, whether constructed 
under the auspices of Germany, Russia, or the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the 
analogy drawn by Curzon between the Persian Gulf and ‘a sort of mid-Asian Gulf of 
Pechili’ is a revealing one.29 Although judicially the territory of the Chinese Government, 
by 1899 the British, French, Germans, and Russians all had ports and differing degrees of 
naval power concentrated there – a microcosm of the wary confrontation that had come 
to characterise the relations between the Great Powers at the turn of the twentieth 
century (see Otte, 2005: 4-18). Thus Curzon’s fear was structured by the belief that the 
Persian Gulf was a British space, its status as a frontier and communications corridor 
secured by the supremacy of British sea power and yet in danger of being eroded and 
undermined by the prospect of railway enabled land power.  
 Put differently, the arguments that Chesney and Andrew had offered in favour of 
the Euphrates Valley Railway were now turned on their head and depicted as reasons 
why Russia (or any other Power) could not be allowed to construct a railway from the 
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. From Kapnist’s scheme onwards, British 
transcontinentalism here was shaped by this fundamental feature of railway technology. 
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It was a tool of power projection, not merely concerned with the conveyance of troops 
but also producing imaginations of spaces such as the Tigris and Euphrates valleys as 
contested and threatened – and ultimately at risk of absorption. One important 
difference between the responses to Kapnist’s fleeting scheme and the later Baghdad 
Railway Convention of 1903 was the lack of an economic component in Britain’s 
reaction. This reflected the common imagination of Russia as a greedy, irrational state 
that sought territorial gain for no other reason than to enhance its own military and 
political power (Morgan, 1981). The civilisational and naturalised undercurrents of 
transcontinentalism remained subdued as the twentieth century began. As the next two 
chapters will suggest, Britain’s concern with the Baghdad Railway in the 1900s was 
primarily about defining, and then responding to, the power projection potential of the 
railway. It was only in the First World War that I argue we see British fears of 
transcontinentalism emerge to their full extent. 
3.5. Conclusions 
 As Hoskins (1928) and Goren (2011) have argued, the history of Britain’s Middle 
Eastern diplomacy and policy in the nineteenth century can be thought of as a consistent 
encounter with the possibility of an overland route to India rendering the supremacy of 
the Royal Navy superfluous. In this chapter I have documented the ways in which this 
was so. The chapter has charted the transforming relationship between Britain, the 
Persian Gulf, and India in the decades immediately following the Napoleonic Wars. I 
have demonstrated how, in partial response to fears over the safety and security of 
India, Britain slowly assimilated the Persian Gulf into the political and economic 
networks of informal empire, producing as it did so two geopolitical imaginaries of the 
Gulf as a frontier of India and a communications corridor between Britain and India. The 
first of these imaginaries was important because it meant that any encroachment upon 
the Gulf was seen as tantamount to a future encroachment upon India itself. The second 
was equally important because it created and solidified a belief that because the Persian 
Gulf was part of all routes of communication with India, and that any disruption at the 
Gulf could concomitantly disrupt Britain’s communications with India. However, for 
most of the nineteenth century British sea power was sufficient to ensure that both of 
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these possibilities were extremely unlikely, especially after the partial acquisition of Suez 
in 1875 and the occupation of Egypt in 1882.  
 And yet, not everyone believed sea power was enough to secure Britain’s Indian 
possessions. As I have shown, germs of transcontinentalism were present in the 
nineteenth century, firstly in the 1850s with the formation of the Euphrates Valley 
Railway company by Andrew and Chesney, and secondly in the early 1870s when the 
matter was placed before a House of Commons Select Committee. Chesney, Andrew, 
and others recognised the potential of a transcontinental railway across the Ottoman 
Empire for the mobility of British power, and equated its potential construction with the 
establishment of Britain as an amphibious power able to project power across both land 
and sea, thus “render[ing] the invasion of India all but impossible” (Andrew, 1870: 8). 
Others discussed the Euphrates Valley Railway slightly differently. In particular, Chenery 
demonstrated an early and rare example of the civilisational geopolitical trope that a 
railway spanning the civilisations of Europe and India would, by virtue of covering a 
space constructed as the entirety of a continental landmass, civilise all that lay between. 
Neither Chesney nor Andrew lived to see the Baghdad Railway constructed, but their 
early transcontinentalism was prescient in that they identified some of the crucial 
aspects of the shifting balance between land and sea power that became more central 
to the British government during the building of the Baghdad Railway. Their words were 
however not heeded, with the British government believing, like Mackinder, that the 
opening of Suez increased the mobility of sea power relative to land. By the time 
Kapnist’s proposal had come and gone, a transcontinental railway linking Europe and 
India was a more prominent concern in the Foreign Office and the Indian Government.  
 Lastly, this chapter has shown how the co-constitutive and interlocking political 
and economic concerns of the newly unified German state and the Ottoman Empire 
entwined in the last three decades of the nineteenth century. As R.W. Seton-Watson 
(1945: 575) noted,  
 “[b]y the turn of the century British influence at the Porte was negligible, while German 
 predominance, already entrenched by the military mission under Kolmar von der 
 Goltz, found its economic expression in railway concessions in Asia Minor, the germ of 
 ‘Berlin-Baghdad’.” 
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The Ottoman Empire became the site upon and through which German geopolitical 
visions and economic necessities were articulated, while to the Ottomans German 
infrastructural investment was welcomed as a component of an oft-debated programme 
of modernisation and a means of economically and militarily safeguarding the status of 
the Empire. In the next chapter I show how Britain responded to the transcontinental 
offspring of this German-Ottoman entanglement.  
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Chapter Four – ‘A foreign port at the end of a foreign line’: Britain’s 
response to the Baghdad Railway, 1902-1914 
4.1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I analysed the development of transcontinentalism from 
the Napoleonic Wars to the proposal of Count Kapnist to build a transcontinental railway 
between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf in 1898. In this chapter I narrow the 
focus to a detailed archival examination of Britain’s response to the construction of the 
Baghdad Railway. The granting of the Baghdad Railway Convention to the German-
backed Anatolian Railway Company (ARC) in March 1903, and the subsequent formation 
of a Baghdad Railway Company (BRC) was a significant catalyst for the development of 
transcontinentalism in the corridors of the British and Indian Governments. It 
established that only one state could construct and work a railway between the 
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf – Germany. It technically foreclosed any possibility 
of Britain having a say in the direction or eventual terminating location of the railway. 
Finally, it raised the possibility of that which had so worried Chesney, Andrew, and later 
Curzon becoming a reality. The construction of a transcontinental railway under the 
auspices of Germany would make Suez, and the mobility it afforded British sea power, 
basically irrelevant to the defence of India. It would also tear at the seams of Britain’s 
informal empire in the Persian Gulf and unfasten the bonds of collaboration so 
painstakingly cultivated by the British Empire over the course of the nineteenth century. 
It was, as the Indian Government put it in 1906, tantamount to the “Germanisation” of 
the Persian Gulf and the potential destruction of Britain’s Indian possessions.30  
 From Kapnist’s proposal, therefore, the Baghdad Railway was no longer about 
the modernisation and civilisation of the Ottoman Empire (at least not to the British). 
Unlike, as we will see, in Africa, transcontinentalism between Europe and India moved 
away from this course. In fact, the civilisational geopolitics evinced most strongly by 
Chenery was one of many contradictions sufficing the mechanisms of the British Empire 
at this time. While the civilisation of the Ottoman Empire was regarded a good thing 
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because it would strengthen the unstable Ottomans against the supposedly greedy 
designs of Russia, the construction of the railway under German auspices signalled that 
the imperial rewards – including the fastest route to India – would be exclusively in 
German hands. Britain’s policy towards the railway subsequently became concerned 
with preventing two possibilities: the projection of German military power towards India 
and the destruction of Britain’s informal empire in the Gulf. Although the majority of 
Britain’s preventative strategies were exhausted by April 1910, analysing them 
demonstrates how transcontinentalism took a specific form along the east-west, 
Europe-India axis in the 1900s.  
 This chapter is split into two main sections. The first analyses Britain’s reaction 
to, and definition of the problems that would be caused by, the railway. I argue Britain’s 
reaction can be divided into three related components. The first explicitly concerns the 
projection of German power, and the prospective consequences of a German naval base 
being established on the shores of the Persian Gulf. This was equated to the 
establishment of Germany as a kind of inverse-amphibious power; with an 
unprecedented mobility of power between Europe and the Persian Gulf which could 
then be extended via sea towards India far quicker than Britain could mobilise the Raj’s 
defences. As suggested in the previous chapter, this was a threat intrinsically shaped by 
the entrenched understandings of the Persian Gulf as both a frontier of India and a 
communications corridor between Britain and India. The crux of the problem was 
therefore simple – the Persian Gulf would be straddled by Germany, the frontier 
transformed into a launchpad for the attack of India and the communications corridor 
blockaded by German destroyers.   
 The second and third components of the problem were deemed to be the 
extinguishing of Britain’s informal empire. British and Indian officials feared that the 
Baghdad Railway would be fundamentally faster, more efficient, and less prone to 
disruption than Britain’s existing pathways of maritime trade. As Andrew (1870: 15) had 
been at pains to argue, where a battalion of troops could go a bale of goods could also 
go, and with the same efficiency. Thus, I demonstrate how the completion of the railway 
was equated with the extinguishing of Britain’s informal empire in the Gulf and the 
redirecting of flows of goods, resources, and peoples away from British control to those 
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dominated by Germany. Lastly, the third component of the problem posed by the 
railway was the impact it would have on the bonds of collaboration that existed 
between British officials and the Arab ruling elites at the Gulf. As I will discuss, 
collaboration was an integral part of Britain’s informal empire, based on the social 
relations carefully cultivated and maintained by British officials between themselves and 
certain members of the Arab ruling elite. The prospective impact of the railway, 
however, was the unfastening of these relations and their reterritorialisation towards 
Germany. Crucial to this were relations of prestige, which were commonly referenced by 
British and Indian officials and which evince how gravely important the maintaining of 
collaboration was to the continuing existence of Britain’s informal empire in the Gulf.  
 The second main section of the chapter documents Britain’s strategic and 
diplomatic manoeuvres, analysing in turn British proposals to internationalise the 
railway, Lord Curzon’s naval tour of the Persian Gulf in the winter of 1903, and a secret 
proposal for Britain to purchase any shorelines on the Gulf that were potential locations 
for the mooted naval base. Ultimately the first of these solutions came close to 
succeeding in 1914, before being rendered impossible by the outbreak of the First World 
War. It was with the war that British fears of a ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ block of German 
territory erupted, and this forms the content of the following chapter. Throughout this 
chapter, two important aspects of transcontinentalism undergird my arguments. The 
first is the idea of relative ascent and decline in a closed political world. To Lansdowne, 
Edward Grey, Curzon, and the other British officials involved in Britain’s Baghdad 
Railway negotiations, there was no question of co-operation or collaboration in the 
Persian Gulf. There could be no balance or harmony if a German port was constructed 
there, only strife. The benefits that Germany would garner from the railway were 
proportionate to the losses that would assuage Britain. The broader structural 
conditions associated with the naturalised geopolitical era consequently shaped the 
severity of Britain’s reaction to the railway.  
 The second aspect of transcontinentalism that needs to be emphasised is the 
oscillating balance between land and sea power. The Baghdad Railway Convention was 
signed less than a year before Mackinder’s famous 1904 lecture, and his dictum 
concerning the transmuting of the conditions of land power is consistent with the 
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Figure 4.1. Location maps of the Persian Gulf and the proposed termini of the Baghdad Railway. Reproduced from 
Busch (1967: 8, 96).  
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response of the British and Indian governments to the railway. It also shaped and 
restricted the practical strategies and diplomatic manoeuvres that Britain attempted to 
use to neutralise the threat of the railway, as the second half of the chapter will discuss. 
But what is equally important is that, as for Mackinder, the global swing back towards 
land power was in 1903 past the point of no return. Britain’s practical response to the 
railway was therefore about diplomatic obstruction, neutralisation, and damage 
limitation above anything else, and operated with a resigned acceptance that the 
railway would be constructed at some point.  
4.2. The Germanisation of the Persian Gulf 
 During and after the problems that were created by Kapnist’s proposal for a 
transcontinental railway in 1898 and 1899, the German-backed ARC had discussions with 
the Ottoman Empire to extend their existing lines to Baghdad and thence onwards to 
the Persian Gulf for a number of years. It is important to note that, in contrast to 
Kapnist’s scheme, “the basic Foreign Office view at this time was cooperative” (Busch, 
1967: 203). Lord Lansdowne fundamentally supported the extension of the Ottoman 
railway system to Baghdad, but on the specific provision that Britain could “acquire a 
proper share in the control of the railway and of its outlet on the Persian Gulf.”31  
Consequently, there were several discussions over the potential participation of British 
capital in the construction of the ARC’s planned railway in 1900 and 1901 before the 
formal conventions of the railway agreement were drawn up in January 1902 (for the 
best analysis of these years, see Wolf [1936] 1973: 17-35). These conventions were a 
surprise: “the terminus was to be at Basra, with  the [ARC] reserving the right to build a 
branch to some undetermined point on the Gulf” regardless of whether Britain was to 
contribute or not (Busch, 1967: 203). Between January 1902 and March 1903 debates 
over British participation continued in various forms, before the signing of the contract 
between the Ottoman Government and the ARC and the subsequent creation of the BRC 
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to construct and administer the new railway.32 As initially mooted in January 1902 the 
convention, in Article 1, decreed that  
 “[t]he Imperial Ottoman Government grant the concession for the construction and 
 working of an extension for the line from Konia to Bagdad and Basra [...] as well as the 
 following branches [...] From Zobeir to a point on the Persian Gulf to be agreed upon 
 between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the concessionaries”.33  
Article 23 of the convention further stated that the BRC would have the right to build a 
harbour at this point on the Gulf, as well as harbours at both Baghdad and Basra.34 At 
the same time, and due to a complicated diplomatic tangle the House of Commons 
voted against allowing British capitalists to participate in the railway in April 1903, and 
the railway concession for the transcontinental line thus became a bilateral agreement 
between Germany and the Ottoman Empire (see Francis, 1973). Both British and French 
capital was excluded, and the British Government, at least on paper, was to have no 
legal say in its construction. 
 In other words, Lansdowne’s conditions of Britain having a proper share and 
control of the outlet on the Persian Gulf were not met. As he put it to the House of Lords 
in May 1903,  
 “I say it without hesitation – we should regard the establishment of a naval base 
 or of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace 
 to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal.”35  
This, in turn, was tantamount to what the Indian Government called the ‘Germanisation’ 
of the Persian Gulf. The next three sub-sections elucidate why this was so.  
4.2.1. The German naval base on the flank of India 
 The most severe impact of the Baghdad Railway was connected to Lansdowne’s 
fear of a naval base being established on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and was 
typically referred to as the ‘strategic’ impact of the railway by British officials in their 
letters and memos. Simply put, to Lansdowne and his colleagues the Baghdad Railway 
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was a transcontinental tool of German power projection, and the naval port would 
enable a translation of German land power to the sea; a reversal of the terms of the 
amphibious power touched upon by Chesney. A German naval base at any location on 
the Gulf would, in other words, render it a place from which German power could be 
projected onwards towards British India, and which due to its fortifications and relative 
proximity to Germany would be impregnable to any neutralisation from British sea 
power.  
 In November 1904 a memo was published on the Baghdad Railway by the British 
War Office which speculated on the future of the railway and its possible impacts. The 
War Office postulated that “the terminus on the Gulf, being the point of distribution and 
transhipment, will eventually become a great focus of trade, and therefore of great 
strategical value.”36 Because of this, the memo continued, it was doubtful whether or 
not the Ottoman Empire could provide adequate levels of commercial and military 
security that the terminus would require, and this would necessitate the devolution of 
control over the terminus to Germany. Should this happen, it was believed that 
Germany could “succeed in gradually converting the port into a naval base, 
notwithstanding promises and agreements to the contrary.” The slow transformation of 
the terminus into a naval base “would enable [Germany] to keep a fleet in eastern 
water, independent of the Mediterranean route, for protecting her maritime trade and 
for attacking that of the enemy.” Furthermore, the War Office speculated, if Russia and 
England were at any point to go to war and Germany became allied with Russia, the 
position of the base would make it impossible to reinforce the Indian military garrison. 
This was because the overland route would be straddled by the Baghdad Railway, and 
the base would enable the confrontation of British naval vessels with German military 
force on their maritime route to India. 
 These fears, I argue, were intimately shaped by the intrinsic understanding of the 
Persian Gulf as a frontier of British India, an understanding that was evinced in several 
ways. After the construction of the port and its transformation into a naval base, the 
War Office stated that German warships would be placed “on the flank of our 
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communications via Suez with India.”37 This basic geographical description, connoting an 
attack from an exposed side onto a point of centrality and importance, formed the crux 
of how the strategic threat of the railway reaching the Gulf was defined. In 1906, the 
British Consul in Basra, Consul Crow, summarised this best when he grimly stated Britain 
would be “face to face with a great military and naval Power, advantageously based on a 
railway ten days from Berlin and four from Bombay.”38 This was crucial because of the 
imagined proximity of the Gulf to India and reconfiguration of the time and rapidity with 
which German military power could be projected from the port towards Indian space. 
This prospective ability to transport people, troops, munitions, stocks, and other 
resources across the Ottoman Empire in ten days, combined with a fortified naval base 
at some point at the Gulf, was imagined as “a means of overthrowing our present 
predominate position in the Gulf and menacing India.”39 Put simply, a space deemed to 
be one of the most integral frontiers of India would be turned into something akin to a 
launchpad; a place from which German power could be projected by combination of rail 
and sea over the entirety of the Persian Gulf and, as a consequence, towards India. 
 There was a second military consequence which was defined as the imperilling 
and disrupting of British communications with India. Although estimates differed in their 
specifics, it was typically agreed among the British and Indian Governments that the 
journey from Germany to Bombay would take around twelve-to-fourteen days via the 
railway, as opposed to around fifteen from London by sea via Marseilles, the Suez Canal, 
and the Red Sea. Thus, as Lansdowne’s successor Edward Grey put it in a memo to the 
French and Russian Ambassadors in June 1907, “[t]he interest of Great Britain in a 
railway which, if completed, would form the most direct mail route to India is so evident 
as to require no demonstration”.40 At its worst, it offered the possibility of 
communications being entirely disrupted during a severe international crisis. This 
gloomy future was understandably magnified when viewed through the lens of the 
Indian Government, who with Curzon at the helm from 1899 repeated his fears over 
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Kapnist’s plot consistently throughout the 1900s. For instance, in 1906 several of the top 
Indian officials signed a long, piercing letter to the Secretary of State for India John 
Morley arguing that “it is difficult to believe that a trans-continental railway terminating 
on the Gulf would not sooner or later bring with it the construction of fortifications”. 
This they then connected and equated to the “consolidation of German influence 
through [the Ottoman Empire] and the eventual passing into German hands of all the 
real power in this particular zone.”41  
 This issue of the deepening of German influence in the Ottoman Empire was a 
contentious point that was perceived markedly differently by the British and Indian 
Governments, something reflecting the Foreign Office’s subordination of Indian affairs 
to the intricacies of European diplomacy. The Indian Government reacted, for instance, 
with great alarm to unconfirmed and relatively trivial stories concerning the German 
subsidisation of Carmelite schools in Ottoman Arabia, arguing that it was evidence of 
“the intention to spread German influence through this country.”42 This can be 
juxtaposed with the fact that Grey seemingly did not respond to reports from his 
Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Nicholas O’Conor, that German archaeological digs 
in Anatolia in 1906 were fronts for the “collection of information and dissemination of 
German influence in connection with the construction of the Baghdad Railway.”43 Both 
the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Board of Trade, on the other hand, 
consistently argued that the prospective increase of German influence in the Ottoman 
Empire was secondary to the issue of the naval base, and that “[w]e might without 
serious disadvantage consent to the Anatolian Railway remaining under German 
control.”44  
 Notwithstanding these important disagreements between London and the Raj, 
the issue they did agree on was the severity of the potential naval base. Consul Crow’s 
summation of the problem is perhaps the most revealing. In particular, his description of 
Germany as a ‘great military and naval power’ captures the essence of Germany as 
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comfortable on both land and sea and able to project power across and between both 
with relative ease. If, in (at most) fourteen days, Germany could transport troops from 
Berlin to Bombay via the Gulf, the fifteen days it would take Britain to reinforce the 
Indian garrison would plainly be insufficient. It would also ensure, as the War Office put 
it, that a German fleet could be maintained in the Persian Gulf, something that was 
hitherto impossible because of the lack of a proximate friendly port. Finally, even Crow’s 
rendering of the problem as leaving Britain ‘face to face’ with Germany reflects the 
sense of a closed international political map, with states wriggling combatively in close 
proximity to one another for the smallest relative advantage that could be gained.  
 The ‘strategic’ impact of the Baghdad Railway was therefore simple. It would 
enable the projection of German power across the Ottoman Empire to a fortified naval 
base on the Persian Gulf, from which Germany’s growing fleet of warships could be 
deployed with menace towards Britain’s Indian possessions. Germany’s presence at the 
Persian Gulf constituted the reimagining of that space as a launchpad; a place from 
which power could be projected towards India. It was coupled with a second 
component, which took on a distinctly commercial character. The next sub-section turns 
to this.      
4.2.2. The extinguishing of informal empire 
 In the previous chapter I discussed how, in the early nineteenth century, the 
Persian Gulf became a part of Britain’s informal empire, a disparate patchwork of spaces 
which were not formal colonies of the British Empire but were economically and 
politically dominated by British influence. Accordingly, the second component of the 
Baghdad Railway’s impact was the extinguishing and exsanguination of Britain’s informal 
empire – but not just in the Persian Gulf. It also included the probable elimination of the 
“commercial interests which we have in the past two centuries secured in the valley of 
the Tigris and Shatt-el-Arab, and on the Persian and Arabian shores of the Gulf.”45 
Britain’s dominance in India and the Persian Gulf had gradually been extended inland to 
Mesopotamia, and by the end of the nineteenth century the majority of trade focused 
around Baghdad and the Tigris and Euphrates River Valleys was controlled by British 
                                                     
45
 ‘Effect of the Baghdad Railway’ (note 36). 
118 
 
merchants (Cohen, 1976). This was maintained in part due to the Lynch Steamship 
Company’s effective monopoly on the Shatt-el-Arab, a river linking the confluence of the 
Tigris and Euphrates rivers to the Persian Gulf. Arguably, therefore, Mesopotamia was 
just as much a part of Britain’s informal empire as the Persian Gulf. This was put most 
emphatically by Edward Grey, who often in his correspondence repeated the line that 
“[t]he commercial position of Great Britain in the Mesopotamian delta is altogether 
exceptional; that position has been steadily consolidated since the foundation, upwards 
of two and a-half centuries ago, of the first English factory in Bussorah”.46  
 It was this informal empire that the railway was projected to destroy. By 1910, 
the consensus was that the impact of the railway reaching the Persian Gulf would confer 
on Germany “a monopoly on the economic development of the country [and lead to] 
the destruction of British commercial interests”.47 The process through which this 1910 
prediction was reached was relatively straightforward. Between Baghdad and the 
Persian Gulf, it was calculated that Lynch’s steamship trade would effectively disappear 
overnight, simply because it would not be able to compete with the cheapness, 
efficiency, and speed of a railway between these two places. It was expected that “[t]he 
Railway Company would presumably make it their business to cut freights between 
Bussorah and Bagdad so as to be able to compete with the river-borne traffic.”48 This 
perhaps explains why Lynch (1911: 8) spoke to the Central Asian Society about the ways 
in which “the railway is designed to control all the country lying between the 
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf” and how it was therefore essential that the railway 
did not undercut steamship rates on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The voluminous 
trade that was dispersed and shipped throughout the entirety of Mesopotamia and the 
Gulf would therefore veer away from British hands and be usurped by the Baghdad 
Railway.  
 In addition to this unpleasant probability, in late 1909 a new Mesopotamian 
threat was identified and considered. Somewhat ironically, a British civil and irrigation 
engineer, the famed William Willcocks, had been for some years employed by the 
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Ottoman government to plan and undertake the irrigation of the Shatt-el-Arab and 
wider Mesopotamian lowlands to stimulate agriculture. Grey thought that this irrigation 
scheme was “of a kind probably calculated to render the rivers non-navigable, in which 
case no means of transport would be available until the completion of the railway.”49 
Further, when the railway was completed and river transport impossible, the inevitable 
consequence would be that trade would have to travel on the railway out of sheer 
necessity, allowing the BRC “to tax all of our trade with India and our sea-borne trade 
with Europe” at whatever rate it pleased.50 “With the rivers closed,” another official 
added, “British trade might be made to pay under the guise of freight and considerable 
share of the guarantee given by the Turkish Government to the Bagdad Railway 
Company.”51 Finally, it was projected that Germany would subsequently endeavour to 
establish a system of its own steamships from the prospective terminus to Bombay, 
replacing Lynch’s. If this happened,  
“practically the entire trade between India and the Persian Gulf would fall into German 
hands, because it would be quite impossible for the British lines to stand against ships 
supported by this enormous Railway Company, which could give through rates and 
through bookings for passengers and cargo.”52  
Aside from these problems, there were other prospective economic impacts that were 
discussed from time to time. Some, for instance, argued that branch lines would run 
from Bagdad into Persia, and thus “oust British Indian goods from the promising market 
which now exists for them via Khanikin and Kermanshah.”53 Taken as a whole, it was to 
be nothing less than the deterritorialisation of Britain’s established economic networks 
and their replacement by German economic activity centred on the railway and its 
terminus.   
4.2.3. Collaboration and prestige 
 A final component of the threat of the Baghdad Railway was the impact it was 
seen to potentially have on British prestige in the Persian Gulf. Prestige was an 
important element in the production and maintenance of informal empire that must be 
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placed within the wider context of the role of collaboration in British imperialism. 
Collaboration was proposed as an essential component of European imperialism by 
Robinson (1972), who argued that imperial historiography had disproportionately 
focused on the strategic and commercial imperatives of territorial expansion. Robinson 
argued a third factor needed more attention, collaboration; or the social relationships 
between agents of European imperialism and the indigenous elites residing in any given 
place subject to European encroachment. Collaboration worked as a balance between 
two factors. On one hand, European imperialism required indigenous elites to provide 
administrative and organisational support (or, more colloquially, the ‘know-how’), 
typically because it was difficult and expensive for imperial officials, with potentially 
limited or no knowledge of local customs or history, to do so on their own. On the other 
hand, association with wealthy imperial powers allowed indigenous elites to buttress 
and secure their own financial, political, and social interests. This often extended to 
explicit imperial backing and sheltering in places that were subject to local unrest, 
rebellion, and frequent political upheaval. Thus, collaboration was a mutually beneficial 
arrangement for both the imperial power and the indigenous elite, and the relationship 
between them was a key mechanism through which imperialism unfolded on a day-to-
day basis.      
 This is important because “[i]n the Gulf, the British were so light on the ground 
that they had no alternative but to rely heavily on local agents and staff” (Onley, 2007: 
73). British presence in Gulf towns such as Bushire and Basra was often limited to a 
single Consul who had in his employ several local staff to conduct day-to-day 
administrative duties. Prestige was intimately related to this system of collaboration. 
Wood (2013) argues that, at its simplest, prestige is a social relation defined by a certain 
‘recognition of importance’, and in the Gulf States this could be amended to recognition 
of the privileged importance of one Great Power in relation to the importance of other 
Powers, particularly in places such as Muscat, Bahrain, and Kuwait. In the British case it 
referred in other words to a recognition of British importance by local elites in the Gulf 
States, a recognition which favoured and privileged British interests over all others, 
enabling and smoothing the movement of goods and peoples throughout the Persian 
Gulf. Prestige can thus be seen as an element of soft power, a way in which British 
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imperialism was enabled through non-coercive means of attraction, protection, and 
persuasion (Wood, 2013). British officials worked hard to maintain this prestige; it was 
seen as “the fundamental interest from which security and wealth flow[ed]” (Halvorson, 
2010: 439). This was especially so because, as Wood has suggested, when the material 
power of one state declines, “the importance of prestige increases. When prestige 
wains, empires end” (Wood, 2013: 401). Given anxieties about foreign encroachment 
towards the Gulf, British and Indian officials were anxious that prestige was maintained 
among the Arab elites to the greatest possible extent.    
 However, as an enabler and facilitator of trade and a symbol of technological 
progress and modernity, railways played a pivotal role in transforming the social 
relations intrinsic to collaboration and “were thus characteristic of the collaborative 
bargains of informal imperialism” (Robinson, 1991: 5). The prestige that could be 
produced by the promise of a railway was large indeed, and equally the impact of the 
Baghdad Railway reaching the shores of the Gulf was expected to be severely 
detrimental to British prestige in the region. In the debates surrounding the exclusion of 
British capital from the project in April 1903, O’Conor had made clear to Lansdowne that 
“England’s exclusion from a public enterprise so intimately connected with the progress 
and development of the country will affect her prestige and position throughout Asia 
Minor.”54 In the following years it was the Indian Government that most emphatically 
underlined the potential effect of the Baghdad Railway on British prestige. They warned 
repeatedly that “the undivided occupation by a German Railway Company of a 
potentially invulnerable position is not calculated to conduce the enhancement […] of 
British political prestige.”55 The stream of memos and letters that winged their way from 
the India Office to the Foreign Office attesting to this diminution of British prestige 
stresses the severe importance that Curzon and his officials attached to it. “[T]he 
probable antagonism of German interests to our own in this quarter,” read one 
particularly barbed letter, meant that “no time should be lost in endeavouring to 
retrieve, so far as may still be possible, the position which we have so seriously 
                                                     
54
 ‘O’Conor to Lansdowne’, April 28th 1903, TNA FO 406/19/ff33.  
55
 ‘Government of India to [Secretary of State for India St John] Broderick’, February 4
th
 1904, FO 
881/9055X/ff3.  
122 
 
endangered by acquiescence in these encroachments.”56 The effect of the Baghdad 
Railway on British prestige in the Gulf was therefore feared to be what Wood (2013: 
388) calls the negative dimension of prestige; “diminution, loss of face, and disrespect”, 
the subsequent erosion of the recognition of privileged importance of Britain by the Gulf 
States, and its possible usurpation by Germany.  
 Many of the officials based in the vicinity of the Gulf who contributed evidence 
to the Baghdad Railway Committee in 1907 expanded on exactly why this was so. The 
Baghdad Railway Committee was established in 1906 by Sir Charles Hardinge, 
Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, on Grey’s orders. Its objective was 
explicitly to consider “[t]he effect of the Bagdad Railway, if completed without British 
co-operation, on British political and commercial interests in the Middle East.”57 It 
collected the speculations not only of the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Board 
of Trade, but also from consuls, merchants, and other agents who lived and worked in 
the Gulf States, and who thus understood from first-hand experience the importance of 
collaboration and of the maintenance of British prestige. The Report of the Committee, 
delivered to Edward Grey on March 26th 1907, quoted evidence from the Consul-General 
at Bushire, who argued that should the railway be completed “we should suffer 
immensely in prestige and in regard to our present predominant influence among the 
maritime Arabs as ‘keepers of the peace by the sea.’”58 This role entailed, inter alia, the 
minding of Shia Muslim pilgrims, who travelled yearly up the Euphrates to the holy city 
of Karbala from the Indian provinces; the more general protection of the Shia minority in 
Persia, India, and the surrounding regions; the mediating and settling of disputes 
between different ruling indigenous elites; and finally the elimination of piracy and slave 
trading.  
 In his evidence to the Baghdad Railway Committee, the Vice-Consul at 
Mohammerah William McDouall also speculated that this loss of prestige in the Gulf 
would logically mean “the Arabs on the ground” would turn to Germany for 
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protection,59 while a representative from the War Office stated that one of the principle 
objects of the railway in the first place was to “increase the prestige of Germany in the 
Middle East, and to make her attitude as the ‘Friend of Mahommedans’ still more 
imposing.”60 A 1905 dispatch from the Board of Trade agreed that 
“[i]t is difficult to discern how either our general consideration in the eyes of the Arabs 
or our particular position as the local protector of the Shia section of the Mahommedan 
faith are to benefit by the introduction of a new and powerful Frankish nation in this 
part of the Ottoman Empire.”61   
Moreover, some also believed that a domino effect would destroy British prestige at 
greater distances in Persia, India, and Central Asia. “German influence will permeate 
these regions,” Consul Crow believed, and “a current of feeling may set in hostile, if not 
directly antagonistic, to British interests.”62 To amend Woods’ aphorism, the grim 
inference was that when prestige wanes, (informal) empires end, and were replaced by 
Germans.  
4.2.4. Summary 
 In this section I have analysed what I have termed the three components of how 
British and Indian officials defined the problem of the Baghdad Railway. I have argued 
that these three components were, firstly, the projection of German military and naval 
power across the Ottoman Empire and on towards India via a fortified port on the 
shores of the Gulf. If this port was constructed Germany would become a 
transcontinental power, able to transport troops, munitions, and other military 
essentials between Europe and the Persian Gulf, and thence to India, faster than any 
response could be mustered by Britain. Secondly, I have suggested that, to Britain, the 
construction of the railway was tantamount to the destruction of Britain’s informal 
empire in the Gulf, the redirection of trade away from British maritime networks of 
transport, and the development of Mesopotamia for the benefit of Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire alone. Finally, I have elucidated how British and Indian officials feared 
the railway would loosen and tear the bonds of collaboration that were so crucial for the 
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maintenance of British power in the Persian Gulf. Taken together, these three 
components comprised nothing less than the ‘Germanisation’ of the Persian Gulf. As 
Kumar (1962: 76) has put it, “[a] German terminus at the head of the Gulf would lead to 
the Germanization of Mesopotamia; it would disturb British relations with the Arab 
chiefs of the Gulf; it would reflect adversely too on the British position in Persia, and 
necessitate the maintenance of a powerful fleet in the Gulf.”  
 These conclusions were solidified with the publication of the Baghdad Railway 
Committee’s report in March 1907. It stated that “[t]he evidence we have collected is 
remarkable for its unanimity.”63 “No witness that we have heard”, it read, “has doubted 
that if the railway is completed to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf without British co-
operation, the effect on British political and commercial interests will be disastrous”.64 
Evidence as to the likely impact of the railway reaching the Persian Gulf on British 
commerce in the region oscillated from the severely disadvantaging to the categorically 
eradicating. Germany would “in course of time […] virtually monopolize the entire trade 
between India and the Persian Gulf”65 and ensure that “British trade in South-Western 
Persia, Bagdad, and Bussorah would first languish and then vanish.”66 Furthermore, “our 
political standing and ascendency, which have been undisputed and predominant over 
those of every other foreign nation […] will be eclipsed and must disappear.”67 The 
expected transformation of the terminus into a German port meant that, “[s]trategically, 
we should have a potential naval base and supply depot, fed by a railway controlled by a 
rival naval Power, within 1,200 miles of Kurrachee, and we should have German men-of 
war cruising about the Gulf”.68 The “shortest route to India [would be] under the 
auspices of Germany”, a fact that would give rise to “serious anxiety” as it would also be 
the only realistic route for mails and goods to travel, and they would be at the whim of 
German freight rates.69 The Committee ended the Report thus:  
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“The Committee desire to place on record their opinion that the completion of the 
Bagdad Railway to the Persian Gulf without British co-operation would inflict grave and 
irreparable injury upon British interests, both Imperial and Indian, in the Middle East.”70  
 The characteristics of the ascent of the land power Germany in direct proportion 
to the decline of the sea power Britain were thus codified and solidified. A final point, 
however, is that this was not equated by either the British or Indian governments to the 
colonisation and annexation of any of the Ottoman Empire by Germany. The closest 
anyone in the British government came to this was the firebrand King’s Lynn MP Thomas 
Gibson-Bowles, who like Mackinder was worried about the decline of British sea power 
(see Gibson-Bowles, 1910: esp. 47, 227 for his views on land and sea power), something 
which made him a fierce opponent of the Baghdad Railway. In 1904 he had told 
parliament the railway was fundamentally concerned with the “general extension of 
German predominance into Asia Minor”71, and the year before he had written a letter to 
The Times scolding the government for what he perceived as “giving [...] special 
encouragement to a German scheme likely to have effects so detrimental to British 
interests” (Gibson-Bowles, 1903). In March 1911 he was also to tell a meeting of the 
Central Asian Society that the railway was an imperial project masquerading as a 
railway, and was concerned with the extension of German power into Asia Minor over 
any and all commercial intentions (in Chéradame, 1911: 17). Yet not even Gibson-Bowles 
went as far as to fear German annexation. This final feature of Berlin-Baghdad 
transcontinentalism was only to come later with the outbreak of war.     
 In the meantime, the slow, creeping progress of the railway itself left much scope 
for negotiation. In the next section I analyse how Britain took action to attempt to 
mitigate the threefold problem identified here.   
4.3. Stopping the Germanisation 
4.3.1. Internationalisation and the Baghdad-Gulf section 
 “If we participate in the further construction of the railway, and can obtain a 
 share equal to that of any other Power in respect of construction and 
 management, more especially of that portion of the line extending from 
 Baghdad to the Persian Gulf,  with a prepondering influence as regards the 
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 control of the terminus, the railway would not, as far as can be foreseen, 
 exercise any detrimental effect.”72 
 To some degree, the internationalisation of the entire system of Ottoman 
railways remained the ideal solution to Britain’s problems even after the withdrawal of 
British participation in 1903. Lord Lansdowne continued to reiterate in 1904 that he 
viewed the railway as a question of “common and international interest”, and went as 
far as suggesting that “an international free port, open to all, and unfortified, at Koweit 
would not be a source of danger to us.”73 Memos authored by the Board of Trade and 
the Indian Government in 1905 and 1906 respectively also evidence their tacit support 
for internationalisation.74 Furthermore, after the first section of the railway was 
completed in 1904, the BRC “became increasingly anxious to secure British co-
operation” when it became apparent some German capitalists would not be reinvesting 
their profits into the next sections.75 In Britain internationalisation was based on the 
simple premise that a fully international railway company which had no majority of 
directors with one nationality would ensure any continuation of the line could only be 
made with Britain’s assent. The management of the railway company would be 
organised into what Cohen (1976) has termed the quatre structure, where 25% of shares 
would be each allocated to French, British, and German investors, with the rest directed 
towards smaller powers. As O’Conor put it, “it would be impossible to direct its policy 
and working to the benefit of any single country at the expense of others.”76 Put 
differently, British board members, lent on by the British government, could ensure that 
no discriminatory railway tariffs would impact on British maritime trade, and any port on 
the Persian Gulf would be subject to regulations preventing its transformation into a 
naval base.  
 However, this solution was unrealistic precisely because French and German 
capital was locked into more railway lines than British capital at this time. The prospect 
of full internationalisation was thus not appealing either to French or German financiers, 
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even as the BRC warned that without British assistance the Baghdad Railway might not 
be completed at all. As construction on the Baghdad Railway progressed, George Clarke, 
secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, made clear in June 1906 that “the 
bringing of existing lines into a great international system seems beyond the scope of 
present possibilities.”77 Some therefore began to mix the idea of internationalisation 
with the necessity of Britain having a controlling influence over the section of the 
railway from Baghdad to the Persian Gulf; “international control, which appears to be 
essential, is not incompatible with the construction and maintenance of the Baghdad-
Gulf section by Great Britain.”78 The essence of this solution was that the Anatolian and 
Baghdad Railways would remain under the control of Germany, the Syrian railways 
owned and operated by French capitalists would likewise remain, and the BRC would 
cede the right to construct and maintain the Baghdad-Gulf section to Britain. George 
Clarke commented that British control of the Baghdad-Gulf section “might fairly be 
regarded as a legitimate counterpoise to the French and German railways in Syria and 
Asia Minor respectively.”79  This seemed possible, even likely, but for the question of 
Russia. Specifically, in 1906 the notion of an international railway system spanning the 
entire Ottoman Empire and split into sections controlled by Britain, France, and 
Germany was unacceptable in Moscow. Consequently, it was quickly realised that any 
plan along such lines would have to be a joint Anglo-French-Russian proposal to 
Germany and the BRC. The question of how to achieve this occupied the attention of 
Grey and the British Ambassadors to France and Russia almost constantly in the latter 
half of 1906.80 In essence, by the time this issue was resolved (primarily with the signing 
of the Anglo-Russian Entente in August 1907), German capital had been found for the 
continuation of the railway. Furthermore, when the Entente was signed The Times 
(1907) reported, with some scorn, the reaction of a German newspaper, which believed 
it was a prelude to Britain attempting to turn “the Hinterland of Koweit, together with 
the Euphrates region and the Bagdad Railway, into a second Egypt.” Not only this, as the 
same newspaper had reported the year before, there were still some in Germany who 
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believed British participation of any kind “was out of the question in view of the fact that 
the original proposal of the German concession-holders had been wrecked by the refusal 
of England to participate” (The Times, 1906a). Whatever the reasons,the crucial 
question, defined in January 1905 as “can Germany complete the line without British co-
operation?”, was for the time being definitely answered in the affirmative in the 
summer of 1907.81 Internationalisation of any kind slid off the table altogether, leading 
the Baghdad Railway Committee to (rather desperately) argue for “supreme British 
control over the portion of the railway in which British interests are most vitally 
concerned.”82  
 This was also a solution favoured by those concerned with the railway in 
parliament. It is important to underline that the majority of the discussions over the 
impact of the Baghdad Railway (as discussed in Section 4.2.) were not shared with British 
MPs in parliament. The deliberations and report of the Baghdad Railway Committee, for 
example, were never brought before MPs, and nor was most of the information 
contained within the various memos and letters shared by the Foreign and India Offices. 
Thomas Gibson-Bowles remained the main agitator over the railway in the mid-1900s, 
and he was joined by John Rees, a Liberal MP first elected in 1906, in asking Grey 
repeatedly in parliament for news regarding the railway’s progress. Each time Grey 
responded matter-of-factly with the current position of the railway, and what 
construction was taking place at that time.83 However, more specific requests by Gibson-
Bowles and Rees were strictly denied. For example, in February 1907 Rees asked Grey in 
parliament “whether he can make any statement to the House regarding the 
internationalisation of the Baghdad Railway or the participation of Great Britain in the 
progress of the line”, to which Grey replied drily “[t]he [a]nswer is in the negative.” 
Gibson-Bowles then interjected, asking “whether His Majesty's Government have 
recently entered into negotiations with any foreign Government with a view to the 
construction of the Baghdad Railway; and whether any Papers on the subject can be laid 
upon the Table.” Again, Grey replied that the answer to both questions was “in the 
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negative”, an outright lie considering the aforementioned discussions of 1905 and 
1906,84 and given that he had recently ordered the formation of the Baghdad Railway 
Committee explicitly to answer such questions. Yet Rees never wavered from the view 
that was eventually to become dominant once internationalisation had slid off the table, 
that “it ought to be an absolute sine que non that England should have control of the 
section between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf.”85   
  The logic behind the response of internationalism was that if achieved it would 
directly combat the first two components of the threat of the Baghdad Railway 
discussed in the previous chapter. British control of the Baghdad-Gulf section of the 
railway would block the projection of German power that the railway was deemed to 
potentially enable. Thus by constructing, controlling, and managing this line, any 
movement of troops or munitions by Germany towards the Gulf could be blocked swiftly 
and easily. Furthermore, the crucial add-on to this was that Britain would also construct, 
control, and manage the terminating port of the railway on the Gulf, thus ensuring that 
it could never be turned into a German naval base. With regards to the second 
component, the extinguishing of informal empire, British control of the Baghdad-Gulf 
section would ensure a concomitant control of freight rates and tariffs, which would be 
internationally agreed and thus not discriminatory to British goods as was feared. It 
would also ensure that none of Britain’s Mesopotamian trade in the valleys of the 
Euphrates and Tigris (i.e. between Baghdad and the Gulf) could fall into German hands. 
The destruction of Britain’s informal empire would therefore be checked, and the 
careful regulation and management of railway tariffs would guarantee the continuation 
and relevance of Britain’s preponderant maritime pathways of movement.  
 While internationalisation of this kind was ultimately agreed upon in 1914, other 
responses to the threat of the Baghdad Railway were put forward alongside 
internationalisation in the mid-1900s. The next two sub-sections analyse two of these 
responses; a naval tour embarked upon by Lord Curzon in November 1903, and a secret 
plot to purchase and lease parts of the Gulf shoreline that were thought suitable for the 
location of the much-feared railway terminus.  
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4.3.2. Curzon and the spectacle of power and prestige 
 Curzon embarked on his naval tour of the Persian Gulf in November and 
December 1903, backed by a considerable entourage. This was a continuation of his 
attempts, noted at the end of the previous chapter, to proactively defend and secure 
those spaces identified as the frontiers of British India against foreign encroachment. As 
Radford (2013a: 890) puts it, “Curzon’s strategic vision for the frontiers of the Indian 
Empire, and the Persian Gulf in particular, was based on securing the interests of the 
British and excluding those of other powers.” He did this in various ways, such as 
replacing the part-time ‘native agents’ at the Gulf with full-time British officers such as 
Sir Percy Cox, who were much more active and prominent than their predecessors had 
been. In 1902 Curzon also commissioned a gargantuan six-volume gazetteer and a map 
of the Persian Gulf; documents that “Curzon and the British establishment regarded as 
information necessary to ensure that they could know, and therefore control, the 
Persian Gulf” (Radford, 2013a: 897). While these instances comprised elements of 
Curzon’s ‘forward policy’ in the Gulf, I want to focus on his naval tour because it 
demonstrates how Curzon attempted to use the spectacle and theatricality of British sea 
power to visualise British power in the region and negate the prospective impacts of a 
German railway reaching the shores of his British lake.  
 Curzon had wanted to tour the Gulf States as early as May 1901 in response to 
the growing threats that Russia, Germany, and to a lesser extent France were thought to 
pose in the Gulf, but conflict with the India Office and the distraction provided by the 
war in South Africa meant he was denied until mid-1903. Curzon timed its revival well: 
coinciding with the granting of the Baghdad Railway Convention, Lansdowne’s 1903 
speech to the Lords, and the growing furore in the British press towards German 
expansionist intentions, thus ensuring the softening of the previously hostile Secretary 
of State for India George Hamilton to the idea. Curzon departed from Karachi on 
November 16th 1903 and, over the following three weeks, visited Muscat, various towns 
around the Strait of Hormuz, Kuwait, and finally Persia. While his tour has been analysed 
before (Radford, 2013a), I argue that the trip was first and foremost a spectacle, a 
voyage designed to demonstrate both to British collaborators in the Gulf and to 
Germany that any encroachment upon the ‘British lake’ would not be tolerated. Further, 
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it was an instance of power projection in Williams’ (2010) second sense; designed to 
internationally (re)produce the notion that the Gulf was an intrinsically British space.  
 Many geographers have highlighted the importance of spectacle in inculcating 
feelings of attachment, belonging, and identification with a particular ideal; most often 
the modern nation-state (Daniels and Cosgrove, 1993; Kapferer, 2004; Kong and Yeoh, 
1997). Although often used to modify behaviour through viscerally punitive spectacles, 
which inculcate fear and shock, Kong and Yeoh (1997: 216) have argued that equally 
important are those spectacles that seek to instil a sense of wonder, awe, and reverence 
through “the deliberate use of ceremony; the conscious construction of pomp; the 
creation of occasion and circumstances for celebration, and visual effects.” Moreover, 
this is a tactic that scholars such as Rech (2015) have argued takes on a special 
significance militarily. Spectacular displays of military prowess such as modern day 
military airshows and Curzon’s naval tour 
 “are in many ways a legitimisation of the nation state, are designed as a  celebration of 
 military strength and reproduce imaginaries of the world as backdrop to threat, host 
 to difference and stage to war” (Rech, 2015: 541).   
Understood as spectacle, and viewed in the context of the previous section, Curzon’s 
cruise had two aims. Firstly, he sought to reinforce and enhance British prestige among 
the ruling elites in the Gulf through the spectacular inculcation of “feelings of admiration 
and wonder” (Kong and Yeoh, 1997: 216), and secondly to demonstrate through a 
showing of military prowess “that the British were the ruling power in the Gulf and 
would not be supplanted by any other rival” (Radford, 2013a: 889).  
 In the first instance, Curzon explicitly utilised the tour as an opportunity to 
cultivate ties with the Arab Rulers at Muscat and Kuwait. Muscat, in present day Oman, 
was a contested space where France and Britain had historically competed for influence 
and prestige. In an act of obvious seduction, Curzon made Muscat’s Sultan a ‘Knight 
Grand Commander’ of the British Empire, and afterwards told Percy Cox that “he took 
my hand between his and swore eternal fidelity and devotion” (quoted in Radford, 
2013a: 893). At the railway’s potential terminus in Kuwait, meanwhile, Curzon made 
every effort to entrench British prestige with the Sheikh. He invited the Sheikh to board 
the H.M.S. Hardinge on November 28th, and after coming ashore Curzon rode on 
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horseback under the escort of an Arab entourage down to the town. The fanfare that 
accompanied Curzon was more than the extravagant but not unordinary performances 
of diplomacy, but a very real recognition of the need to reproduce and cement relations 
of prestige, favour, and esteem among the Arab Rulers of the Gulf. Upon Curzon’s return 
to India, The Times (1903b: 5) newspaper captured the importance of this to the 
mutually beneficial nature of collaboration:  
“The tribes and peoples of the Gulf [...] have received from the mouth of the 
representative of the Sovereign assurances as to the continuance of the protection 
which they have so long enjoyed and which has been a guarantee of their peace and 
security for more than a century.”  
 Yet in the second sense, the intended recipients of Curzon’s spectacle were not 
only the Arab Rulers of the Gulf, but the other European powers – primarily Germany, 
but also France and Russia. As MacDonald (2006: 67) has suggested in a different 
context, the tour can be argued to have existed in a “tension between being known, 
seen and understood on the one hand and being secretive and protective [...] on the 
other.” Curzon needed to emphasise the magnitude, aptitude, and valour of British sea 
power if it was to act as a sufficient deterrent to the other European powers, yet its 
exact itinerary, operational details, and precise intentions were obscured. Thus Curzon’s 
fleet was excessively large, “by far the most imposing which had ever flown the flag of 
single power” in the Gulf (Radford, 2013a: 888). It included the H.M.S. Argonaut, “a 
large and impressive 11,000-ton cruiser” which had never been seen in the Gulf 
(Radford, 2013a: 888). However, a journalist embedded on the Hardinge for the 
duration of the tour dutifully reported its proceedings to The Times (1903c: 6) but 
omitted crucial details, such as a survey of the waters surrounding Kuwait to identify 
possible ports and waterways potentially suitable for a railway terminus. At the same 
time, reporters in Berlin carefully relayed to The Times (1903a: 7) the reaction of the 
German press, such as the Cologne Gazette’s observation that “[such] an imposing 
display of power will not fail to create the desired impression.”  
 Curzon’s tour can therefore be understood as a Janus-faced spectacle of British 
sea power, engineered and stage managed to reinforce Britain’s prestige among the 
Arab elites and demonstrate to Germany that any designs they might have on the 
Persian Gulf would be met with considerable naval force. As the Indian Government 
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later recognised in 1906, the tour had as its objective “to consolidate our influence [in 
Kuwait] in anticipation of the day when the port of a trans-continental railway system 
should be located in this neighbourhood.”86 More broadly, of course, it reflected the 
recognition that the relations of collaboration that were so crucial to the maintenance of 
informal empire could be unfastened by the progress of the railway. In the prosaic sense 
that railway technology threatened to reterritorialise the social relations of collaboration 
towards Germany, Curzon’s tour demonstrates a different angle of the gradually sliding 
importance of sea power relative to land, and just as importantly the continuing yet 
increasingly unsatisfactory ability of the British navy to defend British spaces of 
predominance.  
4.3.3. Shadowy strategies 
 Curzon’s attempt to reproduce relations of prestige and renown with the Sheikh 
of Kuwait foreshadowed the final way in which Britain attempted to dilute the railway’s 
threat, which was kept secret from Germany and the BRC. This was Britain’s partly 
successful attempt to purchase or lease those portions of the Gulf shoreline that were 
deemed likely candidates for the terminus of the railway. In early 1905, the Foreign 
Office had dispatched a railway surveyor, Edward Mahon, to “examine the country 
adjacent to the Khor Abdullah at the head of the Persian Gulf, with a view to reporting 
on the places which appeared most suitable as termini of the proposed Bagdad 
Railway.”87 Mahon reported there were five suitable termini; Basra, Fao, Um Kasr, 
Warba Island, and Kuwait itself, at which a port could be built at either El-Kathama or 
Bunder-es-Shwiekh (see Figure 4.1 for these locations in respect to the wider Persian 
Gulf, and Figure 4.2 for the maps produced by Mahon). Assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of each one, Mahon concluded Basra would be the best due to its 
commercial position – “[t]he Power holding Bussorah as a port, would control the trade 
of north-east Arabia which is at present almost entirely British.”88  
                                                     
86
 ‘Government of India to Morley’ (note 30), ff7.  
87
 ‘Report (with maps) on the country adjacent to the Khor Abdullah, and places suitable as Termini of 
proposed Bagdad Railway, by E W S Mahon’, July 24
th
 1905, IOR L/PS/18/B165/ff1. 
88
 Ibid, ff5.  
134 
 
 Mahon’s conclusions were welcomed dimly, especially in India, which in 1904 
had already noted that “the anchorages below Um Kasr and at Warba Island can at any 
time be converted into an impregnable harbour.”89 They wrote to Morley that: 
 “The arrival of a German railway at Bussorah, Um Kasr, Koweit, or other point in this 
 quarter, must tend to the Germanization of Bagdad and Bussorah Vilayets, the 
 dimunition of British prestige and commerce in these provinces, and the disturbance 
 of our relations with the Arab chiefs of the Gulf.”90  
Furthermore, Mahon’s report led to little consensus over the most suitable spot for the 
terminus. The former Military Attaché at Constantinople Francis Maunsell believed 
Mahon’s report exaggerated Basra’s suitability, while the steamship magnate George 
Mackenzie agreed with Curzon that Kuwait “was capable of being developed into an 
excellent harbour.”91 As McMurray (2001) has suggested, this uncertainty was reflected 
in Germany, where neither the railway’s financiers nor the German government had 
agreed on even a suitable list of possible termini. Regardless, as the Government of India 
was to put it in August 1906, “the necessity for securing in anticipation an effective 
control over the future terminal port of the line [had] come prominently under 
notice.”92 Thus the Foreign and India Offices sought to use their influence with the 
Sheikh to ensure a future terminal port, wherever it might end up, could not be 
developed into a military base by Germany.    
 As a broad strategy this was first put forward by Percy Cox in November 1905, 
but it was only seriously considered in the middle of 1907 when, as discussed previously, 
the construction of the railway had recommenced after the BRC’s financial problems.93 
In October 1907 the Indian Government and the British Treasury agreed to lease one of 
the possible ports at Kuwait, Bunder-es-Shweikh, from the Sheikh for a yearly sum. The 
lease was defined as a rectangular plot of 3750 yards in length, with a British right of 
pre-emption stretching a further 1000 yards in any direction and the option to also lease 
El-Kathama in the future if it was deemed necessary. As Cox observed, the lease 
                                                     
89
 ‘Report of the Inter-Departmental Conference on the Bagdad Railway Terminus’, October 2
nd
 1907, TNA 
406/32/ff16.  
90
 ‘Government of India to Morley’ (note 30), ff7-8.  
91
 ‘Baghdad Railway Committee Evidence’, TNA FO 881/9157X/ff16; ‘Report of the Baghdad Railway 
Committee’ (note 48), ff16.  
92
 Government of India to Morley’, August 2nd 1906, TNA FO 881/9055X/ff25. 
93
 ‘Cox to Government of India’, February 10
th
 1907, TNA FO 881/9055X. 
135 
 
provided Britain with “the whole of the valuable rock-fronted strip in the neighbourhood 
of the position.”94 The Sheikh also promised that “neither I nor my heirs after me will 
grant, sell or lease to a foreign Government […] any of our land within Koweit 
boundaries, or around it, without the permission of the precious Imperial English 
Government.”95 In sum, leasing the foreshore of Bunder-es-Shweikh ensured that 
Kuwait, which by 1907 Grey was describing as “possess[ed of] capabilities [...] superior 
to those of any other port on the Persian Gulf”, could not be used as the railway’s 
terminus without Britain’s acquiescence.96  
 It was not just at Kuwait that British officials forwarded this strategy. While 
negotiations over Bunder-es-Shweikh were ongoing, an Interdepartmental Conference 
featuring representatives from the India Office, Admiralty, Board of Trade, and Foreign 
Office met in September 1907 to consider each of the possible termini. Grey asserted 
that although the Bunder-es-Shweikh negotiations were almost concluded, “it is also of 
great importance that we should secure prior rights to all suitable sites for a terminus.”97 
The report of the conference concluded in kind, noting that “we do not consider that the 
possession of [Bunder-es-Shweikh] would exclude the Germans from access to the 
Persian Gulf.”98 Quoting the India Office’s 1904 ‘impregnable harbour’ comments, the 
report recommended that Warba and Bubiyan be similarly secured “since both 
command the approaches to the Khor Abdullah and [Um-Kasr]”.99  
 This, however, was more problematic. Warba, Fao, Bubiyan, and Um Kasr were 
all points “where Ottoman, Persian, and Kuwaiti authority blurred” (Radford, 2013a: 
900). Their jurisdiction was not agreed upon internationally. Consequently, moves were 
made to encourage the Sheikh to assert claims to Warba, and the Interdepartmental 
Conference recommended establishing a British posting on the northern end of Bubiyan 
to frighten the Ottoman troops presently occupying the southern end, and on Warba 
too if feasible. As O’Conor wrote to Grey in September 1907, “we should let wily Shiekh 
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Figure 4.2: Mahon's maps of Kuwait and the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab. Reproduced from IOR L/PS/18/B165. 
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watch his opportunity to extend his territorial jurisdiction to Um Kasr and other 
neighbouring districts of most importance from the point of view of the Baghdad 
Railway.”100 “With this”, as the Indian Government put it the month before, “we should 
command all possible railway outlets on the western shore of the head of the Gulf.”101    
 As with the discussions over internationalisation, this entire process was not only 
kept secret from Germany, but from parliament as well. In June 1906, over a year after 
Mahon had delivered his report and as the Indian government were explicitly extolling 
the ‘necessity for securing in anticipation an effective control over the future terminal 
port of the line’, John Rees stood up in parliament once again to ask another doomed 
question about British policy towards the railway. He asked whether Grey “had received 
any official information that the German Embassy in Constantinople has made overtures 
to the Porte, for the purchase or lease of an island or station in the Persian Gulf”, but 
was told bluntly that Grey had “no official information which I can give to the hon. 
Member on the subject.”   
4.4. Conclusions 
 Ultimately, neither the leasing of the foreshore at Bunder-es-Shweikh nor the 
spectacular performance of British power in the Gulf by Curzon brought any kind of 
closure to the threat posed by the Baghdad Railway. By April 1910, after the upheaval of 
the Young Turk Revolution in July 1908 had stopped the progress of the railway for some 
months,  
 “the negotiations for the Bagdad railway had reached the same state of deadlock as the 
 [Anglo-German] naval conversations; and although the Anglo-German negotiations 
 continued intermittently until they were interrupted by the second Moroccan crisis in 
 July 1911, no real progress was made” (Sweet, 1977: 232).    
This largely remained the case until the First World War, as the railway’s physical 
construction ran into unsurmountable problems due to the Ottoman Empire’s troubled 
finances, the task of tunnelling the Amanus, Taurus, and Nur mountains, and frequent 
outbreaks of disease on the construction sites (McMurray, 2001). An Anglo-German 
                                                     
100
 O’Conor to Grey, September 23
rd
 1907, TNA FO 406/32/ff2.  
101
 Government of India to Morley, August 27
th
 1907, TNA FO 881/9055X/ff18.  
138 
 
Convention of March 28th 1914, which had been in the making for over a year, decreed 
in Article 2 that 
“[t]he terminus of the Baghdad Railway Company's line shall be at Basra, and the Bagdad 
Railway Company has renounced all claims to construct a branch line from Basra (Zobeir) 
to the Persian Gulf, referred to in article 1 of the Bagdad Railway Convention of the 5th 
March, 1903, and to build a port of railway terminus on the Persian Gulf, under article 
23 of said Bagdad Railway Convention."102    
By this point, the railway had been completed only to the small outpost of Tel-Helif, 
some 476km away from Baghdad. But additional securities were still built into the 
Convention, such as Clause B of Article 3, a declaration by the German Government that 
they would not initiate or even support any attempt to construct a port on the Persian 
Gulf without Britain’s assent.103 Although the ratification and formal signing of the 
agreement never took place due to the outbreak of the First World War in July 1914, the 
premise of the agreement was an acceptable outcome for both states which confirmed 
Britain’s rights in both Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf.  
 However, at no point during this period was this solution an inevitable 
conclusion. What I have shown in this chapter is how Britain considered the construction 
of the Baghdad Railway to be fundamentally concerned with the projection of German 
power across space, and if a naval base was constructed on the shores of the Persian 
Gulf, the ascension of Germany to a state that would hold an unrivalled mobility of 
power between Europe and India and thence onwards to the Persian Gulf. I have also 
shown how Britain equated the construction of the Baghdad Railway with the 
destruction of the informal empire in the Gulf and its replacement by Germany, and the 
diminution and eventual disappearance of the social bonds of collaboration that were so 
integral to the (re)production and maintenance of informal empire on a day-to-day 
basis. The chapter has therefore lain bare in more detail the fears surrounding German 
encroachment towards spaces of British influence and ascendency in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, and the responses that British and Indian officials devised to 
attempt to mitigate, neutralise, and pre-empt the identified threats.  
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 More broadly, this detailed focus on the machinations and discussions of the 
British and Indian governments evinces the importance of the doctrine of 
transcontinentalism for shaping Britain’s reaction to the railway. The projection of 
German power towards vital spaces of British predominance was the crucial factor 
determining Britain’s fears to and responses to the railway. The railway truncated and 
compressed the relative proximity of the two places deemed to be at the extreme and 
opposite ends of the railway – the German state at the western and the Persian Gulf at 
the eastern extreme. Germany, in accordance with the wider structural context of 
naturalised geopolitics, was deemed to be a state with an innate and instinctive need to 
expand its political and economic influence in the Ottoman Empire, and as I have shown 
in the previous chapter this was importantly related to a German imaginary of the 
Ottoman Empire as a space upon and throughout which a growing German Weltpolitik 
could be manifested. The Persian Gulf, on the other hand, derived its importance from 
its dual status as a frontier of British India and a communications corridor between 
Britain and India. The transcontinental Baghdad Railway twisted these two places 
together in the geopolitical imagination, and when completed would amount to a ‘rival 
naval Power within 1,200 miles of Kurrachee’. This intrinsic feature of 
transcontinentalism, the projection of power across space between two naturally 
determined points with specific imagined characteristics, therefore shaped Britain’s 
response to the railway.  
 At the same time, a qualification is needed to Williams’ (2005) assertion that her 
technogeopolitical project involves the materialisation and territorialisation of the 
sovereignty of one state over a specific space. As I have noted, the construction of the 
railway was not equated to the annexation and colonisation of the Ottoman Empire by 
Germany. And nor might it have been, had the First World War not broken out in July 
1914. If it had not, it is likely the Anglo-German Convention would have been ratified 
and the railway completed before the end of the second decade of the twentieth 
century. Britain’s predominant position in Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf, and India 
would have probably continued, Germany would presumably have begun to reap the 
commercial and political benefits of administering the line, and there is also every 
chance that the Ottoman Empire would have been strengthened and stabilised by the 
140 
 
economic, modernising, and military benefits such a railway and its branch lines would 
have brought. The railway could, therefore, have been a project that contributed to the 
lubrication of the fricticious system of international relations at a point when it was 
becoming increasingly heated; a reification of the important role of internationalism and 
diplomacy in solving European problems at a point when faith in them was crumbling. As 
it happened, the lights went out at the end of July, and the Baghdad Railway was soon 
being fingered in Britain as a vital part of a wider German conspiracy to destroy the 
British Empire and establish a grand Germanic transcontinental empire stretching from 
the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. Transcontinentalism accordingly reached its height, 
and as the next chapter will examine brought all the historical concerns over the 
overland route to India to the surface.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
141 
 
Chapter Five – The rails to world power: the Baghdad Railway and the 
First World War, 1914-1921 
5.1. Introduction: the Baghdad Railway in the war 
 The signing of the formal alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire on 
August 2nd 1914 marked the culmination of the political and economic relationship that 
developed between the two Empires in the late nineteenth century. The construction of 
the railway, unaffected by the now redundant Anglo-German Convention of March 
1914, continued, and at the end of 1914 it had for the first time passed the halfway 
mark: 1104km out of the total 2190km between Konya and Basra were completed. 
Despite this, the outbreak of war decimated the railway’s multinational labour forces, 
who were conscripted into military service by their respective nations. Meanwhile, 
German engineers continued to wage their own war against the intractable Taurus and 
Amanus mountain ranges, a war which they were finally beginning to win; “after years 
of boring around the clock and using tens of thousands of drill bits”, the majority of 
mountain tunnels were completed by July 1915 (McMurray, 2001: 118). However, as an 
important logistical and communications pathway the railway immediately became a 
potential military target, which ensured that no private capital was forthcoming for its 
continuation. In this environment, Deutsche Bank was forced by the German war 
government to fund the railway. As McMurray (2001: 117) summarises, “the railway had 
simply become too strategically important to squabble over its funding. The railway still 
represented Germany’s last remaining trump card, whether or not an attack on the Suez 
took place in the future.”     
 McMurray (2001) here indicates how, with an attritional stalemate reached on 
the Western Front by 1915, Germany’s war strategists began to think about how the 
Baghdad Railway could be utilised to put pressure on two of Britain’s key positions, the 
Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. The major fear of the British and Indian governments in 
the 1900s became a reality as the railway “metamorphosed from being an independent 
advocate of German commercialism to an involuntary surrogate of German militarism” 
(McMurray 2001: 125-126). As McMeekin (2011) has masterfully demonstrated, the 
Ottomans had planned to attack Suez since the outbreak of war, but due to the only 
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Ottoman munitions factory being in Constantinople and suffering from poor output, 
weapons for any attack on Suez had to be transported directly from the Central Powers 
in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Yet when the decision was finally taken to attack Suez 
in the first week of February 1915, with  
 “several dozen kilometres on the Baghdad railway near Cilicia still uncompleted, 
 getting guns to Syria was like sending them to the moon. Not for the last time, [German 
 general] Kress lamented the dreaded Taurus and Amanus mountain gaps, which had 
 ensured that his forces would be woefully short of firepower at Suez” (McMeekin, 
 2011: 167).  
 Partly as a result, the attack on Suez failed. McMeekin (2011: 178) suggests its 
failure demonstrated to German generals that “the Baghdad railway gaps had to be 
forded as soon as possible” if any successful strikes were to take place in the Middle 
East. However, by January 1916 any hope that the railway would be finished by the end 
of the year was in tatters. The fluctuating and precarious workforce was inadequate to 
maintain any consistent progress, and the war disrupted the lines of communication 
between the multiple construction sites and the BRC’s headquarters in Frankfurt. A 
second German-Ottoman attack on Suez failed in August 1916, and over the following 
winter shortages of food, shelter, and clothing combined with harsh weather to produce 
several outbreaks of disease, decimating the workforce even further. The construction 
was thus stationary when, on March 11th 1917, an army led by Frederick Stanley Maude 
marched triumphantly into Baghdad having finally driven out the Ottoman garrison.    
 As Leo Amery was to put it in 1917, 
 “As regards warfare on land the factor that has dominated the situation has been 
 railway power. To a large extent the war has been one of railway power versus sea 
 power, and, within its radius, railway power has proved the more effective. The secret 
 of Germany’s striking power is in her great railway system, and it is through her control 
 of the great railway arteries that she dominates and keeps together the Alliance  of the 
Central Powers.”104  
The implication here is that, had Germany’s ‘great railway system’ included Baghdad in 
its ‘radius’, Maude’s recapture of Baghdad might not have been possible. This aspect of 
power projection and its relation to the First World War has been thoroughly 
documented by McMeekin (2011: 342), who speculates that had the Baghdad Railway 
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been completed by July 1914, “a decisive blow might well have been struck at the Suez 
Canal, severing the lifeline of the British Empire [...] which would surely have seen 
Germany emerge as the leading power in the Near East.” McMeekin’s (2011) argument 
is a tantalising one because it emphasises how the projection of German military power 
that was so feared during the 1900s could have become a pivotal reality in the German-
Ottoman offenses on Suez. In this chapter, however, I want to focus on how in the First 
World War the Baghdad Railway came to be feared in Britain as the backbone of a great 
transcontinental German empire spanning the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. This in turn 
prompted a different response. No longer was it sufficient to secure Britain’s position at 
the Persian Gulf, simply because German absorption of the Ottoman Empire would leave 
the Gulf, and India, completely vulnerable in a future war. What was explicitly called 
‘Berlin-Baghdad’ for the first time during the war had to be stopped both now, and from 
ever being realised in the future.     
 To do this the chapter is split into two main sections. The first details the rise of 
Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism after the capture of Baghdad, and the second 
considers proposals for a series of buffer states in South Eastern Europe to prevent 
Berlin-Baghdad from ever being resuscitated in the future. In the first section I focus my 
analysis in two directions. The first concerns three documents, authored in 1917 by Lord 
Curzon, Leo Amery, and the British war government’s Intelligence Bureau, which discuss 
the Baghdad Railway and the doctrine of Berlin-Baghdad from a British perspective and 
in relation to Germany’s supposed war aims. These three documents are part of a vast 
cross-section of papers concerning British strategizing in the First World War, and are 
certainly not the only ones that could have been chosen. They were selected however 
for two reasons. Firstly and most relevantly, they all explicitly discuss Berlin-Baghdad, 
and relate it to wider questions of German war aims and the history of the Baghdad 
Railway. They are thus manifestations of transcontinentalism in the British government 
in the war. Secondly, their dating is important because they were all written after the 
recapture of Baghdad. Their context is therefore one in which Britain could increasingly 
contemplate possible terms of peace, which in turn required an appreciation of 
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Germany’s war aims.105 The second direction of the sub-section turns to a more popular 
geopolitical analysis of two maps and a cartoon that, in different ways, illustrate Berlin-
Baghdad transcontinentalism. These examples are relevant to my argument because 
they enable us to  
 “examine not only the role and place of [railway] technologies within the high-level 
 practical geopolitical planning and strategising, as undertaken by governments, but also 
 to consider the popular geopolitical processes associated with ways of seeing and 
 envisioning geopolitical space created by and through transport  technologies” 
 (Williams, 2010: 82). 
As I will discuss these examples are not unproblematic. But taken alongside the analysed 
documents they demonstrate how Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism emerged in 
Britain as a doctrine of German territorial domination from the North Sea to the Persian 
Gulf, and how this was equated to the ascension of Germany to the status of global 
hegemonic power. 
 In the second main section of the chapter I turn to how Britain planned to 
prevent Germany from establishing this feared transcontinental dominion across the 
Ottoman Empire. In the environment of the war the problem was now far greater than 
any internationalisation of the Baghdad Railway could alleviate. Instead, the solutions 
proposed involved the reconstruction of the entire political geography of South Eastern 
Europe, and the creation of new, territorially large and racially homogeneous nation-
states to act as barriers to any future German expansion towards Constantinople – the 
‘buffer state’ principle. I trace these arguments by following one particularly important 
individual, the British historian and journalist Robert William (R.W.) Seton-Watson. 
Seton-Watson believed that Germany’s central war aim had, from the beginning, been 
to conquer the Ottoman Empire, and he proposed the creation of a South Slav state as a 
barrier to Germany’s future expansion in his writings throughout the war, in his 
involvement with the so-called New Europe school of post-war planning, and during his 
time at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. My argument is not that Seton-Watson 
singlehandedly orchestrated the creation of a South Slav state from behind the scenes, 
but that he was important in shaping and promoting the wider logic of preventing 
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‘Berlin-Baghdad’ from ever coming close to happening again. I end the chapter by 
discussing the three ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ chapters as a whole and relating them back to the 
overall argument in the thesis.  
5.2. Berlin-Baghdad and the rails to world power 
5.2.1. A solid block of German influence 
 The starting point of Amery, Curzon, and the Intelligence Bureau’s memos were 
all the British seizure of Baghdad, which allowed consideration of the prospective post-
war peace settlement for the first time. In turn, this necessitated a retrospective 
appreciation of both Britain’s and Germany’s war aims. Especially for Amery, these war 
aims were based on the two states’ divergent historical courses. Amery suggested that 
Britain’s policy had always been reliant on “the use of British sea power at the enemy’s 
overseas sources of strength, or points of vantage and menace, and [incorporating] 
them into the British system”.106 However, Germany’s historical course was not the 
same. “‘Power’ has been the Prussian watchword”, Amery argued, “Prussia, as a rule, 
has deliberately provoked wars in order to increase her power and enlarge her 
frontiers.”107 Amery traced this historical course back to before German unification, 
when East Prussia, Brandenburg, and other territories in western Germany had 
“indefensible natural frontier[s].”108 Amery’s argument was that because of the 
naturalised geopolitical law that small states could not survive on the world political 
stage, these territories had to unify under the Prussian flag or face eradication. As he put 
it, “[t]here is little scope in the Europe of the future for completely independent and 
detached small nations. A small nation, unless extremely favourably situated 
geographically, has to maintain fortified frontiers out of all proportion to its 
resources.”109  
 Amery’s argument was repeated in the Intelligence Bureau’s report, which noted 
that “[t]he day of small States is over. Every small State, even if nominally independent, 
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is destined to be drawn within the orbit of one or other of the World-States.”110 There 
were thus two entwined parts to these arguments; the general law of state competition 
and the law as it applied to Germany. The general law was one of naturalised 
geopolitics, with those states comprised of a propitious combination of territory and 
peoples able to survive while those that were not would inevitably struggle. Yet this was 
combined with a historical narrative of an expanding Germany as destiny. For Amery the 
unification of Germany was a “natural outcome of the conditions” of international 
relations, and had created an “inbred” need for future territorial expansion.111 As he put 
it, unification was the beginning of “the conception of Prussia as the controlling and 
organising state over a confederacy of smaller states whose military and economic 
systems should be incorporated into hers.”112 In other words, Amery narrated a world 
defined by the laws of naturalised geopolitics, but a particular and unique principle of 
teleological territorial expansion as Germany’s destiny. This not only shaped Germany’s 
war aims, but was also the primary cause of the war itself. 
       As Neilson (2014: 396) puts it, within this narrative the First World War is 
rendered “another attempt by one of the great powers, this time by the newly created 
Kaiserreich, to obtain control of Europe.” This is an argument that has recently been 
reformulated by Simms (2013), who proposes that since the fall of Constantinople in 
1453 the European political system has been dominated by the question of whether or 
not Germany could unite the predominantly German speaking races in Central Europe 
and thus become the indisputable European hegemon. The important difference is that 
Simms bases his reading on labyrinthine primary and secondary sources, whereas the 
narratives of Amery and the Intelligence Bureau operate with the geopolitical logic of 
naturalised state expansion. For Amery, this logic continued in two ways after the 
unification of Germany. “The first was the development of the policy of organisation and 
control outside Germany, first to Austria and to the Balkans and Turkey. This was the 
project whose watchword was ‘Berlin to Baghdad’”.113 The second continuation of 
Germany’s expansionist logic was for Amery a plan to wrest both naval supremacy and 
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overseas empire from Britain, “which in German eyes appeared to show signs of 
incipient decay and disintegration.”114    
 It is enormously significant that the watchword of Berlin-Baghdad – what the 
Intelligence Bureau simply defined as “control of the Ottoman Empire”115 – constituted a 
considerable rewriting of the history of the Baghdad Railway negotiations in the 1900s. 
As I emphasised in the last chapter, ‘control’ of the Ottoman Empire was not the 
concern of the British or Indian Governments in their discussions and responses to the 
Baghdad Railway. Heffernan (1996: 527) has noted that there were several books 
published in Britain before and during the war that demonstrated anxiety at Germany’s 
Drang nach Osten, but what he does not emphasise is that these publications were 
severely weighted in favour of the war years themselves (as Section 5.4. will additionally 
show). Two of the most prominent books published before the war were by Harrison 
(1904) and Sarolea (1907), who both worried about the Baghdad Railway as a possible 
prelude to German colonisation and annexation of the Ottoman Empire. Yet there is no 
evidence that their books had any impact in the policy making circles of the British and 
Indian Governments. Anti-German animosity in Britain during the 1900s emanated from 
a number of other sources; most commonly the press, but also from sections of the 
army, navy, Foreign Office, and Liberal party (Kennedy, 1980). But throughout the 
Baghdad Railway negotiations there was no consideration, even in the increasingly 
worried Indian Government, of the Ottoman Empire suffering territorial annexation by 
Germany and absorption into any German empire. This was a rewriting of the history of 
the negotiations that only took place in the environment of war itself.  
 This is an important point to emphasise because some authors, writing both in 
the immediate aftermath of 1914 and more recently, have sought to finger the railway 
as a cause of the war. The origins and causes of the First World War constitute an 
extraordinary large debate which I cannot do justice to here. However, two books 
authored during and after the First World War placed the blame for the war squarely on 
the tracks of the Baghdad Railway, and largely for the same reason (Jastrow Jr., 1917; 
Earle, 1924). They narrated Germany as an evil, perpetually expanding, Empire and the 
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railway as a “preeminent tool of German imperialism designed to enslave the Ottomans, 
rob them of their sovereignty, and exploit their labor and resources” (McMurray, 2001: 
5). In particular, Earle (1924) argued that the Baghdad Railway negotiations necessarily 
brought Britain, France, and Russia closer together as they collectively negotiated their 
response to a railway with which they were all concerned. For Earle (1924) this directly 
led to the formalisation of the Triple Entente which in turn produced the confrontational 
relations between the Entente and the Central Powers which led to war. This 
perspective has recently been restated by Somerwil-Aryton (2007).116 In opposition to 
these authors are those who have considered the Baghdad Railway within wider studies 
of the causes of the First World War. Clark (2012) and Otte (2014: 100) both reject any 
connection of the railway to the war’s causation, with the latter stating that the  
 “Anglo-German Convention of June 1914 [...] testified to the reciprocal wish of the two 
 governments ‘to prevent all causes of misunderstandings between Germany and 
 Great Britain’, and so seemed to prepare the ground for future cooperation.” 
   I argue it is best to consider the arguments of Jastrow Jr., Earle, and even 
Somerwil-Ayrton not as causal explanations of the First World War, but as evidence of 
the seductive power of Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism as a doctrine of naturalised 
German state expansion between Berlin and the Persian Gulf. They project this doctrine 
into the messy realm of causation, their reading of ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ as it manifested in 
the war itself shaping their perspective on the construction of the Baghdad Railway 
before the war began. In doing so, they fall into a trap of causality, what Neilson (2014) 
has aptly called the teleology of 1914. As he writes,  
 “This means at least two things: that [their arguments] are inevitably German-centred 
 and that the other possibilities of the era are ignored. In short, they conflate the 
 study of the relations between and among the great powers with the study of the 
 origins of the war” (Neilson, 2014: 411-412). 
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Neilson (2014: 412) argues that only scholars who examine “European power politics 
before 1914 without seeing them as prefiguring an inevitable war and without being 
concerned primarily with Germany” can escape from this teleology and reach a balanced 
understanding of the causes of war. Perhaps Jastrow Jr. (1917) and Earle (1924) can be 
excused from this critique, given their proximity to the war and lack of access to primary 
documents, but Somerwil-Ayrton (2007) cannot. She reads the First World War into the 
diplomatic history of the Baghdad Railway to fashion a story that could lead only to war, 
when – as I noted at the end of the last chapter – if the Anglo-German Convention had 
been ratified in March 1914 things could have turned out entirely differently.  
 It is a similar teleology that assuaged the arguments of Amery, Curzon, and the 
Intelligence Bureau. The naturalised tendency of the German state to expand had 
naturally brought it into conflict with the other prominent organisms occupying 
European space, and war was therefore inevitable even it had not broken out in July 
1914. “Indeed,” as Curzon believed, “the only party that entered the war with a policy of 
territorial aggrandisement at the forefront of its programme was Germany herself.”117 
As noted previously, this logic of territorial aggrandisement supposedly manifested itself 
in two ways in Germany’s war aims. The first was the projects of Mitteleuropa and 
Berlin-Baghdad, which according to Amery and the Intelligence Bureau “belong[ed] 
together as two parts of a single scheme.”118 Mitteleuropa was quite simply defined as a 
“Central European bloc of Allied Powers, politically, militarily, and economically 
associated, under German leadership”119 (see Meyer, 1955). Berlin-Baghdad was 
Mitteleuropa “plus the Ottoman Empire, shut off from the outside world”.120 What was 
gestured towards by the watchword of Berlin-Baghdad was therefore the absorption of 
the Ottoman Empire. Under German leadership, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, the Balkans, 
and the Ottoman Empire would be tied together, “and the stretch of one organised 
Power from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf [would be] made a reality.”121 This, in 
other words, was when the fear of Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism in its most 
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holistic form finally emerged inside the deepest echelons of the British War Cabinet. The 
construction of the Baghdad Railway and the close entwinement of Germany and the 
Ottoman Empire were equated to the annexation and territorialisation of German 
power across the entirety of Ottoman space in accordance with the naturalised 
geopolitical laws of state expansion, resulting in “a definite tract of continental territory 
within which Germany commands”.122  
 The term ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ (sometimes rendered as ‘Berlin-to-Baghdad’) first 
emerged in the British press one month after the outbreak of war (e.g. Pall Mall Gazette, 
1915; Sunday Mirror, 1915) and had become a common occurrence across British 
newspapers and magazines by the end of 1916 (e.g. Dillon, 1916a: 545; 1916b: 721). 
From the beginning it referred to the territorialisation of German power across the 
Ottoman Empire, with an early August 1915 usage by the Daily Mirror (1915: 9) arguing 
that had Britain not got involved in the war, ‘Berlin-Bagdad’ would have already become 
an established reality. Its subsequent proliferation was likely a direct result of its rising 
use in Germany. As Meyer (1955: 108, 142, 214) has noted, in parallel debates in 
Germany about what Germany’s war aims should be strains of Berlin-Baghdad advocacy 
emerged, especially in pamphlets published immediately after the outbreak of war and 
through to its cessation.  This was in direct contrast to pre-war discussions of the 
Baghdad Railway; as Meyer (1955: 72) wrote, “there is no evidence prior to 1914 that 
Berlin was seeking to integrate Turkey with the Reich via some mid-European or political 
scheme.” However, some of the pamphlets Meyer discusses were translated into English 
and circulated among the British government’s strategists and officials.   
 One example is from June 1916, in an enclosure sent by Britain’s Director of 
Military Intelligence George Macdonogh to the Under Secretary of State for India John 
Fickson-Poynder. The enclosure is a precis of a book translated as The Development of 
the Bagdad Railway Policy, authored by the German writer C.A. Schaefer in 1916. Not 
only did this precis explicitly use the term Berlin-Baghdad, it also summarised Schaefer’s 
book as arguing for a turn away from Russia as Germany’s primary enemy. Make peace 
with Russia, Schaefer is quoted as arguing, and encourage Russia to attack India, “thus 
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freeing the Antwerp-Basra line, and assuring Germany her position as the leader of 
Europe.” Germany would thus not be deprived of the railway, “her last land-route to the 
outside world.”123 A second example is the Intelligence Bureau’s memo on German war 
aims, which discussed in great detail the “chief exponent of Berlin-to-Bagdad” Paul 
Rohrbach, editor of a periodical entitled Deutsche Politik and who, on June 5th 1916, 
formed the ‘German National Committee for the Preparation of an Honourable Peace’ 
as a group to argue for the necessity of Germany retaining both Mitteleuropa and Berlin-
Baghdad in any peace settlement (on Rohrbach, see Rash, 2011). Although I do not want 
to press this claim too far, it would appear that the rise of the fear of Berlin-Baghdad 
transcontinentalism in Britain was motivated by the translation and reception of authors 
such as Schaefer and Rohrbach who it seems did argue for the annexation of the 
Ottoman Empire by Germany.  
 This was also reflected by the widespread and common usage of the term in the 
British press from the end of 1916. For example, when it reported that one of the 
tunnels through the Taurus Mountains had finally been completed, The Times (1916) 
lamented that “the long-cherished German dream of [...] ultimate control over the 
whole of the Middle East” was one step nearer. The Times also ran a series of articles 
under the name Through German Eyes, which selectively relayed the pages of German 
newspapers to its British audience. It frequently mentioned Berlin-Baghdad (e.g. The 
Times, 1917b; The Times 1918), and in one notable article after the war celebrated the 
fact that “[t]he great German scheme, crystallized in the phrase Berlin-Baghdad, by 
which a gate was to be opened for German colonization and German industry, has gone 
for ever” (The Times, 1919). A final example comes from the letters section of The 
Times, a place where popular geopolitical narratives can be both supported and 
contested by the public (see Pande et al, 2012). This letter, by a W.J.H. (The Times, 
1917a), discussed a supposedly “remarkable” 1907 book published in Germany entitled 
Berlin-Baghdad. Gesturing towards the burgeoning era of air power (see Omissi, 1990), 
the German author of this book apparently argued that “Germany’s future ‘lies in Asia 
and in the air.’” Should Germany conquer the Ottoman Empire, it would give her control 
of the Gobi Desert, which could subsequently “be developed into the most formidable 
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air-base in the world.” From this air-base a thousand zeppelins could threaten India and 
Russia with an unrivalled mobility of power (as Mackinder would have it), enabling 
Germany “to ‘hold the principle overland route to the East’ and to ‘establish her 
transcontinental empire.’’” “There are the facts”, summarised W.J.H. matter-of-factly. 
That The Times considered this a knowledgeable and publishable letter on Germany’s 
transcontinental ambitions rather than an example of a wider imperial and Orientalist 
paranoia speaks to how rooted the fear of Germany’s Berlin-Baghdad 
transcontinentalism was in Britain at the time.    
 However, the reason these fears were stressed so strongly was because the 
absorption of the Ottoman Empire by Germany was not considered an end in itself, but 
rather a way of achieving the second war aim Amery spoke of – the destruction of 
Britain’s naval supremacy and colonial empire. This is where the railway became 
important, and where I argue we see Kapp’s notion of a railway system as the circulatory 
system of a naturalised transcontinental empire emerge. Much ink was spilled on the 
resources that would fall into Germany’s orbit should the Ottoman Empire be annexed. 
Amery noted how the Ottoman Empire  
 “can be developed so as to produce all the foodstuffs, all the petrol, and almost all the 
 minerals and other raw materials which the populations of the Central Powers can 
 require. Cotton can be grown extensively in Asia Minor, and there are many oil yielding 
 plants which can be grown in Asia Minor and the Balkans to make good, in time of war, 
 the absence of palm oil and copra.”124 
The only resource the Ottoman Empire could not provide, as Amery and the Intelligence 
Bureau both commented on, was rubber. Furthermore, they also commented on the 
impregnability of a German empire stretching from Berlin to Baghdad. Amery underlined 
how Poland and Romania under German control would constitute the shortest land 
frontier in Europe, and how control of the Balkans would eliminate Germany’s southern 
frontier altogether while dominating the Aegean, Adriatic, and Black Sea coasts. 
Moreover,  
 “[t]he control of Turkey increases this sea frontage and involves no difficult land frontier 
 problem whether the whole of the Turkish Empire in Asia is recovered or whether the 
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 frontier is drawn back to Asia Minor. The whole area controlled is thus eminently 
 defensible.”125 
 It is difficult not to read these comments in parallel to Mackinder’s writings on 
the heartland. To Amery, Curzon, and the Intelligence Bureau, Berlin-Baghdad was 
nothing less than a space with all of the natural attributes necessary for the domination 
of the world, just as for Mackinder the heartland was a space with all of the natural 
attributes necessary for the domination of the world. It was impregnable and laden with 
natural resources. All that was required was the unity of Berlin-Baghdad under modern 
railway conditions, what Amery called the “Railway Empire scheme”.126 This, in turn, 
would lead to the formation of so unassailable a land power that it would gradually and 
inevitably overwhelm Britain’s naval power and overseas colonies. Amery noted only 
that Berlin-Baghdad presented “immense advantages for the future”.127 Meanwhile, the 
Intelligence Bureau argued that if Berlin-Baghdad was accomplished,  
 "Germany will have got the necessary basis for future expansion later on. The solid 
 stretch of power from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf is not to be regarded as 
 something finally adequate, but as a secure foundation. No blockade will be 
 formidable; no assault of outside enemies will imperil Germany any more; no one 
 will be able to hinder her while she organises herself for the next advance.”128 
 Amery feared that the completion of the Baghdad Railway and the 
accomplishment of Berlin-Baghdad would in due course enable the recapture of the 
German colonies in Africa and, through the long-mooted German port on the Persian 
Gulf, the eventual draining of all British sea power from one of India’s primary frontiers. 
The Intelligence Bureau also considered that Germany would be able to chase Britain 
out of Egypt – as Mackinder ([1919] 1942: 187) put it, “a great military power in 
possession of the Heartland and Arabia could take easy possession of the cross-ways of 
the world at Suez.” Amery argued this would result in a “great Railway Empire [...] 
continuous from Hamburg to Lake Nyasa.”129 The last word here however goes to 
Curzon, who insisted that  
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 “if the central block remains unconquered by the Allies at the end of the war, then, to 
 allow it to thrust out its military and economic tentacles towards the Persian Gulf on the 
 one hand, and the Suez Canal on the other, and to permit Germany to create another 
 central  block in Africa, which would for ever be pushing northwards to establish 
 connection with the European block, would be to hand over the future of the Eastern 
 hemisphere to the Germans, and give her the precise spoils at which she has aimed.”130 
5.2.2. Astride this vast space 
 
Figure 5.1: Berlin-Baghdad or 'Mittel Europa'. Reproduced from TNA MPI 1/389.  
 In the previous sub-section I demonstrated how Berlin-Baghdad 
transcontinentalism was manifested in three important documents that were at the 
heart of Britain’s war planning after the recapture of Baghdad in 1917. I illustrated how 
Berlin-Baghdad came to signify the territorialisation of German power across the 
Ottoman Empire and its eventual absorption into the naturally expanding German state 
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organism. The Baghdad Railway was to be the backbone of the circulatory system 
enabling the mobility of German power and resources across the Berlin-Baghdad 
Empire, something that would afford Germany the basis from which to attack and 
eventually destroy the British Empire. In this sub-section, I want to show how this was 
manifested in and through popular geopolitical means, exemplified by two maps and 
one cartoon from the First World War.  
 Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism in visual form. 
Figure 5.1 shows the intersection of the German schemes of Mitteleuropa and Berlin-
Baghdad, its powerful red hue depicting the German Empire as it would be should 
Germany’s supposed war aims be accomplished. Figure 5.2 shows Curzon’s ‘Eastern 
hemisphere’ under the control of Germany, with the tract of Berlin-Baghdad territory 
connected to an African empire conjoined by a conquered Egypt. However, care must be 
taken with an analysis of these maps, primarily because I have been unable to find much 
information about their production, usage, circulation, or reception. This is important 
not merely because it means there is little context behind the images, but because 
geographical scholarship has stressed the limits of analysing maps representationally 
without also paying attention to their production and circulation. We are now adept at 
critiquing the notion that maps are accurate and objective reflections of different spaces 
and realities, instead investigating how they work to produce the very spaces and 
realities they purport to impartially display (Harley, 1989). However, analysing maps in 
this way has in turn been critiqued in two ways. Firstly, Edney (1997) has critiqued the 
focus on examining the representational aspects of maps because it eschews the 
contested networks of collaboration, exploration, editing, and production that 
determine the final content of the map itself. For instance, drawing on Edney’s work, 
Prior (2012) has shown how the maps of Africa produced by the geographer Harry 
Johnston, who was cited in Chapter One, in the late nineteenth century were shaped by 
complex and contingent networks of editorial decisions, intended audiences, 
uncertainties over accuracy, authorial identity, and the professional standards of British 
cartography. Edney and Prior’s point is that a focus on representation ignores 
production.  
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Figure 5.2: What Germany Wants. Reproduced from TNA MFQ 1/379. 
 Secondly, scholars have critiqued the lack of attention to how maps are 
consumed by and affect the subjectivities of those who encounter them. In this critique, 
the map is conceptualised as something that takes its place within variegated networks 
of audience reception and consumption to shape both geopolitical space and the 
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geopolitical subject (Pickles, 2004; Wood and Fels, 2008; Steinberg and Kristoffersen, 
2017). As Steinberg and Kristoffersen (2017: 6) put it, “[a]s networked relations emerge 
between the map, the reader and the cartographer, new spaces and subjectivities are 
produced as individuals use the map to locate themselves in space.” In other words, this 
line of critique stresses how a focus on representation ignores questions of agency and 
audience consumption. These two critiques are important because they draw attention 
to the limitations in analysing maps representationally without also giving careful 
attention to “the range of processes of production and circulation that enable [them] to 
be seen” (Woodward et al, 2009: 221). My point is that it has been problematic to do 
this with Figures 5.1 and 5.2 because I have been unable to trace much information on 
how they were produced or consumed. However, despite these difficulties the maps are 
still worthy of consideration because of the dynamics of the map itself, how they freeze 
a complex array of territorial and imperial fears into an authoritative and consequently 
indubitable truth of Germany’s war aims. Following Monmonier (1996: 88), not only was 
Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism “on paper, it’s on a map, so it must be real.”  
 Furthermore, we can infer possible clues as to the production and reception of 
these maps. Figure 5.1 was archived in CAB 21/77, which contains the minutes of the 
Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet, a British war planning committee that was 
chaired by Lord Curzon. It comprised figures such as the Foreign Affairs parliamentary 
under-secretary Lord Robert Cecil, Jan Smuts, eventual Prime Minister of the unified 
South Africa, and Joseph Chamberlain’s son Austin, Secretary of State for India at the 
time.131 Although it is impossible to reconstruct the committee’s processes of 
“recognizing, interpreting, translating, [and] communicating” the map (Kitchin and 
Dodge, 2007: 335), its mere presence indicates that it had a role in the discussions of the 
committee. It can consequently be inferred that the map took its place within the wider 
deliberations of the committee which produced knowledge of Berlin-Baghdad as a 
definable, recognisable, and meaning-laden feature of Germany’s war aims. The map 
thus helped to (re)produce Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism rather than merely 
reflecting it. Of course, it is problematic to take these inferences too far because it is 
entirely possible that as the archive has been reassembled and transformed over the 
                                                     
131
 ‘Imperial War Cabinet: Report of Committee on Terms of Peace’, April 24
th
 1917’, TNA CAB 21/77.  
158 
 
years the map has changed positions. However, on balance it is possible to consider it an 
object that took its place in a wider textual network helping to produce and solidify the 
reality of Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism at the centre of Britain’s post-war 
planning.  
 Figure 5.2, on the other hand, is more ambiguous. While evidently a propaganda 
map, no documents referencing it or seemingly related to it in any way are to be found 
in the papers it was archived with. However, a clue as to its production can be inferred 
from some of its text, ‘enlarged and reproduced from the map accompanying The 
Pangerman Plot Unmasked by Andre Chéradame’. Chéradame was an exemplary French 
anti-German writer who published a number of books arguing for the intrinsically 
expansionist and imperialist intentions of Germany’s foreign policy. Only some of these 
books were translated into English (e.g. Chéradame 1916, 1918, 1923). The 1916 
translation referenced by the map is the best indication of Chéradame’s conflation of 
Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism with Pan-Germanism and Germany’s ambitions to 
crush the British and French nations in a prelude to world domination. ‘From Hamburg 
to the Persian Gulf’ was for Chéradame (1916: 6) not only “the chief formula of Pan-
German domination”, but also the singular cause of the war itself. Moreover, 
Chéradame had been consistent in this view for some years. In 1906 The Times 
translated an article of his published in a French newspaper in which he had argued that 
the construction of the railway “would be tantamount to the seizure by Germany of the 
Ottoman Empire” (The Times, 1906b). There is not the scope here to fully analyse 
Chéradame’s fascinating writing on Berlin-Baghdad, but the emphasis he placed on it 
along with its connection to the Baghdad Railway is best evinced by the following:  
 “[B]eyond the Bosphorus, Germany would reach Asia-Minor, that immense quarry of 
 wealth.  The huge German railroad projected to run from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf 
 without a break, would link Berlin to the Far East. Then would Emperor William’s 
 Brobdingnagian dream be fulfilled. Germany would rule the world by her might and by 
 her commercial wealth” (Chéradame, 1916: 82-83).  
 Interestingly, none of the maps in Chéradame’s book correspond exactly to 
Figure 5.2. Instead, Figure 5.2 appears to have been stitched together from four 
different maps presented by Chéradame (1916: 79, 95, 101, 185; see Figure 5.3). 
Furthermore, some important features have been added to the reproduction. First and 
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foremost, Chéradame’s book was published in black and white. Although a narrow focus 
on the importance of colour in maps has been critiqued by scholars such as Herb (1997: 
3), it is significant because the orange hue has evidently been added to emphasise the 
territorial extent of the German Empire in relation to the lighter yellow hue of the Triple 
Entente powers. Monmonier’s (1996: 171) description of progressive shading is 
insightful here. He observes that “the addition of progressively redder, more intense 
tints makes a forceful propaganda map even stronger.” The chosen hues are in other 
words noteworthy because the German Empire is progressively redder, making the map 
more impactful than Chéradame‘s original through its relative proximity to the colour 
red and its cultural associations of danger, threat, and warning (Greenfield, 2005; 
Monmonier, 1996: 170). 
 Secondly, the ‘Hamburg-Constantinople-Bagdad Railway’ has been given a darker 
hue than the ‘other railways’ depicted on the map. It has also been given its own place 
on the legend. This, I argue, is not accidental, but intended to emphasise the centrality 
of the Baghdad Railway as the “backbone” (Chéradame, 1916: 107) of the scheme, 
which as I have suggested is saturated with connotations of the railway as the biological 
and geopolitical upholstering of the predicted German empire. It is also significant that 
the ‘other railways’ depicted on the map, including the Cape-Cairo Railway, the French 
Syrian railways, and the TransCaspian Railway (proceeding through ‘Wheat, Oil, Coal, 
Iron’, as the map states) are included in their lighter, subsidiary hue. I argue this 
corresponds to their status as the veins and arteries of a German circulatory system, 
enabling the life-giving mobility of German power and resources across the space of the 
empire. Put differently, here is Kapp’s naturalised geopolitical and technological 
ontology of a functioning biological state; the railways, centred on the backbone, are the 
very augmentation, transformation, and realisation of the German Empire itself, rather 
than its mere extension. In the remainder of this section I want to turn to a second 
popular geopolitical manifestation of Berlin-Baghdad in the form of a cartoon. Cartoons, 
as Greenberg (2002: 194) has noted, “are normally understood by readers to be satirical 
depictions of real events, [but] they nevertheless draw from an available stock of public 
knowledge and reproduce a common sense view of the world”. Geopolitically, Dodds  
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Figure 5.3: Four maps from Andre Chéradame 's Pangerman Plot Unmasked (1916), upon which Figure 5.2 was 
based. 
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(2007b) has suggested cartoons are worthy of analysis because they entwine image, 
text, and symbol into a compressed visual frame, allowing complicated geopolitical 
events and processes to be represented in an initially obvious message but with layers of 
nuance and cultural reference. As with the two maps I have presented, we must be 
careful not to take a historical analysis of cartoons too far because it eschews how they 
were produced and consumed. However, unlike the two elite maps, it shows the 
“practical geopolitical reasoning” of Berlin-Baghdad as it was manifested “in informal, 
everyday discourse” (McFarlane and Hay, 2003: 213).  
 W.K. Haseldon’s Big and Little Willies’ Bagdad Trick (see Figure 5.4) was 
published in the Daily Mirror on March 13th 1917, and its context is therefore the British 
recapture of Baghdad two days previously. It also has an important reference point 
which, momentarily, necessitates a diversion into Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism. A 
more famous cartoon by Edward Linley Sambourne was published on December 10th 
1892 in the satirical magazine Punch depicting Cecil Rhodes, his body conflated with the 
idea of the expanding British Empire, stretching across the latitudinal length of Africa, 
his left foot in Cairo and his right at the Cape (see Figure 5.5). In his hands he holds a 
telegraph wire, which cleverly doubles as a rein demonstrating his masculinised taming, 
domestication, and mastery of the African continent. The title of the famous cartoon, 
The Rhodes Colossus, is mirrored in the Daily Mirror cartoon, which replaces the ‘C’ with 
the ‘K’ of the Kaiser in the midst of his giant stride act. The fact that Haselden’s cartoon 
copies but changes the terms of the Punch cartoon is significant, because it represents 
the feature shared by both transcontinentalisms: the projection and territorialisation of 
state power, embodied in the figure of a conquering, male agent of Empire, across the 
space deemed to be the two naturally opposed extreme points of a continent. Of 
course, the Cape-Cairo cartoon, satirical as it is, depicts Rhodes’ transcontinental feat as 
both a personal and imperial triumph, a miraculous achievement against the odds 
gestured towards by the doffing of Rhodes’ hat. In the Berlin-Baghdad case, the terms 
are again reversed; the Kaiser’s stretch between Berlin-Baghdad is shown as perilously 
close to being realised yet tempered at the last minute by the patience, cunning, and 
perfect timing of the British lion.  
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Figure 5.4: W.K. Haseldon’s Big and Little Willies’ Bagdad Trick. Reproduced from Daily Mirror, March 13
th
 1917.  
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Figure 5.5: The Rhodes Colossus. Reproduced from Punch, December 10
th
 1892. Linley Sambourne took inspiration 
for the cartoon from the Colossus of Rhodes, a statue erected by the Ancient Greeks on the island of Rhodes. For 
more on the history and origins of the cartoon and the trope it inspired, see Scully (2012).  
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  There are further noteworthy features in Haseldon’s cartoon. Most palpably is 
the figure of the Kaiser himself, stretching between Berlin and Baghdad, the 
geographical and cultural otherness of the latter emphasised by the Islamic symbols 
sketched upon its front. The figure of the Kaiser, like the figure of Rhodes, entwines the 
personal and imperial, which is especially significant because it implicitly signifies the 
intermingling of the biological, geopolitical, technological, and the state. In other words, 
in my reading the Kaiser’s stride act symbolises the wider trope of the biological German 
state extending itself according to the naturalised laws of territorial expansion, the 
oneness of the Kaiser’s body emphasising the Baghdad Railway as that which is 
generative, not a mere extension, of the German Empire. Kapp’s (1877) disavowal of the 
ontological distinction between biology, technology, and state is consequently pushed to 
the forefront of Haseldon’s cartoon. A second central feature of the cartoon is its 
location, which is a satirical amalgamation of gladiatorial arena, theatrical circus, and 
world stage. This is an important trope because it reproduces multiple senses of the 
modern and naturalised geopolitical imagination: the Darwinian ‘struggle for survival’ 
inside the gladiatorial arena representing the stakes of the war between Britain and 
Germany in a closed political space, and the notion of an ontological separation of 
viewer and viewed epitomised in the inherent spectatorship of the audience. The 
brilliance of Haseldon’s cartoon is therefore how it embodies the geopolitical, biological, 
and technological tropes of Berlin-Baghdad, while simultaneously, through the 
connotations of a theatrical circus, gesturing towards the absurdity of Berlin-Baghdad 
itself.  
5.3. The peace settlement and preventing Berlin-Baghdad 
 In the previous section I demonstrated how, in the eyes of the British wartime 
government, German Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism was narrated as a doctrine of 
establishing a German Empire ‘from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf’. Further, it 
revealed how this was connected to the by-now deeply skewed perceived balance 
between small and large states, the naturalised geopolitical trope of a German state 
with biological needs for territorial expansion, and the ultimate ascension of Germany to 
the status of global hegemonic power. As in the previous chapter, defining Germany’s 
Berlin-Baghdad aims in this way demanded a particular response to prevent its 
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realisation and the concomitant destruction of the British Empire. In this final section I 
argue that the solution to the problem of Berlin-Baghdad was a very particular one. Put 
simply, it was to support the creation of a South Slav state in the Balkans to act as an 
obstacle to the projection of German power towards the Ottoman Empire and the 
Persian Gulf in the future. The section traces this solution not through the papers of the 
British Government, but primarily through the work of R.W. Seton-Watson, a British 
historian and journalist who articulated the solution forcefully and who played a small 
but not insignificant role in its eventual adoption. The solution was additionally 
geopolitical, but in more ways than the naturalised geopolitics of the previous section 
might suggest.  
 Mackinder is a useful starting point here because of his discussions, in 
Democratic Ideals and Reality, of the necessity of a series of Eastern buffer states to 
prevent the possible melding of Russia and Germany at any point in the future. This was 
his answer to a question he had previously posed in 1917: “how shall we solve the 
problem on the eastern side?” (Mackinder, 1917: 10). Mackinder considered that 
“whatever the result of this war, the German race as an active agency in the centre of 
Europe will remain” (Mackinder, 1917: 10). As a consequence, he insisted that “there 
must be a complete territorial buffer between Germany and Russia [because] a German 
East Prussia would be a stepping-stone for German penetration into Russia” (Mackinder, 
[1919] 1942: 113-114). As Sloan (1999: 28) has noted, this was not just a proposal for 
the creation of Poland to separate Russia and Germany, but also for a whole series of 
buffers running from north to south across Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, consisting 
of newly anointed states White Russia, Ukraine, South Russia, Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Daghestan. Thus Poland would keep Germany out of Russia, and the 
other buffer states would restrict the mobility of Russian power in the Heartland. This 
later policy failed to gain wider support, something which “Mackinder maintained would 
increase the chances of Russia becoming a great heartland power” (Sloan, 1999: 31). The 
suggestion of buffer states was a logical progression of Mackinder’s geopolitical 
thinking, a conscious proposal to ensure that the Heartland could not be dominated by 
either land power of Russia or Germany.  
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 Yet Mackinder also turned his attention to the route of the Baghdad Railway and, 
implicitly, to Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism. He proposed that alongside the 
creation of Poland there must also be a South Slav state composed of the “three tribes 
of Slovenes, Croatians, and Serbs” (Mackinder, 1919: 114). Together with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, the South Slav state would be part of “a broad wedge of independence, 
extending from the Adriatic and Black Seas to the Baltic [...] together effectively 
balanc[ing] the Germans of Prussia and Austria” (Mackinder, 1919: 116-117). Or, as he 
put it in 1917,  
 “Europe can have peace if we can erect on the Danube and southward to the Aegean 
 Sea sufficient native strength to dam the ambitions, mainly of the Germans, and to a 
 minor extent of the Magyars. [...] What we can get [...] is a barrier formed partly by 
 Serbia, a great Serbia, and partly by Roumania, a great Roumania, which will extend 
 across from the Black Sea to the Adriatic” (Mackinder, 1917: 10). 
Put differently, Mackinder envisaged a South Slav state, what was to become Yugoslavia 
under the rule of the House of Karađorđević in 1918 before being formally recognised by 
the Allied Powers in July 1922. Yugoslavia and Romania were a part of his system of 
buffer states effectively severing Germany’s future connection with Constantinople; as 
he recognised, “one of the trunk railways of the world will run down the Save Valley to 
Belgrade, and then through the Morava and Maritza ‘Corridor’ to Constantinople” 
(Mackinder, [1919] 1942: 114). To my knowledge, here Mackinder came as close as he 
ever did to discussing the Baghdad Railway, and seemed to recognise, by arguing for a 
barrier separating Germany from the Near East,  the need to prevent any future 
opportunity for Germany to absorb the Ottoman’s rapidly disintegrating Empire.  
 Moreover, Mackinder was not the only intellectual who lent his assistance to the 
war effort to suggest this. One example is his fellow geographer Thomas Holdich, 
President of the Royal Geographical Society between 1917 and 1919. Holdich (1917: 
169) observed in 1917 that “[a]bsolute dominance in the Balkan States and in Turkey is 
the basis of [Germany’s position], and the open line to Baghdad is the inevitable sequel 
which appears at present to be well within her grasp.” His solution to the problem was 
the same as Mackinder’s, an independent union of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs which 
would be “a new power of the first class in mid-Europe to face any Germanic 
combination that might arise” (Holdich, 1918: 9). A second opinion was provided by the 
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celebrated archaeologist and Balkan specialist Arthur Evans, most noted for his work on 
the Minoan civilisation. Speaking to the Royal Geographical Society in January 1916, he 
argued that the formation of a  
 “united South Slavonic State has a geographical importance which in an even more 
 special degree affects the British Empire [...] it would place in friendly guardianship 
 what can be shown to be a most important chain of connexion in the future overland 
 route to the East” (Evans, 1916: 255).  
 Holdich, Evans, and a number of other intellectuals (e.g. Vosnjak, 1918; Woods, 
1918: 325-327) thus espoused the doctrine of transcontinentalism as one of the chief 
war aims of Germany and suggested the same preventative solution, the creation of a 
buffer state occupying the space between Berlin and Constantinople. This was also the 
opinion of Curzon and Amery, the latter of whom explicitly supported the South Slav 
state and who wrote more generally of the necessity of “creating a series of effective 
barriers to the project of German domination or permeation over Central Europe by a 
rearrangement of the political map on ethnographic lines.”132 In one sense, their 
arguments were genuinely based on the principle of self-determination. As authors such 
as Lampe (1996) and Prpa-Jovanović (2000) have documented, British support for the 
prospect of a South Slav state was shaped by the complex independence movements in 
Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia. This was best represented by the Yugoslav Committee, 
which was based in London for the duration of the war and lobbied the Allies to support 
the creation of a South Slav state (see Evans, 2008: 18-19). The notion that racially 
homogeneous groups should determine their own political future and that such a future 
could only be properly realised within the parameters of the modern nation-state was 
important to the arguments of all the aforementioned authors. 
 Yet their arguments were simultaneously shaped by what Todorova (1997) has 
termed the discourse of Balkanism, which at its simplest imagined ‘the Balkans’ as a 
“contagious disease, an infectious sore in the underbelly of Europe” (Goldsworthy, 1998: 
xi) due to its supposedly ahistorical and ethnically determined violent characteristics. 
However, Balkanism is also a discourse constructing the Balkans as the geographically 
determined ‘route to the East’, the supposedly natural path across which one had to 
pass to travel from Europe to the Ottoman Empire, and thence onwards towards the 
                                                     
132
 Amery, ‘Notes’ (note 104), 18.  
168 
 
Persian Gulf. Historically, this discourse manifested as “a vast human shield area 
protecting Europe from Turkish incursion” (Udovički, 2000: 16), but during the First 
World War it transformed into a binary depiction of the Balkans as either a bridge over 
which German power would be projected towards the Ottoman Empire, or contrarily as 
a barrier preventing the projection of German power across that space (Scott, 2012). 
Simply put, the naturalisation of the Balkans as the route or bridge to the East conjured 
an imperative to, as Bjelić (2002) puts it, ‘blow up the bridge’. Or, to go back to Evans 
(1916), to place in friendly guardianship the corridor which was an essential part of 
Germany’s feared Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism.  
 The Balkans could therefore only ever be a bridge or a barrier between Europe 
and ‘the East’, and for Britain it was essential that it be a barrier to negate the 
transcontinental threat of Berlin-Baghdad. The barrier could only be comprised of 
strong, independent, ethnically unified states. And while Mackinder, Holdich, and Evans 
did not to my knowledge explicitly refer to the South Slav state as a check on German 
Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism (although some variant of this is certainly what they 
meant), one particularly important author did, the British historian Robert William 
(R.W.) Seton-Watson. Seton-Watson was one of the foremost advocates of South-Slav 
unity throughout the 1900s, forming close relationships with the Vienna correspondent 
of The Times Henry Wickham Steed and the Czech philosopher and first president of 
Czechoslovakia Tomáš Masaryk. Widely travelled, he published a number of books and 
articles on religious and ethnic issues in Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Germany, and 
like many others turned in the First World War to suggesting ways to alter the political 
geography of Europe to prevent German aggression (see Seton-Watson and Seton-
Watson, 1981; Péter, 2004, for good analyses of his pre-war views). Yet he is most 
relevant here because he explicitly linked the question of Berlin-Baghdad 
transcontinentalism to the necessity of a South Slav state and, more than Mackinder et 
al, played a small but not insignificant role in the state’s eventual creation. Seton-
Watson did not singlehandedly create Yugoslavia, but through following his writings and 
activities in the later years of the war and at the Paris Peace Conference we can see how 
Berlin-Baghdad was connected to the creation of a South Slav state more widely.    
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Figure 5.6: R.W. Seton-Watson's Three Stage Pan-German Plan. Reproduced from Seton-Watson (1916b : 175). 
 Seton-Watson was unambiguous about Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism: “[a] 
great State running from Hamburg to Basra, from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. That 
is the plan. It is clear as daylight” (Seton-Watson, 1916a: 262). He argued that Berlin-
Baghdad was but the second part of a three-part plan for the German domination of the 
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entire world (see Figure 5.6). The first part, he suggested, was Mitteleuropa; “a great 
Central European state-organism of 130 to 150 million inhabitants, as an economic and 
military Europe” (Seton-Watson, 1916c: 386). This was accompanied by Berlin-Baghdad, 
which he defined as “the inclusion in the political and economic spheres of influence of 
the new Zollverein of all the territory lying between the Hungarian frontier and the 
Persian Gulf” (Seton-Watson, 1916c: 386). The final part of the German plan was the 
destruction of Britain’s sea power, the last genuine obstacle barring the path of 
Germany’s Weltmacht. Seton-Watson regarded the first two parts of this plan complete. 
“The Germans have already realised,” he wrote in 1919, referencing how the political 
geography of Europe stood at war’s end, “for all practical purposes, their programme of 
Berlin-Baghdad, as a glance at the war map will at once reveal” (Seton-Watson, 1919: 
145). Thus, as he put it back in 1916, “the extension of German land power [between 
Berlin and Baghdad] will be the prelude to a fresh attempt to challenge our security on 
the sea” (Seton-Watson, 1916c: 386). Put more plainly, Seton-Watson blended together 
all of the elements present in the previous section. Mitteleuropa and Berlin-Baghdad 
were already achieved, and would act as the foundation for the final assault on British 
sea power and colonies.  
 Moreover, Seton-Watson anchored this narrative, like Amery and those before 
him, in a teleological narrative of naturalised German expansion, rewriting the 
diplomatic history of the Baghdad Railway negotiations in the 1900s to portray the 
railway as the “policy of ‘peaceful penetration’ by which Germany prepared the way for 
what her leaders [are] describing as ‘the German war’” (Seton-Watson, 1916c: 394). As 
early as May 1905 he had argued, with reference to Germany, that “expansion is 
inevitable for a country which is already overpopulated, and is growing at an alarming 
rate every year” (quoted in Péter, 2004: 659). Thus, while in 1905 he was talking 
primarily about German economic and financial investment in Brazil and the Ottoman 
Empire, his war writings about Berlin-Baghdad continued to be underpinned by the 
notion that German expansion was, and always had been, inevitable. In these writings 
Seton-Watson selectively traced both the doctrines of Mitteleuropa and Berlin-Baghdad 
through a plethora of German writings, from Helmuth von Moltke’s writings on 
Palestine, Friedrich List’s proposing of the German colonisation of Asia Minor, and a 
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pamphlet entitled Berlin-Baghdad: New Aims of Mid-European Policy authored by Albert 
Ritter. The ideas of Berlin-Baghdad he then traced forward to Paul Rohrbach, arguing 
that he and others “have done much to popularise the idea that Mesopotamia and Asia 
Minor are destined to become ‘an economic substitute for the lack of a German Canada 
or Australia’” (Seton-Watson, 1916c: 394). The Drang nach Osten was consequently 
recast as the overwhelming cause of the First World War by Seton-Watson, a cause 
driven by the innate need for the German state to expand and the projection of this 
innate need onto the Ottoman Empire since (at latest) the 1840s. For him, “the root 
cause of the war was Germany’s imperialist ambition in south-east Europe and beyond” 
(Evans, 2008: 90-91).  
 This was accordingly the principle reason why Germany had attacked Serbia – 
“Serbia is the route to the East, the last land obstacle to the German Drang nach Osten, 
to the programme of ‘Berlin to Baghdad’” (Seton-Watson, 1916b: 49; see also Seton-
Watson, 1916d: 11). He repeatedly chastised the British government for not recognising 
this basic truth, particularly Edward Grey, whom Seton-Watson regarded with a special 
antipathy; “[he] did not realise what has been obvious for the past nine months, even to 
the man in the street, that Serbia alone blocked the German advance to Constantinople 
and Bagdad” (Seton-Watson, 1919: 110-11). In Seton-Watson’s narrative, therefore, 
Serbia was attacked simply because of the requirement to destroy the barrier it posed to 
the doctrine of Berlin-Baghdad before the war, and subsequently transform Balkan 
space into a bridge for the swift projection of German power and the insertion of 
Germany’s circulatory tentacles into the Ottoman Empire. Seton-Watson was insistent 
that not supporting the creation of a South Slav state was tantamount to “accepting the 
Pan-German design of ‘Berlin-Baghdad’ as inevitable” (Seton-Watson, 1916b: 117). Or, 
as he later put it in 1919,  
 “[t]he Allies are therefore confronted with the alternative of breaking the chains which 
 Germany has riveted right across Europe and Asia, or of resigning themselves to a 
 German hegemony on the Continent such as could only end in the assertion of German 
 world-power” (Seton-Watson, 1919: 145).        
 “The only alternative”, Seton-Watson proposed, “is to have a counter-plan, 
which can only be the creation of a barrier across Prussia’s path towards the domination 
of the Near and Middle East” (Seton-Watson, 1916a: 262). He went as far as suggesting 
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that “Serbia is one of the pivots of our Continental policy, and the erection of a strong 
and unified Southern Slav state upon the Eastern Adriatic [...] is one of the most vital of 
British interests in this war” (Seton-Watson, 1916b: 117-118). Like Mackinder, Seton-
Watson (1916c: 395) also considered the creation of independent states in Poland and 
Czechoslovakia imperative to the wider plan of checking Germany in the future. He 
wanted Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the future Yugoslavia to become three great 
Slavonic states blocking Germany from eastward intrusion, bolstered by the 
independent states of Hungary, Romania, Greece, and Bulgaria, which would be 
refashioned and governed as modern Western democracies (see Figure 5.7). Together, 
the creation of these states would contribute to the fashioning of a peaceful, prosperous 
‘New Europe’ (see Figure 5.8). 
 
Figure 5.7: R.W. Seton-Watson’s buffer states of Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Roumania. Reproduced from Seton-
Watson (1919: 213). 
 Although Seton-Watson’s ideas overlapped with those of Mackinder, Evans, and 
Holdich to some degree, he is particularly important here because of the influence of his 
ideas beyond the learned societies at which they all articulated their ideas. In contrast to 
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these men, Seton-Watson was near the centre of the peace planning of the British 
government from 1917 onwards. As “one of the very few British academics who knew 
central and south-eastern Europe at first hand” (Calcott, 1984: 982), in April 1917 he 
was recruited by the Department of Information’s newly created Intelligence Bureau 
(Goldstein, 1991: 59), which produced the ‘Memorandum on German War Aims’ 
discussed in the previous section. Months earlier in October 1916 he had formed a 
magazine with Steed entitled The New Europe to support his own and similar ideas. A 
highly influential group of experts gradually assembled around this magazine and 
became known as the ‘New Europe’ group, and Goldstein (1991: 4) has observed that 
the “views of this group had a great impact on British policy, particularly after they came 
to dominate the PID [Political Intelligence Department], the hub of the peace-planning 
machinery.”133 Although he himself refused an offer to join the PID, preferring to remain 
at the Intelligence Bureau, the PID remained in “frequent and unfettered 
communication with Seton-Watson”, consulting him on ethnic and territorial matters in 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans (Goldstein, 1991: 62, see also 131-133 for memos 
Seton-Watson produced at the bequest of his colleagues in the PID). Thus whereas 
Mackinder’s plan for buffer states failed to gain support (Sloan, 1999: 31), Seton-Watson 
was close to the centre of the machinations of British peace-planning. Throughout the 
war, he “proposed solutions, interfered in the decision-making process of the British 
government, and use[d] the force of his journalistic abilities to press his case” (Miller, 
1988: 67).    
 Furthermore, a second reason why Seton-Watson’s influence is important is 
because of his prominent role at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which was the first 
step to the formal recognition (in 1922) of the South Slav state he had argued for so 
strongly (Evans, 2008). Although his official role was small,  
 “his indirect influence was considerable [...] During the peace-making process The New 
 Europe continued its work, and he himself influenced some of those British, American 
                                                     
133
 The Political Intelligence Department was created in 1917 after the British government became aware 
that delegates to any future peace conference would require more data on Europe’s political geography 
than was presently available (see Goldstein, 1991: 59-62, for more detail). The PID was created as a 
department “to co-ordinate and synthesize the material being produced” in other intelligence and 
government departments during the war for this purpose (Goldstein, 1991: 2).  
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 and French persons directly involved in the peace conference” (Seton-Watson and 
 Seton-Watson, 1981: 434). 
For instance, one member of Britain’s peace delegation, Harold Nicolson, later wrote 
that he and one of his colleagues “never moved a yard without previous consultation 
with experts of the authority of Dr. Seton Watson”, and subsequently declared that he 
was “imbued” with the ideas Seton-Watson was advocating in The New Europe 
magazine (quoted in Goldstein, 1998: 150-151). As Goldstein (1991) has pointed out, 
part of the reason Seton-Watson and The New Europe’s ideas gained currency was 
because, in their emphasis on self-determination in Eastern Europe, they dovetailed 
closely with the American president Woodrow Wilson’s principles and those of some 
other Gladstonian liberals. Goldstein, however, draws no connection between Seton-
Watson’s role at the Peace Conference and his writings on Berlin-Baghdad and 
Germany’s war aims. As a consequence, he also does not recognise that one of Wilson’s 
principle aims at the conference was to prevent the future possibility of Germany  
 “throw[ing] a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very 
 centre of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia [...] to stand 
 aside, President Wilson warned, would be to risk a map in which the [German] block 
 stretched all the way from Hamburg to Baghdad – the bulk of German power inserted 
 into the heart of the world” (Simms, 2013: 310).  
The principle of self-determination common to Wilson, Seton-Watson, and the wider 
New Europe group thus overlapped with a desire to create buffer states, and a South 
Slav state specifically, to prevent any future realisation of Berlin-Baghdad. In his account 
of Isaiah Bowman’s role at the Paris Peace Conference, Smith (2003: 177) writes that 
“Paris combatants were obliged, however much they sought territory, to fight their 
disputes in terms of competing national and ethnic justice.” In South Eastern Europe, 
however, this was much less a frustrating contradiction than a happy coincidence. The 
creation of a South Slav state served Allied interests, by establishing a barrier state in 
between Germany and Constantinople, and national and ethnic justice.     
     Michail (2011: 175) has proposed that Seton-Watson was “the most influential 
of all experts at Versailles.” While this is certainly an exaggeration, in this section I have 
demonstrated how his impact was not insignificant, and how through tracing his ideas, 
connections, and writings we can simultaneously trace how preventing Berlin-Baghdad 
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motivated, at least in part, Allied support for the creation of a South Slav state. As it 
relates to transcontinentalism, the logic was remarkably simple. The twisted naturalised 
geopolitical reasoning of the time imagined small states as weak and divided, thus 
enabling the smooth, unencumbered projection of German power across space and 
ultimately foreshadowing the absorption of these states in the growing German Empire. 
On the other hand, strong, territorially large, and racially unified buffer states, 
composed of “people possessed of sufficient political acumen to construct, maintain, 
and defend [them]” (Murphy, 1997: 9), could prevent the future projection of German 
power across space. It was for this reason that a unified South Slav state was deemed so 
crucial by Seton-Watson and his associates. For Seton-Watson, it was the only way to 
counter the reality “that small states cannot subsist and must inevitably become the 
prey of the great” (Seton-Watson, 1916b: 389). In the South Slav case, these arguments 
were given additional force by the swirling South Slav independence movements and 
Balkanist perceptions of the Balkans as a natural thoroughfare to the Near East. 
Therefore the necessity of restraining Germany, the principle of self-determination, and 
the “hard facts of geography” (Calcott, 1984: 892) rendering the Balkans the naturally 
determined route to the East blended together in a perfect match. 
 The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was thus arguably the end of Berlin-Baghdad 
transcontinentalism, even as it was one of the beginnings of the path to the Second 
World War. Out of the war arose Karl Haushofer and the German school of Geopolitik, 
and Dodds (2007a: 33) has noted that Haushofer was a wholehearted supporter of the 
construction of the Baghdad Railway. Yet as he correctly suggests, “the 1919 Peace 
Conference terminated German ambitions to pursue such a scheme” (Dodds, 2007a: 
33). There seems to be no evidence that Adolf Hitler was ever attracted to the idea of 
establishing German hegemony across the Middle East (Meyer, 1955), which was by 
1939 an even more exclusive preserve of Britain and France. In 1941 the Baghdad 
Railway was finally completed, yet the conclusion of a century old idea was barely noted 
at the time, a fact which reflects the horror into which Europe had by then descended. 
As McMurray (2001: 138) glumly but aptly summarises, at the end of the First World 
War “all the railway could offer its German benefactors was a slow ride home.”  
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Figure 5.8. Seton-Watson’s ‘New Europe’. Reproduced from Seton-Watson (1919: 183). 
5.4. Conclusions 
 In this chapter I have argued that with the outbreak of the First World War, 
British concern over the construction of the Baghdad Railway metamorphosed into a 
much more deadly fear of the establishment of a transcontinental German empire 
stretching from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. This empire would comprise Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and the entirety of the Ottoman Empire, creating a 
fortress empire impenetrable from the exterior and containing almost all of the natural 
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and mineral resources necessary for its flourishing and dominance. The Baghdad Railway 
was imagined in these worried accounts as the backbone of the German empire’s 
circulatory system, the central route that would act as the political, economic, and 
military skeleton of the new, enormous German organism. In Britain the possibility of 
the realisation of Berlin-Baghdad was accompanied by an inescapable and inevitable 
conclusion, the destruction of British sea power and by extension the British Empire. 
Britain’s faltering grip on global hegemony would be eradicated and usurped by 
Germany, which would use the transcontinental empire, with the Baghdad Railway as its 
spine, to project its power across the entire world. The solution to this, as I have argued 
through a detailed examination of the works of R.W. Seton-Watson, was the creation of 
a barrier to Germany’s path in the Balkans. This was based upon the logic that only 
strong, ethnically unified and territorially large nation-states could prevent the future 
projection of German power across space. Because the Balkans was the supposedly 
naturally determined route to the East, the creation of the South Slav state was 
considered a necessary obstacle that it was imperative to place across the path of any 
future German expansion. This solution was implemented at the Paris Peace Conference 
and after, although it is a grim irony – and testament to the flawed logic of Social 
Darwinism – that the young supposedly robust Yugoslav state was destroyed within 
months of the outbreak of the Second World War.  
 The analysis that I have provided in this and the previous two chapters has 
further implications for my argument in this thesis. Firstly, in showing how 
transcontinentalism gestated in the nineteenth century before erupting in the First 
World War, I have deepened the argument of Goren (2011) that Britain’s policy towards 
the Ottoman Empire, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf needs to be reconsidered in 
terms of the route to India, the shifting balances between land and sea power, and the 
wider political and economic dynamics of relative ascent and decline among the Great 
Powers. With the benefit of hindsight the arguments of Chesney and Andrew have a 
certain prescience, in that they evinced in their writings the air of inevitability 
accompanying the rise of railway technology in the impact it would have on the political, 
economic, and military affairs of the British Empire. More narrowly, this chapter has 
shown that British support for the creation of a South Slav state (and buffer states more 
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generally) must be reconceptualised to account for the prominence of naturalised 
geopolitics and the doctrine of Berlin-Baghdad. Reading Britain’s concern with the 
overland route to India in terms of transcontinentalism has thus produced new and 
original insights into Britain’s relationships with Germany, Russia, and the Ottoman 
Empire with regards to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Secondly, these three 
Baghdad Railway focused chapters have shown the different emphases that were placed 
on the aspects of transcontinentalism identified in Chapter Two. Again, the notion of the 
railway as a tool of power projection is crucial here, and has been shown to have 
conditioned much of Britain’s responses to the Baghdad Railway as it was constructed 
towards spaces imagined and maintained by the Empire as quintessentially British. The 
chapters have demonstrated the tight entwinement of railway technology and the 
naturalised geopolitical imagination, and how at its peak the Baghdad Railway was to 
serve as the backbone of a great German empire, imagined as the focal point of a 
circulatory system ensuring the impregnability and enduring dominance of the German 
state organism. Had the First World War been won by Germany, as McMeekin (2011) 
has speculated, it is highly likely that Berlin-Baghdad would have become a reality. The 
consequences of this could surely not have been far away from that envisaged by the 
individuals discussed in this chapter.     
 However, the part of transcontinentalism that I have outlined in Part One which 
was not as prominent in the story of Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism was 
civilisational geopolitics. Although authors such as Chenery (1869) invoked civilisation as 
an explanation for the construction of the Euphrates Valley Railway, once it became 
clear that such a railway would not be constructed by Britain the civilisational 
underpinnings of such a project largely evaporated from British discourse. The reason 
for this was simply that civilisation was first and foremost a discourse of colonial 
legitimacy, validating infrastructural technologies such as railways as universal moral 
goods. It was therefore muted in Britain precisely because it would have justified a 
project that would have derived political and economic gain for Germany. It is entirely 
possible, and indeed likely, that German authors such as Rohrbach and Schaefer invoked 
civilisation and civilisational geopolitics as a justification for the construction of the 
Baghdad Railway. This will have to be left for future research. In the next part of the 
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thesis, I turn to the Cape-Cairo Railway, tracing its history through a structural biography 
of Cecil Rhodes. Through the history of the Cape-Cairo Railway, the important entwining 
of civilisational and naturalised geopolitics for the doctrine of transcontinentalism will 
become apparent.  
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Part Three – Cape-Cairo 
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Figure 6.1: Map of the African railway system, as it stood in 1927, and depicting the railway routes still under 
construction at that point. The map shows the network of railways in South Africa stretching northwards from Cape 
Town into the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and to the town of Bulaweyo. The railway never reached the southern 
tip of Lake Tanganyika or passed through German East Africa as Rhodes intended, but instead proceeded to 
Bukama via the Victoria Falls and Elizabethville in 1917. As the map shows, the railway was never constructed 
directly north from that point to potentially connect to the Sudanese railway system, but instead continued further 
into the Belgian Congo. See Figure 7.2 for a map showing only the Cape-Cairo Railway route. Reproduced from The 
Railway Gazette and Railway News (1927: 5).  
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Chapter Six – Cecil Rhodes’ geopolitical vision and Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism, 1870-1895 
6.1. Introduction 
 This chapter begins my analysis of Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism by introducing 
the geopolitics of Cecil John Rhodes. Following the method of structural biography, in 
this chapter and the following one I switch from the broader analysis that characterised 
the previous Berlin-Baghdad chapters to a tighter, more in-depth analysis of Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism as it took shape in Rhodes’ life and work. I argue that his efforts to 
construct the Cape-Cairo Railway stemmed from the mixture of civilisational and 
naturalised geopolitical and technological discourses that I elucidated in Chapter Two 
and is thus characteristic of the doctrine of transcontinentalism. After the two chapters 
specifically on Rhodes, Chapter Eight then traces the path of transcontinentalism 
through the numerous writings, activities, and lectures of his various associates after his 
death until around 1930. My argument is that Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism shared 
the same intrinsic features of Berlin-Baghdad transcontinentalism whilst simultaneously 
deviating from it in important ways. Most prominently, Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism 
fully blended together the civilisational and naturalised modes of technogeopolitical 
reasoning to construct Africa as an uncivilised space requiring the insertion of a 
circulatory railway system to civilise it and bring it back to conscious, breathing life. In 
contrast to Berlin-Baghdad, civilisational imperatives did not disappear but instead 
intensified as the First World War approached. Just as importantly, Rhodes’ desire to 
project and territorialise state power ‘from the Cape to Cairo’ emerged before any idea 
of constructing a transcontinental railway between the Cape Colony and Egypt. This 
reflected specific differences between Berlin-Baghdad and Cape-Cairo, which I will 
explore in more detail in this chapter.  
 To accomplish this, this chapter begins by analysing what I will be terming Cecil 
Rhodes’ geopolitical vision. My argument is that Rhodes’ articulated a vision for the 
territorial expansion of the British Empire which emerged from the social, spatial, and 
intellectual contexts of Oxford and his affinity with the history of the Roman Empire, the 
classic texts of Ancient Greece and Rome, and his identification with ‘Great Men’ of 
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history such as Caesar and Napoleon. Out of these contexts Rhodes’ ideas emerged in 
his 1877 Confession of Faith, which portrayed the continent of Africa as an uncivilised 
inert space and the British Empire as the only means through which the continent could 
be revitalised. I argue that this vision was immensely significant to the emergence of 
Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism in the late 1880s and 1890s, and it is for this 
reason that I reconstruct it in considerable detail. The second half of the chapter 
explores Rhodes’ involvement with railway construction in southern Africa in the 1880s. 
I argue that Rhodes gradually grasped the power of the railway as a tool of empire 
through his involvement with the extension of the Cape railway system to Kimberley in 
1881 and his role in the establishment of a British Protectorate over Bechuanaland in 
1885. Finally, I demonstrate how, through his networks of association with Harry 
Johnston and the British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, Rhodes adopted the ‘Cape-Cairo’ 
idea as his own. This analysis therefore explains how Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism 
emerged through the entwining of geopolitics and technology, using Rhodes’ life and 
work as the method to do so.    
6.2. Cecil Rhodes’ geopolitical vision, 1870-1879  
 Cecil John Rhodes (see Figure 6.2) was born on July 5th 1853 in Bishop’s Stortford. 
At the age of seventeen he left Britain for South Africa, arriving in Durban after a seventy 
day voyage. There he joined his brother Herbert on his cotton-farm, a farm young Cecil 
was soon running by himself after Herbert departed to seek his fortune in the South 
African diamond rush at Kimberley (Rotberg, 1986). Cecil soon followed him and in 1888 
consolidated the whole of Kimberley’s diamond deposits under his control at the age of 
35, a feat which guaranteed him an almost unparalleled personal wealth (Newbury, 
1981; Phimister, 1974; Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 180-214). His business dealings 
dovetailed with an increasing interest in politics and the future of the British Empire. In 
1881 he had become a member of the Cape Colony parliament – he would later become 
Prime Minister in 1890 – and in the ensuing years was influential in extending the colony 
northwards, arguing for the annexation Bechuanaland and later establishing the 
territory that would bear his name, Rhodesia. He formed the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) in 1889 to promote the expansion of the British Empire under the 
auspices of economically developing the territories to the North of the Cape, and by 
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1893 both Mashonaland and Matabeleland had also been secured for the British flag. In 
1895 Rhodes’ associate Leander Jameson attempted to annex the Transvaal in what 
became known as the Jameson Raid, an endeavour which ended in humiliating failure 
and which forced Rhodes to resign the Premiership of the Cape Colony in disgrace 
(Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 515-550; Wilburn, 1997). For the last five years of the 
nineteenth century Rhodes busied himself with other projects, especially the 
construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway, before his longstanding heart and lung issues 
claimed his life on March 26th 1902 aged 48.  
 
Figure 6.2: Cecil Rhodes, his hands crossed over a map. Source: Mss. Afr. 229/2/1/File 4. 
 Rhodes has often been described by his colleagues and contemporaries as a 
visionary. Both throughout and immediately after his life there were numerous 
references to Rhodes as “the Visionary – the giant genius who dreamed of reuniting the 
English-speaking worlds” (Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 3, original emphasis). For instance, 
an 1899 article in the short-lived London newspaper the St. James’ Gazette described 
how Rhodes’ “keen vision pierced the future and from Cape Colony looked northwards 
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steadfastly from Bulaweyo to the Nile.”134 Rhodes’ architect Herbert Baker likewise 
wrote during the First World War of the “world-wide reach” of his “prophetic vision […] 
of a better ordering of the world through the civilizing genius of the English speaking 
races.”135 In his reminiscences Rhodes’ associate E.A. Maund spoke of the “wonderful 
far-seeing vision” which allowed Rhodes to “gauge and prophetically speak of the 
future.”136 While all of these examples must be seen in the context of MacFarlane’s 
(2007) chauvinistic approval categorisation of Rhodes’ historiography, references to him 
as a visionary also pervade more contemporary historical literatures and biographies. In 
his history of the Cape-Cairo Railway, for example, Tabor (2003: 11) writes unrequitedly 
of the “visionary Empire Builder” Cecil Rhodes. 
 Although mostly falling firmly within the tradition of hagiography, these 
examples gesture towards the possibility of considering Rhodes’ ideas in the context of 
the modern geopolitical imagination. In particular, I will argue in this section that 
Rhodes’ ideas can be conceptualised as a geopolitical vision rooted in the ontological 
separation of viewer and viewed consistent with Agnew’s (2003) and Ó Tuathail’s (1996) 
notion of Cartestian Perspectivalism. Rhodes, I will show, envisioned the world as a 
whole with a detachment and taciturnity which positioned him anterior to both space 
and time, his own agency in shaping and narrating the flows of history and geography 
erased and unacknowledged. In this reading Rhodes is rendered a “timetraveller and 
prophet” (Hutchings, 2008: 175) who could cut through the shifting complexities of 
space and time to grasp the world how it had been, how it was, and how it should be. 
With respect to transcontinentalism, what is important is that this kind of geopolitics 
“results in the sorts of visions of the world – ‘world stages’, ‘global views’ – pivotal to the 
practical geopolitics of empire, the state, or territorial control” (Rech, 2015: 536).  
 In this section I trace the development of Rhodes’ geopolitical vision in the early 
years of his life. However, I pay close attention to the social, spatial, and intellectual 
contexts from and with which his ideas emerged. I want to not only analyse Rhodes’ 
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 ‘Cutting from St. James’s Gazette’ [undated 1899], WL Mss. Afr. s 228/C18/8/e. 
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 ‘Letter from Herbert Baker, English architect, to Mr. Howell Wright, a student of Cecil Rhodes, 
reprinted in The Post [undated, c. 1914]’, WL Mss. Afr. t 5/251. 
136
 Papers of E.A. Maund, ‘Cecil Rhodes Reminiscences: Rhodes and General Gordon’, WL Mss. Afr. s 
229/4/7/78-98 [81].  
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vision, but also explain its production through contextualising it within his movements 
between South Africa and England, the intellectual and spatial atmosphere of Oxford, 
and through his affinity with the Roman Empire and the ‘Great Men’ of history. Rhodes’ 
vision was simultaneously situated and structural, reflecting his own specific path as well 
as the wider geopolitical currents of the time.  
6.2.1. Rhodes’ intellectual gestation  
 Rhodes arrived in Durban on September 1st 1870, disembarking “clear-headed, 
bright-eyed, enthusiastic, and with a characteristic confidence in his own resources” 
(Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 36). Although the first couple of years he spent in South 
Africa at his brother’s cotton farm were relatively uneventful, it is apparent that before 
long it was actually a lack of vision and purpose that began to characterise his life. 
Writing to his brother Frank on August 19th 1875, just weeks after his twenty second 
birthday, Rhodes agonised about whether he should abandon his life in South Africa, 
return to England, and train for the bar. “I always feel my lungs to be a sort of skeleton 
in a cupboard”, he wrote, “ever ready to pounce down and clear me off, but really what 
is life worth at my present mode of existence with no object, no aim?”137 Even though by 
this time he had started to make a modest earning by swapping working in the cotton 
fields for diamond prospecting at Kimberley, Rhodes was restless and rudderless as a 
young adult. Despite his increasing wealth, social capital, and mobility, much of Rhodes’ 
correspondence, especially that which was sent home to his family during this period, 
gesture towards someone searching with futility for a direction and purpose. For 
example, in a note appended to his Seventh Will and Testament of September 8th 1893, 
he retrospectively explained that his “idea in life” had always been “the active working 
of the soul in pursuit of the highest object in a complete life”, something which he 
borrowed incompletely from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.138 This object for Rhodes 
had to overrule all other ordinary pursuits and pleasures. In 1875, writing to his brother, 
his object was blurred and concealed, but only two years later it was expressed with a 
striking idealistic force in his Confession of Faith.        
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 The Confession was handwritten by Rhodes in Oxford on June 2nd 1877. Leaving 
his growing diamond conglomerate in the hands of his business partners, Rhodes had 
entered Oxford University in the Autumn of 1873, and would return, on and off, for 
several years (see Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 69-107). In Oxford Rhodes was seemingly an 
average student, and the little evidence we have from his time there indicates that he 
was far more interested in associating with Masons and other gentlemanly clubs than he 
was studying. Nonetheless, his steeping in Oxford’s intellectual atmosphere formed the 
context to the coalescing of his beliefs and ideals, which found their expression in 1877 
as the Confession. Specifically, I argue that in Oxford Rhodes’ thought was shaped by 
three wider components of British imperialism that are important to understanding the 
content of the Confession and consequently his geopolitics.  
 The first component was what Betts (1971) has called the allusion to Rome in 
British imperial culture, whereby the British Empire was imagined as the moral and 
secular successor to the Roman Empire (see also Hagerman, 2013). Rhodes’ infatuation 
with the Roman Empire stemmed largely from the English historian Edward Gibbon’s 
colossal six volume The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, originally 
published between 1776 and 1789. The book was crucial to him; as the historian 
Brendon (2007: 188) puts it, “Rhodes read Gibbon rather than the Bible.” Rotberg and 
Shore (1988: 75, 95) have observed that the book was something he had first 
encountered (if not actually ‘read’) on his brother’s cotton farm, and it was in Oxford 
that he apparently “read and reread” Gibbon’s work. It was therefore in the intellectual, 
cultural, and imperial climate of Oxford that he became most acquainted with Gibbon 
(Symonds, 1986: 182). Certain parts of Gibbon’s thesis had a heady impact on Rhodes. 
For instance, in his Commonplace Book Rhodes quoted Gibbon in writing that “when the 
Coliseum falls Rome will fall when Rome falls the world will fall”, indicating that in the 
present, with Britain as Rome’s successor, the fall of the British Empire would mean the 
fall of the world.139 According to Williams (1921: 40), Gibbon’s analysis of Rome’s ethical 
imperative to rule also “gave [Rhodes] a basis for his political creed, [and convinced him] 
that Rome’s burden of governing the world had now fallen on England’s shoulders.” In 
practical terms, Gibbon was part of what convinced Rhodes that the British Empire must 
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“federate or disintegrate”, as his friend and banker Lewis Michell put to him in a 
letter.140 Rhodes thus reached into the history of the Roman Empire, mediated by 
Gibbon, and mapped it onto the present, garnering from it a moral justification for the 
supremacy and expansion of the British Empire.     
 The second component of Rhodes’ intellectual gestation was his encounter with 
some of the classic texts of Ancient Greece and Rome, from which he extracted small 
nuggets of wisdom that spoke to him in some way.141 Rhodes read these texts extremely 
selectively, gravitating towards prosaic sentences or passages that he could connect, 
however tenuously, to his germinating ideas. For instance, he often referred to Marcus 
Aurelius’ obscure panegyric of the Roman Emperor Antoninus Pius “as showing how 
thoroughly the Antonines recognised the republican character of their Empire”, 
something which furnished authority and certainty to his own germinating republican 
and federal leanings.142 The classics also served to enhance Rhodes’ growing feelings of 
self-importance, eminence, and purpose. His Commonplace Book, for example, is 
littered with cryptic quotations from Seneca’s Epistles on subjects of greatness, 
fortitude, and duty, such as Seneca’s axiom that “[g]reatness has no certain measure; 
comparison either raises or depresses it. The ship which is great in the river, is little in 
the sea.”143 The Confession also contains multiple oblique references to Aristotle, such 
as in Rhodes’ repeated use of the Greek term μεγα οψεις, which translates imperfectly 
to mega views or great views.144 Rotberg and Shore (1988: 95) summarise that the 
classics were “a heady, mystical brew justifying and extolling the fervor of imperialism”, 
persuading Rhodes that “Britain was Rome’s successor in world leadership”. As he 
digested the supposedly timeless insights of Marcus Aurelius, Seneca, and Aristotle, his 
incubating ideas about the world, and Britain’s place in it, were turned into truths.  
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 The final component shaping Rhodes’ views was his affinity with, and self-
comparison to, a number of the so-called ‘Great Men’ of history, such as Caesar and 
Napoleon. To a large extent this reflected his allusion to Rome, as many of the figures he 
idolised were Roman Emperors like Marcus Aurelius, and it has also been well 
documented that Rhodes made much of his apparent physical resemblance to the 
Roman Emperor Titus.145 But he particularly fixated on Caesar and Napoleon. As E.A. 
Maund recalled, “[h]is discussions about Julius Caesar, whom he would contrast with 
Napoleon in their respective environments, which afford[ed] them such varied dreams 
and opportunities, were quite delightful.”146 He discussed Caesar’s military strategy and 
Napoleon’s foresight in constructing long, straight roads between towns and camps to 
aid the mobility of his troops.147 In his Commonplace Book, meanwhile, Rhodes jotted 
down the simple and enigmatic words “Caesar undertook conquest of Gaul at age 42.”148 
Although it is difficult to date these words, Rhodes, ever aware that his life would 
probably be cut short by his severe heart and lung problems, would have taken much 
from the fact that Caesar expanded the Roman Empire to the extent he did at such a 
relatively young age. It is evident that Rhodes looked up to both Caesar and Napoleon as 
conquerors par excellence; two of history’s great individuals from whom he could take 
inspiration for his own territorial ambitions. In their leadership, achievements, and 
greatness he perceived himself; or at least what he wanted to become, and how he 
wanted to be remembered. Therefore, if in the classic texts Rhodes found wisdom and 
virtue, in the Great Men he found individuals who had acted upon these inherent truths 
for the supposed benefit of all of civilisation.   
 In taking these inspirations, Rhodes constructed the British Empire and his own 
ideas as “mighty and right” (Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 95). He found in Gibbon and the 
classics (re)affirmations of his vision, and he found in Caesar and Napoleon examples to 
follow in making that vision a reality. Rhodes’ absorption of these influences found their 
expression in the Confession in 1877, and in the next sub-section I turn to a detailed 
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analysis of its content. My argument here is that the Confession is extremely important 
to understanding the later emergence of Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism 
because it articulated a world in which the continent of Africa was apparently there for 
the taking by the British Empire. In 1877, Rhodes’ plan was an incoherent one, but as I 
will show it was the entwining of these ideas with his involvement with railway 
technology in the 1880s and 1890s that precipitated the emergence of his Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism.  
6.2.2. The Confession of Faith  
 Rotberg and Shore (1988: 99) have described the Confession as nothing less than 
a statement of “the principles and the coherent life agenda which had come to seem 
vital to Rhodes.” Stretching to thirteen pages, in it Rhodes articulated an unusual and 
unsettling manifesto for the federal unification of the racially superior Anglo-Saxon race, 
and the main object in life that had so occupied him in previous years was defined as 
“the furtherance of the British Empire, and the bringing of the whole uncivilized world 
under British rule in the recovery of the United States for the making [of] the Anglo-
Saxon race but one Empire.”149 It is important to underline that the ideas he espoused in 
it and his Second Will and Testament “never jettisoned from a central position in his 
ideological universe” (Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 102). He shared the Confession with 
only a few trusted colleagues during his life. In August 1891 he enclosed a copy to the 
journalist W.T. Stead, alongside a note reading “I send you a draft of mine of my ideas 
you will see I have not offered much as to my feelings. I wrote it when I was about 22. 
You will of course respect my confidence.”150 It seems he also shared it with his solicitor, 
Bourchier Francis Hawksley. After Rhodes’ death, Hawksley wrote to Lewis Michell on 
January 9th 1904 enclosing a copy of the Confession, writing that “I know – perhaps no 
one better – how much store Rhodes put upon the long document and his wishes 
therein indicated.”151 It is important therefore to foreground the Confession as an 
articulation of the ideas that would shape Rhodes’ life from his mid-twenties onwards.  
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 Rhodes began the Confession with the Aristotelian imperative; “[i]t often strikes 
a man to enquire what is the chief good in life,” before remarking that he had decided 
his own imperative was to render himself useful to his country.152 From here, Rhodes 
contended that the English race is the “finest race in the world and that the more of the 
world we inhabit the better it is for the human race.”153 He continued:  
“Just fancy those parts that are at present occupied by the most despicable specimens 
of human beings what an alteration there would be in them if they were brought under 
Anglo-Saxon influence […] I contend that every acre added to our territory means in the 
future birth to some more of the English race who otherwise would not be brought into 
existence.”154  
His object defined, Rhodes proceeded to outline a double-edged plan to achieve this 
aim. The first edge was the creation of a secret society “with but one object the 
furtherance of the British Empire.”155 This society would be worldwide, with members 
located at schools and universities throughout the entire British Empire, testing whether 
the “English youth” passing through were “endurant, possessed of eloquence, 
disregardful of the petty details of life, and if found to be such, then elected and bound 
by oath to serve for the rest of his life his Country.”156 The society would seek out those 
with “high thoughts, high aspirations, endowed by nature with all the faculties to make a 
great man”, but lacking the means and opportunity to put these faculties forward in the 
service of Queen and country.157 It would even “own portions of the press for the press 
rules the mind of the people.”158 The society, in other words, would mould the finest 
English youth into the imperialists of tomorrow and equip them with the tools they 
needed to unify the English speaking peoples of the world under the banner of the 
British Empire.  
 The second edge of Rhodes’ plan was the physical acquisition of territory by the 
British Empire. “Fancy Australia discovered and colonised under the French flag”, he 
posed, subsequently answering that it would surely mean that the several million English 
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people who had colonised and subsequently been born in Australia would never have 
existed.159 As he elaborated:  
“We learn from having lost to cling to what we possess. We know the size of the world 
we know the total extent. Africa is still lying ready for us it is our duty to take it. It is our 
duty to seize every opportunity of acquiring more territory and we should keep this one 
idea steadily before our eyes that more territory simply means more of the Anglo-Saxon 
race, more of the best, most human, most honourable race the world possesses.”160 
For Rhodes, the world is known. It has been mapped and surveyed, its primary 
characteristics defined, and it is consequently able to be rendered into a spatial 
hierarchy stretching “from most friendly to most dangerous” (Agnew, 2003: 16). At the 
top of Rhodes’ hierarchy are Britain and the Anglo-Saxon race, whilst at the bottom are 
those parts of the world he deemed occupied by the ‘despicable specimens’ of the 
world; one of which was Africa, which Rhodes implicitly feminises and thus represents as 
‘lying ready’ for masculinised conquest and subjugation by those most appropriately 
‘endowed’ for the task.  Slightly below England in Rhodes’ hierarchy are the United 
States and Australia. At the time Rhodes was writing, Australia was composed of six 
Crown Colonies, while the United States was independent. The folly of allowing the 
United States to become independent from Britain was returned to again and again by 
Rhodes throughout his life; he considered it a mistake that hindered the possibility of 
Anglo-Saxon federation occurring more promptly. The vision articulated in the 
Confession was therefore for the British Empire to territorially annex as much of the 
world as it could, whilst distributing members of a secret society throughout the globe 
to promote the ideals of federation under the superior Anglo-Saxon British Empire. 
Eventually, as Rhodes put it, “this absorption of the greater part of the world simply 
means the end of all wars.”161 
 The Confession therefore sketches the contours of the imperialist ideals that 
would emerge recurrently throughout Rhodes’ life. However, what I want to underline is 
how it demonstrates an assured certainty about the state of the world. Its full extent has 
been unravelled and its different spaces determined. Rhodes therefore grasped the 
world as a picture, apparently transcending positionality and subjectivity to gaze upon 
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its surface and identify the inherent characteristics of different spaces and their relation 
to one another. Furthermore, Rhodes categorises the continent of Africa and those 
other ‘despicable’ spaces in the world as primitive, backwards, and underdeveloped in 
direct opposition to the developed, modern, and racially superior British Anglo-Saxon 
race. He thus placed the British Empire at the civilisational pinnacle with Africa and 
concomitant spaces at the bottom, with France, Australia, and the United States 
somewhere in between. As Agnew (2003) stresses, the consigning of (in this case) non-
Anglo-Saxon races and societies to an uncivilised status ‘further downstream’ the stream 
of Time produces a moral imperative of action; it compelled Rhodes to speak with 
urgency about what could be done to help those further downstream reach a coeval 
level of civilisational development. The world was thus divided by Rhodes into the 
Anglo-Saxon dominated British Empire on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the 
other, “in terms of what the latter lacks and what the former has to offer to make up for 
this deficiency” (Agnew, 2003: 36).    
 Yet the Confession also evinced another related feature of Rhodes’ life, that of 
the global and colonial competition between the European Great Powers in the wider 
context of the relative decline of the British Empire. In the Confession Rhodes blamed 
the House of Commons for the creeping failures of Britain, writing of “the mediocrity of 
the men”162 that populate it and how their time has been spent accumulating money 
rather than studying any past history. He lamented that “in the hands of such men rest 
our destinies.”163 Indeed, Rhodes continuously criticised the British government 
throughout his life, especially the Colonial Office and the Treasury, for not supporting 
him in several of his later imperial schemes. As will be discussed in the next chapter, he 
raged particularly at the British Treasury for not supporting his plans to continue the 
Cape-Cairo Railway into Central Africa. The Confession thus developed another theme 
which was also to occupy Rhodes throughout his life; that of the British government as 
an inadequate and failing body that did not fully grasp the realities and truths that 
Rhodes himself had perceived, and which consequently mismanaged the affairs of the 
Empire in a way that Rhodes despised.  
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     The ideas articulated in the Confession received little explicit iteration 
throughout Rhodes’ life. His First Will from 1874 appears not to have survived, but it is 
mentioned by his associate J.G. McDonald (1927: 26), who states that in it Rhodes 
bequeathed all of his wealth “to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in trust for the 
extension of the British Empire.” His Second Will, dated just months after the Confession 
in September 1877, is perhaps the most extraordinary and is worth quoting at length. In 
it, Rhodes leaves all his wealth 
“for the establishment, promotion and development of a Secret Society, the true aim 
and object whereof shall be the extension of British rule throughout the world, the 
perfecting of a system of emigration from the United Kingdom and of colonization by 
British subjects of all lands wherein the means of livelihood are attainable by energy, 
labour and enterprise, and specifically the occupation by British settlers of the entire 
Continent of Africa, The Holy Land, the valley of the Euphrates, the Islands of Cyprus and 
Candia [Crete], the whole of South America, the islands of the Pacific not heretofore 
possessed by Great Britain, the whole of the Archipelago, the seaboard of China and 
Japan, the ultimate recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the 
British Empire, the consolidation of the whole Empire, the inauguration of a system of 
Colonial Representation in the Imperial Parliament which may tend to weld together the 
disjointed members of the Empire and finally the foundation of so great a Power as to 
hereafter renders wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity."164 
A final example, which has the important distinction of being written some years later, 
was a second letter to W.T. Stead from August 1891. As well as emphasising his plan for 
a secret society, Rhodes reiterated “the sacred duty of taking the responsibility of the 
still uncivilised parts of the world.”165 This time, his list of uncivilised places was not as 
long as it was in his Second Will, but it still included Portugal, Persia, Spain, and “the 
whole of the South American Republics.”166 As Rhodes concluded, this plan required 
“the best energies of the best people in the world [and] the devotion of the best souls of 
the next 200 years.”167 The best people in the world were evidently the Anglo-Saxon 
race, who “must now be trained to view the world as a whole and not only consider the 
social questions of the British Isles.” 168 This particular letter indicates that Rhodes’ 
geopolitics persisted throughout his life, and not just in the years he spent in Oxford. 
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 My argument is that the ideas Rhodes articulated in the Confession and which he 
reiterated at different points in his life are crucial for understanding his 
transcontinentalism and his later attempts to construct the Cape-Cairo Railway. It mixed 
the civilisational and naturalised underpinnings of geopolitics by emphasising the civility 
of the British Empire and the Anglo-Saxon race against the despicable places in the 
world, narrating the Anglo-Saxon race as a people which had to expand, colonise, and 
unite in order to secure “permanent peace in the world.”169 Among a wild and disparate 
array of spaces, Rhodes had already identified ‘the entire Continent of Africa’ as ‘lying 
ready’ for British colonisation. In the context of the late 1870s, when the ‘Scramble for 
Africa’ had not yet begun in earnest, Africa was still regarded as the final expanse of 
uncivilised terra nullius in the modern geopolitical imagination. Rhodes’ definition of 
Africa as a continent awaiting the civilising mission of the British thus anticipated his 
later work in the 1880s and 1890s.  
6.2.3. Summary  
 In this section I have analysed what I have termed Cecil Rhodes’ geopolitical 
vision and the social, spatial, and intellectual context from which it emerged. This was a 
vision for the unfettered and unlimited territorial expansion of the British Empire and 
the colonisation of those spaces Rhodes had identified as the vacant, wasted areas of 
the world map with the racial and moral superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. In 
summarising, I want to stress two points. Firstly, although Rhodes had explicitly 
identified the entire continent of Africa as a prime target for his ideal of colonisation and 
territorial annexation, at the time of the Confession this was no more than the pipe 
dream of subjugating and colonising Africa that occupied the fantasies of many self-
appointed imperial agents in the 1870s. There is no evidence that, at this time, he was 
thinking about Cape-Cairo as a realisable and achievable programme of territorial 
expansion. It was, as John Verschoyle (who edited the collection of Rhodes’ speeches 
under the pseudonym Vindex) put to Rhodes, simply the “sole continent which 
remained for European hands to grasp.”170 Secondly, there is no evidence Rhodes made 
any connection between his ideas and railways at the time of the Confession. This was 
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only to come when he returned to South Africa from Oxford, which I will examine in the 
following section.   
 These two points – railways and Cape-Cairo – became increasingly central to 
Rhodes’ life throughout the 1880s, the decade where the new imperialism witnessed 
the European powers swarming for the vacant spaces of the African map. Rhodes 
entered the Cape Colony parliament as the representative for Barkley West in 1881, the 
same year he entered into the political and economic maelstrom of African railway 
construction. The next section turns to this decade to show how, by the beginning of the 
1890s, Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism had emerged in earnest.  
6.3. Railways and ‘from the Cape to Cairo’, 1880-1892 
 This section traces Rhodes’ activities throughout the 1880s. In particular, I want 
to stress his involvement in railways and with wider imperial concerns concerning the 
status of the British Empire in southern Africa, and how what came to be termed the 
Cape-Cairo idea came to his attention at the end of the decade. My argument is that by 
1892, the scene was set for Rhodes to attempt to conquer the expanse of African space 
between the Cape and Cairo with railway technology as his tool.  
6.3.1. Rhodes and railways 
 Rhodes’ first significant involvement with railway construction was in 1880, the 
year before he entered the Cape Colony parliament. Between 1877, when he wrote the 
Confession, and 1880, his position had changed profoundly. His wealth was accelerating, 
and he was increasingly seen in the Cape Colony as a representative of Kimberley’s 
mining industry and an influential political force. At the same time, by the beginning of 
the 1880s “[r]ailways were radiating out of the Cape to Beaufort West and on to 
Hopetown, Colesberg, and Aliwal North” (Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 129; see Figure 6.3). 
Rhodes supported the prospective extension of the railway from Beaufort West to 
Kimberley in 1880, an extension that was prompted by the agreement of the Cape 
government to annex Griqualand West, the province where Kimberley was located. “We 
are evidently at last to be annexed,” Rhodes wrote to the veteran Cape Colony politician 
John X. Merriman in May 1880. He continued:  
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 “I hope that you will support railway extension direct here as though I see you are rightly 
 opposed to that wretched system of making a railway to every village in the country for 
 the sake of the political support of its members still facts are incontravertible [sic] to 
 shew [sic] that a direct line here from Capetown would return a splendid interest on its 
 construction.”171 
Rhodes emphasised that the construction of the line would mean Kimberley would pay 
almost half as much of its supplies of wood and coal by having it transported from Cape 
Town, and the line would also be profitable to the Cape because of the duty levied on 
the transmission of these resources.  
 It seems that nothing more came of this until Rhodes entered the Cape 
Parliament in April 1881, serving the Prime Minister Gordon Sprigg. Sprigg was a 
committed railway builder and Rhodes consequently leant towards backing him 
(Rotberg and Shore, 1988). But Sprigg made a fatal error over a territory to the east of 
Cape Town called Basutoland, which is now the state of Lesotho. In 1869, it had been 
annexed by Britain and was incorporated as part of the Cape Colony in 1871. This 
annexation proved unpopular amongst the native Sotho, and due to rising tensions and 
fears across the Colony as a whole the Cape Parliament passed the Peace Preservation 
Act in April 1880, which gave the governor the power to demand that the Sotho 
relinquish their weapons at any time. In 1880 Sprigg himself informed a crowd of Sotho 
that this would be accompanied by an increase in their taxes. War subsequently broke 
out and had soon spread into Griqualand, and it took the Cape Colony a year to restore 
order (see Burman, 1981: 132-161, for details on this). 
 Sprigg was variously condemned for his role, and a motion of censure was 
brought forward by a local politician, Thomas Scanlen. Effectively, this was a vote of no 
confidence in Sprigg that had to be approved by a majority in the parliament. Rhodes, 
despite his misgivings about the Basutoland fiasco, voted along with the other members 
from Griqualand West to back Sprigg. Their support was pivotal, as the motion was 
rejected by 37 votes to 34. As Rotberg and Shore (1988: 135) narrate, “[a]s long as 
Sprigg, the railway builder, continued to promise progress in driving steel towards 
Kimberley, Rhodes would remain with him, despite Basutoland.” However, ten days later 
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Rhodes changed his mind, and persuaded two of the other Griqualand West members to 
change theirs too. Sprigg’s government fell, Scanlen became Prime Minister, and 
Merriman became the new Minister for Railways. According to Rotberg and Shore 
(1988: 135), “Rhodes had suddenly decided […] that Sprigg was ‘too weak’ to push the 
rails forward with sufficient speed.” It was not until November 28th 1885 that the first 
train finally travelled into Kimberley from Cape Town.  
 
Figure 6.3: Location map of southern African railways, showing the extent of the railway from Cape Town (bottom 
left) to Kimberley. Reproduced from University of Cape Town Digital Collections. Available at: 
<http://www.digitalcollections.lib.uct.ac.za/collection/islandora-19581> [Accessed 30/03/2016] 
 Flint (1976: 50-51) has attempted to argue that Rhodes’ railway politics in 1880 
and 1881 should be seen as closely connected to the Confession, and that they were a 
conscious attempt to increase his own social and political capital for the purposes of 
enlarging the British Empire. There seems to be little evidence for this, and I am more 
inclined to agree with Rotberg and Shore’s (1988: 125) caution that such an 
interpretation “credits Rhodes with a prescience and a knack for long-range planning 
that he had not then begun to display.” What I do want to emphasise is that through his 
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experiences in railway politics in 1880 and 1881 Rhodes learned much about the political 
and economic necessities of railway construction, and how railways were imbricated in 
the colonial and civilisational logics of the rapidly expanding Cape Colony. Further, and 
although this is a fairly obvious point to make, his letter to Merriman demonstrates how 
he understood the role of railways in circulating people and resources across colonial 
space, and how the construction of railways released places such as Kimberley from 
their previous economic enclosure. As Rotberg and Shore (1988: 125) put it, his support 
for the Kimberley railway is best interpreted parochially: “[i]n order for both his 
company and his town to prosper, Kimberley needed to be connected to the sea by rail.” 
It was in his early political career that Rhodes consequently learned the colonial and 
power politics of railways, and their ability to create spaces of circulation where 
previously there had been none.  
 Rhodes’ second significant involvement in railway construction was in March 
1885, when he was influential in arguing for the establishment of a British Protectorate 
over Bechuanaland (see Figure 6.4). Under Paul Kruger the Transvaal had been slowly 
encroaching westwards from 1880, and the establishment of German South West Africa 
in 1884 caused an imperial panic in the Cape and in London. Essentially, Rhodes and 
others feared that Germany and the Transvaal might ally against Britain “to form a 
Teutonic belt across the continent, making the future British expansion there very 
difficult if not impossible” (Zins, 1999: 58). This was exacerbated by a wider discourse 
fashioning Bechuanaland as a land corridor to the interior of Africa. As Griffiths (1997: 
67) writes, “[w]ithout land corridors of access some states would be land-locked, 
isolated or without access to a perceived natural artery of communication.” The loss of 
Bechuanaland would thus be the loss of any future route to the interior. Rhodes (in 
Vindex, 1900: 62) argued in August 1883 that “I look upon this Bechuanaland territory as 
the Suez Canal of the trade of this country, the key of its road to the interior.” In a 
subsequent letter to The Times in November 1885, Rhodes captured the intensifying 
‘Scramble’ in southern Africa when he stressed that Britain was no longer the only 
colonial power in region. It was now possible, Rhodes argued, “for the German Empire 
[...] to cut off our settlements in South Africa from communications with the interior”. 
Rhodes thus argued that the Protectorate should be turned into an official Crown Colony 
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to cover “the link which may join our settlements to the richer districts beyond” 
(Rhodes, 1885: 8).  
 
Figure 6.4: Map showing both the Crown Colony of Bechuanaland (shaded red), and the British Protectorate of 
Bechuanaland (demarcated by the red line). To the east of Bechuanaland can be seen the South African Republic 
(the Transvaal), and to the west Great Namaqua Land, part of German South West Africa. Reproduced from 
<http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images3/bechuanaland1887map.jpg> [Accessed 30/03/2016]  
 The importance of Rhodes’ intervention into the Bechuanaland debate was his 
concomitant support for the extension of the railway from Kimberley into Bechuanaland 
itself. In his letter to The Times (1885: 8), he argued that  
 “[o]ver 500 miles of this [territory] a railway has been already constructed, and with the 
 advance lately made in the development of Bechuanaland we may look to the extension 
 of the railway system to Shoshong, Khama’s capital, leaving only a distance of 350 
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 miles to the borders of Mashunaland [sic], and of about 200 miles further to the  Zambesi 
 [river].” 
To this Rhodes (1885: 8) added that “a railway system extended along the healthy ridge 
of the centre of Africa [would] defeat any attempt at German colonisation and will tap 
the lake system of Africa.” Rhodes’ concern with the railway through Bechuanaland was 
later crystallised with his formation of the BSAC in 1889, which had as its aim “to open 
up, develop, and colonise the territories to the north of British Bechuanaland, with the 
best results, both for British trade and commerce, and for the interests of the native 
races.”172 One of the first actions of the BSAC “was to arrange the extension northwards 
of the Colonial Railway which then terminated at Kimberley.”173 Thus with the 
Bechuanaland debacle and the increasing pressures of Germany, the Transvaal, and the 
Portuguese in southern Africa, Rhodes learned just how potent railway technology could 
be as a tool of imperial expansion and entrenchment. It was when he began to equate it 
not only with the simple political and economic needs of the Cape Colony, but with the 
territorialisation and extension of British power more generally. With the Bechuanaland 
railway and the BSAC, Rhodes began to perceive the railway as “the sturdy armature on 
which an empire could be assembled, shaped and cast” (Strage, 1973: 16).  
6.3.2. From the Cape to Cairo 
 While Rhodes was dabbling in the imperial politics of Cape Colony and railway 
construction, the British Empire was facing wider anxieties over the status of empire in 
Africa. After the occupation of Egypt in 1882, the Prime Minister Lord Salisbury was 
constantly occupied with potential threats to Britain’s position on the Nile. This was 
exacerbated in 1887 and 1888, when, as Pakenham (1992: 336-357) has shown, tensions 
with both France and Germany placed pressure upon Egypt’s security. Meanwhile, in the 
southern half of the continent fears over the malicious intentions of Germany, Portugal, 
and Kruger’s Transvaal continued unabated despite the efforts of Rhodes and others to 
drive the British flag further towards Lakes Nyasa and Tanganyika. By 1888, the Scramble 
for Africa was at its height, conjuring anxiety and worry in the metropolitan centres of 
empire.  
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 Out of this maelstrom of imperial competition emerged what has been variously 
referred to in the historical literature as the Cape-Cairo ‘idea’ or ‘imaginary’. As 
Ramutsindela (2007: 124) has put it, Cape-Cairo  
 “was neither preconceived nor originated as an instrument of imperialism from the 
 onset. Instead, it emerged as a result of the fusion of interests among disparate 
 European agents [...] It fascinated British Empire builders and, at the same time,  created 
 a climate of rivalry among colonising powers, in particular the French, Germans, and 
 Portuguese.” 
Although Merrington (2001; 2002) has brilliantly traced the cultural roots of Cape-Cairo 
deep into the Victorian psyche, it first coalesced as an imperial term with the publication 
of an article in The Times on August 22nd 1888, authored by the same Harry Johnston 
whom we encountered earlier. Johnston was a renowned linguist, translator, 
geographer, and explorer who served in various consular and administrative positions in 
Africa throughout his life. On a trip to Mount Kilimanjaro in 1884, which was funded by 
the Royal Geographical Society, he negotiated treaties with local chiefs giving priority to 
British interests in the area, and as a consequence of this success he became the Vice-
Consul of the British colony in Cameroon and the surrounding Niger Delta in 1886 (see 
Oliver, 1957 for more details on Johnston’s life). His growing political reputation 
dovetailed with the establishment of a working relationship with Lord Salisbury; they 
shared similar concerns about the future of the British Empire and it was as a direct 
consequence of their discussions that Johnston published the article in The Times.174  
 In this article, Johnston (1888: 8) suggested that British protectorates should be 
established over “countries which we have no desire to directly govern, but which we 
merely wish to secure against outside aggression”, in order “to obviate the jealous 
interference of a rival European power […] without at the same time charging ourselves 
with the internal administration of the country.” This was basically an argument for the 
extension of informal empire, as discussed in the context of the Persian Gulf in Chapter 
Three. Johnston (1888: 8) consequently recommended that Egypt “should become a 
vassal state under English hegemony” and opined that “Nubia, the Suakin distrinct, 
Darfur, and the Egyptian Soudan will no doubt be eventually administered directly or 
indirectly by us.”  He then turned his attention to East Africa, speculating that  
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 “the English domination on Lake Tanganyika may be connected at some future day with 
 the rule of British companies or feudatories on the Albert and Victoria Nyanzas and 
 the Upper Nile; in the south with Lake Nyassa, of which the western and southern 
 banks will probably some day come under our protection, while the eastern bank is 
 left open to German influence" (Johnston, 1888: 8).      
 The extension of British rule south to the northern shores of Lake Tanganyika 
was then pushed by Johnston (1888: 8) to its ultimate conclusion, that, if the British 
government put its full support behind British commercial and missionary activities, “our 
possessions in South Africa may be linked some day to our spheres of influence in 
Eastern African and the Egyptian Soudan by a continuous band of British dominion.”  
With this sentence, the Cape-Cairo idea was arguably propelled into the mainstream 
arena of imperial ideology for the first time. While Johnston maintained that before this 
article the notion of “through communications between the Cape and Egypt had never 
before been specifically enunciated”, he did not claim originality for the Cape-Cairo idea 
itself, acknowledging in a subsequent publication that credit for the conception “should 
really be given to the late Sir Edwin Arnold, who first projected the idea of a British 
dominion stretching from the Egyptian Sudan to Cape Colony in a pamphlet he published 
in 1876” (Johnston, 1897: 81; see also Johnston, 1909: 182). Nonetheless, while tracing 
the political impact of the Cape-Cairo idea up to this point is difficult, it is not 
unreasonable to state that through Johnston and Salisbury (and later Rhodes) it slowly 
dispersed throughout the British political consciousness (Ramutsindela, 2007). 
  It is important to point out that, in contrast to Berlin-Baghdad, the Cape-Cairo 
idea emerged at a time before any transcontinental railway was mooted or discussed in 
any of the European countries. Whereas Chesney’s proposal for a transcontinental 
railway between Europe and India in the 1850s predated the full emergence of Berlin-
Baghdad transcontinentalism in the First World War by several decades, in Africa the 
terms were reversed. This reflects at least two geographical differences between Africa 
and the Ottoman Empire. The first is that Africa was imagined as terra nullius, and thus it 
was possible to consider the annexation and territorialisation of state power across 
African space relatively easily. This was not the case in the Ottoman Empire, which was a 
sovereign empire not exactly coeval to but nonetheless recognised by the European 
powers. As a consequence, it was not until the First World War that German territorial 
annexation became conceivable. A second geographical difference was the sheer 
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distance and terrain between the Cape and Cairo (7210 km) in comparison to the 
distance between Konya and the Persian Gulf (2190km). Even in an age of thinking in 
continents, the distance between the Cape and Cairo was significant compared to that 
covered by the Baghdad Railway. This was even more evident considering that much of 
Central Africa was still unexplored and unchartered in the European epistemology in the 
1880s, and the suitability of its terrain for railway construction was consequently 
undetermined. Chesney, on the other hand, had demonstrated as early as the 1850s 
that it was technologically feasible to construct a railway between Constantinople and 
the Persian Gulf. This is nonetheless an indication that transcontinentalism was not the 
same everywhere and at all times; it developed differently and for different reasons in 
the two examples considered in this thesis. 
 It is difficult to know if Rhodes was aware of the Cape-Cairo idea before a chance 
meeting with Johnston in London in the spring of 1889. The testimony of the approving 
hagiographers cannot be trusted, because they tend to pronounce opinions such as that 
of the South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts in 1922, that “Cecil John Rhodes 
conceived the great idea.”175 While the notion of Cape-Cairo is now associated most 
prominently with Rhodes, Johnston was the first to propel it into wider usage through 
his article in The Times. What is clear, however, is that in May 1889 Rhodes and 
Johnston met in Marylebone in London at the invite of John Verschoyle (see Oliver, 
1957: 152-155; Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 280-281).176 In this meeting, Rhodes and 
Johnston apparently discussed their ideas over dinner before retiring to Rhodes’ room at 
the Westminster Palace Hotel. According to Johnston (1909: 182), before this moment 
Rhodes had “thought of little more than a dominion which might extend from the Cape 
of Good Hope to the Upper Zambezi.” But afterwards Rhodes wrote Johnston a cheque 
for £2000 for treaty-making expeditions across the Zambesi and towards Lake 
Tanganyika, and promised him further funds to help him “take over any degree of 
Central Africa between the Zambesi and the White Nile” (Johnston, 1923: 238). Johnston 
went to see Salisbury the following day, telling him that Rhodes wanted to use the BSAC 
for “the ultimate extension of chartered company government from the Zambezi 
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northwards to Lake Tanganyika, and possibly from Lake Tanganyika northwards to 
Uganda” (Oliver, 1957: 154). This meeting between them has been much mythologised 
in the historical literature as the definitive moment that Rhodes learned of the Cape-
Cairo idea and put into motion a decisive plan to actualise it. To take one example, Gross 
(1957: 172) writes without any evidence that Rhodes sat up all night until dawn the next 
morning “repeating again and again Johnston’s phrase which he had now heard for the 
first time, ‘Cape to Cairo’ [...] He was captivated by it.”  
 Despite this, it is clear that in the years that followed Rhodes adopted the mantra 
as his own (Ramutsindela, 2007; Rotberg and Shore, 1988). The reasons for this are 
complex. On the one hand, ‘from the Cape to Cairo’ was a term that certainly had a kind 
of alluring resonance which sloganized Rhodes’ ideas and ambitions in a way that no 
Confession or letter to The Times could possibly achieve. It was a watchword in no less a 
way than Berlin-Baghdad was, phonetically summarising a complex geopolitical fantasy 
within a simple alliterative slogan. Furthermore, it would have appealed to a Rhodes 
who, by 1889, was growing confident in his manipulative and seductive ability to 
persuade others as to the promise of his ideas. Rhodes, in other words, would have 
appreciated the term’s power as a popular geopolitical catchphrase, a tabloid headline 
around which support for his ideas could be rallied. W.T. Stead (1899: 368), for his part, 
shrewdly noted that a “hardly less potent reason is the fact that the Cape and Cairo both 
begin with the letter C.” Cape-Cairo was thus a superficially simple yet profoundly 
complex term that summarised and gave a renewed force to Rhodes’ earlier designs on 
the ‘entire continent of Africa’.  
 By 1893 a bitter Johnston, aggravated that Rhodes had taken what he considered 
his own idea, awkwardly praised him in a letter for helping to persuade the British and 
Cape Colony’s peoples that “we should not abandon our control over Egypt, but [...] 
should rather seek to open up a continuous chain of Empire from the Cape to Cairo.”177 
As Johnston continued, “[t]his last expression, ‘From the Cape to Cairo’, though often 
credited to you, is of my invention and was one of the first phrases I uttered on the 
earliest occasion of my meeting you in 1889 which attracted your attention.”178 There is 
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little evidence that Rhodes himself used the term in much of his written 
correspondence, despite what the hagiographers such as Gross claim. However, at his 
house at Groote Schuur J.M. Soloman noted the presence of two maps of Africa in the 
billiard room and bedroom with the route of the Cape-Cairo Railway “marked in red”.179 
Objects such as these, as DeSilvey (2007: 403) has suggested, “once occupied a place in 
an active web of social and material relations”; they “yield their stories through their 
alignment with other, equally inscrutable remains.” Juxtaposed with the evidence 
presented in the rest of this chapter, the presence of these two maps evince the point at 
which this chapter ends – that by 1892 Rhodes still wanted the world, and Cape-Cairo 
was beginning to form an integral part of the world he wanted to create. As 
Ramutsindela (2007: 124) puts it, “Rhodes embraced the idea because it expressed all he 
had ever dreamt of, namely, the establishment of a British World Federation in which a 
British Pax Africana formed an important part.”      
6.4. Conclusions 
 In this chapter I have traced the development of Cecil Rhodes’ ideas from his 
arrival at Durban in 1870 to the years when, in one way or another, he adopted the 
Cape-Cairo idea as the semantic watchword for what could increasingly be described as 
his programme of African imperialism. The first part of the chapter has demonstrated 
the development of Rhodes’ geopolitical vision, and how in the 1877 Confession of Faith 
he sketched the contours of an idealist and racially motivated scheme for the extension 
of British rule throughout the world and the formation of a secret society to further the 
aims of the British Empire. This vision, I have argued, is only graspable when related to 
Rhodes’ experiences in Oxford and his affinity with the Roman Empire, the classics, and 
the ‘Great Men’ of history. Out of this milieu emerged Rhodes’ ideas, which displayed 
many core aspects of the modern geopolitical imagination in both its civilisational and 
naturalised modes. It exhibited a turning of time into space that placed the British 
Empire at the pinnacle of Fabian’s ‘stream of Time’ and Africa at the bottom, a narration 
of a anarchical world competing for the last remaining colonisable spaces in the context 
of a wider crisis in the British Empire, and a deeply troubling racialized rendering of the 
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Anglo-Saxon race as superior to all others. The second half of the chapter has traced 
Rhodes’ early railway activities and his adoption of the Cape-Cairo idea. My argument 
here is that with his railway activities Rhodes came to appreciate the power of the 
railway as a tool of empire. In the second case, with his adoption of Johnston’s Cape-
Cairo idea Rhodes’ early fantasies about the continent of Africa being awoken from its 
uncivilised and unconscious slumber were given an alluring and tantalisingly realisable 
slogan.  
 It is perhaps easy given the analysis in this chapter to think there is something to 
the various descriptions of Rhodes as a visionary or genius. Certainly he was high-
functioning, controlling, and commanded fierce loyalty from his associates. Further, he 
came to be regarded as a beacon of greatness and fortitude to many who never actually 
met him. Yet in 1895 Rhodes, alongside his associate Leander Jameson, tried to annex 
Kruger’s Transvaal in a dismal and disorganised plot which ended in failure and which 
forced Rhodes to resign the lead of the BSAC and the Cape Premiership. This proves if 
nothing else Haraway’s (1988: 582) dictum that “infinite vision is an illusion, a god trick.” 
But this, however, is not how it seemed to Rhodes. He “believed that he was acting for 
nature; by the mid-1890s he had also come to believe that he could interpret the 
designs of nature better than anyone else” (Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 530). With the 
failure of the Jameson Raid Rhodes turned his attention back to the Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism that was now at the forefront of his thoughts. In the next chapter I 
will show how Rhodes’ railway construction efforts in the final five years of the 
nineteenth century demonstrate the doctrine of transcontinentalism, and the specific, 
ultimately desperate form it took as Rhodes laboured without success to construct the 
Cape-Cairo Railway.  
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Chapter Seven – Rhodes and the Cape-Cairo Railway, 1895-1902 
7.1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I analysed what I have termed Cecil Rhodes’ geopolitical 
vision and its emergence within the entwined spatial, social, and intellectual currents of 
Oxford. I subsequently traced Rhodes’ involvement in railway politics and his adoption 
of the Cape-Cairo mantra at the beginning of the 1890s. In this chapter I argue that 
Rhodes’ attempts at the end of the 1890s to construct the Cape-Cairo Railway in its 
entirety were shaped by his geopolitical vision, thus demonstrating how 
transcontinentalism emerged in Africa at the confluence of geopolitics and technology. 
More specifically, I argue that by focusing on one letter he wrote to the British Colonial 
Secretary Joseph Chamberlain in April 1898 and extrapolating its themes outwards, 
Rhodes’ intentions for the Cape-Cairo Railway become clear. I argue that he equated the 
construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway with the territorialisation of British power across 
space and the falling of the Cape-Cairo swathe of space Johnston articulated into British 
hands. Furthermore, I argue that, using his discourse of civilising the barbarous space of 
Africa as a moral justification, Rhodes equated the construction of the railway with the 
production of a transcontinental space of circulation in the African continent; a space 
defined by the circulation of labour and resources for the gain of the British Empire and 
one freed from its previous political and economic enclosure. Put differently, tracing 
Rhodes’ activities with railways in the 1890s show how the doctrine of Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism developed out of his geopolitical vision and his adoption of 
Johnston’s Cape-Cairo ‘idea’ in the late 1880s.   
 In November 1892 Rhodes told a meeting of the BSAC shareholders that  
 “I may say when the [Royal Charter for the BSAC] was obtained some of my friends 
 were willing to stop at the Zambesi, but I did not think it right to take two bites at a 
 cherry [...] and that it was just as well to go north and complete the map in so far as the 
 map of Africa was then open.”180 
Under Rhodes’ stewardship, what was increasingly referred to as the ‘Colonial Railway’ 
crept northwards in the first half of the 1890s as part of the BSAC’s wider activities (see 
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Figure 7.1). It was swiftly extended to the towns of Vryburg, Mafeking, and finally 
Bulaweyo by October 1897 (Maylam, 1980: 78-112; see Figures 6.1 and 7.2). Yet Rhodes 
was not politically inactive during his time at the head of the BSAC, and he continued to 
play a role in British foreign politics that concerned Africa. Importantly, Rhodes engaged 
in wider British debates concerning the future of Egypt and Uganda, two territories 
forming the essential northern sections of his Cape-Cairo route. He directed the majority 
of his attention towards the question of Egypt. In 1891 Rhodes donated £5,000 to the 
British Liberal Party on the condition that if the Liberal Party backed a Home Rule Bill of 
any kind without Irish representation at Westminster it would be void. As Taylor (1971) 
has explained, Rhodes was strongly in favour of Irish Home Rule because it chimed with 
his belief that the best way to consolidate the British Empire was the creation of self-
governing colonies that would nonetheless have their say in the decisions of Empire as a 
whole. Yet Rhodes also added a postscript, stating that he had been horrified by a recent 
speech made by John Morley suggesting Britain should withdraw from Egypt, and that if 
Britain did the £5,000 should be given to charity to prevent Rhodes’ money 
inadvertently funding “the breaking up [of] the Empire” (quoted in Michell, 1910: 48).  
 However, on October 2nd 1891 Gladstone, now back on the opposition benches 
but once more the leader of the Liberal Party, gave a speech which argued for the 
removal of British forces from Egypt (Gladstone, 1891). Dismayed, Rhodes wrote to the 
Liberal politician Francis J. Schnadhorst as soon as he returned to Kimberley in April 
1892 from a long stay in Mashonaland. “The matter that is troubling me most is your 
policy as to Egypt”, he wrote. “I was horrified when I returned from Mashonaland to 
read a speech of Mr Gladstone’s evidently foreshadowing a scuttle if he came in.”181 
True to his earlier word, Rhodes subsequently asked Schnadhorst to send his previous 
£5,000 donation to the Liberal Party to charity, blasting that he “did not subscribe to 
your party to assist in the one thing that I hate above everything, namely, the policy of 
disintegrating and breaking up our Empire.”182 This demonstrates that the two features 
of Rhodes’ vision from the last chapter remained prominent in his activities; he criticised 
the breaking up of Empire, and the ceding or withdrawal of British power from any of 
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the territories on the Cape-Cairo route. Of course, 1890 also witnessed the 
establishment of the German colony of German East Africa to the east of Lake 
Tanganyika, which effectively blocked the path of the Cape-Cairo Railway. I will return to 
this in Section 7.3., but for now it is sufficient to note that Rhodes continued to make his 
force felt in the affairs of the Empire, especially with the office of Cape Premiership and 
the might of the BSAC behind him from 1889.  
 
Figure 7.1: Map showing the proposed territories that would be colonised and developed through the formation of 
the British South Africa Company and the granting of the Charter, including Matabeleland, Mashonaland, and 
territories beyond the Zambesi River. Annexed to the First Report of the British South Africa Company. Reproduced 
from WL/ Mss. Afr. s 299/7/2/Item 1. 
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 There is little evidence that Rhodes actively discussed the extension of the 
‘Colonial Railway’ in terms of the Cape-Cairo Railway. If he did, the documentation has 
not survived, and even if it did it would be a mistake to consider the BSAC a vessel of 
Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo vision. Such an argument places too much emphasis on the agency 
of Rhodes within the structural and financial constraints of the BSAC itself. Instead, it is 
more sensible to agree with the careful conclusions of the historians Galbraith (1974) 
and Maylam (1980), who have both painstakingly studied the finances and activities of 
the BSAC as it related to railway construction. Maylam (1980) considered the arguments 
of authors such as Phimister (1974) and Blainey (1965), who contended that Rhodes only 
embarked on railway construction when it was clear the most profit could be accrued 
from working this or that section of the line. The implication is that had Rhodes wanted 
to construct the railway just for the British Empire, he would have used his already 
considerable wealth and power to do so and disregarded the question of financial risk. 
Maylam’s (1980: 92) convincing answer is that Rhodes delayed the construction of the 
railway until his authority had been solidified as effective ruler of both the BSAC and the 
Cape Parliament. Furthermore,  
 “[i]n the short term, [the railway] was a financial burden that the company could not 
 bear; but in the long term, it was still an essential part of his Cape-to-Cairo vision. His 
 concern was to delay the company’s participation in the project until other more 
 important interests had been consolidated.”     
In his study of the BSAC, Galbraith (1974: 203) emphasises the financial constraints of 
the BSAC that Rhodes had to negotiate: 
 “’Cape to Cairo’ was a dream with little relationship to reality. The British South Africa 
 Company did not invest in dreams ... [T]he development of territories from South to 
 North Africa was far beyond the resources of any private corporation even if 
 international diplomacy had not destroyed any possibility of an ‘all-red’ swath.”  
 Rhodes’ railway construction in the early 1890s is thus best understood as a 
project of slow, incremental continuation of the Colonial Railway with one eye on Cairo 
and the other on the finances of the BSAC and his broader concerns in the Cape Colony. 
It was only with the Jameson Raid and his subsequent resignation from both the BSAC 
and the Cape Premiership that Rhodes turned his explicit attention to the Cape-Cairo 
Railway. “Political matters may have subsided”, said Rhodes to Alfred Milner in March 
1898, referencing the fallout from the failed Jameson Raid, “and in that case it is 
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everything to attempt [the railway] at once.”183 Thus in 1898 he began an ambitious plan 
to initially extend the railway from Bulaweyo to the southern tip of Lake Tanganyika. In 
doing so he wrote to the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, asking for a financial 
subsidy towards the capital necessary for the extension. Examining this letter, and the 
arguments Rhodes presented in favour of the railway, elucidates just how he connected 
the Cape-Cairo Railway to the geopolitical and transcontinental vision analysed in the 
previous chapter.   
7.2. Rhodes, the Cape-Cairo Railway, and the production of a space of circulation 
 “My plan is to secure all territory before it is gone.”184 
 My argument in this section is that Rhodes envisaged the Cape-Cairo Railway in 
two entwined ways; firstly as the projection and territorialisation of British power across 
space, and secondly as equivalent to the production of a transcontinental space of 
circulation which would simultaneously lift the African continent out of its previous 
unconscious inertia. To return momentarily to Schivelbusch (1986), Rhodes’ imagination 
of African space was one in which railway construction was a means of connecting the 
uncivilised and inert mass of the African continent to increasingly global flows of labour 
and resources. As Schivelbusch (1986: 194-195) reminds us,  
 “[t]he formula is as simple as can be: whatever was part of circulation was regarded as 
 healthy, progressive, constructive; all that was detached from circulation, on the other 
 hand, appeared diseased, medieval, subversive, threatening.” 
However there is an additional element here that Schivelbusch (1986) does not discuss, 
namely the division of circulation into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ domains, with the former 
circulations facilitated and encouraged and the latter controlled, restricted, and if 
possible eliminated. Drawing on Foucault in his work on the production of maritime 
space, Glück (2015: 644) conceptualises what he calls a security space:  
 “the production of secure spaces for the circulation of certain desirable elements (in this 
 case cargo vessels, commodities, and capital) and the suppression of other 
 ‘undesirable’ elements (that is, piracy and the interruption of commodity and capital 
 flows).”  
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Figure 7.2: The Cape-Cairo Railway route in 1899, showing completed, under construction, and planned lines. As 
can be seen, Rhodes wanted to go along the eastern shoreline of Lake Tanganyika, through German East Africa. 
Reproduced from Stead (1899: 363).  
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  This quote epitomises Rhodes’ logic perfectly. Rhodes argued for the Cape-Cairo 
Railway because he equated it to the production of a transcontinental space of 
circulation for the mobility of labour and resources across African space, while 
simultaneously underlining how the construction of the railway would inhibit the evils of 
the slave trade and suppress the possibility of rebellion. For Rhodes, therefore, the 
Cape-Cairo Railway was equated to the production of a space of circulation atop the 
blank, previously enclosed African continent, a process which would simultaneously 
‘civilise’ the continent while facilitating the territorialisation of British power towards 
the final destination of Cairo.  
7.2.1. Encouraging the circulation of labour and resources 
 Rhodes’ first letter to Chamberlain requesting financial support from the British 
Treasury to construct the Cape-Cairo Railway was dated April 28th 1898, and is a lengthy 
document stating precisely why Rhodes believed the British government should support 
his plan. The letter began by outlining his plan for the “immediate extension of the 
Bechuanaland Railway to Lake Tanganyika” and inviting “the co-operation of Her 
Majesty’s Government in this important undertaking.”185 The first and most evident 
reason he gave for this was the impact the railway would have on the extraction and 
circulation of natural resources across and ultimately out of African space. The railway 
would pass through “valuable coal fields [...] and promising gold districts”, while the 
second section to Tanganyika would pass through an area “in which many gold reefs 
that have been favourably reported upon by competent engineers have already been 
exposed.”186 Beyond the Zambesi, he continued, the railway would proceed through 
“excellent cattle country” and reach “valuable deposits of copper [...] on the borders of 
the British South Africa Company’s territories” before finally allowing the “opening up of 
the Zambesi coalfields.”187 This is evidently not a complex argument; most scholarly 
work on African railway construction has emphasised the tight relationship between 
railways, resource extraction, and capitalist development and exploitation (Galbraith, 
1974; Lunn, 1992; 1997; Maylam, 1980). Therefore, as the Witwatersrand prospector 
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Owen Letcher wrote in 1923, “the attraction which has pulled the [Cape-Cairo] Railway 
northwards and still further northwards has been the development of the wonderful 
mineral resources of the southern portion of Africa.”188 
 However, for Rhodes it took on a special status precisely because of the 
transcontinental scale of the railway. In February 1900 the military explorer Ewart S. 
Grogan concluded the first traverse between the Cape and Cairo on foot (see Paice, 
2001: 44-129), after which he published a book recounting his journey. This book was 
important as a wider cultural reproduction of the Cape-Cairo idea in British society 
(Merrington, 2001). It was also important because Grogan, who had full knowledge of 
Rhodes’ efforts to build the Cape-Cairo Railway, asked him to write a short foreword for 
the book. Rhodes politely declined, saying he was too busy, but Grogan published 
Rhodes’ written declination as a foreword anyway. In it Rhodes wrote that 
 “[e]very one supposes that the railway is being built with the only object that the 
 ‘human being’ may be able to get in at Cairo and get out at Cape Town. This is, of 
 course, ridiculous. The object is to cut South Africa through the centre, and the railway 
 will pick up trade all through the route. The junctions to the east and west coasts, which 
 will occur in the future, will be outlets for the traffic obtained along the route of the line 
 as it passes through the centre.”189 
His ambition did not just therefore concern the Cape-Cairo Railway itself, but the variety 
of branches and feeders that would connect it to the east and west coasts of Africa to 
provide an outlet for the extracted resources and the trade attracted by the route. Thus 
here Rhodes’ captured the essence of the circulatory imperative discussed by Kapp. 
Keeping in mind his previous articulation of the African continent as uncivilised and 
inert, Rhodes equated the insertion of the railway system into Africa with the 
construction of a system of circulation which would extract the resources and minerals 
necessary for the entrenchment of Empire and, through its connections to the sea, 
circulate these resources out of African space so their value could be actualised 
elsewhere. Although Rhodes did not utilise the biological language I have suggested is 
important to such a conceptualisation of circulation frequently, he did narrate to E.A. 
Maund that “we should have a trunk-line right up to the Nile Valley. Let the offshoots to 
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either coast be as numerous as the fish-bones radiating from a Sole’s back-bone.”190 I 
argue this is the kind of banal language that nonetheless reproduced an implicit notion 
of Africa as inert, lifeless, and docile, and thus necessitating the skeletal and bodily 
upholstering of the railway to inject life and vitality across transcontinental space (see 
Figure 7.3).   
 The second and related reason he gave for this extension was the impact it 
would have on the flexibility and intensity of labour supply. In his work on the social 
history of labour in the Indian Ocean in the nineteenth century, Ahuja (2006: 111) 
argues that a “transcontinental regime of labour circulation” was produced through the 
expansion of British shipping industries in India. This is an apt term with which to 
describe Rhodes’ intentions. He put to Chamberlain that the demand for labour in 
Kimberley and Rhodesia had reached “an unduly high figure” because the “natives in 
[the] northern districts are anxious to obtain work, but [...] the great distances which 
they had to cover on foot have prevented extensive employment of their services.”191 
Thus, Rhodes suggested, the completion of the railway to Tanganyika would entail 
“every probability of large numbers of labourers being constantly carried to and from 
the mining districts”, which would result in a “considerable benefit” to “the most 
important industry of South Africa.”192 Rhodes’ foregrounding of the notion of labour 
being constantly carried to and from the mining districts perfectly epitomises the logic of 
circulation, the ceaseless and uninterrupted flow of bodies “ensuring that everything 
remains in motion” (Elbe et al, 2014: 447) to facilitate the continued working of the 
mines and other industries with which Rhodes was so involved in.  
 Furthermore, Rhodes returned to the question of labour in 1900. Writing to his 
associate J.P. Jones in August of that year, when the railway was beginning to once again 
creep northwards from Bulaweyo, Rhodes emphasised that “[t]he want of the future is 
labour and it is a very serious question.” He continued by underlining that “[t]he three 
things necessary for the success of our mines are railways, coal, and labour.”193 The 
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major problem facing Rhodes and indeed all those involved in African railway 
construction at this time was the necessity of transporting sufficient labour to the newly 
discovered coal, copper, and gold deposits in Central Africa and Northern Rhodesia. By 
August 1900, the discovery of coal at Wankie had produced an extra impetus to drive 
the railway forwards, and Rhodes was therefore envisaging a sizable mining settlement 
served by the route of the Cape-Cairo Railway. The construction of the railway was 
therefore equated to the creation of the material pathways that would enable and 
facilitate the motion of labour across African space in response to the shifting demands 
of extractive industries old and new.  
 
Figure 7.3: E.A. Maund’s sketch of Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo trunk line and ‘fish-bones’. Reproduced from WL Mss. Afr. s 
229/4/13/201-215 [208]. 
 It is possible that Rhodes considered the transcontinental circulation of labour as 
the foremost task of the Cape-Cairo Railway. Although he emphasised to Grogan and 
Maund the necessity of extracting and circulating natural resources, some of his 
associates shrewdly picked holes in his plans. His financier Alfred Beit told Rhodes on at 
least one occasion that he was vastly overestimating the potential profits that would 
accrue from the railway (Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 592-593), and after Rhodes’ death 
one of his other associates, Alfred Sharpe, poured scorn on those who suggested that 
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the Cape-Cairo Railway would turn Africa into the resource depository of the British 
Empire. Sharpe was the Commissioner and Consul-General for the British Protectorate in 
Central Africa between 1896 and 1910 and, like many others, had long argued for the 
necessity of railway construction for the development of Africa (Sharpe, 1896: 384-385; 
1910; 1912). In June 1918, Sharpe (1918: 151) told the Royal Geographical Society that 
“[w]e have heard much of the ‘Cape to Cairo Railway,’ a phrase which, after all, when 
the question is carefully studied, does not mean much.” In a subsequent book Sharpe 
(1921: 220) detailed the mines and places that would be served by the Cape-Cairo line, 
arguing that  
 “[n]one of these [places] I have mentioned which already send their produce and 
 receive  their imports by lines running to the East Coast will ever make use of a route 
 either to the Cape or to Cairo: it would not pay to send their produce to either; what 
 they want is the shortest and cheapest route to a port [...] west, south, or north  makes 
 no difference, it’s a matter of business.”    
As Sharpe rightly recognised, by 1921 the central mines of Africa were already being 
served by numerous lateral railways to the coast, something that made the Cape-Cairo 
Railway even less necessary. However, he also insisted that Rhodes, whom he regarded 
with the same reverence as the other Cape-Cairo proponents, would have understood 
this simple economic fact too.  
 There is perhaps therefore something to Denoon’s (1973: 133) speculative 
suggestion that “if Rhodes really did want a land route from Cape to Cairo, he had labor 
supply in mind. It is difficult to imagine another economic (or indeed political) rationale 
for such a grandiose scheme” (but see Butler, 1977: 269, for a critical comment on this 
hypothesis). Although the grandiose nature of transcontinentalism was an integral part 
of its appeal, it is clear that whether or not Sharpe was correct the questions of labour 
and natural resources were inexorably entwined (Butler, 1977). The disruption or 
decline of the circulation of one would always have an impact on the other; emphasised 
most strongly when Rhodes grumbled about the impact of labour shortages on the 
Kimberley mines. Taken together, Rhodes’ intentions can be read in terms of a concern 
with “how people, resources, commodities, money, and information [were] given 
passage across the physical and metaphysical boundar[ies] of [African space]” (Usher, 
2014: 550). It could be fairly argued, as has been done by Phimister (1974: 267), that in 
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light of this “Rhodes’ railway policies are best interpreted when related to his interests 
as a capitalist, even if the rationale offered was couched in the ideology of his time.” 
However, such an argument firstly fails to acknowledge the potency and continual 
articulation of Rhodes’ geopolitical vision throughout his life in relation to his railway 
schemes, and is secondly problematic in “treat[ing] economics and politics as if they 
exist in inverse causal proportion to each other” (Lunn, 1997: 8).   
 Instead, I argue, for Rhodes capitalist expansion was concomitant to imperial 
expansion, and the production of transcontinental spaces of circulation was equally 
concomitant to the production of new spaces of the British Empire. This was best 
articulated in a rambling letter (Rhodes himself acknowledged its “ill connected 
sentences”) he sent to Stead.194 In it, he emphasised how the combined questions of 
labour and the market necessitated the expansion of British trade, to the point of 
inaugurating “a commercial war with those who are trying to boycott [our] 
manufactures”. “You might finish the war”, he continued, “by union with America and 
universal peace I mean after 100 years and a secret society organised like Loyola’s 
supported by the accumulated wealth of those whose aspiration is a desire to do 
something”.195 This demonstrates the incoherent way that Rhodes connected his wealth 
to his geopolitical vision. I therefore do not think it is a stretch to agree with the 
comments of Walford Dowling, a Rhodes Scholar born in Johannesburg, who wrote in 
1923 that Rhodes “saw in the accumulation of wealth a necessary means to the end with 
which he identified”.196 His attempts to create the Cape-Cairo Railway were thus equally 
about the “material network that allows the circulation of goods and possibly of men” 
(Foucault, 2007: 325), and the territorialisation of British power across the entirety of 
the north-south stretch of the continent of Africa.  
7.2.2. Diminishing the circulation of rebellion and the slave trade 
 Whilst extolling his transcontinental railway system as something which would 
enable and accelerate the mobility of labour and resources across and out of African 
space, Rhodes was simultaneously considering how the railway could contribute 
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towards the elimination of what he considered the uncivilised and the barbaric in Africa. 
Most prominent in his letter to Chamberlain was the emphasis he placed on the railway 
as a tool facilitating the governance of native populations and minimising the possibility 
of native rebellion. Fresh in Rhodes’ mind at this point would have been the Matabele 
rebellions of 1895, which were followed by a second rebellion that is also referred to as 
the Second Matabele War in 1896 and 1897. Matabeleland, as Rotberg and Shore (1988: 
285) write, was “a vast hinterland which had not and would never welcome the vision of 
its future which Rhodes had”. The rebellions stemmed from the enclosure and 
appropriation of native Ndebele lands in Matabeleland by the BSAC throughout the 
1890s, which coincided in 1896 with outbreaks of disease, drought, and rinderpest 
among the cattle whom the Ndebele depended on for their livelihoods.  
  Nonetheless, it was these rebellions that Rhodes explicitly discussed in his letter 
to Chamberlain, suggesting that if the railway had been completed to Bulaweyo by 1895 
the first Matabele rebellion could never have occurred. He argued that the railway 
would facilitate “the future government of the vast native populations within the British 
sphere”, justifying this on the grounds that “[e]xperience has conclusively shown that 
the contact of European civilisation with barbarism will always result in native wars and 
disturbances unless authority can be effectively exercised.”197 This is a significant 
comment because of his positioning of European civilisation and barbarism against one 
another, indicating that it was only the authority of the former that could diminish the 
latter. I argue there were two elements to this. Barry (1996: 127) has argued that 
communications infrastructure 
 “came to provide the necessary link between the deliberations of public authorities and 
 the dispersed space of the national [or colonial] territory; appearing to enable the 
 authorities both to direct and to trace the course of distant events in real time, 
 however imperfectly [...] establishing a complex feedback between such 
 disturbances and the exercise of more or less subtle forms of administrative or military 
 action.” 
The first and most obvious way the railway would check such disturbances would 
therefore be through the mobility of British colonial troops to areas of rebellion and 
potential instability. This was later demonstrated by the prominent role that railways 
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played in the Boer War. As Girouard (1903: 11) documented, they not only facilitated 
the mobility of British troops, supplies, and weapons, but were “invaluable for making 
big strategic changes of front, such as Lord Roberts’ concentration near Modder River”. 
There is a parallel here to the military logic of the Ottoman Empire’s railway 
construction, whereby railway infrastructure was supposed to enable the swift putting 
down of rebellion wherever it might occur. 
 A second element was the logic of the civilising rails discussed in Chapter Two. 
Even if the enhanced mobility of troops enabled by Rhodes’ railway could swiftly subdue 
any future rebellion in the Matabele territories, a larger priority was to eliminate the 
conditions that facilitated and permitted rebellions themselves. For Rhodes as for many 
others, the foremost of these conditions was the conflation of the Ndebele and other 
native tribes with inherent qualities of violence, instability, tribal warfare, and barbarity. 
Rebellion was in other words caused not by colonial expropriation, but by the uncivilised 
status of native peoples themselves. Rhodes believed this could be cured by the 
presence of a railway. He wrote to Chamberlain that “in the absence of rail or water 
transport, the establishment of a strong administration is practically impossible.”198 This 
strong administration he equated to the disciplining and ‘civilising’ of the native peoples 
through the spreading of European political and economic norms and structures. No-one 
was to put this better than his associate Robert Williams (1922: 4), who wrote in 1922, 
referring to the slave trade, that  
 “the coming of the railways has blotted out this atrocious traffic. In its place have come 
 the civilising influences of commerce and industry. The African has already been 
 taught in hundred of thousands to work instead of fight. Thousands of them have 
 been trained to the trade of carpenters, bricklayers, blacksmiths; others drive 
 locomotives, work on the telegraph instruments, and perform other skilled jobs. 
 Many are entering colleges and  passing out as surveyors, architects, and medical men. 
 In short, the African is rapidly becoming civilised.”   
 This quote perfectly foregrounds the recursive relationship between the good 
and bad circulations that Rhodes was implicitly speaking to. Not only was the railway a 
means of preventing rebellion, this was connected to the desired production of the 
African subject as a labourer, who could then join the wider transcontinental flows of 
labour circulation that Rhodes desired for the economic prosperity of his mines and for 
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other colonial industries. It was a process of what Monaghan (2013: 124) has referred to 
as “liberal order-making”, or in other words the envisioned role a railway could play 
producing the African native as a free, liberal, conscious subject, who would 
nevertheless be enmeshed within and dependent upon the wider systems of colonial 
rule for their existence. Therefore, as Ajuha (2006: 112) has observed again in the Indian 
context, Rhodes’ intention was the structuring of the labour market into a rigidly 
racialized hierarchy with native Africans occupying the very bottom and thus most 
exploited rung. Rotberg and Shore (1988: 121) similarly argue that Rhodes’ concern for 
the subjugation of rebellions and wars actually came not from a concern for native 
African life, but from a “belief that the time had come for whites to ensure the steady 
and dependable exploitation of African labor by almost any reasonable means.”  
 It is in this context that Rhodes’ concern with the slave trade in his letter to 
Chamberlain should also be seen. At the Brussels Conference of 1890, a group of states 
including the Ottoman Empire, the US, and all of Europe had ratified an agreement 
which pledged them all to reduce and if possible eliminate the slave trade in Africa (as 
well as in the Ottoman Empire and other parts of the world). Article I of this agreement 
declared that  
 “the most effective means for counteracting the Slave Trade in the interior of Africa are 
 the [...] construction of roads, and in particular railways, connecting to the advanced 
 stations on the coast, and permitting easy access to the inland waters and to the 
 upper reaches of streams and rivers which are broken by rapids and cataracts, so 
 as to substitute economical and speedy means of transport for the present means of 
 portage by men.”199  
By 1890, the European powers were in unanimous agreement that the slave trade was a 
moral blight on the civility and progressiveness of Empire. With regards to circulation, 
the slave trade can be thought of as one of “those social phenomena that cannot be left 
to circulate freely lest they spiral out of control” (Elbe et al, 2014: 448). In Africa, the 
enmeshment of African natives within the circuits of the slave trade was simultaneously 
their removal (as Rhodes knew fine well) from the pool of labour that was necessary for 
economic and political growth. Thus Rhodes proposed that  
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 “the duty of Her Majesty’s Government, as well as its interest, lies in the furtherance of 
 the proposed scheme, which, whilst promoting the development of valuable British 
 possessions, will at the same time serve on the completion of the [Uganda Railway] 
 to close entirely the slave routes to the East coast, and thus deal a final blow to the 
 slave traffic throughout the greater portion of Central Africa.”200  
 Rhodes’ argument was largely based on wider proposals dispersing throughout 
Africa at the time. In 1894, just before the official declaration of Uganda as a British 
protectorate, the British Special Commissioner to East Africa Sir Gerald Portal published 
a report that Rhodes would almost certainly have read about the slave trade, repeating 
the claims of the Brussels Conference that “to efficiently check the Slave Trade, there is 
but one course open. The only means of effectively doing this is by making a railway” 
(quoted in Huzzey, 2012: 168). The construction of railways was also advocated by the 
manager of Britain’s first railway in 1829, Joseph Pease (1895: 7), as the only solution to 
the slave trade in Central Africa. Rhodes’ concern was probably more selfish than 
Pease’s, and his emphasis on the railway as a tool for the prevention of the slave trade 
was probably intended to attract Chamberlain’s moral compass towards acquiescing to 
his proposal. Whatever the reason, Rhodes’ foregrounding of the slave trade can be 
analysed, alongside his concern with rebellions, as an obstacle to the efficient and 
ceaseless circulation of labour and resources across African space. Rhodes’ criticising of 
the slave trade as uncivilised, immoral, and barbaric thus merged conveniently with his 
desire to see the mobility of labour and resources accelerated across the continent of 
Africa.  
 Rhodes’ letter to Chamberlain, and the wider examples I have discussed in this 
section, can thus be interpreted as an attempt “to create a frictionless, obstacle-free 
space of circulation that is as efficient as possible” (Glück 2015, 645), but on a truly 
transcontinental scale. Yet I also want to emphasise how Rhodes connected the 
production of this space of circulation to the expansion of the British Empire. Arguably 
his letter to Chamberlain deviated from the activities of the BSAC earlier in the decade 
only in the Cape-Cairo extent of its proposed scale, and was equally concerned with the 
extension of his earlier plan to “gradually assimilate the territory south of the Zambesi” 
to Lake Tanganyika and, ultimately, to connect these territories to British Egypt.201 
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Recalling Galbraith (1974), Rhodes had evidently decided that although it was beyond 
the capabilities of the BSAC to seize the territories from South to North Africa, it was not 
beyond the power of the great Cecil Rhodes. He summarised to Chamberlain that the 
importance of the railway was in “its effect upon the development and consolidation of 
British interests in Africa.”202 It was therefore entirely consistent with his geopolitical 
vision and his professed aspiration to conquer the continent of Africa and hoist it from 
its natural, unconscious slumber into the civilised world. His transcontinental railway – 
and its radiating ‘fish-bones’ stretching to the coasts – can therefore be conceptualised 
in terms of Kapp’s system of circulation, the infrastructure that would circulate the 
lifeblood of civilisation across, within, and out of the inert African continent, connecting 
it to wider flows and releasing it from its historical enclosure.  
      To his dismay, Rhodes was not to get his guarantee from the Colonial Office. 
Although Chamberlain, a committed imperialist himself, agreed that the proposed 
railway was “the most advantageous and most economical means” of securing “the 
peace, order, and good administration of the territory controlled by the British South 
African Company”, the British Treasury did not hold the same view.203 The letters 
between Rhodes and Chamberlain went back and forth until April 1899, at which point 
the Chancellor of the British Exchequer Sir Michael Hicks-Beach informed Rhodes that 
no money would be forthcoming for his railway. Hicks-Beach later explained to the 
British parliament that “we were asked to incur a liability of £60,000 a year practically 
for 73 years”, and that he calculated, like Alfred Beit, that Rhodes was vastly 
overestimating the revenue that the railway would generate.204 Rhodes subsequently 
raged at him, writing to Hawksley in July that “[t]he more I think of that Beach the more 
angry I am […] he is not fit to be treasurer to a village council and yet is in charge of the 
empire.”205 Hicks-Beach was thus added to the list of mediocre statesmen that Rhodes 
had disparaged in the Confession.  
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 Before April 1899, however, Rhodes had little reason to believe his request 
would be unsuccessful. Between his original proposal to Chamberlain in April 1898 and 
then he had simultaneously turned his attention to a different obstacle to his Cape-Cairo 
designs. It is to this that the next and last section of this chapter turns.    
7.3. Rhodes in Berlin: transforming geopolitical visions 
 In this section I want to focus on a contradiction apparent in Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism that has confused some of his biographers (see Lockhart and 
Woodhouse, 1963: 400; Marlowe, 1972: 258; Roberts, 1987: 263), and which demands 
special attention because it has relevance to, and on initial observation could 
undermine, the argument I have been making so far in this thesis. The contradiction was 
the establishment of the German colony of German East Africa in 1890, which effectively 
blocked the way of Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism in the same way that the 
South Slav state was designed to block Berlin-Baghdad (see Figure 7.2). Given that, as 
Rhodes had argued for, Uganda had been made a British Protectorate in 1894 and Lord 
Kitchener had finally conquered the Sudan in 1899, German East Africa became the 
singular blot of green blocking the all-red dominion of British territories stretching 
between the Cape and Cairo that Johnston and then Rhodes had envisaged. Rhodes, it 
must be remembered, had previously greeted Germany’s imperial ambitions in Southern 
and Central Africa with much angst. He had argued strongly for the Protectorate over 
Bechuanaland in 1885, declared himself “tired of this mapping out of Africa at Berlin” in 
1888 (Vindex, 1900: 225), and went as far as telling the French foreign minister in 1897 
that “he ‘hated’ the Germans” (Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 597). However, the presence 
of German East Africa on one side of Lake Tanganyika and the Belgian Congo on the 
other meant that, regardless of what happened with Chamberlain and Hicks-Beach, 
Rhodes would need to seek either Germany’s or Belgium’s permission to continue the 
railway. After failing to persuade the King of Belgium to allow it to go through the 
Congo, he wrote to the Prince of Wales in March 1899 that “[m]y only other chance was 
to get permission from the Emperor of Germany.”206 
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 Rhodes arrived in Berlin on March 11th 1899. Three days later he was given the 
Kaiser’s blessing to construct the railway through German East Africa. Wasting no time, 
the day after this on March 15th Rhodes wrote to Germany’s Undersecretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs in Berlin, Bernhard von Bülow, stating that “[m]y trans-African railway 
having now reached Bulaweyo [...] I desire to make arrangements for its extension to the 
Zambesi and thence northwards.”207 The negotiations were therefore concluded with 
such speed that The Times (1899: 9), in its reporting of the meeting, mused “[h]ow long, 
it may be wondered, would the regular diplomatists have taken to accomplish so much 
practical work?” Six months later in October 1899, the agreement for the continuation 
of the Cape-Cairo Railway through German East Africa was drawn up. But this was not 
all. Rhodes seemingly said nothing of the fact that a large part of the Cape-Cairo axis of 
British dominion would be a German colony, which would certainly benefit from tariffs 
that the Kaiser insisted on enforcing. In fact, Rhodes attempted to persuade 
Chamberlain to concede the Pacific island of Samoa to Germany later in 1899, and he 
subsequently lobbied the British government to drop their opposition to Germany’s 
planned undersea telegraph communications line to North America (Kennedy, 1974: 
162). Most extraordinarily of all, Rhodes’ Last Will and Testament subsequently 
bequeathed a small number of Rhodes Scholarships to German nationals; the only 
country to receive them other than Britain or Britain’s colonies (Stead, 1902: 35-36).  
 Put differently, after visiting Berlin Rhodes changed from positioning Germany as 
a potentially fatal threat to his imperial ambitions to including German students in a 
system of scholarships that was explicitly intended to educate the future leaders of the 
British Empire. However, this is of more relevance to my argument than a mere 
biographical curiosity. I have argued throughout this thesis that transcontinentalism is 
defined in part by the projection and territorialisation of state power across space. In 
the previous chapter I demonstrated how the Cape-Cairo ‘idea’ was for a dominion of 
British territories stretching from Egypt to the Cape Colony. Consequently, it would be 
reasonable to expect that Rhodes was dismayed at the Kaiser’s establishment of German 
East Africa because it prevented the potential realisation of the Cape-Cairo ‘idea’, and 
that he therefore accepted the Kaiser’s acquiescence in continuing the railway only 
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begrudgingly. However, as Lockhart and Woodhouse (1963: 400) first put it, “Rhodes 
was highly pleased with the result, though it is difficult to see why.” My point is that, on 
initial consideration, this undermines my argument about the nature of 
transcontinentalism. If there is no evidence that Rhodes was concerned about German 
East Africa, if he “said nothing at the time about the loss of the Cape-to-Cairo” path 
(Rotberg and Shore, 1988: 309), and if he was in fact ‘highly pleased with the result’ of 
his meeting with the Kaiser, there is perhaps reason to question how much Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism was really about the projection and territorialisation of British 
power from the Cape to Cairo. It follows that it must also be reasonable to question this 
aspect of my analysis of transcontinentalism as a whole in this thesis.  
 In this section I draw on the resources of historical geography to confront this 
contradiction, and to explain why it does not invalidate my analysis of 
transcontinentalism. I argue that the seeming change in Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism can be explained at the interstices of space, place, and the 
masculinised interpersonal relations that developed between him and the Kaiser in 
Berlin. As noted in Chapter One, historical geographers have repeatedly stressed the 
importance of transnational mobilities and the (trans)formative impact of space and 
place on the continual refashioning of ideas and identities. In refracting individual lives 
through a geographical lens, “certain underexplored spaces, sites and places emerge 
that move biographical discussions into new terrains” (McGeachan, 2013: 68). Much of 
this work has focused on the history and geography of science. For instance, Withers 
(2009: 653) has argued not only that “the nature of science is conditioned by place, [it] is 
produced through place as practice rather than simply in place”. Historical geographers 
thus gesture towards how transcontinentalism might be transformed by place (in this 
case, the city of Berlin) and space (in this case, a billiard room in which Rhodes and the 
Kaiser met, as I will show). Examining Rhodes’ visit to Berlin on these terms explains his 
disavowal of the presence of German East Africa on the Cape-Cairo route, and 
demonstrates how the geopolitical ideas evinced in the Confession, especially his affinity 
with the ‘Great Men’, intersected with his time in Berlin to transform both his 
geopolitical imagination of Germany and his Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism.   
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 Rhodes had never visited Germany before, and therefore gleaned his 
understanding of its culture, history, and politics purely through his continual 
enmeshment in an imperial and colonial environment of Anglo-German suspicions. As 
Rotberg and Shore (1988: 596) put it, “[t]here was every expectation that the [K]aiser, 
although half-English, would be just as antagonistic as [the Belgian King]. After all, 
Britain and Germany were competitors. Germany had supported President Kruger in the 
Transvaal.” However, although Rhodes himself never wrote about his visit, it can be 
inferred that Berlin had a transformative impact on his Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism. 
In his memoirs the Kaiser (1922: 84) recalled that Rhodes expressed regret at having not 
visited before, and “was full of admiration for Berlin and the tremendous German 
industrial plants, which he visited daily.” Moreover, Rhodes’ architect Baker (1934: 153) 
recalled how he was “greatly impressed by the appearance of manliness and discipline 
of the German people. He thought the British might, in respect of discipline, learn a 
lesson from them.” As I suggested in the last chapter, it was partly the qualities of 
discipline and manliness that Rhodes gravitated to in his thinking on the Roman Empire 
and the classics, and it is likely that he perceived the same virtues in the industrial plants 
and people that he encountered. It is thus possible, yet difficult to substantiate due to 
lack of evidence, that in Berlin Rhodes developed the racialized strains of what 
Merrington (2009: 34-35) has called “the deep Christian kinship between the ‘Anglo-
Saxon’, the ‘Teuton’, and the ‘Goth’ [as] part of a deeper narrative of British imperial 
destiny.” Certainly Rhodes’ architect Baker (1934: 154) believed his visit to Berlin 
persuaded Rhodes that “[s]uch a strong race [...] must be brought into his idea of allied 
powers to promote world peace.”  
 Rhodes’ transformation from Germanophobe to Germanophile is however best 
evinced by his intriguing relationship with the Kaiser, which was underwritten by their 
masculinised recognition of each other as ‘Great Men’ seeking to impose their own 
idealised orders on a world inhabited by uncivilised peoples and stupid statesmen. 
Writing to his mother not long after Rhodes had left Berlin, the Kaiser described him as 
“a most energetic man and marvellous organiser.” “I have of course promised”, the 
letter continued, “to help him as far as is in my power so that he may be able to see the 
wish of his life fulfilled” (quoted in Röhl, 2005: 988). Oddly, the Kaiser also gave Rhodes 
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a portrait of himself to take back to Groote Schuur, presumably for Rhodes to place 
among the statues and tributes to the other ‘Great Men’ he idolised in his study.208 
Rhodes, for his part, inclined towards the Kaiser immediately. “I like that man. He has 
large ideas”, he said in an Aristotelian manner to the British Ambassador to Germany 
Frank Lascelles after the railway agreements were concluded.209 Rhodes’ affinity with 
the Kaiser lasted far longer than his time in Berlin. In April 1900 he asked Lascelles to 
personally deliver a selection of his favourite classics to the Kaiser, and the year after 
Rhodes dispatched a wreath to Berlin to mark the death of the Kaiser’s mother.210  
 It was not only that Rhodes was “grateful at the fulfilment of his pet ambition by 
Germany”, as the Kaiser (1922: 84) later put it. The interpersonal relations that emerged 
between the Kaiser and Rhodes stemmed from a certain kinship they felt towards one 
another. In short, they recognised their own self-perceived identities in each other; 
Rhodes, who was striving to leave his mark on the world in the same way that his idols 
Caesar and Napoleon had, perceived in the Kaiser a similar conflict, that of attempting to 
actualise a complicated vision of German destiny that only he had been able to 
accurately and objectively foresee. Rhodes would have taken much from the fact that 
the Kaiser was often impeded by the Reichstag similarly to how he was often frustrated 
by the British government. Furthermore, it is significant that according to Lascelles 
Rhodes impressed the Kaiser by talking about the supposed ancient riches of 
Mesopotamia and the Euphrates Valley, which as we have seen comprised some of the 
key spaces upon which the Kaiser projected his own imperial dreams.211 A final 
noteworthy point is that Rhodes, ever-obsessed with his own heart and lung ailments, 
probably sympathised with the Kaiser’s own withered left arm. Thus here were two 
‘Great Men’ with unparalleled geopolitical visions paddling against the tide of imperial 
regression, seeing in each other the masculine qualities of virtue, strength, fortitude, 
and determination that they both anxiously sought to evince in their own lives. Berlin, as 
John Verschoyle (Vindex, 1900: 634) was to write, was “where one great ruler of men 
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recognised another.” The Times (1899: 9) also eulogised the masculinsed similarities 
between both men, noting that “[b]oth love to mould their plans on a colossal scale and 
aspire to build for generations to come”, before praising their shared “tenacity and 
keenness.”   
 My argument here is that Rhodes’ transcontinentalism was therefore 
transformed by the entwining of place and interpersonal relations. His time with the 
Kaiser in Berlin had a tangible impact on his geopolitics and his Cape-Cairo ambitions, 
and this helps to explain the contradiction that has so confused biographers such as 
Lockhart and Woodhouse (1963). Yet there is also the role of space to consider 
(McGeachen, 2013). Indeed, I argue that it is highly significant that Rhodes and the 
Kaiser’s decisive meeting on the Cape-Cairo Railway took place in a billiard room, which, 
following McGeachen (2013), is one of those mundane and therefore underappreciated 
spaces of geopolitical knowledge production. Although little formal research has been 
done on this, billiard rooms were spaces of intense social, cultural, diplomatic, and 
geopolitical negotiation in the two decades before the First World War. Holland (2012: 
132), for instance, describes a hurried conversation between Joseph Chamberlain and 
the French Ambassador Joseph Cambon in a billiard room concerning the Agadir crisis in 
April 1911 – “[t]heir full conversation could not be caught except for two words: ‘Egypt’ 
and ‘Morocco’.” Billiard rooms were mainstays in upper-class mansions, palaces, and 
houses around the 1900s (Hamlett, 2009), but operated as a social space through 
interconnected logics of gendered and classed exclusion in tandem with their furnishings 
and associated discourses of who did, and who did not, belong in them.  
 Most evidently, “[t]he pool halls and parlors of the past were not open to 
women” (Ryan and Alexander, 1973: 29). In the Victorian middle and upper-class home 
or mansion, space was typically divided across rigid gendered lines, with the morning 
room and boudoir characterised as female spaces and the study, smoking room, and 
billiard room exclusively “male terrains” (Hamlett, 2009: 576). As Chee (2011) has 
observed with reference to the Raffles Hotel in Singapore, the aura associated with 
billiard rooms was therefore shaped by the influence of colonial and patriarchal power 
which operated in part through its exclusion of women from male spaces of leisure and 
debate. The billiard room must therefore be understood as an important space in the 
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reproduction of manly power and discipline, the social relations essential to the 
manifestation of the masculinised geopolitical gaze. Accordingly, as Holland (2012) hints 
at they were spaces where issues of political or diplomatic importance could be 
discussed away from the frivolities of female life. In a novel based upon original research 
into the Kaiser’s life, Conrad (2013: 34) narrates a typical scene: “[s]ervants wheeled in a 
table filled with cheese, fruit, coffee, wines, and bread”, after which the Kaiser “settled 
in for an evening of bawdiness with his cronies.” The dual status of the billiard room as a 
space of leisure and a space of geopolitics is then captured when Conrad (2013: 35) tells 
how, after much “guffawing and backslapping”, the Kaiser pulled one of his closest 
confidants aside for a serious discussion.  
 In this context it is easier to understand how, inside and through the billiard 
room, the Kaiser and Rhodes together discussed their geopolitical rearrangement of 
Africa’s railway map. However, a second and little noted feature of the billiard room’s 
dynamic of exclusion is its segregation of class. This is not a noteworthy topic in extant 
discussions of the social and cultural subtleties of the billiard room, but it is highly 
relevant here. Frank Lascelles made much of the fact that he and von Bülow were both 
initially excluded from the billiard room (von Bülow was also apparently irritated by their 
meeting, see Kennedy 1974: 162), writing that Rhodes and the Kaiser were alone inside 
for some time before they were permitted to come inside.212 This division was perhaps 
not so much based on class but on a conception of greatness driven by Rhodes’ and the 
Kaiser’s identification with each other as ‘Great Men’ of history. Lascelles and von 
Bülow, despite both being highly regarded upper-class diplomats, were excluded on the 
simple basis that neither the Kaiser nor Rhodes considered them remotely close to the 
lineage that they themselves were part of. Such an exclusion of the two diplomats does 
not merely reflect the self-identities of the Kaiser and Rhodes, rather the very act of 
exclusion itself can be seen as the constituting moment of social division, the point at 
which a sense of the Kaiser and Rhodes as great was produced and felt. This, in turn, 
shaped the geopolitical sensibilities of the Kaiser and Rhodes inside the billiard room. 
Away from the meddling eyes of agents of the British and German governments, they 
could negotiate freely over their shared ambitions and visions. This is potentially 
                                                     
212
 ‘Cecil Rhodes and the German Emperor’ (note 209). 
235 
 
significant not just in abstract terms. In Lascelles’ report of the meeting, he seemingly 
did not know that which the Kaiser (1922: 85-86) only revealed in his memoirs, that 
Rhodes had declared building the Baghdad Railway and developing Mesopotamia to be 
“Germany’s task, just as his was the Cape-to-Cairo line.” If he did, this might have had 
consequences in the Foreign Office.             
 In this way the classed and gendered dynamics of the billiard room had a tangible 
impact on the reworking of Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism and the mutual 
identification of the Kaiser and Rhodes as ‘Great Men’, shaping the world to their 
designs. There is a final aspect to this, that of the material and architectural constitution 
of the billiard room itself, and its potential agential role in shaping geopolitical 
subjectivities. Billiard rooms were often furnished with trophies of masculine and 
imperial conquest. Hamlett (2009: 584) describes a furnishing of “oak with skin rugs, a 
crocodile skin, guns, mounted ibex horns and Egyptian souvenirs” in one of the billiard 
rooms in her research, noting how this “typology of masculine décor” reflected the 
identities, histories, and imagined futures of those who owned them. Although the 
furnishing of the room the Kaiser and Rhodes met in is not known, Rhodes’ own billiard 
room at Groote Schuur gives an indicative example (see Figure 7.4). As noted in the 
previous chapter, upon the wall was a trace of the Cape-Cairo route inked across a map 
of Africa. Also in his billiard room was a flag carried by Ewart S. Grogan on his 1900 walk 
from the Cape to Cairo. J.M. Soloman recorded that Grogan “[c]arried two flags, one 
presented to Rhodes, and the other to Queen Victoria.”213 The furnishing of billiard 
rooms, particularly Rhodes’, therefore speak more generally to the question of how 
matters of “environment and materiality inject into the everyday mediation of power 
and ideas” (Dittmer and Gray, 2010: 1673). It foregrounds the billiard room as a 
geopolitical space defined by the relational interactions between architecture and 
furnishings, the subtle gendered and classed dynamics of exclusion, and the ideas, 
identities, and movements of the bodies within it. In doing so, it helps to demonstrate 
how the change in Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism occurred in Berlin.  
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 As Megoran (2010b: 383) puts it in a different context, the time Rhodes and the 
Kaiser shared “emphasises the power of geographical proximity and intimate 
interactions to change deeply held world views.” It shows how Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism was transformed through the combination of his kinship with the 
Kaiser and his experiences in Berlin, and how this was simultaneously shaped by the 
geopolitics that he articulated in the Confession. It demonstrates how Rhodes’ time with 
the Kaiser transformed his geopolitical imagination of Germany, and how this in turn led 
him to believe that the presence of German East Africa on his Cape-Cairo route was not 
an impediment to his ambitions. This is important because it explains how Rhodes was 
able to square his Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism with the presence of German East 
Africa in a way that does not undermine my wider claim that transcontinentalism is 
partly defined by the projection and territorialisation of state power across space. By 
“analysing the relationship between individuals’ continually reconstituted subjectivity, 
the places in which they dwell, and the spaces through which they move” (Lester, 2012: 
1470) it is possible to reach a more nuanced perspective, one which acknowledges ideas 
and doctrines like transcontinentalism are not immune from the spaces and places in 
and through which they are (re)produced. We can only speculate on whether Rhodes 
truly came to believe the Teutonic race should join with the Anglo-Saxon race to provide 
the leadership and civilisation he insisted the world needed. But it is certain that his time 
in Berlin changed his view of Germany to a sufficient degree to accept, even cheerfully, 
the existence of German East Africa on his Cape-Cairo axis.  
7.4. Conclusions 
 After travelling to London to secure the £2,000,000 guarantee Hicks-Beach had 
denied him from private capitalists, Rhodes returned triumphant to Cape Town on July 
18th 1899. Upon arriving he gave a speech partly on the topic of “my railway to Egypt” 
(Vindex, 1900: 644):  
 “When the thought came to get through the continent it was a mad thought, it was the 
 idea of a lunatic. This is what they said; but it has grown, and it has advanced, and 
 you greet me here to-night because you see that it has passed from the era of the 
 imagination to practical completion. It is now not a question, sir, of the lunacy of the 
 project; it is merely a question of the years that it will take to complete” 
 (Vindex, 1900: 639). 
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Figure 7.4: Rhodes' billiard room at Groote Schuur. It is unclear whether the large Union Jack or the smaller flag 
bearing the Union Jack and the Islamic Star and Crescent is the flag carried by Grogan. Reproduced from < 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/hilton-t/8622958556> [Accessed 22/05/2017] 
 “[W]e have to complete”, Rhodes continued, “with all the rapidity we can, the project 
that is before us, that is the project of uniting the North and South of Africa” (Vindex, 
1900: 639-640). He praised the qualities of “my people [...] the English people”, who 
“intend to retain every inch of land they have got, and perhaps, sir, they intend to 
secure a few more inches” (Vindex, 1900: 642). By this point in his life Rhodes was a 
skilled orator, and he ended this portion of his speech with a final flourish:  
 “I have often stated it, but if you were to go up in a balloon, how ridiculous it would 
 appear  to you to see all these divided States, divided tariffs, divided peoples; the 
 Almighty made  them one, and it is our work to also unite them [...] But if I go to Egypt I 
 want to leave behind me a union of States that shares in that, a union of young men 
 who can give their lives to the development of these unknown countries” (Vindex, 
 1900: 644). 
 Although the outbreak of the Boer War in October 1899 and Rhodes’ death in 
1902 meant he did not live to see the railway progress to Tanganyika, Rhodes’ speech 
aptly summarises the core arguments I have advanced in these two chapters. Only 
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Rhodes could transcend the limits of space and time by ‘going up in a balloon’ and 
seeing the reality of the world as it really was, and thus how it should be changed for the 
better. The change that Rhodes strove for was adding “every inch” (or every “acre”, as 
he put it in the Confession) of land to the British Empire that was humanely possible, 
and it was only through the British Empire that states, tariffs, peoples, and the 
“unknown” expanse between the “North and South of Africa” could be united in 
benevolent government. What’s more, there seems to be little doubt that had he lived 
beyond 1902 Rhodes would at some point have completed the railway, linking it up with 
the railway system at that point being constructed through the Sudan under the 
watchful eye of Lord Kitchener. Yet it was not to be. Rhodes’ last words are often 
misquoted as the dictum ‘so much to do, so little time.’ Whether he said those words or 
not, they perhaps epitomise his paradoxical despair at his own imperial and existential 
failures when in reality few if any contributed more to the project of colonialism and 
imperialism than he did.  
 In this chapter I have argued that, after the failure of the Jameson Raid in 1895, 
Rhodes turned his attention to the construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway. Using the 
proposal he sent to the Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain as a guide I have argued 
that he equated the construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway with the production of a 
transcontinental space of circulation which would facilitate and encourage the 
movement of labour and resources across African space while restricting the possibilities 
of unrest and slavery, simultaneously ‘civilising’ the continent and lifting Africa out of its 
previous inertia. Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism was thus exemplary of the 
wider doctrine of transcontinentalism I analysed in Chapter Two, privileging the railway 
as a technology which projected British power across space and which, under the 
justification of a discourse of civilisation, produced the spaces of circulation intrinsic to 
the expansion of the British Empire in Africa. And yet, as I have repeatedly stressed 
throughout these two chapters, Rhodes’ transcontinentalism was equally situated within 
specific social, spatial, and intellectual contexts and was far from autonomous of the 
spaces and places within which he articulated it. Researching Rhodes has convinced me 
of the growing insistence of historical geographers that the best way to study ideas and 
their transformation across space and place is to embed them firmly within the long 
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tradition of biography. This enables us to connect “internal motivations of past lives and 
the external factors that shaped them” (Hodder, 2017a: 2), the “big” and “commanding” 
with the “little things” (Thrift, 2000: 384), and the prophetic geopolitical vision with its 
mundane, everyday articulation without denying the importance of either/or. This is of 
relevance not just for showing how transcontinentalism emerged, but for critical 
geopolitics’ research agenda more widely.  
 In the next chapter I will show how some of Rhodes’ associates, many of whom 
have been discussed in these two chapters, attempted to continue his work of 
constructing the Cape-Cairo Railway. In doing so, they carried his doctrine of Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism forward beyond his death. And although they failed, analysing their 
justifications for the necessity of the railway’s completion demonstrates the extent to 
which Rhodes’ Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism continued, albeit unsuccessfully, after his 
passing.  
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Chapter Eight – After Rhodes: the Cape-Cairo Railway and reawakening 
Africa, 1902-1930 
8.1. Introduction 
 In the previous two chapters I analysed Cecil Rhodes’ attempts to construct the 
Cape-Cairo Railway, and how his Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism connected to the 
geopolitical vision that he had articulated in his Confession of Faith in 1877. In this 
chapter I move away from a biographical, chronological approach to a thematic one, 
tracing additional components of Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism that are not strongly 
evinced by Rhodes’ biography. To do so I turn to the individuals who attempted to 
complete the construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway, and the arguments they advanced 
for doing so, after Rhodes’ death. Prominent among these was Robert Williams, Rhodes’ 
friend and fellow railway capitalist who did more than anyone to continue the railway 
after his death (see Hutchinson and Martelli, 1971, for details of Williams’ life). Under 
Williams’ stewardship, the railway progressed not through German East Africa but 
through the Belgian Congo after abundancies of copper were discovered at a small site 
called Katanga. As planned it reached the coal fields of Wankie the year after Rhodes’ 
death, in 1903, before bridging the Victoria Falls in 1905. In 1906 it reached Broken Hill 
and, almost exactly five years after Rhodes’ passing, entered the Belgian Congo in 1907. 
It was thereafter extended into Belgian colonial territory to Elizabethville in 1910, and 
the final link was made between Elizabethville and Bukama in 1917 (see Figure 6.1). The 
railway was never continued past this point and thus never connected with the system 
of Sudanese and Egyptian Railways as intended. After the defeat of Germany in the First 
World War, the distinct lack of British capital to finance any further work effectively 
killed off any possibility of the railway being completed. The Second World War and the 
subsequent acceleration of decolonisation confirmed the demise of the project, and the 
project still stands uncompleted today.  
 In this chapter I want to properly deconstruct one aspect of transcontinentalism 
that has only been gestured at so far. A key aspect of transcontinentalism was the 
geopolitical construction of specific places as the naturalised and commonsensical 
extremes of continental space. This was important because this in turn produced an 
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imaginary of the space between these points, and thus the space to be covered by a 
transcontinental railway, as firstly profoundly and irrefutably uncivilised, and secondly as 
the entirety of a given continental landmass. In Chapter Three I discussed how Thomas 
Chenery imagined and narrated Europe and India as two great civilisations, enabling him 
to argue that if the Euphrates Valley Railway was completed the entirety of the space 
between them would be civilised despite the fact the sleepers and rails of the railway 
would be at most a few dozen inches wide. In this chapter I confront this scratching of 
the civilisational surface fully, demonstrating how the entwinement of the civilisational 
and naturalised geopolitics of the Cape-Cairo Railway was shaped by this feature of 
transcontinentalism.  
 In order to do this, the chapter is split into two main sections. The first section 
demonstrates how those who argued for the completion of the Cape-Cairo Railway after 
Rhodes’ death invoked a very specific geopolitical imaginary of Africa to underpin their 
arguments. They narrated Egypt and the Cape as two bastions of civilisation occupying 
the natural and geographically determined ‘extreme’ longitudinal ends of the continent, 
separated by an uncivilised, lifeless, and inert expanse of African space. My argument is 
that this very specific imaginary of African space combined with the discourse of the 
civilising rails to allow the Cape-Cairo Railway to be spoken of as that which would 
civilise the entirety of the continent, precisely because the entirety of the continent was 
equated with the sum total of the space between Egypt and the Cape. Put simply, 
because the Cape-Cairo Railway was envisioned as connecting the two ‘extreme’ and 
opposite ends of the continent, themselves bastions of civilisation separated by African 
wasteland, this enabled the railway to be spoken of as a project that would civilise the 
entirety of the continent, not just the ten miles either side of the tracks that Jefferson 
(1928) defined as constituting the spatial extent of the corridor of civilisation.   
 In the second half of the chapter, I demonstrate how this imaginary of Africa as 
lifeless and inert was reflected in the language used by the Cape-Cairo Railway 
proponents in their arguments for the railway’s completion. Like Rhodes, they equated 
the civilisation of Africa with the production of a transcontinental space of circulation, 
whereby natural resources would be extracted and made mobile, labour would be 
diffused across African space, and the slave trade would be finally eradicated. I focus in 
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this chapter not so much on that which would be circulated because it largely mirrored 
the arguments that Rhodes put to Chamberlain in 1898. Instead, I concentrate on their 
descriptions of railways as the arteries and veins that would pump lifeblood throughout 
African space, and more specifically on their frequent metaphors of the Cape-Cairo 
Railway as the future trunk, backbone, or spine of the African continent. Their 
arguments epitomised this feature of transcontinentalism because they imagined 
African space as entombed within nature and with no history or other noteworthy 
characteristics of its own. It thus required railway technology to be regenerated and 
linked to the civilised world. Ultimately they argued for the Cape-Cairo Railway as the 
backbone of Africa connected via multiple branch lines to the east and west coasts, 
which I argue was tantamount to the insertion of a circulatory system into the continent 
and the quickening of its spaces and peoples into sentient life.    
8.2. The two extremes of Africa  
 In this section I explore how the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents imagined the 
continent of Africa. My argument is that they narrated a very specific imaginary of 
African space which constructed Egypt and the Cape as the civilised opposite ‘extremes’ 
of the African continent, and the space between them as an uncivilised, inert expanse of 
“bottomless abyss where everything [was] noise, yawning gap, and primordial chaos” 
(Mbembe, 2001: 3). The first sub-section of the chapter explains precisely how they 
imagined Egypt and the rest of Africa as civilised and uncivilised respectively, while the 
second sub-section turns specifically to the Cape.   
8.2.1. Egypt and Africa 
 The clearest exposition of the African imaginary among the Cape-Cairo Railway 
proponents was given by Robert Williams in an address to the Central Asian Society on 
April 5th 1922. The title of Williams’ talk was ‘The Cape to Cairo Railway: From the Point 
of View of African Development’. Williams deliberately began his talk by expressing his 
gratitude that the Central Asian Society should be interested in the development of 
Africa in the first place. However, as he continued, this interest was completely rational, 
“for the first explorers of Africa were undoubtedly Asiatics, and to this day practically 
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the whole of Northern Africa is peopled by races of Asiatic origin” (Williams, 1922: 1). 
Consequently,  
“[h]ad the great Sahara and Libyan deserts (an impenetrable ocean of sand extending 
across the continent from east to west, and 1,000 miles in width) not blocked the way, 
the central and southern parts of Africa would, in all probability, not have remained 
centuries behind the rest of the world in civilization” (1922: 1).  
Williams (1922: 2) then proceeded to give a brief introduction to the Asiatic ‘discovery’ 
of the African continent, an introduction which ends:  
“My whole desire is to point out that whereas Asia is the home of very ancient 
civilization, Africa – with the marvellous exception of Egypt – is a continent, for the most 
part, as yet, uncivilized, and even in those regions civilizing influences have been for 
some time at work she is as yet only in the dawn of her development” (1922: 2). 
 In the very first sentences of his talk, Williams captures the core features of how 
the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents collectively imagined Africa. Firstly, he argues that 
‘the central and southern parts of Africa’ have no history, no culture, and no civilisation 
whatsoever. These parts of the continent, as Williams puts it, are centuries behind the 
rest of the world in terms of civilisation and the continent is therefore completely devoid 
of any sort of civilisational influences or possibilities. Secondly, Williams narrates Asia as 
the home of a ‘very ancient civilisation’ which, in sweeping westwards, was the first to 
colonise and occupy Northern Africa. The first vestiges of African civilisation were thus 
provided by the colonisation of Asiatic peoples into the northern regions of Africa; 
primarily Egypt, but also other parts of the northern Mediterranean coastlines. Thirdly, 
Williams narrates the southern boundaries of Egypt as delimited by the vast Saharan and 
Libyan deserts. These formed natural geographical barriers to the spread of Egypt’s 
civilisation to the rest of the continent. This threefold and intertwined rendering of 
Egypt in relation to the rest of African space was enormously significant because it 
ontologically cleaved Egypt away from Africa, representing Ancient Egypt in particular as 
a small part of the history of civilisation which, in turn, separated it from the historyless 
reaches of the rest of the continent.   
 Importantly, for Williams and many of the other Cape-Cairo Railway proponents 
this narration of Africa formed an instrumental and essential ‘backstory’ and justification 
for the construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway. It was a necessary context that had to be 
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explained before any discussion of the railway could gainfully proceed. Moreover, 
Williams was by no means alone in narrating Africa in this way. For instance, one of the 
commenters on Williams’ address was Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, a barrister and 
administrator in Iraq and Syria after the formation of those countries in the wake of the 
First World War. According to Bonham-Carter,  
“the Egyptians, racially, can hardly be regarded as Africans. Whatever their origin – a 
matter, perhaps, more in dispute than any other racial question – at least we know they 
have been very largely affected by Arabian blood. Also they are Mohammedans, and 
possess a civilization which is largely Arabic in character whereas the Southern Africans 
are in a much lower state of civilization” (in Williams, 1922: 16-17). 
This line of argument reflected a range of historic anthropological and racial debates 
about the origins of European civilisation and the history of Egypt. Young (2005: 111-
132) has shown how numerous 1830s and 1840s European and American racial theorists 
attempted to scientifically prove the Asiatic origins and character of Egyptian civilisation 
to demonstrate that any notion of black or ‘negro’ civilisation was fundamentally 
oxymoronic, thus justifying the essential superiority of white man over black. Moreover, 
Said (2003: 86) has observed that such arguments conflated ‘ancient’ and European 
history, “supplant[ing] Egyptian or Oriental history by identifying itself directly and 
immediately with world history, a euphemism for European history.” Said’s criticism was 
levelled at those who sought to portray Egyptian history as part of the history of 
(Western, European) civilisation, something that denied, firstly, that any of Egypt’s 
history belonged to Africa, and secondly that Ancient Egypt was connected in any social 
or cultural way to the rest of the African continent (see also Trafton, 2004: 143). In the 
arguments of the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents the process was similar: Egypt might 
be part of Africa geographically speaking, but it made no sense to draw connections 
between it and the rest of the continent in any other way.     
 These arguments did not just appear in the meetings of the Central Asian Society. 
For instance, P.E. Lewin (1911: 863), writing in Leo Weinthal’s African World and Cape-
Cairo Express on the topic of the Cape-Cairo Railway in 1911, echoed these sentiments 
when he defined Egypt as “the crumbling civilisation of the ages that meets the West at 
Alexandria”, ostensibly drawing the imagined connection between Asia and Europe (or 
the West) via the pivot of Egypt. Leo Weinthal, meanwhile, discussed Africa and Egypt in 
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these terms in a piece on the ‘Economic, Commercial, and Industrial Development’ of 
the Cape-Cairo route in his five volume collection.214 Weinthal argued that in Egypt 
“some of the earliest records of human endeavour” are to be found “in a remote 
antiquity beyond the reach of the keenest research”.215 Weinthal’s story of trade in 
Africa thus began when “the first pioneers ventured the bold journey that led them from 
the Asiatic cradle of the human race to tap and traverse the African road of riches”; 
what he later described as “Egypt’s ancient glories”.216 Furthermore, he summarised 
that “[a]ncient history begins at the northern end of the [Cape-Cairo] route, where once 
the chief commercial centre of the world hummed with activity while only the primitive 
Bushman roamed the unmade garden of the Cape Peninsula.”217 
 These writings simultaneously worked to narrate Egypt as an ancient place of 
culture, history, and civilisation in Africa but not of Africa, while describing the rest of 
the African continent as barren, empty, uncivilised, and devoid of any kind of notable 
historical or cultural characteristics; a continent therefore “where all developments are 
effected by penetration from the coast towards the interior.”218 Furthermore, these 
representations also work to position Egypt as the cultural and historical ‘northern 
extreme’ of the African continent, both figuratively and metaphorically at the pinnacle 
of African civilisation. They construct Egypt as a centre of civilisation and prosperity, 
pollenated by the history and culture of the Asiatic settlers with whom it shares an 
essential blood lineage, and gazing down upon the rest of Africa, geographically part of it 
but simultaneously an ontologically separate cultural and historical realm. Although the 
evidence for this is anecdotal, it would also appear Rhodes discussed Africa in this way. 
According to his architect Baker, Rhodes at one time or another discussed the possibility 
of a civilisational connection between Rhodesia and Egypt: “[h]e clung to the belief [of] 
its historical connection with an early civilization linked directly or indirectly through 
Arabian or other sea-faring race with Egypt, if not indeed with Phoenicia.”219 One of 
Maund’s reminiscences also remembers Rhodes as pondering deeply a line from Marcus 
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Aurelius’ Mediations. Aurelius described Asia and Europe as corners of the universe, to 
which Rhodes’ apparently mused “[w]hy did he leave out Africa? [...] Mauritania, 
Numidia, Carthage and Egypt were important to the [Roman] Empire. I am sorry he left 
out Africa.”220  
 Egypt was thus imagined as a great and historical civilisation ontologically 
separate from yet geographically part of the continent of Africa. Below it sat a massive 
expanse of uncivilised, undeveloped space. The next sub-section turns to the other end 
of the continent, and explores how the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents envisaged the 
Cape in their writings.  
8.2.2. The Cape 
 The idea of the Cape as a second bastion of civilisation occupying the southern 
extreme of the African continent was significant in the production of an imaginative 
geopolitical link between it and Cairo. The characterisation of Egypt and the Cape as 
respectively the northern and southern extremes of Africa therefore constituted a 
geopolitical imaginary denoting two bastions of civilisation which had rather 
unfortunately been placed at opposite ends of the continent. This was intrinsically 
naturalised, in that the positions of Egypt and the Cape as the extreme opposites of 
Africa were presented as essential and irrefutable geographical facts rather than 
geopolitical and historical constructions. 
 Thus Robert Williams, in his overview of the Cape-Cairo Railway in the first of Leo 
Weinthal’s five volume set, began by writing “[t]he subject of this article is the railway 
route that will connect the two extremes of the African continent, which are nearly 5,000 
miles apart in a direct line.”221 The notion of two extremes here is not just in terms of 
their imagined geographical location furthest from a central point (wherever that might 
be), but also in terms of their exceptional and unusual difference from the rest of the 
African continent. In his influential 1911 book, The Railway Conquest of the World, F.A. 
Talbot (1911: 139) likewise talked of “the two extreme points of the African continent” 
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in the context of the railway, while in his contribution to Weinthal’s volumes the 
Lieutenant-Colonel H. Marshall Hole discussed “the possibility of connecting the 
extremes of Africa by a chain of railways”.222 Many of the other Cape-Cairo Railway 
advocates stated, in a most matter of fact way, versions of these words in their 
writings.223 They therefore captured the dual positions of Egypt and the Cape as the 
northern and southern extremes of the continent while emphasising the geographical 
distance between them. Egypt and the Cape were constructed as the geographically 
essentialised north and south extremes of the continent, separated by 5,000 miles of 
unhistorical, undeveloped African space.     
 The process through which the Cape was naturalised as the second bastion of 
civilisation occupying the southern extreme of Africa is different to that of Egypt, and 
was stimulated by three historical developments that the Cape-Cairo Railway 
proponents connected to the African continent. Firstly, successive maritime voyages 
around the Cape of Good Hope established it as the point marking the geographical 
division of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans; the point when the sailor stopped moving 
south and began to move east. These voyages begun a process of establishing the Cape 
in the European geopolitical imagination as somewhere that had been in contact with 
civilisation and thus had history; distinguishing it from Africa. Thus, the later settlement 
of the Cape by the Dutch and British was underpinned by an imaginative demarcation 
between the Cape and the rest of Africa. The advocates of the Cape-Cairo Railway 
typically preceded their arguments by discussing the importance of these voyages. For 
example, in his piece entitled ‘Economic, Commercial, and Industrial Development’ 
discussed previously, Weinthal traced a direct line from the Asiatic colonisation of Egypt 
to the supposed circumnavigation of Africa by the Phoennicians under the rule of Necho 
II of Egypt around 600BC, and thence onwards to “the Dutch and English [opening] up 
the extreme southern African terminus.”224 Although Egyptologists now doubt that this 
circumnavigation actually took place (see Lloyd, 1977: 148-154), Weinthal’s insertion of 
it into his narrative can be interpreted as an attempt to establish a common cultural and 
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civilizational ancestry between the Asiatics, the Phoenicians, and the Dutch and British. 
In portraying European settlement at the southern extreme of Africa as simply the latest 
effort by a lineage of superior civilisations to fundamentally observe and thus know the 
African continent, Weinthal reproduces the teleological trope that the only significant 
historical movements in Africa are those that come externally from superior civilisations. 
Significantly, in this case these movements focus on the Cape, beginning to distinguish it 
from the rest of Africa as having had some sort of historical and cultural connection to 
Egypt and Europe.  
 Weinthal’s narration was characteristic of the standard historical context given to 
discussions of the Cape-Cairo Railway. Robert Williams, in a different address given to 
the Royal African Society on April 21st 1921, echoed these sentiments by discussing a 
second maritime rounding of the Cape by a civilised people. Before this, however, 
Williams (1921: 1) argued of the railway that its story “is so closely connected with the 
political history of Africa that I must give you some very brief survey of this history as far 
as time will allow.” He then discussed the Portuguese navigators of the 1400s, and more 
specifically Bartholomew Diaz, the famed Portuguese explorer who rounded the Cape of 
Good Hope in 1486. Williams (1921: 2) then mentioned a second Portuguese navigator 
Vasco da Gama, “who, adventuring still further [than Diaz], explored the East African 
coast in 1498.” Diaz and da Gama were for Williams (1921: 2, my emphasis) “the first to 
make Africa known to Europeans.” This mode of narration portrays the history of the 
Cape as the history of European movements around and towards it. My argument is 
that, as also evidenced by Weinthal, this narration worked to historicise and naturalise 
the Cape as a place, similarly to Egypt, in Africa but not of Africa. Further, the 
pinpointing of the Cape as the place to be rounded also began to establish it as the 
extreme south of the African continent.  
 The second important historical development in the Cape was the founding of a 
Dutch colony at Cape Town in 1652, which began the material development of 
civilisation at the southern extreme of Africa. This started with the formation of the 
Dutch colony and the establishment of agriculture. As Boyden (2004: 7) has noted, 
agriculture was 
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“a pivotal point in the history of the interplay between human culture and living 
systems. Farming was the essential precondition underlying, and making possible, the 
development and maintenance of civilisation, with all its benefits and blemishes.” 
This was an important point stressed by the Cape-Cairo Railway advocates in narrating 
the history of the civilizational development of the Cape; what the cotton and tobacco 
exporter W.H. Scherffius described as “[t]he first and greatest essential in the 
development […] of the many facilities of civilization”.225 Farming thus took the position 
of the first vestige of civilisation at the Cape. The Cape Colony grew gradually as the 
extent of the Dutch farming operations spread inland after the establishment of a settler 
colony in the mid eighteenth century. George Beet described how by 1785 “the farmers 
could not be controlled or restricted from enlarging their ranges or moving farther back 
into the wild.”226 For Beet, therefore, there was a dynamic whereby the extension of 
farming operations simultaneously amounted to the penetration of settlement into the 
‘wild’, and concurrently the unrolling of civilisation into the vacant, untamed spaces of 
Africa. Leo Weinthal painted a picture of this early development in his musings on the 
history of trading and industrial progress in South Africa. “In those days”, Weinthal 
wrote, “there was no adequate industrial basis on which to support a large volume of 
trade”:  
“In place of the one present complex and highly developed commercial system there 
existed the 'Coast houses,' then advancing towards their palmiest days, with a thin 
network of small general stores throughout the country, and an army of peripatetic 
'traders,' carrying miscellaneous stocks from farm to farm by means of the slow-moving 
ox-wagon. The trade was done mainly by primitive methods of barter, with an enormous 
multiplication of profits, the farmer giving his produce in exchange for merchandise, 
while the storekeeper and 'trader' paid their debts by passing the produce they collected 
on to the 'Coast houses,' who in turn covered their imports by shipping it to London."227 
 Weinthal’s picture was in other words one of a gradual development of 
civilisation based upon the movement of traders across networks of farms and 
‘primitive’ circuits of exchange among farmers, traders, and storekeepers, and the 
gradual progression from this lowly, embryonic structure to a ‘complex and highly 
developed commercial system’. Similarly, Charles Metcalfe (1916: 5), giving a lecture to 
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the Royal Geographical Society on November 29th 1915, argued that the Dutch settlers 
of Cape Town were  
“very slow at extending their farms inland but they did push the Huguenots into the 
Drakenstein Valley, some 30 miles from Cape Town, which was then on the outskirts of 
the civilized area, and from that time onward the farms were gradually extended 
inland”. 
After the occupation of the Cape Colony by the British in 1806, 
“[g]radual settlements were made from that time on all along the coast from Cape Town 
to Natal. But no settlements were made beyond the mountain barrier until the few 
irreconcilable Boers broke away and trekked to the Orange Colony and the Transvaal, 
and the ox-waggon remained the only means of transport" (Metcalfe, 1916: 5). 
 Metcalfe’s arguments, alongside those of Beet, Weinthal, and others, gesture 
towards three important points. Firstly, they portray the Cape as the hubris or point of 
origin of material European civilisation in southern Africa. Whilet the advocates of the 
Cape-Cairo Railway made reference to the maritime feats of the Phoenicians and the 
Portuguese maritime explorers in their narrations of the Cape, the settling of the Dutch 
constituted no less than a landing of civilisation at a place that was already, and would 
continue to be, understood as the southern extreme of the African continent. The 
establishment of the first farm at the Cape can therefore be interpreted as the first 
bubble of civilisation in southern Africa. Secondly, this bubble was represented as 
gradually but consistently moving outwards from Cape Town into the ‘wild’ spaces of 
the African interior, and can be understood in the context of what Foster (2005: 306), 
after the French philosopher Michel de Certeau, terms “a ‘spatial story’ – in which 
enlightened imperialism was constantly moving outwards, pushing back the frontiers of 
darkness.” Thus the Cape was represented as the place, or ‘base camp’, from which this 
enlightened European civilisation began to flex northwards into the dark and unknown 
spaces of Africa. Thirdly, in the accounts of both Weinthal and Metcalfe there is the 
notion that the everyday movements of civilisation were technologically mediated, 
specifically by the ox-wagon, but also hindered by the steep plateaus that separated the 
Cape and the coastal areas of Southern Africa from the interior. 
 The technologically mediated nature of civilisation was the third and final 
historical development that naturalised the Cape as the southern extreme of Africa and 
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the southern terminus of the railway. The railway was fashioned as but the latest in a 
long line of technologically mediated movements into African space. As George Beet 
argued in Weinthal’s volumes, “the present story of the Cape-to-Cairo Railway would be 
incomplete without some reference to those two very useful and dignified forerunners 
of the locomotive, the wagon and the coach.”228 In particular, Pirie (1993: 319) has 
noted that the ox-wagon has long been mythologised for the role it “played in the 
penetration of the interior by white settlers”, and in Beets’ and others narration there 
emerges a teleological and technologically mediated movement of European civilisation 
into the interior of Africa from the Cape. As Beet put it, “[i]t was due entirely to the 
magnificent co-operation and trustworthiness of the great ox-wagon that those early 
Europeans of the Cape found it possible to unravel the innermost secrets of Africa.”229 
“Previous to the coming of the railway,” Beet continued, “they might have been aptly 
termed, ‘the backbone of the country’”, anticipating as he did so the biological 
underpinnings of the railway that I will discuss in the next section.230 Beet went on to 
detail a history of the penetration of Africa by the European ox-wagons. He began this 
story in 1655, and narrated how the first party that moved into the interior of the 
country did so to learn as much of the country as they could, meet some of the inland 
tribes, and search for mineral deposits. This narrative moved through the 1700s and to 
the occupation of the Cape by the British in 1795, before it became a permanent British 
possession.  
 Beet’s account was supplemented by that of the multitalented Manfred Nathan, 
who contributed a piece to Weinthal’s volumes on the Boer Voortrekkers. Nathan 
argued that  
“the movement of the Boer pioneers from Cape Colony, northwards towards the interior 
of South Africa, covering the decade beginning in 1836, and known as the Great Trek, is 
the most important political and social movement in the history of Africa south of the 
equator.”231 
Both Beet and Nathan therefore correlated technological development with the 
geographical extent to which European exploration in southern Africa occurred. Beet 
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wrote that in 1663 “[t]he original wagons used for these pioneers journey were probably 
imported complete from oversea”, because the initial ‘Cape tent wagon’ was identical to 
a type of wagon in common use in the Netherlands.232 However,  
“[t]he South African rivers and sandflats necessitated, however, higher wheels, and, for 
the longer journeys, a general enlargement of the vehicle, but the original model 
remained unaltered in all other respects down to the days of iron axles and patent 
breaks.”233  
 As a result, for approximately 30 years after the establishment of the Cape 
Colony progress was made no further than 100 miles inland. From around 1750 “the 
building of the ox-wagons for transport purposes had become a staple industry of the 
Colony” which, in turn, stimulated the encroachment of the Dutch settlers as far as 
Graaff Reinet, approximately 370 miles to the north east of the Cape, by 1785.234 Beet 
then progressed onto the ‘buck-wagon’ which had an average rate of progress of around 
three miles per hour, before ending his story with the Rinderpest of 1896-1898, which 
killed at least 90% of the oxen in southern Africa and left thousands of wagons 
abandoned along with their quarry. Summarising his tribute to the ox-wagons, Beet 
affirmed that  
“[t]hese transport riders traversed enormous distances, virtually abolishing the 
wilderness, and with their wagons and sturdy trek oxen were prime factors in drawing 
South Africa into the circle of the world’s activities and interests” (see also Metcalfe, 
1916: 4-5).235  
Through the movement of the ox-wagon, therefore, the Cape became connected to the 
world (in both the sense of trade, and in the sense of ontologically heaved away from 
the historyless African continent) and the wilderness of the African interior was 
abolished. These themes were continued as the ox-wagon was replaced by the railway in 
the mid nineteenth century. 
8.2.3. Summary 
 In this section I have argued three interrelated things. Firstly, Egypt was imagined 
by the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents as a bastion of civilisation occupying the northern 
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extreme of the African continent; a place of history and culture placed in complete 
contrast to the rest of Africa. Secondly, African space between Egypt and the Cape was 
constructed by the Cape-Cairo proponents as an uncivilised, ahistorical, and perennially 
underdeveloped space that had resisted all attempts by civilisation – whether Egyptian 
or European – to placate it. Finally, the Cape was constructed as the southern extreme 
of Africa and a second, although different, bastion of civilisation on the African continent 
through its gradual colonisation by Europeans, both in an epistemological and material 
sense. The positioning of Egypt and the Cape as the northern and southern extremes 
had the effect of constricting the continent of Africa, with two bastions of civilisation at 
opposite ends of a completely dark centre; gazing wistfully and longingly across the 
dark, unknown interior towards one another. However, there was also a positioning of 
the Cape as a ‘base camp’ for a series of technologically mediated movements of 
civilisation northwards into the interior. This began with the ox-wagon, the coach, 
before finally moving onwards to the railway in the mid-1800s. Civilisation, history, and 
culture were deemed as steadily moving northwards as technologies improved and were 
utilised. Thus Weinthal was able to argue that ancient history began in Egypt, but that  
“[m]odern history, however, must reverse the old order by beginning at the southern 
terminus, where was born the immense commercial movement out of which grew the 
pressing necessity for the Cape-to-Cairo scheme.”236  
It was also why, as an anonymous contributor to Weinthal’s volumes shrewdly observed, 
the transcontinental railway “is always spoken of as 'Cape to Cairo' and not 'Cairo to 
Cape'.”237 
 This construction of Egypt and the Cape as the extreme, civilised ends of the 
African continent was a crucial feature of transcontinentalism. It enabled 
transcontinental railways to be thought of as projects that would civilise entire 
continents, firstly because the space between those two points was constructed as the 
entirety of continental space, and secondly because it enabled this entirety of 
continental space to be designated as intrinsically uncivilised. In the next section I will 
argue that for the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents such as Weinthal, Williams, and their 
associates, the construction of Egypt, the Cape, and the rest of Africa in these ways were 
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pivotal to how the construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway could be equated to the 
fantasy of civilising the entirety of Africa. The Cape-Cairo Railway was imagined as 
civilising the entirety of the continent precisely because the entirety of the continent 
was imaginatively constructed as the space between Egypt and the Cape. Any railway 
between these two points would simultaneously traverse the entirety of Africa. 
8.3. Quickening the whole into sentient life: civilisation and circulation 
 “The project which will bring to Africa and her people from north to south, from 
 east to west, Progress, Civilisation, Prosperity, and Peace” (Weinthal, 1920: np).  
 As I argued in Chapter Two and in my analysis of Rhodes in the previous chapter, 
there was a causal connection between railway construction and the civilisation of 
space. This was not only apparent in Rhodes’ attempts to civilise the entirety of the 
African continent, but also in wider discussions of railway construction and its role in the 
development of the Cape Colony. In 1889, for instance, Charles Metcalfe and the Major 
F.I. Ricarde-Seaver wrote an article in The Fortnightly Review where they argued for the 
enlargement of the British imperial sphere of influence in southern Africa. Almost as an 
addendum, they offered a suggestion as to how the countries within British South Africa 
could be “civilised and developed.” “The chief means”, they contended, “plainly is the 
iron way: this is the great civiliser, the great developing force of the nineteenth century” 
(1889: 361). Underpinning such assertions was the belief that technologically mediated 
civilisation would teleologically continue to unroll itself into the vacant and uncivilised 
African interior via the ‘base camp’ of the Cape, facilitating an unravelling, overcoming, 
and ‘opening up’ of the African wilderness. In 1910, the geographer H.J. Peddie (1910: 
195) put it thusly:  
 “The 'Dark Continent' is now being rapidly opened up to civilisation and commerce. As 
 the pages of [the Scottish Geographical] Magazine show, roads and railways are  being 
 pushed  into the interior in all directions, and the rivers are also being utilised as 
 highways through it, and are evidently destined to play a very important part in the 
 development and material prosperity of the Continent.” 
 Closely connected to these ideas were important tropes concerning the railway 
as a subjugator of nature, as a technology tasked with lifting Africa out of its purely inert, 
unconscious, natural state. Philosophically, technology has often been defined in terms 
of its binary opposition to, and subordination of, nature, specifically through its position 
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as “[a]n artificial extension of the innate tendency possessed by all living beings to gain 
mastery over their environment” (Lem, 2013: 4). Freeman (1999: 44) has demonstrated 
how the railway in particular both instigated and symbolised a Victorian war with and 
eventual triumph over nature; they enabled, in the words of the populist reformer Lord 
Brougham, “an almost perennial conquest over the power of nature.” Nature was thus 
tamed, pacified, and controlled by humanity through technological means. In Agnew’s 
(2003: 94) words, this was a reversal of the eighteenth century era where “[h]umanity 
had lost control of its destiny [and] nature ruled in affairs of state.”  
 In Africa, the subjugation of nature by technology was connected to widespread 
understandings of the continent and its peoples as existing in a state of pure nature, 
tethered to and subservient to their environment and unable to develop any 
noteworthy levels of commerce and civilisation for this reason. The geographer Harry 
Johnston provided the strongest articulation of this in a lecture he gave before the Royal 
Geographical Society on February 24th 1915. Positioning Europe against the uncivilised 
world, by which he meant Africa, Asia, and South America, he observed that these 
continents (or, more accurately, Europeans’ experience of them) had been consistently 
characterised by malarial fevers and germ diseases. This was, he argued,  
“the principle reason why the population of those continents [has] remained very sparse 
in volume as compared to Europe – Europe, in which man first began to ask the why and 
wherefore of his martyrdom, and to turn against Nature with every intention of taking 
the law into his own hands” (Johnston, 1915: 289). 
Here Johnston gestured to the emergence of reason and the development of the 
scientific and philosophical qualities which enabled (European) ‘man’ to pose questions 
about his own consciousness, tying this inextricably to a turning against nature and a 
subordination of the ‘law’ of nature to the law of humanity. This then was contrasted to 
the hitherto unchallenged dominance of nature over the affairs of African life. The wider 
topic of Johnston’s address was the potential changes in the political geography of Africa 
that would be engendered by different outcomes of the First World War, and was 
delivered in the immediate aftermath of the commencement of unrestricted U-boat 
warfare and the advancement of German forces into Russia. However, while this context 
acutely shaped the content of Johnston’s talk, he still speculated that, should it be 
decided in Britain’s favour, capital would be invested not into armaments “but into the 
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warfare against hostile and grudging Nature [in Africa].” Furthermore, he continued, “in 
this struggle our most potent arm is the railway [...] there is no agent so pacifying as the 
railway” (Johnston, 1915: 291).  
 This was a theme also prominent in Rhodes’ plans for the construction of the 
Cape-Cairo Railway. It is well known that Rhodes deliberately wanted the railway to 
bridge the gorge of the Victoria Falls, and the huge waterfall occupied a unique place in 
the Victorian imagination at the turn of the twentieth century. McGregor (2003: 172) 
has observed that by 1900, and largely because of Rhodes, the Falls were imaginatively 
“placed as a stop over on the Cape to Cairo axis” in the British popular imagination. 
Simultaneously, the Falls were rendered the quintessential zenith of Africa’s natural 
state, a turgid combination of latent beauty, innocence, and majesty that had previously 
been locked away from Europe’s prying epistemology. Railway technology was imagined 
as the means through which the Falls would be unlocked, tamed, and domesticated for 
the economic, imperial, and leisurely benefits of the triumphant colonial settler 
(McGregor, 2003). In his letter that Grogan used as the foreword to his book, Rhodes 
wrote that he “should like to have the spray of the water over the carriages” as the 
railway bridged the Falls.238 This is important because, as one of Rhodes’ associates 
made clear in 1916, “[t]here were other points where the gorge of the Zambesi could 
have been crossed at less expense and in easier conformity to the limiting grades of the 
railway, facts which were clearly demonstrated at the outset by the engineers" 
(Freeman, 1916: 168). Thus the railway and its bridge, which when built in 1904 was to 
span 500 feet and sit 400 feet above the water (Christy, 1924: 332), represented the 
conquering of Africa’s most secluded and secretive natural wonder. Not only this, the 
practices of spectatorship and observation that the railway carriage afforded is 
consistent with wider colonial tropes that sought to frame and display African nature for 
the leisurely consumption of the European tourist (Schivelbusch, 1986). Through the 
railway, therefore, Rhodes and his followers intended to tame the wild waterfall and 
domesticate it as an object of colonial curiosity and leisure. 
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 Railway technology was thus imagined as a pacifying, subjugating force that 
became a vassal for European and more specifically British fantasies concerning the 
need to emancipate Africa from its entombment within an uncivilised and intrinsically 
natural existence. To the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents, the only way of civilising the 
African continent and its peoples was through railway construction, and especially a 
transcontinental railway stretched between the two points of pre-existing civilisation 
that were naturalised as the northern and southern extremes of the continent. Thus for 
Metcalfe the Cape-Cairo Railway was “the iron track that must ultimately join the Cape 
with Cairo, and carry civilisation through the heart of the dark continent!”239 Weinthal 
(1920: np) finished a 1920 speech to the Empire Club of Canada by arguing that “[w]hen 
the construction of [the] northern and southern links of the Cape-Cairo Route is decided 
upon – darkest Africa – land of mystery – will be so no longer.” P.E. Lewin (1911: 864) 
asked  
“[h]ow many are there in England who realise what this narrow iron road driven into the 
heart of Africa means to the Dark Continent? It is a pledge and an earnest of European 
civilisation. The wonderful development that has taken place in Africa within the last 
fifteen years is quite as much a moral and intellectual awakening as a commercial 
penetration. To millions of African natives the Cape-to-Cairo Railway and its subsidiary 
lines represent the first contact with civilisation after ages of degradation and slavery. 
They are the visible sign of the new order”. 
 However, as with Rhodes it is evident upon closer inspection that the discourse 
of civilisation was equated with the desired production of Africa as a transcontinental 
space of circulation. Freeman (1999: 48) has suggested that  
 “[t]o talk of railroads and the conquest of nature is, of course, to see nature as external. 
 But nature does not exist independently of man: it is a social construction. What the 
 railroad became part of was thus a transformed nature and, more particularly in 
 the eyes of Marxist commentators, a nature tied to the imperatives of capitalism. 
 Putting it slightly differently: the human mind had discovered nature’s secrets and 
 was converting her material resources into productive usefulness.”  
The secrets of Africa, as Freeman calls them, were described in terms of scintillating 
discoveries of mineral deposits and natural resources: most often the alluring shimmer 
of gold and diamonds, but no less important were resources such as coal, cotton, and 
rubber. These mineral deposits Robert Williams (1917) referred to as the ‘Milestones of 
African Civilisation’ in an address to the Royal Colonial Institute in 1917, whereby “these 
                                                     
239
 SCCRI, 99. 
258 
 
discoveries had led the Cape to Cairo Railway step by step northward, and thus formed 
veritable milestones marking the progress of civilisation into the interior of the Dark 
Continent” (Williams, 1921: 14). The South African Minister of Railways and Harbours, 
Henry Burton, concurred in July 1918 that “the direction and the course of our railways 
has been dictated [...] by the pressing necessity of getting the quickest possible route 
first to the diamond fields [at Kimberley] and afterwards to the goldfields” (Burton, 
1918: 3). Like Rhodes, and as the quote by Lewin recognising the commercial and anti-
slavery imperatives of the railway demonstrates, the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents 
equated the construction of the railway to the production of a space of circulation, 
where resources and labour would be accelerated across African space while the 
uncivilised horrors of the slave-trade were exterminated.  
 This was best demonstrated by the disagreements between Alfred Sharpe, 
whose ideas were discussed in the previous chapter, and several other of the Cape-Cairo 
Railway proponents over the future route they believed the railway should take. Sharpe 
insisted that the smoothest and most efficient pathways for extracting and circulating 
the mineral resources of Central Africa were lateral railways stretching to the coasts, 
which would therefore run “not to Cape, nor to Cairo” (in Bigland et al, 1920: 107). 
Sharpe was criticised for this belief by many of his associates. For instance, Henry Wilson 
Fox, the Conservative MP and founder of the Empire Resources Development 
Committee, expressed in a 1920 address to the Royal Geographical Society that  
“in regard to both the limited question of the utility of an extension to Rejaf, and, more 
generally, to the value of the central north-and-south trunk system as a whole, I regret 
to find myself in complete disagreement with the views which have been expressed in a 
recent paper by so high an authority as Sir Alfred Sharpe” (Fox, 1920: 94).  
Meanwhile, Robert Williams, Leo Weinthal, Charles Metcalfe and others continued to 
maintain that the transcontinental line was necessary for the efficient circulation of 
resources and other goods across African space. What is noteworthy here is that Sharpe 
was the only one of these proponents who believed that a north-south transcontinental 
railway was not essential for the production of an efficient space of circulation atop the 
African continent. In his 1921 book he went into minute detail on the different routes, 
distances, and economic calculations affecting future railway construction. Williams, 
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Weinthal, Metcalfe, and Fox maintained, on the other hand, that the transcontinental 
trunk line was indispensable.  
 I argue that Sharpe was thus one of the only naysayers of the Cape-Cairo Railway 
because he was not engulfed by the idea that Africa was an inert, slumbering continent 
that biologically required a specific trunk or backbone as the focal point of a functioning 
circulatory system to be revitalised into economic and political life. To the proponents of 
the Cape-Cairo Railway, their arguments were based not on economic calculation but on 
the assumption that the continent of Africa required this ‘trunk line’ or ‘backbone’ in 
accordance with the naturalised geopolitical imagination of space for any system of 
circulation to be created. Just as Berlin-Baghdad and its subsidiary branch lines would 
produce a transcontinental space of circulation which would ensure the vitality of the 
new German Empire, the Cape-Cairo Railway was imagined as the focal point of a 
railway system that would connect Africa to global flows of labour and resources and 
awaken the continent from its previous entombment within nature. Moreover, the 
Cape-Cairo Railway proponents often expressed this in explicitly biological language. 
Railways were frequently described as providing ‘life’ or ‘lifeblood’ to the African 
continent. Robert Williams (1922: 8) argued to the Central Asian Society the following:  
“To a steady development of [Africa’s] commerce and her industries we must look for 
the ultimate means by which she can, in Livingstone’s words, ‘be introduced into the 
body corporate of nations.’ The great iron highways we are building the arteries through 
which will pulse the new life to which Africa is rapidly awakening.”    
Recalling Schivelbusch (1986), Africa was detached from the health and vitality provided 
by circulation, and was thus diseased, inert, and unconscious. The famed African 
explorer David Livingstone, to whom Williams was referring, used the words body 
corporate of nations to signify the civilised economic and political relations between 
states, where “no one member of which can suffer without others suffering with it” 
(quoted in McCracken, 2012: 39). Williams therefore evoked an imagery of joining the 
continent of Africa to the circulatory systems of the civilised world through railways, 
which would simultaneously act as the arteries through which lifeblood would be 
circulated around Africa itself. Charles Metcalfe (1916: 16-17) referred to the African 
railways in a similar manner, stating that they would be “great arteries going north and 
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south through the continent [...] connected with the coast on all sides by a network of 
railway veins.”  
 These discussions took on a more distinctive form when the Cape-Cairo Railway 
was specifically discussed. Languages of arteries and veins largely gave way to languages 
of backbones, spines, and trunks. As I have been arguing, this language all had a 
particular effect – it granted to the Cape-Cairo Railway a controlling and providential 
role in the civilisation of the African continent. It positioned ideas of limpness, 
dormancy, and slumber against the implantation of structure, awakening, and 
cardio/muscular/skeletal strength and energy. It was not, as Bishop (2002) has 
suggested of the Alice Springs to Durban railway in Australia, that these metaphors 
represented or strengthened the image of the body of the nation. In Africa, there was no 
body to be strengthened; the construction of the Cape-Cairo Railway was instead that 
which would create Africa anew, quite literally providing the infrastructure that would 
lift it out of its former enclosure and disconnection from the rest of the world. Ewart S. 
Grogan, in his 1900 book on his walk from the Cape to Cairo, argued thusly:  
“No other system than the through connection would have the same wide-ranging 
influence for the same expenditure; and the start that its completion will give to 
radiating enterprise is incredible. It is but the vertebral principle in Nature, and applies as 
surely to a continent as to a worm” (Grogan and Sharp, 1900: 318, my emphasis).             
 Grogan’s extraordinary comment exemplifies my argument, and illustrates the 
importance of the intermixing of civilisational and naturalised modes of geopolitical and 
technological reasoning to understanding the centrality of circulation to the Cape-Cairo 
Railway advocates. His argument was not based on any economic calculations (sound or 
otherwise), but on the assumption that the inert and lifeless Africa simply required a 
backbone to be reinvigorated with political and economic life. Only the through 
connection, linking the northern and southern extremes of the African continent, could 
serve as the spine or vertebrae of Africa and thus ensure the establishment of a 
continent-wide space of circulation. The final culmination of the Cape-Cairo Railway as 
backbone was the role it would subsequently play in linking up the lateral railways, 
stressed so strongly by Alfred Sharpe, and the centre of the continent. This affixed 
backbone, as Grogan (and Sharp 1900: 318) continued, would be “the vertebrae and 
spinal cord which [would] direct, consolidate, and give life to the numerous systems that 
261 
 
[would] eventually connect the vast central high-road with the seas.” The Cape-Cairo 
Railway was in fact the first step to the building of a consolidated system of African 
railways, whereby the transcontinental line would be the directional and governing 
entity enabling prosperity and civilisation to circulate throughout the continent via a 
network of lateral railways, ‘ribs’, ‘branches’, or ‘veins’, as they were often called, 
between the main line and the coasts. 
 In Weinthal’s volumes, the British businessman Owen Philipps captured this best 
when he envisaged a  
“central line of railway running through the heart of Africa from North to South, with 
laterals branching out East and West to the Coast. It resembles the insertion of a nervous 
system into an inanimate body, quickening the whole into sentient life, so that the vast 
territories of Africa may be vitalised with activity and industry.”240  
The civilisation of the African continent, which could only be achieved through 
constructing a railway between the naturalised extreme ends of the continent, thus 
essentially meant the creation of a transcontinental space of circulation. Although the 
conflation of the biological, technological, and geopolitical took a variety of forms and 
vocabularies (circulatory system, nervous system, skeletal system, etc.), the notion of 
circulation, understood via Kapp (1877) and Schivelbusch (1986), best encapsulates how 
the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents envisaged the construction of the railway. In fact, I 
would argue that the concept of circulation found its essential expression in the Cape-
Cairo Railway. The railway would constitute the backbone of a transcontinental space of 
circulation, whereby the mobilities of natural resources and labour would be 
accelerated. It would also fulfil the more intangible fantasies concerning the enlightened 
spread of civilisation, the conquest of nature, and the reversal of history’s millennia-long 
neglect of the continent. Yet as Sharpe recognised, the dreams of civilisation and 
circulation had little relationship to any material function a transcontinental railway 
could conceivably perform. The railway was never finished precisely for this reason – 
while Metcalfe, Weinthal, and Williams argued for its necessity, the economic turmoil 
that followed the First World War ensured the railway would never reach its destiny of 
Cairo. The arguments of the Cape-Cairo Railway proponents therefore stand as little 
more than testimonies to Rothstein’s perceptive comment – that men during his lifetime 
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were engulfed by an uncontrollable passion to bring together the uttermost ends of a 
continent, quite irrespective of rational motives.  
8.4. Conclusions 
 On February 22nd 1930, a 44 page supplement on the Cape-Cairo Railway 
appeared as an enclosure in The London Illustrated News, edited by none other than Leo 
Weinthal. In it Weinthal and his contributors attempted, one last time, to argue for the 
necessity of completing the Cape-Cairo Railway. Their arguments covered much of the 
same ground that I have been discussing in this and the previous two chapters – 
civilisation and circulation for the benefit of the British Empire. By 1930, Robert Williams 
had retired to Aberdeenshire, where he would pass in April 1938, Harry Johnston had 
died in 1927, and Weinthal himself died in August 1930. With them died the doctrine of 
Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism. Very little is known about Weinthal’s life, but it is clear 
that after the editing of his five volume set during the First World War he took over 
Rhodes’ mantle. The publication of the supplement and his death in 1930 represented 
the end of efforts to finish the Cape-Cairo Railway. There is no evidence that after 1930 
it was ever taken up by anyone else, and there is no evidence that their arguments 
reached as far into the British government as Rhodes had with Chamberlain. In July 1927 
the Liberal MP for Anglesey Robert Thomas asked parliament “whether construction [of 
the railway] is now in progress at any point; and whether any definite period has been 
laid down for its completion?” The reply – that “[n]o project for a railway from the Cape 
to Cairo is at present under consideration” – remains true to this day.241 
 Nonetheless, in this chapter I have demonstrated a final, important feature of 
transcontinentalism – the construction of places (in this case the Cape and Egypt) as the 
naturalised, geographically determined extreme ends of continental space. Egypt was 
imagined as ontologically distinct from yet geographically within the African continent. 
The Cape, on the other hand, was imagined as the place from which European 
civilisation would inevitably and teleologically unroll itself into African space, a process 
which began with the ox-wagons of the Boer Voortrekkers before eventually taking its 
final form with the railway. Egypt and the Cape were thus rendered two bastions of 
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civilisation at opposing ends of the African continent, even though longitudinally 
speaking they are not. This enabled the space between them to be imagined not only as 
lifeless, inert, dormant, and fundamentally uncivilised, but also as the entirety of the 
African continent itself. The continent was compressed and truncated, and as a 
consequence the possibility of a railway stretching between the Cape and Cairo was 
concomitantly a railway that would civilise the entirety of the continent as it did so. The 
civilisation of the African continent was, however, tantamount to the creation of a space 
of circulation that I more fully analysed in the previous chapter with Rhodes. The Cape-
Cairo Railway proponents in this chapter replicated Rhodes’ arguments while explicitly 
connecting its construction to the insertion of a circulatory system (or vertebrae, or 
nervous system, as Grogan and Phillips put it respectively) into the previously inert and 
empty continent, quickening it into sentient life. Africa would consequently be hoisted 
out of its previous state of pure nature, connected to global flows of labour and 
resources, and hoisted up the ‘stream of Time’ in which it had previously languished at 
the bottom.  
 As well as epitomising the doctrine of transcontinentalism, these three chapters 
constitute the first critical history of the Cape-Cairo Railway. Together, they are the first 
attempt to properly lay bare the geopolitical and technological underpinnings of the 
Cape-Cairo Railway. Its actual construction, along with its minute political and economic 
details, have been touched upon elsewhere, but these chapters add a different 
perspective on the railway that not only deepens our understanding of it, but also works 
to undermine and correct Tabor’s (2003) exoticised history. These chapters also 
demonstrate a new way of comprehending the life and work of Cecil Rhodes. In the 
previous two chapters I have argued that Rhodes’ ideas can be fruitfully analysed in 
relation to geopolitics and the modern geopolitical imagination, and by taking 
methodological lessons from historical geography it has been possible to offer a new 
perspective on one of the numerous points of contention within his biography, namely 
his changed relationship with Germany after his visit to Berlin. These chapters not only 
therefore demonstrate and analyse Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism, but also contribute 
to a deeper and more thorough understanding of Britain’s imperial and diplomatic 
history that has not hitherto been studied with proper reference to geopolitics.  
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 In the following and concluding chapter, I broaden the focus away from the 
Baghdad and Cape-Cairo Railways and turn back to transcontinentalism. I summarise 
and distil the main arguments and contributions of the thesis, propose future areas of 
research, and offer some final thoughts as to the importance of this thesis to our 
understanding of the world and our place in it.  
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Chapter Nine – Conclusion 
9.1. Summary of arguments and contributions to knowledge 
 In this thesis I have identified, explained, and analysed what I have termed the 
doctrine of transcontinentalism. To conclude, this chapter firstly summarises the core 
aspects of my argument, restating the core features of transcontinentalism and how 
they have been evinced in my archival research into the Baghdad and Cape-Cairo 
Railways. It secondly identifies and sketches out three further areas of research relating 
to transcontinentalism that it would be worthwhile to pursue. Lastly, I offer some final 
thoughts to end the thesis in its entirety.   
 In this thesis I have argued that transcontinentalism was a geopolitical and 
technological doctrine that had its foundations in the Napoleonic Wars but only fully 
manifested itself from the late 1880s to the end of the First World War. I have argued 
that transcontinentalism was a geopolitical and technological doctrine defined primarily 
by three interconnected components; 1) the projection and territorialisation of state 
power across continental space, 2) the spread of civilisation across continental space, 
and 3) the extension, reproduction, and transformation of the state and its spaces of 
circulation across continental space; through the construction of transcontinental 
railways. All of these three features were different at different times and places, and 
were not immune from the shifting spatialities and places within which, and through, 
they were manifested. However, transcontinentalism was fundamentally underpinned 
by the relationship between the civilisational and naturalised geopolitical imaginations 
that entwined in the late nineteenth century on the one hand, and discourses of railway 
technology as a tool of state land-power projection that would usurp the previously 
dominant modes of British sea power, as a technology of European civilisation, and as a 
technology enabling and extending the circulation of the ‘lifeblood’ of the biological, 
naturalised state. Transcontinental railways were thus equated with the insertion of 
transcontinental spaces of circulation into continental space, an insertion that would 
simultaneously civilise and territorialise state power across the entirety of a given 
continent. In the last analysis, therefore, the political and economic advantages that 
would accrue for the power in command of a transcontinental railway would engender 
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nothing less than the establishment of that state’s global hegemony to the detriment 
and ultimate eradication of its rivals.  
 In Parts Two and Three of the thesis I have traced transcontinentalism through 
two British examples – firstly the reaction and responses to the construction of the 
Baghdad Railway by the British Empire, and secondly through a structural biography of 
Cecil Rhodes and his associates’ attempts to construct the Cape-Cairo Railway. Both of 
these examples are different, and both railways have evinced certain aspects of 
transcontinentalism more prominently than others. Britain’s response to the Baghdad 
Railway was premised primarily on the railway as a tool of German military and 
economic power projection, which during the First World War became entangled with 
the naturalised geopolitical discourses of a perennially growing German state with a 
biologically ‘inbred’ need for territorial expansion. It was underpinned by the shifting 
balances between land- and sea-power, the notion of relative ascent and decline, and as 
an inevitable consequence did not display the civilisational aspects of geopolitics 
demonstrated most strongly in Part Three. The reason for this was simple; civilisation 
was a discourse of colonial and imperial legitimacy, and therefore would have served as 
a justification for, rather than a reason to oppose, Germany’s attempts to construct the 
railway. However, as I underscored in Chapter Three certain British writers such as 
Thomas Chenery foregrounded the civilisational aspects of the Euphrates Valley Railway, 
indicating how a railway between Europe and India (regardless of who was to build it) 
could be associated with civilisational geopolitics. Thus the overland route to India 
embodied transcontinentalism but with specific geographical, cultural, political, and 
national differences between the European powers.  
 The Cape-Cairo Railway, on the other hand, was from the British perspective 
illustrative of the doctrine of transcontinentalism par excellence. It evinced all three core 
features of transcontinentalism, although geographical and imperial differences and 
relations shaped the ways in which they were expressed at different times and places. 
To begin with, Cape-Cairo transcontinentalism emerged from Johnston’s Cape-Cairo 
‘idea’, as a doctrine of projecting and territorialising British power across the entire 
north-south expanse of African space. Cecil Rhodes, as I have shown, expressed this 
most prominently in his application to the British Colonial Office in 1898 for support in 
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building the railway. Rhodes equated the railway with the projection of British power, 
the civilisation of African space, and the creation of a transcontinental space of 
circulation atop its inert, unproductive and dormant expanse. However, with the 
establishment of German East Africa and his visit to Berlin in 1899, Rhodes accepted the 
necessity of his all-red Cape-Cairo route not actually being all-red, incorporating 
Germany within his wider geopolitical vision. From that point onwards, Cape-Cairo 
transcontinentalism ceased to be about the transcontinental territorialisation of British 
power and, as I have shown in Chapter Eight, became centred on the twin imperatives of 
civilisation and circulation. In the arguments of Weinthal, Metcalfe, Williams and their 
contemporaries I have argued we have seen the core of transcontinentalism – the 
insertion of a transcontinental material network of circulation into the vast nothingness 
of African space, an insertion that would simultaneously civilise the entirety of the 
continent by virtue of the space between Cairo and the Cape being constructed as the 
entirety of the continent. 
 In identifying the doctrine of transcontinentalism, this thesis contributes to three 
different broader strands of literature. Firstly, this thesis is a contribution to what Butler 
(2001) and Williams (2005) have termed technogeopolitics, a nascent but growing body 
of critical geopolitical scholarship that examines how technologies and technological 
projects are shaped by, even as they shape, geopolitical imaginaries and visions of space. 
By arguing for the centrality of railway technology to the doctrine of 
transcontinentalism, and to the geopolitically inflected obsession with enabling (or 
preventing) the construction of railways across transcontinental space, I have 
demonstrated it is no longer tenable to see technology as a “unidirectional force which 
is kept to the side [of geopolitical scholarship] because of lack of knowledge of the 
technology or because its incorporation would be too messy” (Butler, 2001: 637). This 
thesis has consequently offered a corrective to the work of scholars such as Agnew 
(2003) and Ó Tuathail (1996), who gesture towards the importance of railway 
technology but do not fully substantiate or analyse its effects. It has also offered a 
different perspective to that of Hugill (1995; 1999) regarding the historical relations 
between technology, geography, and geopolitics, one that does not privilege social and 
economic relations of capitalism and is able to examine the linkages between 
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technology and geographical assumptions, designations and understandings 
underpinning world politics.  
 Secondly, this thesis has offered a framework through which to understand the 
attempts of imperial powers to project and territorialise power across continental space 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As I outlined in Chapter One, the Cape-
Cairo and Baghdad Railways were just two of various transcontinental railways that were 
at least partially constructed from the 1850s onwards. The Trans-Siberian Railway, the 
American and Canadian transcontinental railways, and even less obvious examples such 
as the French Trans-Saharan Railway could all be studied as manifestations of 
transcontinentalism in a rapidly transforming technogeopolitical world – as expressions 
of the threefold imperative to project and territorialise power across space, civilise 
entire continental landmasses in accordance with the civilising mission, and produce 
transcontinental spaces of circulation in and through which labour, resources, and other 
objects could be given motion and transported. This is a contribution that builds upon 
Meinig’s (1993; 1998) previous studies of the geopolitics of transcontinental railway in 
America but which offers a new lens through which such railways could be analysed and 
understood. Of course, more research and synthesis would be required to demonstrate 
the extent to which these railways reflect the transcontinentalism I have analysed across 
this thesis. I will say more on this in the following section.  
 Lastly, by explaining the doctrine of transcontinentalism and placing it within the 
context of geopolitics and historical geographical literatures this thesis has contributed 
to our understanding of British imperial and diplomatic history. While 
transcontinentalism itself is a new perspective on British history, there are five specific 
contributions I want to draw out. Firstly, this thesis has demonstrated the necessity of 
seeing Britain’s diplomatic reaction and responses to the Baghdad Railway in the wider 
historical perspective of the changing balances between land- and sea-power and the 
shifting geopolitical imaginations of the long nineteenth century. Historians such as 
Chapman (1948) and Wolf (1973) begin their histories of the railway in the late 1880s, 
but I have shown that the roots of Britain’s concern with the overland route to India 
must be traced to the Napoleonic Wars and to the entwined geopolitical and 
technological transformations of the Euphrates Valley Railway schemes, the political and 
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economic relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, and the tensions 
between railway and naval power projection. Secondly, my analysis of R.W. Seton-
Watson, the arguments for the creation of a South Slav state as a barrier to Berlin-
Baghdad transcontinentalism, and the naturalised geopolitical logic of buffer states is a 
contribution to our understanding of the wider reconstruction of Europe’s political 
geography after the First World War. More research would be needed to fully 
substantiate this, but it would appear that British support for the creation of Yugoslavia, 
while certainly stimulated by genuine principles of self-determination, cannot be 
understood if examined in isolation from fears over the potential establishment of a 
German railway empire from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf.  
  The third contribution the thesis makes to the study of British imperial and 
diplomatic history is through its approach to the life and work of Cecil Rhodes. As I have 
noted throughout, Rhodes has been the subject of numerous biographies and studies, 
but none have connected the development and solidifying of his imperial ideology to the 
wider geopolitical contexts of the late nineteenth century. I have argued that Rhodes’ 
thought can be usefully conceptualised as a geopolitical vision premised on the 
ontological separation of subject and object. Thinking about Rhodes from this angle, and 
placing his geopolitical vision within the social, intellectual, and spatial contexts from 
which it emerged, offers a new way of understanding not only his ideas, but also his 
multifaceted and multifarious exertions in the service of the Anglo-Saxon race and the 
British Empire. Fourthly and relatedly, by foregrounding the transformative impacts of 
space, place, and interpersonal relations I have produced a new understanding of the 
changing of Rhodes’ perspective towards Germany. As I demonstrated in Chapter Seven, 
Rhodes’ sudden shift from Germanophobe to Germanophile has puzzled historians, but I 
have argued that by utilising historical geographical approaches we can more completely 
grasp how Rhodes’ experiences in the places and spaces of Berlin with the Kaiser 
fundamentally altered his world view. Fifthly and finally, Part Three of this thesis can be 
thought of as the first critical history of the Cape-Cairo Railway which properly places 
Rhodes and his associates’ attempts to build the railway in their geopolitical, imperial, 
and technological contexts. The Cape-Cairo Railway has been much mythologised 
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(Tabor, 2003), but this thesis has offered a step towards a more nuanced and thorough 
understanding of its conception and partial construction.  
9.2. Future Research Directions 
 From these conclusions, I think there are three prominent avenues of research 
that would be worthwhile to explore. First and foremost, work needs to be carried out 
into the emergence and development of transcontinentalism outside of the British 
context, and concomitantly into what these different empirical studies could say back to, 
or fundamentally challenge, the conceptualisation of transcontinentalism that I have 
been arguing for in this thesis. More archival research, for example, could be undertaken 
into the German (as I initially intended) and Ottoman experiences of constructing the 
Baghdad Railway, and the Russian experience of the Trans-Siberian Railway. 
Methodologically, such work could follow a similar course to the one I have undertaken 
here, exploring the interlocking interests of practical and formal geopolitical elites 
(statesmen, geographers, explorers, capitalists, and so on) and the ways in which they 
connected the construction of transcontinental railways to imperial state power and the 
production of spaces of circulation atop continental space. This would help unpick the 
national, cultural, and political specificities of the civilised and naturalised 
technogeopolitical imaginaries in each case, something which would help refine (or, as I 
would hope) add new components of understanding to the doctrine of 
transcontinentalism as a whole.   
 Secondly, because transcontinentalism was ultimately a doctrine of the 
territorialisation of imperial power across space it will be necessary to understand how it 
was recognised, understood, and resisted. As noted previously in the thesis, to many 
post-World War One British writers the Baghdad Railway was an evil tool of German 
imperialism designed to dominate and enchain the Ottoman Empire into a 
transcontinental empire, but their worries were based more on Britain’s own imperial 
angst than any moral or intellectual opposition. Contrarily, recent work in geography has 
emphasised how a range of anticolonial, socialist, and anarchist movements constructed 
alternative geopolitical imaginations in response to the dominant nationalist, imperial, 
and colonial discourses of the period under consideration in this thesis (e.g. Kearns, 
271 
 
2009; 2014; Springer, 2013). Ferretti’s (2013; 2017a; 2017b) work on the historical 
geographies of anarchism, scholarship on pacifist internationalisms (Ferretti, 2016; 
Hodder; 2015; 2017b), and wider work on the historical geographies of peace and non-
violence (Megoran, 2011) are beginning to demonstrate how disparate groups of 
radicals forged alternative visions of being in the world in direct opposition to doctrines 
such as transcontinentalism. This prompts the question: was transcontinentalism 
disputed and resisted, and if so how? I am uncertain if anarchists like Kropotkin and 
Reclus ever mentioned it, but there is scope to explore here. For instance, the 
‘Memorandum on German War Aims’ noted how some German socialists opposed 
Berlin-Baghdad, contending that “any annexation of fresh territory would make the war 
a war of conquest instead of a war of defence”.242 Exploring some of this opposition 
could help us critique and undermine the logic of transcontinentalism.  
   Finally, to veer away from transcontinentalism I hope this research will 
contribute to a more incisive critique of the relationship between technology and 
geopolitics in both historical and contemporary registers. One of the things that first 
attracted me to this topic was a comment by my undergraduate supervisor on a draft of 
the analysis chapter of my dissertation. In it I briefly discussed the Baghdad Railway in 
the context of geopolitics in the Balkans during the First World War. His comment was 
that I needed to ‘read, or at least cite, Mackinder’ in the relevant paragraph. This 
puzzled me. At the time, I was not aware Mackinder had said anything remotely relevant 
to the Balkans or the Baghdad Railway in his work. I therefore interpreted the guidance 
as to cite Mackinder “in a strategy to bolster authority and add a false sense of 
profundity to writing that otherwise lacks both theoretical rigour and political and 
geographical nuance” (Megoran, 2004: 355). This is perhaps reflective of the way critical 
geopolitics has treated technology, as a subsidiary component to supposedly more 
important and timely analyses. Yet others such as the neoclassical geopolitics writers 
Deudney (2000) and Dolman (2002) have explicitly drawn upon Mackinder’s theorisation 
of the relationship between geography and technology to guide their work. Dolman 
(2002: 75) in particular has considered the Lagrange Liberation Points, positions in space 
where the gravity of the Earth, Sun, and Moon cancel each other out so that an “object 
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fixed at one of these points (or more accurately stated, in tight orbit around one of 
these points) would remain permanently stable, with no expenditure of fuel.” An object 
at a Lagrange Point thus has a fixed relation to the Earth and Moon. Dolman (2002: 75) 
hints towards the “imaginatively intense” possibility of a space weapon of some kind 
being stationed at a Lagrange Point, fulfilling most completely Virilio’s (2002: 53) 
description of orbital weapons as having the “traditional attributes of the divine: 
omnivoyance and omnipresence.” 
 And yet I see no real engagement by scholars of critical geopolitics with 
questions of how Mackinder’s theorisations of technology are folded into neoclassical 
geopolitical reasoning (Kearns, 2010; MacDonald, 2007; Megoran, 2010a). Of course, 
scholars such as Shaw (2013) and Gregory (2011) have repeatedly critiqued the US 
military’s increasing use of UAVs and aviation technologies in war, and Duvall and 
Havercroft (2008: 757) have suggested “space weapons under the control of a single 
state logically constitute a new structure of imperial power through the counteracting 
forces of centralisation of sovereign power and deterritorialisation of sovereignty.” Yet 
in critical geopolitical engagements with neoclassical thinking I see little focus on 
technology, which Deudney (2000: 80), for his part, explicitly conceptualises as that 
which determines “the velocity and volume of violence available in particular material 
contexts”. If, as Dalby (2010: 281) has argued, a key part of critical geopolitics’ research 
agenda should be about “challenging how contexts are constructed to justify violence”, 
there is a need to unpick and critique how the military and geopolitical logics that I have 
argued were so central to the doctrine of transcontinentalism manifest in the 
technologically mediated desire to control, subjugate, and ultimately destroy in an era of 
late-modern war. Put differently, foregrounding and critiquing the use of technology 
needs to be a central part of how we disrupt deterministic statements like Dolman 
(2012: 78) has made in his more recent work:  
 “When we have this mind-set and apply the tenets of traditional realist and geopolitical 
 theories that have survived millennia in their basic forms, the unavoidable conclusion is 
 that the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are on a collision 
 course for war.”  
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Pursuing all of these three avenues is something beyond my own capabilities, but if my 
work contributes in some small way to a wider examination of transcontinentalism and 
the relationship between geopolitics and technology it will have been worth the effort.   
9.3. Final Thoughts 
 Throughout the planning, (re)writing, and editing of this thesis, I have worried 
much about that age-old and pivotal question – why is what I’m doing important? Even 
after I worked through and persuaded myself that the doctrine of transcontinentalism 
was not just something my stressed and sleep-deprived mind had conjured out of 
nowhere, I asked myself that question. Why is transcontinentalism important? I have 
argued in this thesis that it is important because it identifies and helps us understand 
and conceptualise a strain of geopolitical and technological thinking that was prevalent 
in different forms in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, thus contributing to, 
and partially subsuming, the work of historians into the national and imperial backdrops 
to transcontinental railway construction. I have also argued that it is important because 
it contributes to wider debates in critical geopolitics on the agency of technology in 
shaping geopolitical imaginaries and visions of space. Finally, I have argued it is 
important because, almost as a by-product, conceptualising and thinking with 
transcontinentalism generates new and variegated understandings of different aspects 
of Britain’s imperial, diplomatic, and geopolitical history.  
 I think I have done all of those things, yet the question still nagged at me. But 
then I went back and read Schivelbusch’s (1986) book one more time. In the final 
analysis, transcontinentalism is important because it was in many ways the final 
manifestation of the deeply burning nineteenth century desire to achieve mastery over 
time and space before the rise of aviation technology. The continents were identified as 
continents, and imagined as the largest continuous blocks of land in the world. They 
were eventually known. They were increasingly mapped, charted, photographed, and 
surveyed. Parts of them were colonised. As Rhodes put it in the Confession, by the late 
nineteenth century humanity knew the size of the world and its total extent. 
Transcontinentalism emerged out of that impulse to master space and time, to extend 
the frontiers of humanity across the entirety of terra, to mould and conform space and 
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time to its own designs. Transcontinentalism was born of the urge to know, control, and 
master all of the land on the surface of the earth. Geopolitics was its motivation and 
railway technology was its means. The entwining of the two furnished its opportunity, 
and resulted in the attempted territorialisation of state power on a previously 
unprecedented scale. It is for this reason this thesis is important, because it contributes 
to our understanding of that which is still with us today, our seemingly fundamental 
desire to know, and subsequently master, the entirety of the cosmos.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
275 
 
Bibliography 
Archival Sources 
British Library, London (BL) 
India Office Records (IOR) 
Royal Geographical Society, London (RGS) 
Papers of R.I. Money (RIM)  
The National Archives, Kew, London (TNA) 
Board of Trade papers (BT) 
Cabinet Office papers (CAB) 
Colonial Office papers (CO) 
Committee of Imperial Defence minutes and papers (CID) 
Foreign Office papers (FO) 
 
Weston Library, University of Oxford, Oxford (WL) 
 
Copies of letters from Cecil John Rhodes edited by T.W. Baxter (1974), entitled Yrs, Cecil 
Rhodes: The Letters of an Imperialist (two volumes) Mss. Afr. s.1804.  
Correspondence of Cecil John Rhodes [1] Mss. Afr.s.229. 
Correspondence of Cecil John Rhodes [2] Mss. Afr. s.227. 
Correspondence of Cecil John Rhodes [3] Mss. Afr.s.1707.  
Papers of Cecil John Rhodes (1871-1901) Mss. Afr. t.1.  
Papers relating to Cecil John Rhodes [1] Mss.Afr.s.229. 
Papers relating to Cecil John Rhodes [2] Mss.Afr.s.1934. 
Papers relating to Cecil John Rhodes [3] Mss.Afr.t.45. 
Papers relating to Cecil John Rhodes [4] MSS. Afr.s.2301. 
276 
 
Primary Sources 
Andrew, W.P. (1856) The Scinde Railway and its relations to the Euphrates Valley and 
other routes to India. London: Wm. H Allen and Co.  
Andrew, W.P. (1870) The Euphrates Valley Railway: Letters addressed to Her Majesty's 
Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, and for India. London: Wm. H. Allen and Co.  
Baker, H. (1934) Cecil Rhodes, by His Architect. London: Oxford University Press. 
Bigland, A; Grogan, E; Christy, C; Melland, F.H; Major Taylor and General Collard. (1920) 
'The Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Train Ferries: Discussion', The Geographical Journal 55 
(2): 101-108. 
Bowes, A.I. (1899) 'Barrage of the Nile', The Journal of the Manchester Geographical 
Society 15 (10-12): 193-200. 
Burton, H. (1918) ‘Railways and Communications in South Africa’, Journal of the African 
Society 18: 1-8. 
Corbett, J.S. ([1911] 1988) Some principles of maritime strategy. London: Brassey’s 
Defence Publishers.  
Chenery, T. (1869) Suggestions for a Railway Route to India. London: Robert Hardwicke. 
Chéradame, A. (1911) The Baghdad Railway. London: Central Asian Society.  
Chéradame, A. (1916) The Pangerman Plot Unmasked. London: John Murray.  
Chéradame, A. (1918) German War Profits and the German Formula No Annexations, No 
Indemnities. The Extension of Prussian Militarism. London: Hodder and Stoughton.  
Chéradame, A. (1923) The Mystification of the Allied Peoples: Why? How? By Whom? 
Evreux: Ch. Herissy Press.  
Chesney, F.R. (1857) Report on the Euphrates Valley Railway. London: Smith, Elder & Co. 
Christy, C. (1924) 'The Cape-to-Cairo Railway', The Scottish Geographical Magazine 40 
(6): 331-334.  
277 
 
Curzon, G.N. (1892) Persia and the Persian Question. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.  
Dillon, E.J. (1916a) ‘The New Situation’, Fortnightly Review 100 (598): 531-548. 
Dillon, E.J. (1916b) ‘The One Thing Wanting’, Fortnightly Review 100 (599): 711-726. 
Earle, E.M. (1924) Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway – A Study in 
Imperialism. London: Macmillan and Co. 
Evans, A. (1916) ‘The Adriatic Slavs and the overland route to Constantinople’, The 
Geographical Journal 47 (4): 241-261.  
Ex-Kaiser William II (1922) My Memoirs: 1878-1918. London: Cassell and Company.  
Fox, F; Philipps, O; Younghusband, F; Fox, W; Captain Slack. and Metcalfe, C. (1916) 
‘Railway Development of Africa, Present and Future: Discussion, The Geographical 
Journal 47 (1): 17-21.  
Fox, H.W. (1920) ‘The Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Train Ferries’, The Geographical Journal 
55 (2): 73-101.  
Freeman, L.R. (1916) 'Rhodes's 'All Red' Route: The War's Effect upon the Cape-Cairo 
Railway', The World's Work 27 (158): 159-177. 
Gandell, J.H. and Brunton, J. (1845) Report on the Practicability of Forming the Trunk Line 
of Railway from Newcastle to Berwick by way of Alnwick. Alnwick: W. Davison.  
Gibson-Bowles, T. (1903) ‘The Baghdad Railway’, The Times, 14th April, p.4.  
Gibson-Bowles, T. (1910) Sea Law and Sea Power. London: John Murray.  
Gilpin, W. (1890) The cosmopolitan railway, compacting and fusing together all the 
world’s continents. San Francisco: The History Company.  
Girouard, P. C. (1903) History of the railways during the war in South Africa. London: 
Harrison and sons.  
Gladstone, W.E. (1891) ‘The future policy of the Liberal party, Newcastle, October 2, 
1891’, in: Hutton, A.W. and Cohen, H.J; eds. (1902) The speeches of the Right Hon W.E. 
Gladstone. London: Methuen.  
278 
 
Grogan, E.S. and Sharp, A.H. (1900) From the Cape to Cairo: The First Traverse of Africa 
from South to North. London: Hurst and Blackett Limited.  
Harrison, A. (1904) The Pan-Germanic Doctrine: Being a study of German Political Aims 
and Aspirations. New York: Harper and Brothers.  
Holdich, T. (1917) ‘Between the Tigris and the Indus’, Geographical Review 4 (3): 161-
170.  
Holdich, T. (1918) ‘Geographical War Problems in the Near East’, The Geographical 
Journal 51 (1): 3-13.  
Jastrow Jr, M. (1917) The War and the Bagdad Railway. London: J.B. Lippincott and 
Company. 
Johnston, H.H. (1888) ‘Great Britain’s Policy in Africa, Letter to The Times’, The Times, 
22nd August 1888, p.8.  
Johnston, H.H. (1897) British Central Africa: An attempt to give some account of a 
portion of the territories under British influence north of the Zambezi. London: Methuen.  
Johnston, H.H. (1909) Britain across the seas: Africa: a history and description of the 
British Empire in Africa. London: National Society’s Depository.  
Johnston, H.H. (1912) 'Railway Projects in Africa and the Near East', Nineteenth Century 
and After 72 (427): 558-569. 
Johnston, H.H. (1915) ‘The Political Geography of Africa before and after the War’, The 
Geographical Journal 45: 273-294.  
Johnston, H.H. (1923) The Story of My Life. London: Chatto & Windus. 
Lord Curzon (1898) ‘Memorandum by Lord Curzon respecting Persian Affairs, 19 
November 1898’, in: Lauterpacht, E; Greenwood, C.J; Weller, M. and Bethlehem, D; eds. 
(1991) The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents. Cambridge: Grotius Publications. 
Lewin, P.E. (1911) ‘The Cape to Cairo Railway’, African World and Cape-Cairo Express 34: 
863-864.  
279 
 
Lynch, H.F.B. (1911) Railways in the Middle East. London: Central Asian Society.  
Mackinder, H.J. (1887) ‘On the Scope and Methods of Geography’, Proceedings of the 
Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 9 (3): 141-174.  
Mackinder, H.J. (1890) ‘The physical basis of political geography’, Scottish Geographical 
Magazine 6 (2): 78-84.  
Mackinder, H.J. (1904) ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, The Geographical Journal 23 
(4): 421-437.  
Mackinder, H.J. ([1911] 1921) The Nations of the Modern World: An Elementary Study in 
Geography and History. London: George Philip and Son.  
Mackinder, H.J. (1912) The Modern British State: An Introduction to the Study of Civics. 
London: George Philip and Son. 
Mackinder, H.J. (1917) ‘Some geographical aspects of international reconstruction’, 
Scottish Geographical Magazine 33 (1): 1-11.  
Mackinder, H.J. ([1919] 1942) Democratic Ideals and Reality A Study in the Politics of 
Reconstruction. London: Constable and Company.  
Mackinder, H.J. (1924) The World War and After. London: George Philip and Son. 
Macneill, J. (1843) Report on a Proposed Line of Railway from Dublin to Cashel &c. 
Dublin: Alexander Thom.  
McDonald, J.G. (1927) Rhodes: a life. London: P. Allan.  
McMurry, F.M. (1918) The geography of the great war. New York: Macmillan.  
Metcalfe, C. (1916) ‘Railway Development of Africa, Present and Future’, The 
Geographical Journal 47: 3-17.  
Michell, L. (1910) The Life of the Rt. Hon. Cecil Rhodes 1853-1902 Volume Two. London: 
Edward Arnold.  
Pall Mall Gazette (1915) ‘War Losses at Sea’, 29th December, p.2.  
280 
 
Pease, J.A. (1895) How we countenance slavery. London: British and foreign anti-slavery 
society.  
Peddie, H.J. (1910) ‘Amphibious steam navigation for African rivers: A suggestion’, 
Scottish Geographical Magazine 26: 195-198.  
Pratt, E.A. (1916) The rise of rail-power in war and conquest: 1833-1914. Philadelphia: 
J.B. Lippincott and Company.  
Rhodes, C. (1885) ‘Letter to The Times’, The Times, 11th November 1885, p.8 
Ricarde-Seaver, F.I. and Metcalfe, C. (1889) ‘British Sphere of Influence in South Africa’, 
The Fortnightly Review 3: 351-362.   
Sarolea, C. (1907) The Baghdad Railway and German Expansion as a factor in European 
politics. London: Gurney and Jackson.  
Schaefer, C.A. (1916) Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik: Mit einer farbigen Karte 
derBagdadbahn. Weimar: G. Kiepenheuer.  
Seeley, J.R. ([1883] 1914) The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures. London: 
MacMillan and Co.  
Seton Watson, Dr; Woods, C; Lyde, Prof. and Evans, A. (1916a) ‘The Adriatic Slavs and 
the Overland Route to Constantinople: Discussion’, The Geographical Journal 47 (4): 
261-265.  
Seton-Watson, R.W. (1916b) German, Slav, and Magyar; a study in the origins of the 
great war. London: Williams and Norgate.  
Seton-Watson, R.W. (1916c) ‘Pan-German Aspirations in the Near East’, Journal of the 
Royal Society of Arts 64 (3306): 385-397.  
Seton-Watson, R.W. (1916d) The spirit of the Serb. London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd.  
Seton-Watson, R.W. (1919) Europe in the Melting Pot. London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.  
Seton-Watson, R.W. (1945) Britain In Europe 1789-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
281 
 
Sharpe, A. (1896) ‘The Geography and Resources of British Central Africa’, The 
Geographical Journal 7 (4): 366-387.  
Sharpe, A. (1910) ‘Recent Progress in Nyasaland’, Journal of the Royal African Society 9 
(36): 337-348.  
Sharpe, A. (1912) ‘The Geography and Economic Development of British Central Africa’, 
The Geographical Journal 39 (1): 1-17.  
Sharpe, A. (1918) 'The Backbone of Africa', The Geographical Journal 52 (3): 141-154.  
Sharpe, A. (1921) The Backbone of Africa: A record of travel during the great war, with 
some suggestions for administrative reform. London: H.F. and G. Witherby.  
Stead, W.T. (1899) 'The Cape to Cairo Railway Part I', The Windsor Magazine 10: 363-
374. 
Stead, W.T. (1902) The Last Will and Testament of Cecil John Rhodes: with elucidatory 
notes to which are added some chapters describing the political and religious ideas of the 
testator. London: William Clowes and Sons.  
Sunday Mirror (1915) ‘If Britain Had Not Gone to War’, 15th August, p.9.  
Supplement on Cape-Cairo Railway (1930) London Illustrated News 176 (4760): 324-368.  
Talbot, F.A. (1911) The Railway Conquest of the World. London: William Heinemann.  
The Daily Telegraph (1857) 19th August, p.3.  
The Railway Gazette and Railway News (1927) ‘Second Special African Railway 
Supplement’, 5th December.  
The Times (1857) ‘Persia’, 16th January, p.7.  
The Times (1871a) ‘The Euphrates Valley Railway’, 19th September, p.4.  
The Times (1871b) ‘The Euphrates Valley Route to India’, 19th July, p.10.  
The Times (1875) 14th August, p.9.  
282 
 
The Times (1899) 16th March, p.9.  
The Times (1903a) ‘Lord Curzon's Tour’, 21st November, p.7.  
The Times (1903b) ‘Lord Curzon's Visit To The Persian Gulf’, 9th December, p.5.  
The Times (1903c) ‘With The Viceroy In The Persian Gulf’, 28th December, p.6.  
The Times (1906a) ‘Revival of the Baghdad Railway Question’, 22nd May, p.5.  
The Times (1906b) ‘The Baghdad Railway’, 29th May, p.5.  
The Times (1907) ‘The Anglo-Russian Convention’, 27th September, p.7.  
The Times (1916) ‘Berlin to Baghdad’, 25th November, p.7.  
The Times (1917a) ‘German Ambitions in the East’, 16th January, p.7.  
The Times (1917b) ‘Through German Eyes’, 6th March, p.5.  
The Times (1918) ‘Through German Eyes’, 22nd May, p.5.  
The Times (1919) ‘Through German Eyes’, 7th June, p.11.  
Vindex [Verschoyle, F.] (1900) Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and Speeches, 1881-1900. 
London: Chapman and Hall.  
Vosnjak, B. (1917) A Bulwark against Germany: the fight of the Slovenes for national 
existence. London: G. Allen and Unwin.  
Weinthal, L. (1920) ‘The Cape to Cairo Railway and River Route, an address given to the 
Empire Club of Canada in Toronto on the 4th of November 1920’, [online] Available at: 
<http://speeches.empireclub.org/62367/data> [Last accessed 22/05/2017] 
Weinthal, L; ed. (1923) The story of the Cape to Cairo railway & river route from 1887 to 
1922, five volumes. London: The Pioneer Publishing Company.  
Williams, B. (1921) Cecil Rhodes. London: Constable and Company.  
Williams, R[obert]. (1917) ‘Milestones of Civilization’, United Empire Journal 8: 446-462. 
283 
 
Williams, R[obert]. (1921) The Cape to Cairo Railway. London: Macmillan.  
Williams, R[obert]. (1922) The Cape to Cairo Railway: From the Point of View of African 
Development. Guildford: Billing and Sons.  
Williams, R.C. (1913) How I Became a Governor. London: John Murray.  
Woods, H.C. (1918) The Cradle of the War: The Near-East and Pan-Germanism. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co.  
Zola, E. ([1890] 1948) The Human Beast. New York: United Book Guild.  
Secondary Sources 
Agnew, J. (2003) Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics. London: Routledge.  
Agnew, J. (2014) ‘By words alone shall we know: Is the history of ideas enough to 
understand the world to which our concepts refer?’ Dialogues in Human Geography 4 
(3): 311-319 
Agnew, J; Hannah, M.G; Sharp, J; Hugill, P.J; Dowler, L. and Kearns, G. (2011) ‘Reading 
Gerry Kearns’ Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder’, Political 
Geography 30 (1): 49-58.  
Ahmad, F. (1992) ‘A Note on the International Status of Kuwait before November 1914’, 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 24: 181-185.  
Ahuja, R. (2005) ‘‘The Bridge-Builders’: Some Notes on Railways, Pilgrimage and the 
British ‘Civilizing Mission’ in Colonial India’, in: Fischer-Tine, H. and Mann, M; eds. (2005) 
Colonialism as Civilising Mission: Cultural Ideology in British India. London: Anthem.  
Ahuja, R. (2006) ‘Mobility and Containment: The Voyages of South Asian Seamen, 
c.1900-1960’ International Review of Social History 51: 111-141. 
Aksakal, M. (2008) The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First 
World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Alder, G.J. (1972) ‘Britain and the defence of India: The origins of the problem 1798-
1815’, Journal of Asian History 6 (1): 14-44.  
284 
 
Alghanim, S. (1998) The reign of Mubarak Al-Sabah, Shaikh of Kuwait, 1896-1915. 
London: IB Tauris.  
Ambrose, S.E. (2002) Nothing Like It in the World: The Men who Built the 
Transcontinental Railroad, 1863-1869. New York: Simon & Schuster.  
Amin, A. (1967) British Interests in the Persian Gulf. Leiden: E.J. Brill. 
Antonsich, M; Kolossov, V. and Pagnini, M.P; eds. (2001) On the Centenary of Ratzel's 
Politische Geographie: Europe Between Political Geography and Geopolitics. Rome: 
Societa Geografica Italiana. 
Atkinson, D. (1995) Geopolitics and the geographical imagination in Fascist Italy. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Loughborough.  
Bain, D.H. (2000) Empire Express: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad. Penguin: 
New York.  
Baker, A.R.H. (1997) ‘“The Dead Don’t Answer Questionnaires: Researching and Writing 
Historical Geography’, Journal of Geography in Higher Education 21 (2): 231-243.  
Ball, D. (1985) ‘Technology and Geopolitics’, in: Zoppo, C.E. and Zorgbibe, C; eds. (1985) 
On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear. Boston: Nijhoff.   
Barry, A. (1996) ‘Lines of Communication and spaces of rule’, in: Barry, A; Osborne, T. 
and Rose, N; eds. (1996) Foucault and political reason: Liberalism, neo-liberalism, and 
the rationalities of government. London: Routledge. 
Barton, G.A. and Bennett, B.M. (2010) ‘Forestry as Foreign Policy: Anglo-Siamese 
Relations and the Origins of Britain’s Informal Empire in the Teak Forests of Northern 
Siam, 1883-1925’, Itinerario 34: 65-86.  
Bassin, M. (1991) ‘Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of 
Geographical Space’, Slavic Review 50 (1): 1-17.   
Bassin, M. (1999) Imperial visions: nationalist imagination and geographical expansion in 
the Russian Far East, 1840-1865. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
285 
 
Behr, H. (2007) ‘The European Union in the Legacies of Imperial Rule? EU Accession 
Politics Viewed from a Historical Comparative Perspective’, European Journal of 
International Relations 13 (2): 239-262.  
Behrent, M.C. (2013) ‘Foucault and technology’, History and Technology 29 (1): 54-104.  
Bektas, Y. (2004) ‘Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction of 
the Baghdad Railway (review)’, Technology and Culture 45 (4): 872-874.  
Belsey, C. (2002) Poststructuralism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Betts, R.F. (1971) ‘The Allusion to Rome in British Imperialist Thought of the Late 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, Victorian Studies 15 (2): 149-159.  
Bimber, B. (1994) ‘Three Faces of Technological Determinism’, in: Smith, M.R. and Marx, 
L; eds. (1994) Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Bishop, P. (2002) ‘Gathering the Land: The Alice Springs to Darwin Rail Corridor’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20 (3): 295-317.  
Bjelić, D.I. (2002) ‘Introduction: Blowing Up the “Bridge”’, in: Bjelić, D.I and Savić. O; eds. 
(2002) Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalisation and Fragmentation. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Blainey, G. (1965) ‘Lost causes of the Jameson Raid’, Economic History Review 18: 350-
366.  
Blouet, B. (1987) Halford Mackinder: a biography. College Station Texas: A&M University 
Press.  
Blouet, B.W. (2013) 'Mackinder: Imperialism, the Empire of India and Central Asia', in 
Megoran, N. and Sharapova, S; eds. (2013) Central Asia in International Relations: The 
Legacies of Halford Mackinder. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boyden, S. (2004) The Biology of Civilisation: Understanding Human Culture as a Force in 
Nature. Syndey: UNSW Press.  
286 
 
Brendon, P. (2007) The Decline and Fall of the British Empire. London: Jonathan Cape.  
Burçak, B. (2008) ‘Modernization, Science, and Engineering in the Early Nineteenth 
Century Ottoman Empire’, Middle Eastern Studies 44 (1): 69-83. 
Burman, S. (1981) Chiefdom politics and alien laws: Basutoland under Cape rule 1871-
1884. London: Macmillan.  
Busch, B.C. (1967) Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914. Berkeley: University of 
California Press.   
Butler, D. (2001) ‘Technogeopolitics and the struggle for the control of world air routes, 
1910-1928’, Political Geography 20 (5): 635-658.  
Butler, J. (1977) ‘Cecil Rhodes’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies 10 
(2): 259-281.  
Calcott, W.R. (1984) ‘The Last War Aim: British Opinion and the Decision for 
Czechoslovak Independence, 1914-1919’, The Historical Journal 27 (4): 979-989.  
Campbell, D. (1992) Writing security: United States foreign policy and the politics of 
identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Chapman, M.K. (1948) Great Britain and the Bagdad Railway, 1888-1914. 
Massachusetts: Smith College Studies in History. 
Chee, L. (2011) ‘Under the billiard table: Animality, anecdote and the tiger’s subversive 
significance at the Raffles Hotel’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 32: 350-364.  
Clark, C. (2012) The sleepwalkers: how Europe went to war in 1914. London: Allen Lane.   
Cohen, S. (1976) British policy in Mesopotamia, 1903-1914. London: Ithaca Press.  
Conrad, D.B. (2013) In The Service of God and Evil: A Psychological Study Of The Rise And 
Fall of Kaiser Wilhelm II (Volume I). United States of America: Xlibris.  
Colás, A. and Pozo, G. (2011) ‘The Value of Territory: Towards a Marxist Geopolitics’, 
Geopolitics 16 (1): 211-220.  
287 
 
Cole, J. (2008) Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Craggs, R. and Neate, H. (2017) ‘Post-Colonial Careering and Urban Policy Moibility: 
Between Britain and Nigeria, 1945-1990’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 42 (1): 44-57.  
Craggs, R. (2008) ‘Situating the Imperial Archive: The Royal Empire Society Library, 1868-
1945, Journal of Historical Geography 34 (1): 48-67.  
Cumings, B. (2009) Dominion from sea to sea: Pacific ascendancy and American power. 
New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.  
Dalby, S. (1990) ‘American security discourse: the persistence of geopolitics’, Political 
Geography 9 (2): 171-188.  
Dalby, S. (1991) ‘Critical geopolitics: discourse, difference, and dissent’, Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 9 (3): 261-282.  
Dalby, S. (2010) ‘Recontextualising violence, power, and nature: The next twenty years 
of critical geopolitics?’, Political Geography 29 (5): 315-325.  
Dalby, S. (2014) ‘Environmental Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century’, Alternatives: 
Global, Local, Political 39 (1): 3-16.  
Dalby, S. (2015) ‘Geoengineering: The Next Era of Geopolitics?’, Geography Compass 9 
(4): 190-201. 
Daniels, S. and Cosgrove, D. (1993) ‘Spectacle and text: landscape metaphors in cultural 
geography’, in: Duncan, S. and Ley, D; eds. (1993) Place, Culture and Representation. 
London: Routledge.  
Daniels, S. and Nash, C. (2004) ‘Lifepaths: Geography and Biography’, Journal of 
Historical Geography 30 (3): 449-458.  
Darby, H.C. (1960) ‘An Historical Geography of England: Twenty Years after’, The 
Geographical Journal 126 (2): 147-159.  
288 
 
Denoon, D. (1973) A grand illusion: the failure of imperial policy in the Transvaal Colony 
during the period of reconstruction, 1900-1905. Harlow: Longman.  
den Otter, A.A. (1997) The philosophy of railways: the transcontinental railway idea in 
British North America. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
Der Derian, J. (1992) Antidiplomacy: spies, terror, speed, and war. Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell.  
Deringil, S. (1998) The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimisation of Power 
in the Ottoman Empire. London: IB Tauris. 
Deringil, S. (2003) ‘”They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery”: The Late Ottoman 
Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 45 (2): 
311-342. 
Deudney, D. (2000) ‘Geopolitics as Theory: Historical Security Materialism’, European 
Journal of International Relations 6 (1): 77-107.  
DeSilvey, C. (2006) ‘Observed Decay: Telling Stories with Mutable Things’, Journal of 
Material Culture 11 (3): 318-338.  
DeSilvey, C. (2007) ‘Salvage memory: constellating material histories on a hardscrabble 
homestead’, Cultural Geographies 14 (3): 401-424.  
Dicken, P. (1998) Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy. New York: Guilford 
Press. 
Dillon, M. (2000) ‘Post-structuralism, Complexity and Poetics’, Theory Culture and 
Society 17 (5): 1-26.  
Dittmer, J. and Dodds, K. (2008) ‘Popular Geopolitics Past and Future: Fandom, Identities 
and Audiences’, Geopolitics 13 (3): 437-457.  
Dittmer, J. and Gray, N. (2010) ‘Popular Geopolitics 2.0: Towards New Methodologies of 
the Everyday’, Geography Compass 4 (11): 1664-1677.  
289 
 
Dittmer, J. and McConnell, F; eds. (2015) Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: 
Translations, Spaces and Alternatives. London: Routledge.  
Dittmer, J. (2010) Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield.  
Dittmer, J. (2016) ‘Theorizing a More-than-Human Diplomacy: Assembling the British 
Foreign Office, 1839-1874’, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 11 (1): 78-104.  
Dodds, K. and Atkinson, D; eds. (2000) Geopolitical traditions: a century of geopolitical 
thought. New York: Routledge.  
Dodds, K. and Powell, R.C; eds. (2014) Polar Geopolitics? Knowledges, Resources and 
Legal Regimes. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Dodds, K. and Sidaway, J. (2004) ‘Halford Mackinder and the ‘geographical pivot of 
history’: a centennial retrospective’, The Geographical Journal 170 (4): 292-297.  
Dodds, K. (1994) ‘Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British Representations of Argentina 
1945-1961’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 19 (3): 273-290.  
Dodds, K. (2007a) Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Dodds, K. (2007b) ‘Steve Bell’s Eye: Cartoons, Geopolitics and the Visualization of the 
‘War on Terror’, Security Dialogue 38 (2): 157-177.  
Dodds, K; Kuus, M. and Sharp, J; eds. (2013) The Ashgate research companion to critical 
geopolitics. Farnham: Ashgate.  
Dolman, E.C. (2002) Astropolitik: classical geopolitics in the Space Age. London: Frank 
Cass.  
Dolman, E.C. (2012) ‘New Frontiers, Old Realities’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 6 (1): 78-
96. 
Dowler, L. and Sharp, J. (2001) ‘A Feminist Geopolitics?’, Space and Polity 5 (3): 165-176.  
290 
 
Duara, P. (2001) ‘The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism’, Journal of World 
History 12 (1): 99-130.  
Duara, P. (2004) ‘The Discourse of Civilization and Decolonization’, Journal of World 
History 15 (1): 1-5.  
Duvall, R. and Havercroft, J. (2008) ‘Taking sovereignty out of this world: space weapons 
and the empire of the future’, Review of International Studies 34 (4): 755-775.  
Edney, M.H. (1997) Mapping an Empire: the Geographical Construction of British India. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Eigen, K. (2010) Parallel Tracks: American Transcontinentalism and the Specter of 
Canada. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of California.  
Ek, R. (2000) ‘A revolution in military geopolitics?’, Political Geography 19 (7): 841-874.  
Elbe, S; Roemer-Mahler, A. and Long, C. (2014) ‘Securing circulation pharmaceutically: 
Antiviral stockpiling and pandemic preparedness in the European Union’, Security 
Dialogue 45 (5): 440-457.  
Erikson, E. (2014) Between Monopoly and Free Trade: The English East India Company, 
1600-1757. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Evans, J. (2008) Great Britain and the Creation of Yugoslavia: Negotiating Balkan 
Nationality and Identity. London: IB Tauris.  
Fabian, J. (1983) Time and the other: how anthropology makes it object. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Faroqhi, S; McGowan, B; Quataert, D. and Pamuk, S. (1997) An Economic and Social 
History of the Ottoman Empire Volume Two, 1600-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ferretti, F. (2013) ‘“They have the right to throw us out”: Élisée Reclus' New Universal 
Geography’, Antipode 45 (5): 1337-1355.   
291 
 
Ferretti, F. (2016) ‘Geographies of peace and the teaching of internationalism: Marie-
Thérèse Maurette and Paul Dupuy in the Geneva International School (1924–1948)’, 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 41 (4): 570-584.  
Ferretti, F. (2017a) ‘Evolution and revolution: Anarchist geographies, modernity and 
poststructuralism’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space DOI:  
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775817694032 
Ferretti, F. (2017b) ‘Political geographies, ‘unfaithful’ translations and anticolonialism: 
Ireland in Élisée Reclus's geography and biography’, Political Geography 59: 11-23.  
Flint, J. (1976) Cecil Rhodes. London: Hutchinson.  
Forsyth, I. (2016a) ‘A Bear’s Biography: Hybrid Warfare and the More-than-Human 
Battlespace’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775816664098 
Forsyth, I. (2016b) ‘Desert Journeys: From Exploration to Covert Operations’, The 
Geographical Journal 182 (3): 226-235.  
Foster, J. (2005) ‘Northward, upward: stories of train travel, and the journey towards 
white South African nationhood, 1895-1950’, Journal of Historical Geography 31: 296-
315.  
Foucault, M. (2007) Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 
1977-1978. Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillian. 
Francis, R.M. (1973) ‘The British Withdrawal from the Baghdad Railway Project in 1903’, 
The Historical Journal 16: 168-178. 
Freeman, M. (1999) Railways and the Victorian Imagination. London: Yale University 
Press.  
Galbraith, J.S. (1974) Crown and charter: The early years of the British South Africa 
Company. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Giaccaria, P. and Minca, C; eds. (2016) Hitler’s Geographies: The Spatialities of the Third 
Reich. London: University of Chicago Press.  
292 
 
Gibson-Graham, J.K. (2003) ‘Poststructural interventions’, in: Sheppard, E. and Barnes, 
T.J. (2003) A Companion to Economic Geography. Oxford: Blackwell, 95-110.  
Glück, Z. (2015) ‘Piracy and the production of security space’ Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space 33 (4): 642-659.  
Goldstein, E. (1991) Winning the peace: British diplomatic strategy, peace planning, and 
the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920. Oxford: Clarendon.  
Goldstein, E. (1998) ‘Great Britain: The Home Front’, in: Boemeke, M.F; Feldman, G.D. 
and Glaser, E. (1998) The Treaty of Versailles: a reassessment after 75 years. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Goldsworthy, V. (1998) Inventing Ruritania: the imperialism of the imagination. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.  
Gong, G.W. (1984) The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Goren, H. (2011) Dead Sea Level: Science, Exploration and Imperial Interests in the Near 
East. London: I.B. Tauris.  
Graham, M; Anderson, C. and Mann, L. (2015) ‘Geographical Imagination and 
Technological Connectivity in East Africa’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 40 (3): 334-349.  
Gray, C. (1977) The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the 
Technological Revolution. New York: Crane, Russak & Company. 
Greenberg, J. (2002) ‘Framing and Temporality in Political Cartoons: A Critical Analysis of 
Visual News Discourse’, Canadian Review of Sociology 39 (2): 181-198.  
Greenfield, A.B. (2005) A Perfect Red: Empire, Espionage and the Quest for the Colour of 
Desire. Reading: Doubleday.  
Gregory, D. (1995) ‘Imaginative Geographies’, Progress in Human Geography 19 (4): 447-
485.  
293 
 
Gregory, D. (2011) ‘From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War’, Theory Culture 
and Society 28 (7-8): 188-215.  
Griffiths, I.L. (1997) ‘African land and access corridors’, Geopolitics and International 
Boundaries 2 (1): 69-81.  
Gross, F. (1957) Rhodes of Africa. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.  
Hagen, G. (2004) ‘German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental 
Studies’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 24 (2): 145-162. 
Hagerman, C.A. (2013) Britain’s Imperial muse: the classics, imperialism and the Indian 
Empire, 1784-1914. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Halvorson, D. (2010) ‘Prestige, Prudence and Public Opinion in the 1882 British 
Occupation of Egypt’, Australian Journal of Politics and History 56 (3): 423-440.  
Hamlett, J. (2009) ‘’The Dining Room Should Be the Man’s Paradise, as the Drawing 
Room Is the Woman’s’: Gender and Middle-Class Domestic Space in England, 1850-
1910’, Gender and History 21 (3): 576-591.  
Hannah, M. (2005) ‘“In Full View yet Invisible”: On Neil Smith’s American Empire’, 
Political Geography 24 (2): 239-243.  
Haraway, D. (1988) ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective’, Feminist Studies 14: 575-599.  
Harley, J.B. (1989) ‘Deconstructing the map’, Cartographica 26: 1-20.  
Harris, C. (2001) ‘Archival Fieldwork’, Geographical Review 91 (1-2): 328-334.  
Harrison, P. (2006) ‘Poststructural theories’, in: Aitken, S. and Valentine, G; eds. (2006) 
Approaches to Human Geography. London: Sage.  
Hartmann, D. (2014) ‘Of artifacts and organs: world telegraph cables and Ernst Kapp’s 
philosophy of technology’, in: Rayward, W.B; ed. (2014) Information Beyond Borders: 
International Cultural and Intellectual Exchange in the Belle Époque. Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate. 
294 
 
Hartmann, E. (2013) ‘The Central State in the Borderlands: Ottoman Eastern Anatolia in 
the Late Nineteenth Century’, in: Bartov, O. and Weitz, E.D; eds. (2013) Shatterzone of 
Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman 
Borderlands. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Hauner, M. (2013) What is Asia to Us? Russia’s Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today. 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
Heersmink, R. (2012) ‘Defending Extension Theory: A response to Kiran and Verbeek’, 
Philosophy and Technology 25 (1): 121-128. 
Heffernan, M. (1996) ‘Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal 
Geographical Society and the First World War’, Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 21 (3): 504-533.  
Heffernan, M. (1998) The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics. London: 
Arnold.  
Heffernan, M. (2000) ‘Fin de siècle, fin du monde? On the origins of European 
geopolitics, 1890-1920’, in: Dodds, K. and Atkinson, D; eds. (2000) Geopolitical 
traditions: a century of geopolitical thought. New York: Routledge.   
Heffernan, M. (2011) ‘Shifting Sands: The Trans-Saharan Railway’, in: S.D. Brunn; ed. 
(2011) Engineering Earth: The Impacts of Megaengineering Projects Volume One. 
London: Springer. 
Hepple, L. (1986) ‘The revival of geopolitics’, Political Geography Quarterly 5: S21-S36.  
Herb, G.H. (1997) Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918-1945. 
London: Routledge.  
Herwig, H.H. (2012) ‘The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s 
Bid for World Power – By Sean McMeekin’, The Historian 74 (1): 190-191.  
Hess, J.M. (2000) ‘Johann David Michaelis and the Colonial Imaginary: Orientalism and 
the Emergence of Racial Antisemitism in Eighteenth-Century Germany’, Jewish Social 
Studies 6 (2): 56-101. 
295 
 
Hodder, J. (2015) ‘Conferencing the international at the World Pacifist Meeting, 1949’, 
Political Geography 49: 40-50.  
Hodder, J. (2017a) ‘On absence and abundance: biography as method in archival 
research’, Area DOI: 10.1111/area.12329 
Hodder, J. (2017b) ‘Waging peace: militarising pacifism in Central Africa and the problem 
of geography, 1962’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 42 (1): 29-43.  
Holdsworth, D.W. (2003) ‘Historical Geography: New Ways of Imaging and Seeing the 
Past’, Progress in Human Geography 27 (4): 486-493.  
Holland, R. (2012) Blue-Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean Since 1800. 
London: Penguin.  
Hoskins, H.L. (1928) British Routes to India. New York: Longmans and Co.  
Hugill, P. (1995) World Trade since 1431: Geography, Technology, and Capitalism. 
London: The John Hopkins University Press.  
Hugill, P. (1999) Global Communications since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology. 
London: The John Hopkins University Press.  
Hutchings, K. (2008) Time and world politics. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Hutchinson, R. and Martelli, G. (1971) Robert’s People: The Life of Sir Robert Williams, 
Bart., 1860-1938. London: Chatto and Windus.  
Huzzey, R. (2012) Freedom Burning: Anti-Slavery and Empire in Victorian Britain. London: 
Cornell University Press.  
Jefferson, M. (1928) ‘The Civilizing Rails’, Economic Geography 4: 217-231.  
Jenkins, J. (2004) ‘German Orientalism: Introduction’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 24 (2): 97-100. 
Jones, L. and Sage, D. (2010) ‘New directions in critical geopolitics: an introduction. With 
contributions of: Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Jennifer Hyndman, Fraser MacDonald, Emily Gilbert 
and Virginie Mamadouh’, GeoJournal 75 (4): 315-325.  
296 
 
Kapferer, J. (2004) ‘City, community, nation, state: Participation and spectacle’, Social 
Analysis 48 (3): 108-125.  
Kapp, E. (1877) Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik. Braunschweig: Westermann.  
Kearns, G. (1993) ‘Prologue: fin de siècle geopolitics: Mackinder, Hobson and theories of 
global closure’, in: Taylor, P.J; ed. (1993) The Political Geography of the Twentieth 
Century. London: Belhaven Press. 
Kearns, G. (2008) ‘Progressive Geopolitics’, Geography Compass 2 (5): 1599-1620.  
Kearns, G. (2009) Geopolitics and Empire: The Legacy of Halford Mackinder. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Kearns, G. (2010) ‘Geography, geopolitics and Empire’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers 35 (2): 187-203.  
Kearns, G. (2013) ‘Beyond the Legacy of Mackinder’, Geopolitics 18 (4): 917-932.  
Kearns, G. (2014) ‘”Up to the Sun and Down to the Centre”: The Utopian Moment in 
Anticolonial Nationalism’, Historical Geography 42: 130-151. 
Kennedy, P.M. (1974) The Samoan Tangle: A Study in Anglo-German-American Relations 
1878-1900. Dublin: Irish University Press.  
Kennedy, P.M. (1980) Rise of the Anglo-German antagonism. London: Allen and Unwin.  
Kent, S.K. (2015) Queen Victoria: Gender and Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Kelly, J.B. (1968) Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880. London: Clarendon.  
Kern, S. ([1983] 2003) The culture of time and space 1880-1918. London: Harvard 
University Press.  
Khairallah, S. (1991) Railways in the Middle East, 1856-1948 (Political and Economic 
Background). Beirut: Librarie du Liban.   
297 
 
Khoury, D.R. and Kennedy, D.K. (2007) ‘Comparing Empires: The Ottoman Domains and 
the British Raj in the Long Nineteenth Century’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East 27 (2): 233-244. 
Kitchin, R. and Dodge, M. (2007) ‘Rethinking maps’, Progress in Human Geography 31 
(3): 331-344.  
Kong, L. and Yeoh, B.S.A. (1997) ‘The construction of national identity through the 
production of ritual and spectacle: An analysis of National Day parades in Singapore’, 
Political Geography 16 (3): 213-239.  
Koopman, S. (2011) ‘Alter-geopolitics: Other securities are happening’, Geoforum 42 (3): 
274-284.  
Kraska, J. (2011) Maritime Power and the Law of the Sea: Expeditionary Operations in 
World Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Kraxberger, B.M. (2005) ‘The United States and Africa: Shifting Geopolitics in an “Age of 
Terror”’, Africa Today 52 (1): 47-68.  
Kumar, R. (1962) '2. The Records of the Government of India on the Berlin-Baghdad 
Railway Question', The Historical Journal 5 (1): 70-79. 
Kumar, R. (1965) India and the Persian Gulf Region, 1858-1907: A Study in British 
Imperial Policy. London: Asia Publishing House.  
Kuus, M. (2013) ‘Foreign Policy and Ethnography: A Sceptical Intervention’, Geopolitics 
18 (1): 115-131.  
Lambert, D. and Lester, A; eds. (2006) Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial 
Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Lampe, J. (1996) Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Lawson, C. (2010) ‘Technology and the Extension of Human Capabilities’, Journal for the 
Theory of Social Behaviour 40 (2): 207-223. 
298 
 
Lehmann, P.N. (2016) ‘Infinite Power to Change the World: Hydroelectricity and 
Engineered Climate Change in the Atlantropa Project’, The American Historical Review 
121 (1): 70-100. 
Lem, S. (2013) Summa Technologiae. Minneapolis: Minneapolis University Press.  
Lester, A. (2006) ‘Imperial Circuits and Networks: Geographies of the British Empire’, 
History Compass 4 (1): 124-141.  
Lester, A. (2012) ‘Personifying colonial governance: George Arthur and the transition 
from humanitarian to development discourse’, Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 102: 1468-1488. 
Lewis, M.W. and Wigen, K. (1997) The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography. 
London: University of California Press.  
Lin, W. (2013) ‘A geopolitics of (im)mobility?’, Political Geography 36: A1-A3.  
Livingstone, D.N. (2014) Dealing with Darwin. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.  
Lloyd, A.B. (1977) ‘Necho and the Red Sea: Some Considerations’, The Journal of 
Egyptian Archaeology 63: 142-155.  
Lockhart, J.G. and Woodhouse, C.M. (1963) Rhodes. London: Hodder and Stoughton.  
Lorimer, H. (2009) ‘Caught in the Nick of Time: Archives and Fieldwork’, in: DeLyser, D; 
Herbert, S; Aitken, S; Crang, M. and McDowell, L; eds. (2009) The Sage Handcook of 
Qualitative Geography. London: Sage. 
Lubenow, W.C. (2015) ‘Only Connect’: Learned Societies in Nineteenth-Century Britain. 
Woodbridge: Boydell Press.  
Lunn, J. (1992) ‘The Political Economy of Primary Railway Construction in the Rhodesias, 
1880-1911’ The Journal of African History 33: 239-254. 
Lunn, J. (1997) Capital and Labour on the Rhodesian Railway System 1888-1947. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
299 
 
Luque-Ayala, A. and Marvin, S. (2016) ‘The maintenance of urban circulation: An 
operational logic of infrastructural control’ Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 34 (2): 191-208. 
MacDonald, F. (2006) ‘Geopolitics and ‘the vision thing’: regarding Britain and America’s 
first nuclear missile’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31 (1): 53-71.  
MacDonald, F. (2007) ‘Anti-Astropolitik – outer space and the orbit of geography’, 
Progress in Human Geography 31 (5): 592-615.  
MacFarlane, R.A. (2007) ‘Historiography of Selected Works on Cecil John Rhodes (1853-
1902)’, History in Africa 34: 437-446.  
Makdisi, U. (2002a) ‘After 1860: Debating Religion, Reform, and Nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (4): 601-617.  
Makdisi, U. (2002b) ‘Ottoman Orientalism’, American Historical Review 107 (3): 768-796. 
Marlowe, J. (1972) Cecil Rhodes: The Anatomy of Empire. London: Paul Elek.  
Marshall-Cornwall, J. (1965) ‘Three Soldier-Geographers’, The Geographical Journal 131 
(3): 357-365.  
Martins, H. (1993) ‘Hegel, Texas: Issues in the philosophy and sociology of technology’, 
in: Martins, H; ed. (1993) Knowledge and Passion: Essays in Honour of John Rex. London: 
IB Tauris. 
Mayell, P. (2004) ‘Beyond the ‘Outer Crescent’: the Mackinder century in New Zealand 
geopolitics’, The Geographical Journal 170 (4): 368-376.  
Mayhew, R. (2000) ‘Mackinder’s ‘new’ political geography and the geographical 
tradition’, Political Geography 19 (6): 771-791. 
Maylam, P. (1980) Rhodes, the Tswana, and the British: colonialism, collaboration, and 
conflict in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885-1899. Westport, Conn: Greenwood 
Press.  
Mbembe J. A. (2001) On the postcolony. Berkeley, University of California Press. 
300 
 
McCracken, J. (2012) A History of Malawi, 1859-1966. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer.  
Mcfarlane, T. and Hay, I. (2003) ‘The battle for Seattle: protest and popular geopolitics in 
The Australian newspaper’, Political Geography 22: 211-213.  
McGeachan, C. (2013) ‘Needles, Picks and an Intern Named Laing: Exploring Psychiatric 
Spaces of Army Life’, Journal of Historical Geography 40: 67-78.  
McGeachan, C. (2016) ‘Historical Geography II: Traces Remain’, Progress in Human 
Geography DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132516651762 
McGregor, J. (2003) ‘The Victoria Falls 1900-1940: Landscape, Tourism and the 
Geographical Imagination’, Journal of Southern Studies 29 (3): 717-737.  
McKale, D.M. (1997) ‘The Kaiser’s Spy’: Max von Oppenheim and the Anglo-German 
Rivalry Before and During the First World War’, European History Quarterly 27 (2): 199-
219. 
McMeekin, S. (2011) The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's 
Bid for World Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
McMurray, J.S. (2001) Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the Construction 
of the Baghdad Railway. Westport Conn: Greenwood Publishing Group.  
Megoran, N. and Sharapova, S; eds. (2013) Central Asia in international relations: the 
legacies of Halford Mackinder. London: Hurst.  
Megoran, N. (2004) ‘Revisiting the ‘pivot’: the influence of Halford Mackinder on analysis 
of Uzbekistan’s international relations’, The Geographical Journal 170 (4): 347-358.  
Megoran, N. (2010a) ‘Neoclassical geopolitics’, Political Geography 29: 187-189.  
Megoran, N. (2010b) ‘Towards a geography of peace: pacific geopolitics and evangelical 
Christian Crusade apologies’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 35 (3): 
382-398. 
Megoran, N. (2011) ‘War and peace? An agenda for peace research and practice in 
geography’, Political Geography 30: 178-189. 
301 
 
Merrington, P. (2001) ‘A Staggered Orientalism: The Cape-to-Cairo Imaginary’, Poetics 
Today 22: 323-364.  
Merrington, P. (2002) ‘Cape-to-Cairo: Africa in Masonic Fantasy’, in: Harper, G; ed. 
(2002) Comedy, Fantasy and Colonialism. London: Continuum.  
Merrington, P. (2009) ‘Loyal Memory: The Tercentenary in Colonial Cape Town’, in: 
Bradshaw, G; Bishop, T.G. and Wright, L; eds. (2009) The Shakespearean International 
Handbook 9: Special section, South African Shakespeare in the Twentieth Century. 
Farnham: Ashgate.   
Meyer, H.C. (1955) Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff. 
Michail, E. (2011) The British and the Balkans: Forming Images of Foreign Lands, 1900-
1950. London: Continuum.  
Mikhail, A. and Philliou, C.M. (2012) ‘The Ottoman Empire and the Imperial Turn’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 54 (4): 721-745. 
Miller, N.J. (1988) ‘R.W. Seton-Watson and Serbia during the Re-emergence of 
Yugoslavism, 1903-1914’, Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 15 (1-2): 59-69.  
Mills, S. (2013) ‘Cultural-Historical Geographies of the Archive: Fragments, Objects and 
Ghosts’, Geography Compass 7 (10): 701-713.  
Mitcham, C. (1994) Thinking through technology: the path between engineering and 
philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Monaghan, J. (2013) ‘Mounties in the frontier: Circulations, anxieties, and myths of 
settler colonial policing in Canada’ Journal of Canadian Studies 47: 122-148. 
Monmonier, M. (1996) How to Lie with Maps. London: University of Chicago Press.  
Moore, F.P.L. (2010) ‘Tales from the Archive: Methodological and Ethical Issues in 
Historical Geography Research’, Area 42 (3): 262-270.  
Morgan, G. (1981) Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810-1895. London: Cass.  
302 
 
Müller, M. (2012) ‘Opening the Black Box of the Organization: Socio-Material Practices 
of Geopolitical Ordering’, Political Geography 31 (6): 379-388.  
Müller, S.M. and Tworek, H.J.S. (2016) ‘Imagined Use as a category of analysis: new 
approaches to the history of technology’, History and Technology 32 (2): 105-119.  
Munro, J.F. (2003) Maritime Enterprise and Empire: Sir William Mackinnon and His 
Business Network, 1823-1893. Woodbridge: Boydell Press.  
Murphy, D.T. (1997) The Heroic Earth: geopolitical thought in Weimar Germany 1918-
1933. Kent: Kent State University Press.  
Neilson, K. (2014) ‘1914: The German War?’, European History Quarterly 44 (3): 395-418.   
Neuman, W. (2006) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 
Boston: Pearson.  
Neumann, I.B. (2012) At Home with the Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry. 
London: Cornell University Press.  
Newbury, C. (1981) ‘Out of the pit: The capital accumulation of Cecil Rhodes’, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 10 (1): 25-49.  
O’Hara, S. and Heffernan, M. (2006) ‘From Geo-Strategy to Geo-Economics: The 
‘Heartland’ and British Imperialism Before and After Mackinder’, Geopolitics 11 (1): 54-
73.  
Oliver, R.A. (1957) Sir Harry Johnston & the Scramble for Africa. London: Chatto & 
Windus.  
Omissi, D. (1990) Air power and colonial control: the Royal Air Force, 1919-1939. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Onley, J. (2005) ‘Britain’s Informal Empire in the Gulf, 1820-1971’, Journal of Social 
Affairs 22: 29-45.  
Onley, J. (2007) The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British 
in the Nineteenth Century Gulf. Oxford: OUP.  
303 
 
Onorato, M.G; Scheve, K. and Stasavage, D. (2014) ‘Technology and the Era of the Mass 
Army’, The Journal of Economic History 74 (2): 449-481.  
Otte, T.G. (2005) ‘Wee-ah-wee’? Britain at Weihaiwei, 1898-1930’, in: Kennedy, G; ed. 
(2005) British Naval Strategy East of Suez 1900-2000: Influences and actions. London: 
Taylor and Francis. 
Otte, T.G. (2014) July Crisis: the world’s descent into war, summer 1914. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Ó Tuathail, G. and Agnew, J. (1992) ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical geopolitical 
reasoning in American foreign policy’, Political Geography 11 (2): 190-204.  
O’Tuathail, G. and Luke, T. (2000) ‘Thinking geopolitical space: the spatiality of war, 
speed and vision in the work of Paul Virilio’, in: Crang, M. and Thrift, N; eds. (2000) 
Thinking Space. London: Routledge. 
Ó Tuathail, G. (1986) ‘Political geography of contemporary events VIII the language and 
nature of the ‘new geopolitics’ – the case of US-El Salvador relations’, Political 
Geography Quarterly 5 (1): 73-85.  
Ó Tuathail, G. (1992) ‘Putting Mackinder in his place: Material transformations and 
myth’, Political Geography 11 (1): 100-118.  
Ó Tuathail, G. (1996) Critical Geopolitics. London: Routledge.  
Ó Tuathail, G. (1999) ‘Understanding critical geopolitics: Geopolitics and risk society’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies 22 (2-3): 107-124.  
Ó Tuathail, G. (2002) ‘Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United 
States’ Response to the War in Bosnia’, Political Geography 21 (5): 601-628.  
Ó Tuathail, G. (2005) ‘Geopolitics’, in: Sibley, D; Jackson, P; Atkinson, D. and 
Washbourne, N; eds. (2005) Cultural Geography: A Critical Dictionary of Key Concepts. 
London: IB Tauris.  
304 
 
Oxford English Dictionary [OED] (2017) ‘trans-, prefix’ [online] Available at: 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/204575?rskey=6QGzrD&result=3&isAdvanced=false#
eid> [Last accessed 17/05/2017] 
Paice, E. (2001) Lost Lion of Empire: The Life of ‘Cape-to-Cairo’ Grogan. London: Harper 
Collins. 
Pain, R. (2009) ‘Globalized fear? Towards an emotional geopolitics’, Progress in Human 
Geography 33 (4): 466-486.  
Pakenham, T. (1992) The Scramble for Africa. London: Abacus.  
Pande, R; Jeffrey, A; Megoran, N. and Young, R. (2012) ‘Connecting lectures to current 
affairs: the ‘letters to newspapers’ assignment’, Journal of Geography in Higher 
Education 37 (2): 220-229.  
Péter, L. (2004) ‘R.W. Seton-Watson’s Changing Views on the National Questions of the 
Habsburg Monarchy and the European Balance of Power’, Slavonic and Eastern 
European Review 82 (3): 655-679.  
Peterson, J.E. (2009) ‘Britain and the Gulf: At the Periphery of Empire’, in: Potter, L; ed. 
(2009) The Persian Gulf in History. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Petts, J; Owens, S. and Bulkeley, H. (2008) ‘Crossing boundaries: Interdisciplinarity in the 
context of urban environments’, Geoforum 39 (2): p.593-601. 
Phimister, I.R. (1974) ‘Rhodes, Rhodesia, and the Rand’, Journal of Southern Africa 
Studies 1 (1): 74-90. 
Pickles, J. (2004) A History of Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping and the Geo-coded 
World. London: Routledge. 
Pinkerton, A. and Dodds, K. (2008) ‘Radio geopolitics: broadcasting, listening and the 
struggle for acoustic spaces’, Progress in Human Geography 33 (1): 1-27.  
Pinkerton, A. (2008) ‘A new kind of imperialism? The BBC, cold war broadcasting and the 
contested geopolitics of south asia’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 28 
(4): 537-555.  
305 
 
Pirie, G. (1993) ‘Slaughter by Steam: Railway Subjugation of Ox-Wagon Transport in the 
Eastern Cape and Transkei, 1886-1910’, The International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 26: 319-343.  
Pomeranz, K. (2005) ‘Empire & ‘Civilizing’ Missions, Past & Present’, Daedalus 134 (2): 
34-45.  
Popke, E.J. (1994) ‘Recasting geopolitics: the discursive scripting of the International 
Monetary Fund’, Political Geography 13 (3): 255-269.  
Power, M. and Campbell, D. (2010) ‘The State of Critical Geopolitics’, Political Geography 
29 (5): 243-246.  
Prior, A (2012) British Mapping of Africa: Publishing Histories of Imperial Cartography, 
c.1880-c.1915. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh.  
Prpa-Jovanović, B. (2000) ‘The Making of Yugoslavia: 1830-1945’, in: Udovički, J. and 
Ridgeway, J; eds. (2000) Burn This House. The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 
Quataert, D. (2003) ‘Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes towards the 
Notion of “Decline”’, History Compass 1 (1): 1-9.  
Quataert, D. (2005) The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Radford, K. (2013a) ‘Curzon’s Cruise: The Pomp and Circumstances of Indian Indirect 
Rule of the Persian Gulf’, The International History Review 35 (4): 884-904. 
Radford, K. (2013b) Exalted Order: Muslim Princes and the British Empire, 1874-1906. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. York University, Canada.  
Ramutsindela, M. (2007) Transfrontier conservation in Africa: at the confluence of 
capital, politics, and nature. Wallingford, England: CABI Pub.  
Raphael, L.A.C. (1936) The Cape-to-Cairo Dream: A study in British imperialism. New 
York: Colombia University Press.  
306 
 
Rash, F. (2011) ‘Images of the Self and Other in Paul Rohrbach’s ‘German Idea’’, Patterns 
of Prejudice 45 (5): 381-397.  
Rech, M.F. (2014) ‘Be Part of the Story: A popular geopolitics of war comics aesthetics 
and Royal Air Force recruitment’, Political Geography 39: 36-47. 
Rech, M.F. (2015) ‘A critical geopolitics of observant practice at British military 
airshows’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 40 (4): 536-548.  
Revill, G. (2012) Railway. London: Reaktion.  
Roberts, B. (1987) Cecil Rhodes. London: Penguin.  
Robertson, R. (2006) ‘Civilization’, Theory Culture and Society 23 (2-3): 421-427.  
Robinson, R. (1972) ‘Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for a 
theory of collaboration’, in: Owen, R. and Sutcliffe, R.B; eds. (1972) Studies in the theory 
of imperialism. Harlow: Longman. 
Robinson, R. (1991) ‘Introduction: Railway Imperialism’, in: Davis, C.B. and Wilburn Jr., 
K.E. (1991) Railway Imperialism. Westport Conn: Greenwood Press. 
Röhl, J.C.G. (2005) Wilhelm II: The Kaiser’s Personal Monarchy, 1888-1900. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Rose, G. (2000) ‘Practising photography: an archive, a study, some photographs and a 
researcher’, Journal of Historical Geography 26 (4): 555-571.  
Rotberg, R.I. and Shore, M.F. (1988) The Founder: Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Rotberg, R.I. (1986) ‘Cecil Rhodes in the cotton fields’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 9 (3): 
288-305. 
Routledge, P. (1998) ‘Anti-Geopolitics: Introduction’, in: Ó Tuathail, G; Dalby, S. and 
Routledge, P; eds. (1998) The Geopolitics Reader. New York: Routledge.   
Ryan, M. and Alexander, R. (1973) ‘Focus on Lifetime Leisure Activities #3: Billiards’, 
Journal of Health, Physical Education, Recreation 44 (4): 29.  
307 
 
Said, E. ([1978] 2003) Orientalism. London: Penguin.  
Salter, M. (2013) ‘To Make Move and Let Stop: Mobility and the Assemblage of 
Circulation’ Mobilities 8: 7-19.  
Sauer, C.O. and Leighly, J. (1963) Land and Life: A Selection from the Writings of Carl 
Ortwin Sauer. London: University of California Press.  
Schivelbusch, W. (1986) The Railway Journey: The Industrialization of Time and Space in 
the 19th Century. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Schoenberg, P.E. (1977) ‘The Evolution of Transport in Turkey (Eastern Thrace and Asia 
Minor) under Ottoman Rule, 1856-1918’, Middle Eastern Studies 13 (3): 359-372. 
Schwantz, W.G; ed. (2004) Germany and the Middle East, 1871-1945. Princeton: Markus 
Wiener. 
Schwartz, J.M. and Cook, T. (2002) ‘Archives, Records, and Power: The Making of 
Modern Memory’, Archival Science 2 (1-2): 1-19.  
Scott, M. (2012) What were the imaginative geographies of the Balkans produced in 
Britain during the years 1914-1921? Unpublished BA Dissertation, Newcastle University.  
Scully, R. (2012) ‘Constructing the Colossus: the Origins of Linley Sambourne’s Greatest 
Punch Cartoon’, International Journal of Comic Art 14 (2): 120-142.  
Seton-Watson, H. and Seton-Watson, C. (1981) The making of a new Europe: R.W. Seton-
Watson and the last years of Austria-Hungary. London: Methuen.  
Sharp, J. (2011) ‘Subaltern geopolitics: Introduction’, Geoforum 42 (3): 271-273.  
Shaw, I.G.R. (2013) ‘Predator empire: the geopolitics of U.S. drone warfare’, Geopolitics 
18 (3): 536-559.  
Shaw, J. and Sidaway, J.D. (2010) ‘Making links: On (re)engaging with transport and 
transport geography’, Progress in Human Geography 35 (4): 502-520.  
Showalter, D.E. (1975) Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology and the Unification of 
Germany. Connecticut: The Shoe String Press. 
308 
 
Sidaway, J. (1994) ‘Geopolitics, geography, and ‘terrorism’ in the Middle East’, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (3): 357-372.  
Sidaway, J. (1998) ‘What is in a Gulf?: From the ‘arc of crisis’ to the Gulf War’, in: Ó 
Tuathail, G. and Dalby, S; eds. (1998) Rethinking Geopolitics. London: Routledge. 
Sidaway, J. (2001) ‘Iraq/Yugoslavia: Banal Geopolitics’, Antipode 33 (4): 466-486.  
Simms, B. (2013) Europe: the struggle for supremacy, 1453 to the present. London: Allen 
Lane.  
Slater, D. (2004) Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell.  
Sloan, G. (1999) ‘Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland theory then and now’, Journal 
of Strategic Studies 22 (2-3): 15-38.  
Smith, N. (2003) American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to 
Globalization. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Sneddon, C. and Fox, C. (2011) ‘The Cold War, the US Bureau of Reclamation, and the 
technopolitics of river basin development, 1950-1970’, Political Geography 30 (8): 450-
460.  
Sneddon, C. and Fox, C. (2012) ‘Water, Geopolitics, and Economic Development in the 
Conceptualization of a Region’, Eurasian Geography and Economics 53 (1): 143-160. 
Sneddon, C. (2012) ‘The ‘sinew of development’: Cold War geopolitics, technical 
expertise, and water resource development in Southeast Asia, 1954-1975’, Social Studies 
of Science 42: 564-590. 
Somerwil-Ayrton, K. (2007) The train that disappeared into history: the Berlin-to-
Baghdad railway and how it led to the Great War. Soesterberg: Aspekt. 
Speller, I. (2003) The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defense Policy. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave.  
309 
 
Springer, S. (2013) ‘Anarchism and Geography: A Brief Genealogy of Anarchist 
Geographies’, Geography Compass 7 (1): 46-60.  
Spykman, N. (1938) ‘Geography and Foreign Policy II’, American Political Science Review 
32: 213-236.  
Squire, V. (2015) ‘Reshaping critical geopolitics? The materialist challenge’, Review of 
International Studies 41: 139-159.  
Steinberg, P. and Kristoffersen, B. (2017) ‘‘The ice edge is lost...nature moved it’: 
mapping ice as state practice in the Canadian and Norwegian North’, Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers DOI: 10.1111/tran.12184 
Steinert, D. (2016) ‘Taking Stock of Extension Theory of Technology’, Philosophy and 
Technology 29 (1): 61-78. 
Stevenson, D. (1999) ‘War by Timetable? The Railway Race before 1914’, Past & Present 
162: 163-194.  
Strage, M. (1973) Cape to Cairo: rape of a continent. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich.  
Strong, J.W. (1965) ‘Russia’s Plans for an Invasion of India in 1801’, Canadian Slavonic 
Papers 7 (1): 114-126. 
Sturm, T. (2013) ‘The future of religious geopolitics: towards a research and theory 
agenda’, Area 45 (2): 134-140.  
Sweet, D.W. (1977) ‘Great Britain and Germany, 1905-1911’, in: Hinsley, F.H. (1977) 
British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Symonds, R. (1986) Oxford and empire: the last lost cause? London: Macmillan.  
Tabor, G. (2003) The Cape to Cairo Railway and River Routes. London: Genta.  
Taylor, A.J.P. (1969) War by Timetable: How the First World War began. London: 
MacDonald & Co. 
310 
 
Taylor, G.P. (1971) ‘VII. Cecil Rhodes and the Second Home Rule Bill’, The Historical 
Journal 14 (4): 771-781.  
Thrift, N. (2000) ‘It’s the little things’, in: Dodds, K. and Atkinson, D; eds. (2000) 
Geopolitical traditions: a century of geopolitical thought. New York: Routledge.   
Todorova, M. (1997) Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Toulmin, S. (1990) Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
Trafton, S. (2004) Egypt Land: Race and nineteenth-century American Egyptomania. 
London: Duke University Press.  
Trumpener, U. (1984) ‘Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire’, in: Kent, M; ed. 
(1984) The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire. Hemel Hempstead: 
George Allen & Unwin Publishers. 
Tunander, O. (2001) ‘Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century: Rudolf Kjellén’s 
‘The State as a Living Organism’’, Review of International Studies 27 (3): 451-463.  
Udovički, J. (2000) ‘The Bonds and the Fault Lines’, in: Udovički, J. and Ridgeway, J; eds. 
(2000) Burn This House. The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Usher, M. (2014) ‘Veins of Concrete, Cities of Flow: Reasserting the Centrality of 
Circulation in Foucault’s Analytics of Government’, Mobilities 9: 550-569.  
Väliaho, P. (2008) ‘Bodies Outside In: On Cinematic Organ Projection’, Parallax 14 (2): 7-
19. 
Van Creveld, M. (1977) Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Van Den Eede, Y. (2014) ‘Extending “Extension”: A Reappraisal of the Technology-as-
Extension Idea through the Case of Self-Tracking Technologies’, in: Weiss, D.M; Propen, 
A.D. and Reid, C.E; eds. (2014) Design, Mediation, and the Posthuman. London: 
Lexington Books. 
311 
 
van der Wusten, H. and Dijkink, G. (2002) 'German, British and French Geopolitics: The 
Enduring Differences', Geopolitics 7 (3): 19-38. 
Venier, P. (2004) ‘The geographical pivot of history and early twentieth century 
geopolitical culture’, The Geographical Journal 170 (4): 330-336.  
Vevier, C. (1960) ‘American Continentalism: An Idea of Expansion, 1845-1910’, American 
Historical Review 65 (2): 323-335.  
Virilio, P. (2002) Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light. London: Bloomsbury.  
Virilio, P. (2005) Negative Horizon. London: Continuum.  
Young, R.J.C. (2005) Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. London: 
Routledge.  
Waltz, K.N. (1959) Man, the state and war: a theoretical analysis. New York: University 
of Colombia Press.  
Warf, B. (2008) Time-space compression historical geographies. Hoboken: Taylor and 
Francis. 
Weber, C. (2014) International relations theory: A critical introduction. London: 
Routledge.  
Weitz, E.D. (2013) ‘Germany and the Ottoman Borderlands: The Entwining of Imperial 
Aspirations, Revolution, and Ethnic Violence’, in: Bartov, O. and Weitz, E.D; eds. (2013) 
Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and 
Ottoman Borderlands. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Weir, P. (2014) ‘Radio Geopolitics’, Geography Compass 8 (12): 849-859.  
Wilburn, K. (1997) ‘The Drifts Crisis, the ‘missing telegrams’, and the Jameson Raid: A 
centennial review’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 25 (2): 219-239.  
Williams, A.J. (2005) Aviation technogeopolitics and the materialisation of the Pacific as 
United States space, 1918-1941. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Hull.  
312 
 
Williams, A.J. (2007) ‘Hakumat al Tayarrat: the role of air power in the enforcement of 
Iraq’s borders’, Geopolitics 12 (3): 505-528. 
Williams, A.J. (2010) ‘Flying the flag: Pan American Airways and the projection of US 
power across the interwar Pacific’, in: MacDonald, F; Hughes, R. and Dodds, K; eds. 
(2010) Observant States: geopolitics and visual culture. London: IB Tauris. 
Williams, A.J. (2011) 'Reconceptualising spaces of the air: performing the multiple 
spatialities of UK military airspaces', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 
36 (2): 253-267. 
Williams, A.J. (2013) ‘Re-orientating Vertical Geopolitics’ Geopolitics 18 (1): 225-246.  
Williams, A.J. (2017) ‘Aircraft carriers and the capacity to mobilise US power across the 
Pacific, 1919-1929’, Journal of Historical Geography DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2017.07.008 
Williams, R[aymond]. (1983) Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. New York: 
Oxford University Press.  
Withers, C.W.J. (2009) ‘Place and the ‘spatial turn’ in geography and in history’, Journal 
of the History of Ideas 70: 637-665.  
Wood, D. and Fels, J. (2008) The Natures of Maps: Cartographic Constructions of the 
Natural World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Wood, S. (2013) ‘Prestige in world politics: History, theory, expression’, International 
Politics 50 (3): 387-411.  
Woodward, R. and Jenkings, K.N. (2012) ‘”This place isn’t worth the left boot of one of 
our boys”: Geopolitics, militarism and memoirs of the Afghanistan war’, Political 
Geography 31 (8): 495-508.  
Woodward, R; Winter, T. and Jenkings, K.N. (2009) ‘Heroic anxieties: the figure of the 
British soldier in contemporary print media’, Journal of War and Culture Studies 2 (2): 
211-233.  
313 
 
Wokoeck, U. (2009) German Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Islam from 
1800 to 1945. London: Routledge. 
Wolf, J.B. ([1936] 1973) The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad. New York: 
Octagon Books. 
Wolkersdorfer, G. (1999) 'Karl Haushofer and geopolitics - the history of a German 
mythos', Geopolitics 4 (3): 145-160. 
Wolmar, C. (2009) Blood, Iron and Gold: How the Railways Transformed the World. 
London: Atlantic Books.  
Wolmar, C. (2010) Engines of War: How Wars Were Won & Lost on the Railways. 
London: Atlantic Books.  
Wylie, J. (2006a) ‘Depths and Folds: On Landscape and the Gazing Subject’, Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 24 (4): 519-535.  
Wylie, J. (2006b) ‘Poststructuralist theories, critical methods and experimentation’, in: 
Aitken, S. and Valentine, G; eds. (2006) Approaches to Human Geography. London: Sage. 
Yasamee, F.A.K. (1998) ‘Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz and the rebirth of the Ottoman 
Empire’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 9 (2): 91-128. 
Ze’evi, D. (2004) ‘Back to Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the 
Middle East’, Mediterranean Historical Review 19 (1): 73-94. 
Zins, H. (1999) ‘International context of the creation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
in 1885’, Africana Bulletin 47: 54-62.  
 
